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This dissertation examines British policy in Afghanistan between 1864 and 1879, with 
particular emphasis on Sir John Lawrence’s term as governor-general and viceroy of 
India (1864-69). Having achieved national renown for his exploits in the Punjab during 
the Indian Mutiny, as governor-general Sir John (later first Baron) Lawrence became 
synonymous with a particular line of foreign policy in Afghanistan, commonly referred 
to by contemporaries as ‘masterly inactivity’. His tenure at Calcutta coincided with a 
critical period in Anglo-Afghan relations, on account of a protracted civil war in 
Afghanistan and the renewal of Russian military advances in central Asia. This 
dissertation explains why government ministers granted Lawrence so much latitude for 
formulating British policy and what motivated his ‘masterly inactivity’, an alluring 
although misleading expression. A central concern is the extent to which public 
criticism in Britain influenced Lawrence’s decisions in India. Some of the constraints on 
policy-makers are also explored, including contemporary perceptions about the 
importance of ‘prestige’ to the control of India. In addition, the thesis considers some of 
the domestic effects of British imperialism, by reference to Lawrence’s public criticism 
of government policy before the second Afghan war, and by analysing metropolitan 
reaction to the murder of the British envoy at Kabul in 1879. His utility to parliamentary 
Liberals and prominence in public discussion about Afghanistan in 1878 demonstrate 
that—after nearly a lifetime on the imperial ‘periphery’—Lawrence ultimately exerted a 
considerable influence on politics in the imperial metropolis.   
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A portrait of Sir John Lawrence (by George Frederic Watts; oil on panel, 1862) is 
currently displayed at the National Portrait Gallery, London (NPG 1005). 
 
4 
Table of contents 
 
Abstract          2 
Acknowledgements         5 
Introduction          6 
I.  Sir John Lawrence, the ‘saviour of India’     33 
II.     British policy in Afghanistan:  
Sir John Lawrence and official decision-making, 1864-1869  69 
III.     The pragmatism of ‘masterly inactivity’     87 
IV.     The importance of prestige: Britain, India and Abyssinia, 1867-1868 114 
V.     ‘Our Indian armies pine for war’!  
Perceptions of army officers in India, c.1864-1869    165 
VI.     The limits of ‘masterly inactivity’, 1864-1869    199 
VII.     Lord Lawrence, the Liberals and Afghanistan, c. 1878   222 
VIII.  Major Sir Louis Cavagnari,  
Afghanistan and imperialism in British culture, c.1879   259 
Conclusion          281 





I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Paul Readman, of King’s College London, 
for his invaluable advice and supervision throughout the period of my doctoral research. 
I alone am of course responsible for any shortcomings or omissions in this dissertation. 
I would also like to thank my wife Rebecca, for her constant support and 










John Lawrence, first Baron Lawrence, GCB, GCSI, PC, was a British administrator who 
worked in the Punjab, achieved national renown for his exploits during the Mutiny, and 
subsequently served as governor-general and viceroy of India for a perfect five-year 
term, from 12 January 1864 to 12 January 1869. During his tenure at Calcutta, Sir John 
Lawrence (he was not ennobled until his return to England in 1869) became 
synonymous with a particular line of British policy in Afghanistan. Contemporaries 
understood that policy as ‘masterly inactivity’, an alluring although misleading 
expression. Neglected by modern scholars, Lawrence’s approach to Afghanistan is 
worth studying, for as governor-general he had great latitude for determining policy at a 
critical juncture in Anglo-Afghan relations, when civil war in Afghanistan and Russian 
military expansion in central Asia threatened to disturb the status quo enjoyed since the 
end of the first Afghan war in 1842. Examining the formulation and motivation of his 
policy also illuminates characteristics of British imperialism, in India and at home, as 
well as some of the external influences and constraints on policy-makers. Lawrence’s 
return to public prominence in 1878, as perhaps the most conspicuous force in Liberal 
opposition to a new Afghan policy, demonstrates how a Briton from the imperial 
‘periphery’ could exert a powerful influence on public discussion and politics in the 
imperial metropolis. 
 
* * * 
 
John Laird Mair Lawrence was born at Richmond, Yorkshire, on 4 March 1811. He was 
the sixth son of Major Alexander Lawrence, of Ulster protestant stock, and his wife 
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Catherine Letitia, daughter of Reverend George Knox of Lifford, co. Donegal.1 Having 
attended schools at Bristol, Londonderry and Wiltshire, in 1827 Lawrence received a 
nomination to the East India College at Haileybury. He sailed for India in 1829, in the 
company of an elder brother, Henry, who later died in the defence of Lucknow (Sir 
Henry Montgomery Lawrence, KCB (1806-57)). After a year studying languages at 
Calcutta, John Lawrence requested a posting to Delhi, where he worked for four years 
as assistant judge, magistrate and collector. He was then given temporary charge of the 
Panipat district (north of Delhi), with responsibility for surveying its lands and assessing 
their taxation. Initially working without a British assistant, in a population of several 
hundred thousand, Lawrence ‘displayed the qualities that were to become a legend and 
a model. Riding armed through a district with a turbulent history, attired for comfort in 
a mixture of Western and Indian dress, he made himself accessible to its people, in 
patriarchal fashion, and acquired a local reputation for omniscience. He excelled in 
settlement work, spending the greater part of the year under canvas.’2 
 
Lawrence came home on extended sick leave (1840-42), following a near fatal attack of 
jungle fever. Against medical advice, he returned to India after marrying (in 1841) 
Harriette Katherine Hamilton (1820-1917), daughter of Richard Hamilton, rector of 
Culdaff, co. Donegal. In 1844 Lawrence was appointed collector of Delhi and Panipat. 
Two years later he was promoted to commissioner of the Trans-Sutlej States, territory 
acquired after the first Anglo-Sikh war. After the second Anglo-Sikh war and the 
annexation (in 1849) of the Punjab, a board was established to administer the new 
province, with Henry Lawrence at its head, supported by John and a third member. The 
                                                            
1  D. Steele, ‘Lawrence, John Laird Mair, first Baron Lawrence (1811-1879)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. Jan. 2011). 
2  Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
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brothers disagreed regarding the treatment of the defeated Sikh aristocracy. Henry 
pleaded with the governor-general, Lord Dalhousie, for the Sikhs. John favoured their 
total subjection to direct rule, believing that lower taxation and greater security for the 
peasantry would provide stronger foundations for British rule than Sikh princes and 
noblemen. Dalhousie backed the younger Lawrence: in 1853 the board was dissolved, 
Henry moved to another post, and John was promoted to chief commissioner of the 
Punjab.3 
 
John Lawrence was therefore able to implement his policy of reconciling the ‘hardy 
yeoman’ to British rule. ‘Assess low,’ he instructed a subordinate in 1853, ‘leaving fair 
and liberal margin to the occupiers of the soil, and they will increase their cultivation 
and put the revenue almost beyond the reach of bad seasons.’4 The achievements of 
Lawrence’s administration in the Punjab were considerable: a warlike population, 
predominantly Sikh and Muslim, was disarmed; roads and irrigation works were 
constructed; a police force of over twenty thousand men ‘set a standard of public order 
unequalled in the subcontinent’; within three years of annexation thuggee and dacoity 
had been eradicated; and by 1856, over three thousand schools existed, providing 
rudimentary education. In recognition of these achievements, in 1856 Lawrence was 
made KCB, on the recommendation of Lord Dalhousie.5 
 
Although Lawrence had been an unusually successful administrator in India, it was the 
Indian Mutiny (1857-58) that transformed his reputation in Britain. His exertions during 
                                                            
3 Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
4  John Lawrence to John Nicholson, 22 Jan. 1853, cited in R. Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence 
(II vols., London, 1883), vol. I, p. 394. 
5  Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. The term thuggee refers to the practices of a sort of criminal brotherhood of 
thugs, who strangled their victims before stealing their valuables and burying their bodies. The term 
dacoity refers to acts of robbery committed by armed bandits.  
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the crisis made him a national hero, acclaimed as the ‘saviour of India’ and rewarded 
with an array of official and private honours. His actions will be considered in more 
detail in chapter I, but in essence his reputation was made by his resolution and vigour 
in the Punjab. Lawrence acted quickly and boldly by disarming Bengal army regiments 
and raising large, irregular Punjabi forces to replace them. He determined that 
recapturing Delhi was more important than the safety of his own province, and pressed 
British generals to move immediately on the centre of the rising. He then drained the 
Punjab of its new troops, sending them to Delhi together with British soldiers, stores, 
and moneys extracted from Punjabi bankers and princes. Finally, Lawrence arrived in 
the old Mughal capital, was given its charge, and argued—successfully—that the 
defeated rebels should receive clemency.6  
 
Lawrence returned to England in February 1859, where he joined the secretary of state’s 
council of India. After the death of the Earl of Elgin in November 1863, Lawrence was 
appointed governor-general and viceroy of India. This was an exceptional honour for a 
commoner from within the Indian civil service. In domestic policy, he strived to 
increase tenant security and to reduce fiscal assessments imposed on Indians, confident 
that what had worked in the Punjab would succeed across the subcontinent. ‘Light 
taxation’, he told Viscount Cranborne in 1866, ‘is the panacea for foreign rule in 
India.’7 Characteristically, Lawrence viewed light taxation as a question of fairness and 
pragmatism. For if Indian yeomen were to safeguard British rule it was essential that 
they should feel palpable benefits from British administration. Lawrence therefore 
resisted calls for increasing the taxation of salt that would have disproportionately 
                                                            
6  Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’ 
7 Lawrence to Viscount Cranborne, 5 Nov. 1866, British Library, papers and correspondence of Sir 
John Laird Mair Lawrence, 1st Baron Lawrence, Mss Eur F90 (hereafter ‘Lawrence Mss’)/31, no. 48. 
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affected poorer Indians. He calculated that the excise on salt increased its price as much 
as twelvefold in the Punjab, and perhaps by eight times in the North West Provinces. 
‘The people cannot fail to see this. The general masses are wonderfully frugal, and 
bring up their families with great difficulty on their earnings.’8 In contrast, Lawrence 
was disgusted by the stance taken by many of his compatriots, who considered it their 
‘prerogative while in India to pay no taxation at all.’ He characterised the non-official 
British community in India as ‘birds of passage’, rushing to amass wealth as quickly as 
possible with no care for what happened after their departure.9 Such was Lawrence’s 
conviction that light taxation was ‘the panacea for foreign rule in India’ that he even 
preferred reducing the British garrison to increasing taxation, believing that lower 
assessments provided more effective security than additional soldiers. There should of 
course be limits to such troop reductions, as he warned the secretary of state in 1867: 
‘[i]nfantry should never be allowed to fall below a certain strength: they are the sinews 
of our power.’10 
 
In foreign policy, Lawrence was confronted by a war of succession in Afghanistan, 
following the death in 1863 of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan, and by the renewal of 
Russian military advances in central Asia. ‘I frankly confess that I cannot’, he wrote on 
the eve of his departure from India, ‘see the formidable character of the danger with 
which we are said to be threatened by the presence of the Russians in Central Asia’. 
Lawrence could however perceive ‘much real danger to which we are exposed from 
various circumstances within our own borders in India, more particularly if we adopt a 
                                                            
8  Lawrence to Viscount Cranborne, 16 Sept. 1866, Lawrence Mss/31, no. 35. 
9  Lawrence to Sir Stafford Northcote, 14 May 1867, Lawrence Mss/32A, no. 30. 
10  Lawrence to Sir Charles Wood, 18 Sept. 1865 (2), Lawrence Mss/30, no.55. Lawrence to Cranborne, 
19 Jan. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32A, no. 6. 
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policy in Affghanistan from which it may prove difficult hereafter to recede.’11 
Lawrence’s concern for internal threats to security recognised the dangers of increasing 
taxation (which active interference in Afghanistan would require), and the emergence of 
a new Indian élite who would soon ‘chafe for want of an outlet for their energies.’12 His 
reluctance to interfere in the Afghan civil war was criticised in several publications in 
Britain, by writers apparently disturbed by the progress of Russia. In order to counter 
such criticism, Lawrence instructed one of his subordinates to defend his foreign policy 
in a British periodical. This was the genesis of an article published anonymously in the 
Edinburgh Review of January 1867, in which the author declared that Lawrence’s 
opinions with respect to Russia ‘tend clearly towards the conclusion which the quietists 
would advocate—a masterly inactivity.’13 This seems to have been the first usage of 
‘masterly inactivity’.14 
 
Having completed his five-year term as governor-general, Lawrence returned to 
England in January 1869. In April 1869 he was created Baron Lawrence of the Punjaub 
and of Grateley.15 He returned to public prominence—briefly but significantly—as a 
leading critic of the Conservative government’s Afghan policy in the months preceding 
the second Afghan war (1878-81). Lord Lawrence died on 27 June 1879, and was 
buried in Westminster Abbey.  
                                                            
11 Memorandum by Sir John Lawrence, 25 Nov. 1868, Correspondence respecting the relations between 
the British Government and that of Afghanistan since the accession of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan, 
Parliamentary Papers 1878-79 [C.2190] (hereafter, ‘Afghanistan Correspondence’), no. 14, Enclosure 
4, p. 61. 
12  Lawrence to Cranborne, 4 Oct. 1866, Lawrence Mss/31, no. 39. 
13 [J.W.S. Wyllie], ‘Foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence’, Edinburgh Review, CXXV (Jan. 1867), 44. 
The motivation and argument of this article will be examined in detail in chapter VI. J.W.S. Wyllie 
was under-secretary in the Foreign Department of the government of India. 
14  Contemporaries understood ‘masterly inactivity’ to mean calmness in the face of Russian advances in 
central Asia, and a reluctance to interfere outside the existing frontiers of India. The term was often 
used in praise of Lawrence’s Afghan policy, but also in criticism.  




Victorian biographies  
In the thirteen years following his death, five full-length biographies of Lawrence were 
published, together with several shorter sketches.16 Three of his biographers—Robert 
Cust, Sir Richard Temple and Sir Charles Aitchison—had worked with Lawrence in the 
Punjab administration and afterwards. These men did not write critical appraisals of 
their former chief. Cust explicitly acknowledged Lawrence as ‘my model, my friend, 
and my master’ and dedicated his book to the memory of his subject.17 The official 
biographer chosen by Lawrence’s family was not however a fellow Punjab official. 
Reginald Bosworth Smith had in fact never visited India, and only met his subject 
around 1878. A Harrow schoolmaster and classical scholar, Bosworth Smith spent three 
years researching Lawrence’s papers and in meetings with his former colleagues. The 
biography was published in two volumes in February 1883, and enjoyed an enthusiastic 
reception. It was subsequently translated into Urdu and widely read in India.18 The 
success of Bosworth Smith’s Life of Lord Lawrence is understandable. It is a 
comprehensive account, covering over one thousand pages, and incorporates 
voluminous extracts from Lawrence’s correspondence. The combination of Bosworth 
Smith’s sympathetic, elegant prose with his subject’s more direct writing is successful, 
and it remains the essential account of Lawrence’s life. 
 
                                                            
16 L.J. Trotter, Lord Lawrence: A Sketch of his Public Career (London, 1880); R.N. Cust, ‘The great 
proconsul’, in R.N. Cust, Pictures of Indian Life. Sketched with the pen from 1852 to 1881 (London, 
1881), pp. 244-69; Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence; R. Temple, Lord Lawrence (London, 
1889); J.J. Ellis, Lord Lawrence (London, 1891); C. Aitchison, Lord Lawrence (Oxford, 1892). 
17 Robert Cust worked in the Indian civil service and first met Lawrence in 1846, in the Punjab. Cust 
worked with Lawrence again while the latter was governor-general, and later in the Church 
Missionary Society and in the ‘Afghan Committee’ chaired by Lawrence in 1878. Cust, ‘The great 
proconsul’, p. 246. 
18  E. Graham, ‘Smith, Reginald Bosworth (1839-1908)’, rev. M.C. Curthoys, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed.). 
13 
John Lawrence as described in the Victorian biographies was a large, rugged man of 
great vigour and resolution, simple and straightforward in his tastes and manner, hard-
working, scrupulously honest, dutiful, with a strong sense of justice, guided in India by 
his unostentatious Christian faith and his instinctive sympathy for the tillers of the soil. 
His biographers compared Lawrence to Oliver Cromwell, in physical appearance and in 
character. Robert Cust tells us that Lawrence was ‘dauntless in his aspect, built in the 
mould of a Cromwell... so strong in his simplicity and straightforwardness’.19 Bosworth 
Smith wrote that, like Cromwell, Lawrence ‘cared naught for appearances, spoke his 
mind freely, swept all cobwebs out of his path, worked like a horse himself, and insisted 
on hard work in others.’20 Comparisons with Cromwell allowed Bosworth Smith to 
distinguish Lawrence from Britons who had gone to India in search of personal gain. He 
illustrated this distinction with an anecdote about the Koh-i-noor diamond, which had 
been committed to Lawrence’s care after the annexation of the Punjab. Rather than 
keeping this ‘peerless’ jewel close at hand, Lawrence simply stuffed it into his waistcoat 
pocket, and then forgot all about it. Only when Queen Victoria sent for the Koh-i-noor 
did Lawrence recall that he’d left it in a bundle of clothes with his Indian servant. 
Bosworth Smith would presumably have been conscious of the contemporary resonance 
of this anecdote: following the Mutiny, Sir Henry Havelock was admired as a latter-day 
‘Ironside’, as educated Britons became interested in seventeenth century puritanism, 
and in particular Cromwell and the Ironsides.21 Bosworth Smith thus sought to 
demonstrate that Lawrence and the men he gathered around him in the Punjab were 
motivated not by personal gain but paternal love. This was the irreproachable 
explanation for Lawrence’s absent-mindedness with the Koh-i-noor. After all, ‘what 
                                                            
19 Cust, ‘The great proconsul’, pp. 249-50. See also Ellis, Lord Lawrence, p. 78. 
20 Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. I, p. 112. 
21 O. Anderson, ‘The growth of Christian militarism in mid-Victorian Britain’, English Historical 
Review, LXXXVI (1971), 50-1. 
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was the custody of a court jewel compared with that of the happiness of the millions for 
which he was also responsible?’22  
 
Lawrence’s Victorian biographers agreed that their subject was motivated by a strong 
sense of public duty. Captain Trotter for example related that Lawrence, following his 
appointment as governor-general, with ‘manifest reluctance’ agreed to return to India; 
for he ‘had everything at home that could make life pleasant to a man of his moderate 
desires and homely tastes’. However, ‘if duty called him to India, to India he would 
go.’23 The secretary of state for India had made a similar observation at the time, telling 
the House of Commons that Lawrence had ‘sacrificed the quiet and tranquil enjoyment 
of domestic life in order to perform the duty to which he was called’.24 Lawrence may 
well have wanted to retire peacefully after the Mutiny. In 1858 he had written to Lord 
Stanley as follows: ‘I have served now twenty-nine years in India. I have had my share 
of work. My health is much shaken, and my sole desire is to return home and settle 
down among my children.’25 However, it was almost certainly an exaggeration to 
suggest that Lawrence returned to India with ‘manifest reluctance’. He had been raised 
to the most distinguished position in British India. As governor-general, he might be 
able to implement Punjab reforms across India, and perhaps mitigate the post-Mutiny 
reaction against the official promotion of Christianity. In personal terms, the 
appointment conferred the certainty of a vast salary, and the likelihood of a peerage. 
Such attractions may not of course have proved particularly alluring to a puritan. 
Lawrence however had ten children. As his friend Sir Richard Temple later wrote, 
Lawrence ‘was himself a man of the simplest tastes and the fewest wants, but he had a 
                                                            
22 Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. I, p. 329. 
23 Trotter, Lord Lawrence, pp. 82-3. 
24 Sir Charles Wood, Hansard, 173 (8 Feb. 1864), col. 223. 
25  Lawrence to Lord Stanley, 16 June 1858, cited in Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. II, p. 
304. 
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large family for whom he was affectionately solicitous.’26 
 
A striking feature of Temple’s biography is his determination to present Lawrence as a 
model for the middle-classes to follow. Temple seems to have had a distinct audience in 
mind: young British men, of modest means, for whom the Indian civil service offered a 
potential career. Temple thus explained how Lawrence had risen to governor-general 
not through social or political advantages but ‘solely from experience of India, 
knowledge of her people, and services rendered within her limits. The son of a poor and 
hardy veteran officer, he was essentially a self-made and self-taught man.’27 For this 
reason, Temple thought that Lawrence’s life should have ‘a spirit-stirring effect on the 
middle class from which he sprung.’ Lawrence’s life thus had a great exemplary value, 
for it proved that with ‘virtue, energy and resolution like his, British youths of scanty 
means’ could win places by competition in Indian administration and thus carry with 
them ‘to the Eastern empire the possibilities of national usefulness’.28 
 
The exemplary value of Lawrence’s life may have been enhanced because his 
biographers presented him in several respects as quite ordinary. According to Robert 
Cust, Lawrence was no genius.29 Temple acknowledged that as a young man, Lawrence 
had never been considered remarkable, and that as a man he was no orator.30 This 
treatment seems at odds with a tendency in Victorian biography to show that the 
subjects had enjoyed a seamless life, and that even as boys had shown their future 
                                                            
26  Temple, Lord Lawrence, p. 143.  
27 Temple, Lord Lawrence, pp. 2-3. 
28 Temple’s biography of Lawrence was the fourth volume in the ‘English Men of Action’ series 
published by Macmillan and Co. The first three volumes were accounts of General Charles Gordon, 
King Henry V and David Livingstone. Several subsequent volumes also chose as their subjects men 
who had made their names in India, such as Warren Hastings, Sir Charles Napier and Sir Henry 
Havelock. Temple, Lord Lawrence, p. 5 & end pages. 
29 Cust, ‘The great proconsul’, p. 252. 
30 Temple, Lord Lawrence, pp. 3, 140-1. 
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greatness.31 However, the description of Lawrence’s more ordinary characteristics 
allowed his biographers to broaden his contemporary appeal. ‘He is like you’, Temple 
seemed to be telling his readers. For Lawrence’s attributes ‘were for the most part those 
which are commonly possessed by the British people. He evinced only two qualities in 
an uncommon degree, namely energy and resolution.’32  
 
Artistic representations of Lawrence were in important respects consistent with the man 
depicted in the early biographies. This is true of the oil portrait of Lawrence by George 
Frederick Watts, completed in 1862 and currently displayed in the National Portrait 
Gallery, and the bronze statue by Sir Joseph Edgar Boehm, completed around 1882 and 
situated in Waterloo Place, London.33 If one contemplates the stern countenance of John 
Lawrence in Watts’s portrait, or in Boehm’s massive sculpture, one may be struck by an 
impression of the simplicity, or plainness, so admired by the Victorian biographers. 
Although these men were rarely critical of their subject and exaggerated his virtues, 
their representation of Lawrence is in many details—his appetite for work, his 
straightforward manner, his sympathy for the governed and his simple faith—consistent 
with the impression conveyed by Lawrence’s private papers and public acts. This will 
become clear throughout this dissertation. To give one example here, it is striking that 
John Lawrence, first Baron Lawrence, GCB, GCSI, PC, followed his term as governor-
general and viceroy of India with the rather drab office of chairman of the first London 
school board (1870-73). It is hard to imagine the first Earl of Lytton doing that. 
 
 
                                                            
31 C.I. Hamilton, ‘Naval Hagiography and the Victorian Hero’, Historical Journal, 23 (1980), 383. 
32 Temple, Lord Lawrence, p. 3. 
33  R. Ormond, Early Victorian Portraits (II vols., London, 1973), vol. I, pp. 264-6. 
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Historiographical treatment  
The efflorescence of biographical interest in the thirteen years after Lawrence’s death 
has not been matched by more recent scholarly attention. Modern historians have 
nonetheless examined particular aspects of Lawrence’s career, such as his actions 
during the Mutiny.34 Eric Stokes wrote about Lawrence’s settlement policy, and his 
attitude to the Sikh aristocracy following the annexation of the Punjab.35 Modern 
scholars have also shown some interest in Lawrence’s tenure as governor-general, 
taking a quite different approach from the early biographers. The Indian historian 
Sarvepalli Gopal was particularly critical. Gopal argued that although Lawrence 
enjoyed a distinguished reputation as a civil servant, his appointment as governor-
general raised him ‘to a level to which he was unequal’. ‘The Viceroy fainéant in India’, 
Gopal alleged, appeared to secretaries of state in London ‘as a senior foreman awaiting 
orders.’36 The contention that Lawrence was indolent—for which no evidence is 
produced—is not one made by other historians or by contemporary critics. Some 
contemporaries certainly complained about Lawrence’s ‘coarseness’, and his alleged 
proclivity for Punjab officials and methods. Gopal also recovers both of these 
criticisms. In fact, his use of the word ‘foreman’ seems to be based on a characterisation 
by a contemporary whose testimony is far from reliable, as we shall see in chapter I. 
Gopal described Lawrence’s five-year term as ‘a period of tired authority with little 
perspective or hint of the future.’ He however acknowledged that Lawrence made 
‘substantial advances’ in the construction of public works and the improvement of 
sanitation. Gopal also recognised Lawrence’s determination to ‘better the lot of the 
ordinary cultivators’ and his successes in strengthening tenant rights in Oudh and the 
                                                            
34  See e.g. E. Stokes, The peasant armed: the Indian revolt of 1857 (Oxford, 1986), pp. 21-2, 29-30, 
128; M. Naidis, ‘John Lawrence, mutiny hero’, Bengal Past and Present, 82 (1963), 1-11; Steele, 
‘Baron Lawrence’. 
35  E. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford, 1959), pp. 16-9, 117-8. 




Writing around the same time as Gopal, Thomas Metcalf offered a more positive 
assessment of Lawrence. He credited Lawrence with checking the acts of vengeance 
perpetrated in Delhi following its recapture from the Indian rebels.38 More recent 
scholarship has reinforced this assessment. Kathryn Tidrick has described how initially 
the British authorities did nothing to restrain the ‘orgy of killing and looting’ in Delhi. 
‘To his everlasting credit,’ Tidrick writes, ‘John Lawrence succeeded in using his now 
very great influence to stop it.’39 Metcalf also identified Lawrence as an ‘outspoken 
reformer’ who as governor-general succeeded in maintaining something of the 
reforming sentiment and liberal ideology of pre-Mutiny British India, in the face of the 
prevailing ‘conservative reaction’ after 1858.40 Similarly, in the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography David Steele acknowledged Lawrence as ‘an authentic liberal’. 
This verdict is made more significant by the contexts of time and place, for ‘it was not 
easy to be a liberal in India, especially in the aftermath of rebellion.’41 Steele contended 
that Lawrence’s viceroyalty was characterised by ‘solicitude’ for the millions of Indians 
under British rule. Lawrence however found the powers of governor-general weaker 
than he had anticipated, and was frustrated in some of his initiatives. Partly for this 
reason, Steele recognised that Lawrence’s tenure should not be assessed by legislative 
progress: ‘his endeavours are not to be measured by enactments.’ Lawrence’s successes 
in tenant legislation support this contention. ‘Without Lawrence’ Steele concluded, ‘the 
tide might have run more strongly against that care for “ancient tenures” which he 
                                                            
37  Gopal, British policy in India, pp. 62-3. 
38  T.R. Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt: India, 1857-1870 (Princeton, 1965), p. 295. 
39  K. Tidrick, Empire and the English Character: The Illusion of Authority (New York, 2009), p. 28. 
40  Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt, p. 326. 
41  Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
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considered was the most important single factor in reconciling Indians to British rule.’42  
  
Modern scholars have however proved somewhat economical in their consideration of 
Lawrence’s Afghan policy, and have presented his return to public prominence in 1878 
as merely a footnote towards the end of his life.43 The dissertation attempts to address 
this historiographical lacuna. It places Lawrence at the centre of the development of 
British policy in Afghanistan from 1864, and argues that he ultimately exerted a 
considerable influence on both parliamentary Liberals and metropolitan public 
discussion around the time of the second Afghan war. It will show how, during his 
tenure at Calcutta, successive secretaries of state for India gave Lawrence considerable 
discretion for formulating Afghan policy, partly in deference to his post-Mutiny 
reputation and partly because their decision-making capacity was constrained by 
political events in Britain. The motives of Lawrence’s ‘masterly inactivity’ are therefore 
worth examining in detail. The dissertation explains Lawrence’s policy as a pragmatic 
response to competing administrative priorities, and his assessment that the greatest 
dangers to British rule originated not from extrinsic developments (such as Russian 
expansion) but from political circumstances within India. In the period 1864-69, the 
merits of ‘masterly inactivity’ were much debated in the British press, for it was not 
only officials who perceived the border with Afghanistan as India’s only vulnerable 
frontier. The dissertation asserts that Lawrence and many of his government colleagues 
were sensitive to press criticism in Britain, and it discerns press influence in specific 
Afghan policy decisions taken in India. Several constraints on policy-makers are also 
identified, including the effects of the absence of naval power on the north-west 
frontier, Indian fiscal considerations and Lawrence’s recognition of the imperatives of 
                                                            
42  Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
43  See e.g. Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
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‘prestige’. It is submitted that this concentration on Lawrence, Afghan policy and 
Britain is rewarding, because it informs our understanding of Lawrence himself, and the 
formulation of Afghan policy at an important moment in the history of British India. It 
also offers new perspectives on the behaviour of British administrators in India, as well 
as the nature of British imperialism and its centripetal effects. 
 
Sources 
The dissertation makes extensive use of Lawrence’s private correspondence with the 
secretaries of state for India, held at the British Library in London.44 There were five 
secretaries of state during Lawrence’s tenure as governor-general: Sir Charles Wood, 
Earl de Grey, Viscount Cranborne, Sir Stafford Northcote and the Duke of Argyll. 
Three of these men were Liberals (Wood, de Grey and Argyll) and two were 
Conservatives (Cranborne and Northcote). At this point in Lawrence’s life his political 
leaning was not publicly known, and he had made only oblique contact with British 
politics (through the council of India, from 1859 to 1863). His letters to ministers in 
London rarely referred to political events in Britain, though the question of franchise 
reform provided an exception. ‘I sincerely hope that the Reform Bill will pass’, he told 
Earl de Grey in May 1866, ‘for I think that the effect of such measures is to consolidate 
& strengthen the constitution.’45 Lawrence’s policy of ‘masterly inactivity’, although 
criticised in some of the Conservative press during his viceroyalty, did not become a 
party political matter until 1878, in the months preceding the second Afghan war. 
Following his elevation to the peerage in 1869, Lawrence initially took his seat on the 
cross benches of the House of Lords. From there he supported William Gladstone’s 
                                                            
44 British Library, papers and correspondence of Sir John Laird Mair Lawrence, 1st Baron Lawrence, 
Mss Eur F90 (referred to in this dissertation as ‘Lawrence Mss’). 
45  Lawrence to de Grey, 31 May 1866, Lawrence Mss/31, no. 23. 
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Irish church and land bills.46 From this point Lawrence could be clearly identified as a 
Liberal in British politics, an affiliation consolidated by his public criticism of 
Conservative foreign policy in Afghanistan in 1878. His close friends may of course 
have always known this; Richard Temple later wrote that Lawrence had always been ‘a 
very moderate Liberal’.47 Political affiliation seems however to have made little 
difference to the way Lawrence corresponded with the secretaries of state for India. To 
all of them he wrote with considerable frequency; it is not uncommon to see two letters 
written on the same day. Lawrence also wrote with a frankness quite distinct from the 
formal and restrained tone that often cloaks correspondence between officials. This 
frankness makes Lawrence’s letters more interesting, and more revealing. Without his 
frankness, it would be harder for instance to trace his sensitivity to press criticism.  
 
Lawrence’s correspondence was of course subject to a considerable time delay. 
Chandrika Kaul suggests that after 1852 it took anything from thirty-three to forty-four 
days for mail to reach England from Bombay or Calcutta. The opening of the canal at 
Suez in 1869 (after Lawrence had left India), together with the introduction of 
steamships, significantly reduced this time.48 Correspondence between Lawrence and 
his secretaries of state in the period 1864-69 was often received in as little as four 
weeks, though five weeks was more common. This calculation is based on the 
correspondents’ habit of acknowledging receipt of letters of a particular date, and 
assumes that they wrote immediately (or very soon) after receiving letters from India or 
England.49 Although communications sent by telegraph were much faster, they 
conveyed only limited information and were used sparingly. The construction of 
                                                            
46  Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
47  Temple, Lord Lawrence, p. 191. 
48  C. Kaul, Reporting the Raj: The British press and India, c. 1880-1922 (Manchester, 2010), p. 31.  
49  The period could be longer than five weeks, though anything longer than six weeks seems to have 
been rare.  
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telegraph lines in earnest started in the eighteen fifties.50 By 1865 the governor-general, 
in Calcutta, could receive the secretary of state’s London telegrams in just three days.51 
 
In 1878 the government published official correspondence relating to Anglo-Afghan 
affairs sent between secretaries of state and the government of India in the period from 
July 1863 to November 1878.52 The dissertation draws extensively from this 
voluminous series of parliamentary papers. The official despatches are more formal and 
elliptical than Lawrence’s private correspondence, though often their intended meaning 
is nonetheless clear. For example, official communications rarely referred to Russia 
directly, preferring instead to write of ‘another Power’. (In contrast, Lawrence in his 
private correspondence referred to Russia without hesitation.) What was meant by 
official communications is not always so apparent. The research has therefore set some 
despatches in a wider political and cultural context.53 For example, the secretary of 
state’s decision, in 1875, to instruct the government of India to send a British envoy to 
Afghanistan will be set in the context of increasing public anxiety about the 
vulnerability of India’s north-west frontier. 
 
The dissertation relies on a variety of British newspapers and periodicals in order to 
understand how events pertaining to Afghanistan were reported, and how British policy 
was discussed. By the time Lawrence arrived at Calcutta as governor-general in 1864, 
the influence of the political press in Britain had been strengthened by legislative and 
                                                            
50  Kaul, The British press and India, p. 41.  
51 Lawrence commented on the time taken to receive telegrams in a letter to Sir Charles Wood. 
Lawrence to Wood, 4 March 1865 (2), Lawrence Mss/30, no. 17. 
52 Afghanistan Correspondence. 
53  An approach suggested by Paul Readman, following Paul Kennedy’s study of Anglo-German rivalry 
before the Great War (The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism (1980)): P. Readman, ‘Patriotism 
and the Politics of Foreign Policy, c. 1870 -c. 1914’, in W. Mulligan and B. Simms (eds.), The 
Primacy of Foreign Policy in British History, 1660-2000: how Strategic Concerns Shaped Modern 
Britain (Basingstoke, 2010), p. 265. 
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technological developments. Stephen Koss has argued that three laws—abolition of the 
tax on advertisements (1853), repeal of the stamp duty (1855) and abolition of the tax 
on paper (1861)—together ‘created a new forum for national debate by according 
newspapers a vastly enlarged readership and, consequently, an enhanced potential for 
political influence.’ Technological advances in the printing and distribution of papers, 
the introduction of the telegraph, and the establishment of news agencies all supported 
the rise of the political press.54 
 
In her research on the British press and India, Chandrika Kaul found that The Times was 
the most influential British newspaper on Indian questions, with the greatest financial 
outlay and several specialist leader writers.55 That finding also holds true for the 
reporting of events in Afghanistan and central Asia, and for editorial comment on 
Britain’s Afghan policy, which The Times covered in unrivalled depth. For this reason, 
the thesis refers to The Times more than any other newspaper. Contemporary 
newspapers also drew heavily from The Times. For example, during Lawrence’s tenure 
as governor-general the Manchester Guardian printed eight of The Times’s editorials on 
Afghan policy. As Stephen Koss puts it, the press was ‘a ravenous animal… [that] 
always fed on itself’.56 The importance of The Times in terms of understanding public 
discussion about Afghanistan is increased because its letters pages provided a national 
forum for debate. Unlike parliament, this forum was open every day of the year. Writing 
to the editor of The Times in order to praise or attack Afghan policy was popular with 
serving and former army officers, and was a tactic also used by several former 
government of India officials, including Lawrence himself. Letters published in The 
                                                            
54  Koss acknowledges that literacy was increasing, but contends that the effect of the 1870 Education 
Act (on the rise of the political press) has been exaggerated. S. Koss, The Rise and Fall of the 
Political Press in Britain, Volume One: The Nineteenth Century (London, 1981), pp. 1-2. 
55  Kaul, The British press and India, p. 61.  
56  Koss, The Political Press in Britain, p. 22. 
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Times sometimes formed the basis for discussions in other newspapers. For example, a 
January 1868 editorial in the Standard criticised Lawrence’s Afghan policy and 
supported its attack by reference to the opinions of an army officer published a few days 
earlier in a letter to The Times.57 The importance of The Times for the present research 
is further supported by the historiographical consensus that the governing classes placed 
more reliance on it than on any other newspaper.58 The private correspondence of 
Lawrence with ministers in London is certainly consistent with that conclusion, for the 
correspondents often referred to The Times. The Times is also a vital source for 
understanding Britain and Afghanistan because its Calcutta correspondent was at liberty 
to make independent pronouncements on Afghan policy. His assessments could depart 
entirely from the editorial line adopted in London, demonstrating how in some instances 
the perspective of Anglo-Indians was utterly at variance with the perspective of their 
compatriots in Britain.  
 
The research has also made extensive use of several other newspapers. They have been 
chosen on the basis of the extent of their coverage and commentary, but also in order to 
achieve a balance between different political leanings. For the Conservative perspective, 
the Standard has proved most useful, although the Morning Post has also been 
consulted. For the Liberal standpoint, the research has relied mainly on the Daily News, 
although the Pall Mall Gazette and Manchester Guardian have also been considered. 
Other newspapers have been used in particular circumstances. For example, the Radical 
Reynolds’s News made some interesting observations about the virtues of middle class 
merit following Lawrence’s appointment as governor-general.59 Similarly, the Liberal 
                                                            
57 Standard, 8 Jan. 1868, p. 4; Times, 4 Jan. 1868, p. 6. 
58 Koss, The Political Press in Britain, p. 218. 
59 This will be considered in chapter I. The politics espoused in Reynolds’s Newspaper were arguably to 
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Glasgow Herald provided the most detailed reporting of Lawrence’s presentation with 
the freedom of the city of Glasgow, and is accordingly used in order to help understand 
Lawrence’s appeal to certain audiences in the aftermath of the Mutiny. In 1864, the 
political leaning of newspapers provides only an approximate guide to their attitude 
towards Lawrence’s Afghan policy. As previously noted, that policy did not become an 
overtly party political question until the eve of the second Afghan war. During 
Lawrence’s first years at Calcutta, British newspapers largely supported his circumspect 
policy in Afghanistan. By the end of his term, some fissures along political lines were 
discernible: the Liberal Daily News vigorously supported his policy, while the 
Conservative Standard was increasingly critical of it. Liberal newspapers could not 
however be relied upon to support Lawrence’s ‘masterly inactivity’, and the Pall Mall 
Gazette came to advocate much more active steps on the north-west frontier.60  
 
Numerous periodicals have also been used, including the Liberal Fortnightly Review 
and Edinburgh Review, and the Conservative Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 
Quarterly Review and Saturday Review. The dissertation necessarily concentrates on 
newspapers and periodicals published in Britain, because it is concerned with the way 
Afghan policy was discussed in Britain and how that discussion influenced policy-
making. However, two British publications in India—the Calcutta Review and the 
Times of India—have proved useful for considering whether assumptions in Britain 
about the security of the Indian empire accorded with British views in India. Anglo-
Indian opinion was of course disseminated in Britain by the use of ‘Indian’ 
correspondents (such as the Calcutta correspondent of The Times) and by the practice of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the left of Radicalism: in Koss’s opinion the paper was ‘marked by an unsettled Radicalism that did 
not stop short of republicanism’. Koss, The Political Press in Britain, p. 89. 
60 See e.g. Pall Mall Gazette, 30 May 1867, p. 1. 
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reprinting articles first published in India.  
 
The research has also made use of several other published sources. The records of 
parliamentary debates in Hansard have proved particularly helpful, and can be searched 
online for the period covered by the research.61 These parliamentary debates shed light 
on some diverse matters, including public criticism of Lawrence, the emphasis policy-
makers placed on ‘prestige’, and the way politicians conceived Afghanistan before the 
second Afghan war. A number of contemporary books—written by army officers, 
politicians and journalists—have also been consulted, in order to analyse their authors’ 
attitudes to Afghan policy and Anglo-Indian militarism. 
 
Chapter structure 
The dissertation comprises an abstract, this introduction, eight main chapters, a 
conclusion and bibliography. Chapter I describes Lawrence’s actions during the Mutiny 
and his perceived instrumentality in preserving Britain’s empire in India. It then 
examines his appeal to a variety of British audiences. It also considers how some of 
Lawrence’s most celebrated characteristics—especially his Christian faith and ‘puritan’ 
manner—became problematic once he became governor-general of India. The chapter 
argues that Lawrence nonetheless managed to retain his heroic status as the ‘saviour of 
India’, and was invested with a lasting reputation for vigour and for knowledge of the 
Punjab and India. 
 
It is partly for this reason, Chapter II contends, that four secretaries of state in 
succession insisted that Lawrence should have considerable latitude for deciding what 
                                                            
61  http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/index.html 
27 
British policy in Afghanistan should be. This devolution of authority to Lawrence 
occurred at an important moment in Anglo-Afghan relations, because civil war in 
Afghanistan and Russian progress in central Asia led some Britons to fear that all may 
not be quiet beyond the north-west frontier. The chapter also asks to what extent 
Lawrence’s authority on Afghan policy should be understood as a consequence of 
domestic political events, in particular the question of franchise reform. For there is 
evidence that the turbulence of this and other domestic questions not only made the 
tenure of some ministers exceptionally short but distracted their attentions from the 
India Office.   
 
Chapter III seeks to explain why Lawrence was determined that Britain should avoid all 
interference in Afghanistan. It first considers an argument made by some historians: that 
‘masterly inactivity’ was essentially Lawrence’s reaction to certain traumatic events 
during the first Afghan war (1838-42), when his brother was taken captive. The chapter 
posits an alternative explanation for Lawrence’s policy, arguing it was a natural 
consequence of his administrative priorities and his assessment that the greatest threat to 
British rule came from within India. Resources expended against a Russian threat, 
which Lawrence considered remote, could not be used on Indian administrative projects 
that would provide more effective security for British imperium. The chapter contrasts 
Lawrence’s approach with the proposals of Sir Henry Rawlinson, perhaps the most 
forceful advocate of intervention in Afghanistan in the period 1864-69. Finally, in order 
to assess whether Lawrence’s stance was representative of the ‘official mind’ in India, 
the opinions of his colleagues in the government of India will be examined.  
 
Lawrence’s foreign policy critics argued that a British officer, supported by a small 
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military escort (or even by a small army), should be sent to Afghanistan. Such an envoy 
would, these critics insisted, exert a material and moral influence over one (or more) of 
the warring Afghan Amirs, and would check any corresponding move by Russia. 
Lawrence however was adamant that no British officers should cross the north-west 
frontier. He recognised that any such move might require ever-increasing intervention, 
because Britons in such remote places were liable to come to harm, and this would then 
have to be punished by military force. This process of escalation was driven by the 
imperatives of ‘prestige’, a problematic but nonetheless important concept. Chapter IV 
considers the influence of prestige on British policy by examining the motives for the 
Abyssinian expedition (1867-68). The scene thus moves from India to Africa. The 
expedition was however very much a British Indian affair: it was planned in India, 
commanded by officers from the Bombay army, and relied on Indian troops, supplies 
and transport animals. Moreover, although the expedition’s official objective was 
liberating a small number of British captives, the foreign secretary and other officials 
argued that it was necessary in order to maintain the prestige they thought essential for 
the control of India. The chapter also explores how official perceptions about prestige 
constrained policy decisions, setting Lawrence’s refusal to allow British officers to 
enter Afghanistan in this context.  
 
Chapter V examines how British army officers in India were depicted in the British 
press. It identifies a recurring characterisation of these officers as restless, bellicose and 
‘ambitious’ for promotion and honours. Such characteristics were thought to explain 
army officers’ affinity for more active policies in Afghanistan. The chapter suggests that 
officials in Britain and India—including Lawrence, Sir Charles Wood and the Earl of 
Elgin—had grave misgivings about the military authorities in India and the motivations 
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of some frontier officers. These officials were particularly concerned about the 
independent power of the commander-in-chief in India, and they shared press 
perceptions about the motivations of officers who bridled at policies of frontier restraint. 
The chapter considers what all of this says about the image of the army in the period 
after the Mutiny, and the vitality—in at least part of the British world—of a type of 
militarism before it is thought to have arrived in Britain itself.  
 
Critics of Lawrence’s foreign policy complained that Britain’s passivity in Afghanistan 
would allow Russia to establish her influence at Kabul. It was argued in certain sections 
of the British press, with increasing urgency, that Lawrence should counter this threat 
by supporting one of the protagonists in the Afghan civil war with armaments and a 
subsidy. Chapter VI examines Lawrence’s sensitivity to such criticism, and its effects 
on the formulation of British policy in Afghanistan. Lawrence remained resolute on 
what he considered the most important policy decision; accordingly no British envoys 
or troops were sent to Afghanistan. He even prohibited civilian explorers from 
wandering beyond the frontier. However, the chapter argues that on two matters—
constructing railway lines to the north-west frontier and supporting Amir Sher Ali 
Khan—Lawrence offered concessions to public pressure for more active measures in 
Afghanistan. The chapter considers the possible reasons for Lawrence’s anxiety about 
public opinion in Britain and its relationship with policy in India. It also asks whether 
Lawrence was exceptional in this regard, by contrasting his approach with that of his 
colleagues in the government of India. The sensitivity of these officials to press and 
public opinion suggests that the historiographical depiction of British policy-makers 
exhibiting a rational detachment from external influences may require qualification. 
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Chapter VII first traces the continuation of Lawrence’s Afghan policy during the 
Liberal administration of 1868-74. It then considers why the Conservative government 
of 1874-1880 resolved to force a British envoy on Amir Sher Ali Khan, placing this 
decision in the context of prevailing anxieties about Russian expansion in central Asia. 
The chapter goes on to examine how parliamentary Liberals harnessed Lawrence’s 
expertise, during public debates about the government’s foreign policy around the time 
of the second Afghan war. These Liberals recognised that Lawrence’s particular 
knowledge, his patriotic reputation, and his political record as a moderate gave him 
great utility as a public critic of Conservative policy. Lawrence was therefore 
encouraged to amplify his public condemnation of the abandonment of ‘masterly 
inactivity’ well in advance of other Liberals. The chapter argues that Lawrence, after so 
long on the imperial periphery, ultimately exerted an important influence on politics in 
the metropolis. 
 
In September 1879 Afghan soldiers attacked the British residency in Kabul, killing the 
envoy and his entire military escort. Chapter VIII analyses how newspapers and 
politicians in Britain reacted to news of this attack, and in particular to the death of the 
envoy, Major Sir Louis Cavagnari. The prime minister, Lord Beaconsfield, feared a 
public outcry. However, a consensus that Cavagnari’s death had to be avenged—on 
grounds of national honour, dignity and prestige—seems to have been the dominant 
contemporary response. This consensus, together with excited reports that Cavagnari 
and his small retinue had maintained a heroic defence of the residency before being 
overwhelmed, seems to have been remarkably effective in frustrating Liberal criticism 
of government policy. The chapter will ask what all of this says about domestic support 
for imperialism. The attack occurred on the cusp of the period in which historians have 
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identified an increase in the cultural purchase of imperialism in Britain, and it is 
tempting to see newspaper reporting of Cavagnari’s last stand suffused with an imperial 
light. The chapter instead attempts to place the imperial strands in domestic newspaper 
coverage in the context of several other prominent strands, which had meanings quite 
independent of empire. It also considers the longevity of public interest in the ‘gallant’ 
Major Cavagnari, and asks whether he may have been perceived as all too 
representative of the type of restless, ambitious officer discussed in chapter V. 
 
* * * 
 
A note on terminology 
The terms ‘Afghan’ and ‘Afghanistan’ will be used imprecisely throughout the 
dissertation. The term ‘Afghan’ literally refers only to the Pashtun, the largest ethnic 
group in ‘Afghanistan’ (the ‘land of the Afghans’). The geographical area referred to as 
‘Afghanistan’ did not assume its modern form until the end of the nineteenth century, 
when Britain and Russia delineated its political borders. Historians of Afghanistan 
nonetheless employ the terms ‘Afghan’ and ‘Afghanistan’ as a matter of convenience.62 
These were also the terms used by contemporary Britons, although a different spelling 
was popular. When quoting from such sources, the original spelling will be preserved, 
so that the terms will appear with an extra letter ‘f’, as ‘Affghan’ and ‘Affghanistan’.  
 
The terms ‘Anglo-India’ and ‘Anglo-Indian’ are used in the sense they were understood 
in period from 1864-79, that is to say as references to respectively the British 
community in India and Britons in India. The word ‘forward’ will also be used in the 
                                                            
62  The other ethnic groups include the Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Nuristanees. B.D. Hopkins, The 
Making of Modern Afghanistan (Basingstoke, 2008), pp. 2, 5.  
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same way contemporaries would have understood it. This word in one sense conveyed a 
desire to move the frontier of British India further ‘forward’ into Afghanistan. However, 
the word was also understood to mean a more general preparedness to ‘interfere’ in the 
internal politics of Afghanistan, in order for example to seek to control the foreign 
policy of particular rulers. Contemporaries would therefore have recognised various 
proposals as examples of ‘forward’ measures, the most ubiquitous of which were that 
Britain should support one of the protagonists in the Afghan civil war with armaments 
and money, that British envoys should be sent to Afghanistan, and that British garrisons 
should be established beyond the existing frontier. The expression ‘forward school’ will 
not be used, as it does not seem to have appeared until 1885.63  
 
                                                            
63  J.L. Duthie, ‘Pressure from within: the “forward” group in the India Office during Gladstone’s first 
ministry’, Journal of Asian History, 15 (1981), 47. 
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I 
Sir John Lawrence, the ‘saviour of India’ 
 
In the summer of 1866, the Duke of Edinburgh went in state to the City of London, in 
order to receive the freedom of the Worshipful Company of Grocers. This ancient guild, 
trading in ‘all the various products of tropical climes’, had long enjoyed royal 
patronage. Having been ushered into the drawing-room of the Grocers’ hall at Princes 
Street, the Duke found himself in ‘a gorgeous apartment’ decorated with marble busts 
of Queen Victoria, Prince Albert, the Duke of Wellington, Viscount Nelson, and Sir 
John Lawrence.1 The decision to place a civilian in such exalted company, among 
royalty and the greatest military and naval heroes of the century, was not the quixotic 
act of a fraternity of pepper merchants. Rather, it was consistent with a widespread 
recognition of Lawrence’s instrumentality in preserving Britain’s empire in India during 
the Mutiny of 1857-58. This chapter will seek to understand how contemporaries 
understood the significance of Lawrence’s Mutiny endeavours. In order to do so, it will 
consider the way in which Lawrence was rewarded with honours from the crown, 
parliament, the East India Company and British cities and universities. The chapter will 
also examine public discussion about his claims to a peerage, an honour not in fact 
conferred until much later (1869). This discussion illuminates Lawrence’s appeal to a 
variety of audiences, in particular those seeking more merit-based political 
appointments, the continued implementation of Christian policies in India, and 
reassuring proof that British rule in India was beneficent.  
                                                            
1  Reynolds’s Newspaper, 3 June 1866, p. 2. The sculptor of Lawrence’s bust is identified as ‘R. Theed’ 
in Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’ and in Ormond, Early Victorian Portraits, vol. I, p. 265. It was however 
almost certainly the work of William Theed, the younger (1804-91), who later created the group 
‘Africa’ (1865-71) for the Albert Memorial in Hyde Park, London. Lawrence’s bust is still on display 
at the Grocers’ company. Anon., ‘A Brief History of the Grocers’ Company’, 
[http://www.grocershall.co.uk/] [accessed 23 Apr. 2012]. 
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Relatively recently, historians have concentrated less on a hero’s deeds, than on the 
cultural context in which his life was imaginatively reconstructed. For Geoffrey Cubitt, 
heroes are ‘endowed by others, not just with a high degree of fame and honour, but with 
a special allocation of imputed meaning and symbolic significance—that not only raises 
them above others in public esteem but makes them the object of some kind of 
collective emotional investment.’2 That emphasis on ‘collective emotional investment’ 
will be adopted in this chapter; an approach hitherto not followed with respect to 
Lawrence.3 It is surprising that Lawrence has been overlooked in this way, given his 
reputation as the ‘saviour of India’ and the voluminous scholarship on other British 
heroes of the Mutiny, such as Sir Henry Havelock.4 Lawrence offers an important case 
study for two principal reasons. First, he suggests that heroic reputations could become 
problematic for men who outlived their heroic deeds. In the aftermath of the Mutiny, 
Lawrence’s claims to greatness were contested only marginally. Had he, like Havelock, 
died in the hour of his triumph in India, perhaps that would have remained the case. But 
Lawrence lived, and some of the same traits celebrated in the aftermath of the Mutiny 
became problematic once Lawrence returned to India in 1864. This problem seems to 
have been obscured in the recent scholarship on heroism, perhaps because of the 
concentration on men like Havelock. Secondly, Lawrence’s perceived heroism provided 
                                                            
2 G. Cubitt, ‘Introduction: heroic reputations and exemplary lives’ in G. Cubitt and A. Warren (eds.), 
Heroic Reputations and Exemplary Lives (Manchester, 2000), p. 3. See also M. Jones, ‘What Should 
Historians Do With Heroes? Reflections on Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Britain’, History 
Compass, 5 (2007), 439-454. 
3 Lawrence’s heroism is considered, solely on the basis of his deeds, in Naidis, ‘John Lawrence, mutiny 
hero’. Recently, Kathryn Tidrick has considered Lawrence (alongside several Punjab officials) in 
order to argue that an ‘illusion of authority’—namely, a myth that the personal authority of some 
Englishmen obviated their reliance on military force—lay at the heart of British imperialism. Tidrick, 
Empire and the English Character, ch. 1. 
4 For scholarship on Havelock: Anderson, ‘The growth of Christian militarism in mid-Victorian 
Britain’; J.M. MacKenzie, ‘Heroic myths of empire’, in J.M. MacKenzie (ed.), Popular imperialism 
and the military 1850-1950 (Manchester, 1992); and G. Dawson, Soldier Heroes: British adventure, 
empire and the imagining of masculinities (London, 2005), chs. 4-5. 
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him with an enhanced reputation in both official and public spheres, endowing him with 
greater authority, particularly on matters pertaining to the Punjab and its frontier with 
Afghanistan. It was partly for this reason that Lawrence would be granted so much 
latitude for determining Afghan policy during his term as governor-general, as chapter 
II will argue.   
 
Lawrence and the Indian Mutiny  
The events known to British audiences as the ‘Indian Mutiny’ began in Bengal in May 
1857. On receiving news of the rising, the authorities in India and Britain had several 
grounds to fear for the safety of the Punjab. For one thing, the province had been 
acquired only recently, in 1849. It was also home to large Sikh and Muslim populations, 
regarded as ‘martial races’ who had proved their fighting qualities against Britain 
respectively in the Anglo-Sikh wars (1845-46, 1848-49) and the first Afghan war (1838-
42). Furthermore, the geographical situation of the Punjab raised the disturbing prospect 
that tribes from around the Afghan frontier would join with the Indian rebels. This was 
the position that confronted Lawrence as chief commissioner of the Punjab. Initially 
Lawrence received no instructions from the superior authority of the governor-general, 
Earl Canning, as communications with Calcutta had been cut. Lawrence therefore acted 
immediately on his own initiative, assuming powers considerably beyond those of a 
chief commissioner. Realising that the entire Bengal army was suspect, he and his 
subordinates disarmed its regiments stationed in the Punjab. To replace these regular 
forces, Lawrence then raised over forty thousand Punjab horse and foot—trebling the 
existing provincial forces—all organised on the ‘irregular’ model, thus relying on very 
few British officers. He took advantage of all the circumstances that naturally tended to 
favour the British cause, by exploiting: the traditional antagonism of the Sikhs towards 
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the Mughal emperors (whose lineal representative, the King of Delhi, the mutineers had 
acknowledged as their sovereign); the ‘indifference’ of the Punjab Muslims to the 
residual prestige of the Delhi dynasty; and the popularity of his administration in the 
Punjab (assisted by good harvests and relatively moderate tax assessments).5  
 
Lawrence also determined that the recapture of Delhi was more important to Britain’s 
position in India than the safety of his own province. The day after receiving the 
telegram with news of the outbreak at Meerut, Lawrence wrote to General Anson 
(commander-in-chief of British forces in India), urging him to act swiftly to move on 
Delhi: 
 
The next step will be to recover Delhi and its magazine; the latter is the arsenal for all Upper 
India... By decisive measures at once we should crush the mutineers, and give support to the 
well-affected or timid. Time, in such matters, seems to be everything... A week or two hence it 
may be too late. If your Excellency will sanction these arrangements, Brigadier Sydney Cotton 
and I will arrange all the details. I will send him a copy of this letter and request he will have 
H.M.’s 27th Regiment ready to move at an hour’s notice… I make no apology for writing to 
your Excellency plainly and fully. I consider this to be the greatest crisis which has ever 
occurred in India. Our European force is so small that, unless effectively handled in the outset, 
and brought to bear, it will prove unequal to the emergency. But with vigour and promptitude, 
under the blessing of God, it will be irresistible.6 
 
As chief commissioner of the Punjab, Lawrence had no formal power to set strategic 
objectives for the commander-in-chief. As a civilian, he might have been wary of 
                                                            
5  Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
6  Lawrence to General Anson, 13 May 1857, cited in Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. II, 
pp. 15-6. 
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recommending specific troop movements to a general. Yet he wrote not only to Anson, 
but also to Generals Barnard and Wilson, urging them to move decisively to retake 
Delhi. Acting on his judgement that Delhi was the key to Britain’s position, Lawrence 
denuded the Punjab of the irregular troops he had raised, despatching them together 
with his British troops to the old Mughal capital. Money was required as well as men, 
and so Lawrence raised forced loans from Indian bankers, traders, and princes. He sent 
this money along with stores and the troops to Delhi.7  
 
Delhi fell to British forces in September 1857. Initially considered a particularly 
vulnerable province, the Punjab had not only been held but had proved decisive to the 
recapture of Delhi and ultimate British victory. For his prompt and vigorous actions, 
Lawrence was acclaimed as the ‘saviour of India’, meaning of course the saviour of the 
British position in India. This triumphant contemporary soubriquet was based on an 
underlying assessment of Lawrence’s instrumentality shared by modern historians, 
writing over one hundred and fifty years later. In Lawrence’s entry in the Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, David Steele asserts that Britain could not have 
recovered Delhi without the men and supplies sent by Lawrence. Steele concludes that 
‘[Lawrence’s] hold on the Punjab and his leadership in this crisis rescued the British in 
northern India.’8 
 
For his exertions in suppressing the Mutiny, Lawrence received a host of honours, 
including three from the crown. In 1857 he was promoted to a knight grand cross of the 
Bath (GCB) and the following year accepted his first hereditary honour, a baronetcy. In 
                                                            
7  Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
8 Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
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1859, having returned to Britain, he was sworn of the Privy Council.9 Lawrence also 
received two significant awards from the East India Company in recognition of his 
Mutiny services. In 1858 the Company granted Lawrence a two thousand pound annual 
annuity, and in 1859 promoted his rank, salary and status as ruler of the Punjab from 
chief commissioner to lieutenant-governor.10 
 
In February 1858, Lawrence received the thanks of both Houses of parliament.11 The 
prime minister, Lord Palmerston, concluded that the ‘services of Sir John Lawrence 
were really beyond all praise.’ What Palmerston found so remarkable, as he had earlier 
explained in a speech to the Commons, was that the very province thought to have been 
‘our weak point’ in fact ‘turned out to be our strong point’.12 According to Benjamin 
Disraeli, Lawrence ‘probably deserved more than any other man in India, whether 
soldier, sailor, or civilian.’13 The parliamentary acclamation of Lawrence continued long 
after the vote of thanks. After the Earl of Derby formed his second ministry, he lauded 
Lawrence’s ‘courage and dauntless resolution’ in first checking incipient mutiny, and 
then raising from the Punjab ‘in the hour of India’s extremity those levies and 
reinforcements to which in great measure the suppression of the revolt is due’.14 Ten 
years after the Mutiny, politicians of all parties continued to refer to Lawrence as the 
‘saviour of India’.15  
 
                                                            
9 Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
10  Lawrence’s salary was raised from £7,200 to £10,000 per annum, backdated to 1 Jan. 1858. Hansard, 
151 (26 July 1858), cols. 2125-6. In the administrative structure of British India, the rank, salary and 
status accorded to the senior British official in a province depended on the perceived importance of 
that province. During Lawrence’s term as governor-general (1864-69), Madras and Bombay enjoyed 
governors; Bengal, the Punjab and the North-Western Provinces had lieutenant-governors; while other 
provinces variously had to make do with agents, residents and chief commissioners.  
11  Hansard, 148 (8 Feb. 1858), cols. 865-932 (Commons) & cols. 809-52 (Lords). 
12 Hansard, 148 (8 Dec. 1857), col. 389; Hansard 148 (8 Feb. 1858), col. 875. 
13 Hansard, 148 (8 Feb. 1858), col. 888. 
14 Hansard, 153 (14 Apr. 1859), col. 1696.  
15 E.g. Sir Stafford Northcote, Hansard, 189 (2 Aug. 1867), cols. 816-7. 
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Some British cities, guilds and universities also recognised Lawrence’s heroic deeds in 
India. He received the freedoms of the cities of London (1858) and Glasgow (1860), the 
freedom of the Worshipful Company of Grocers (1859) and honorary doctorates of civil 
law from the universities of Oxford and Cambridge (1859).16 However, one honour 
eluded Sir John Lawrence: a peerage. Public discussion about his claims to this honour 
illuminate both the esteem in which he was held in the wake of the Mutiny, and the 
different audiences to which he appealed.   
 
Lawrence and the peerage 
Before the Mutiny the East India Company exercised responsibility for the government 
of India, under the supervision of the British government (acting through the Board of 
Control). In 1858, shortly before that responsibility was transferred to the British crown, 
the directors of the East India Company met for the last time. In almost their final act, 
the directors resolved: 
 
That in recognition of the eminent merits of Sir John Laird Mair Lawrence, G.C.B., whose 
prompt, vigorous, and judicious measures crushed an incipient mutiny in the Punjab, and 
maintained the province in tranquillity during a year of almost universal convulsion, and who, 
by his extraordinary exertions, was enabled to equip troops and to prepare munitions of war for 
distant operations, thus mainly contributing to the re-capture of Delhi, and to the subsequent 
successes which attended our arms, and in testimony of the high sense entertained by the East 
India Company of his public character and conduct throughout a long and distinguished career, 
an annuity of £2,000 be granted to him.17  
                                                            
16 Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. II, chs. 8 & 9.  
17 Resolution of a special General Court of the East India Company, 25 Aug. 1858, reported in Times, 26 
Aug. 1858, p. 7 (hereafter, the ‘East India Company Meeting, 25 Aug. 1858’). The resolution was 
subsequently approved at a meeting of the proprietors of the Company, on 30 Aug. 1858, reported in 
Times, 31 Aug. 1858, p. 7. 
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This resolution set down an official opinion regarding the importance of Lawrence’s 
endeavours; one later endorsed by parliament.18 There was nonetheless a quite 
particular ‘emotional investment’ at work on the part of the East India Company, as its 
chairman made explicit at the meeting. Sir Frederick Currie and his colleagues had 
already pressed the government to confer a ‘higher mark of distinction’ on Sir John 
Lawrence (that is to say, higher than a baronetcy or GCB). In order to support its case, 
the Company had pledged to grant Lawrence some suitable means of maintaining such a 
dignity. The government was at the time known to be considering whether any further 
honours should be conferred on Lawrence.19 Currie told the directors that the grant to 
Lawrence was being made ‘in the hope’ that a peerage would follow, but the Company 
must have hoped that its decision would in fact stir the government into action. The 
quantum of the pension awarded to Lawrence had been chosen carefully: two thousand 
pounds per annum was the amount usually bestowed when Anglo-Indian officers were 
raised to the peerage.20 It is significant that the East India Company, days from its 
abolition, should have concentrated on such a matter. The Company had been somewhat 
discredited after the outbreak of the Mutiny; the prospect of elevating one of its servants 
to the peerage must accordingly have been extremely appealing. For Lawrence’s 
ennoblement would have reflected well on the East India Company, through whose 
ranks he had risen from settlement officer to chief commissioner of a great province. 
Prompting the government in this way certainly could work: the Company had already 
                                                            
18 An 1833 Act of Parliament required that if the governor-general of India was in receipt of a pension, 
his salary would be reduced by a corresponding amount. Exceptions were however sometimes made, 
and on this occasion  parliament resolved to pass a special Act, permitting Lawrence to receive the full 
amount of his governor-general’s salary together with the pension awarded by the East India 
Company. Hansard, 173 (8 Feb. 1864), cols. 222-5. 
19 Lord Stanley (president of the Board of Control): ‘Whether any further recognition of his services 
should be conferred on Sir John Lawrence is a question at present under the consideration of the 
Government.’ Hansard, 151 (26 July 1858), cols. 2125-6. 
20 East India Company Meeting, 25 Aug. 1858.  
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increased Lawrence’s salary as chief commissioner of the Punjab so that it matched the 
amount received by a lieutenant-governor, and in January 1859 Lawrence duly became 
the Punjab’s first lieutenant-governor.21 Long after its abolition, the East India 
Company’s former directors continued to draw public attention to the men who had 
risen through its ranks.22  
 
The East India Company was not alone in pressing the claims of Lawrence on the 
government. Several publications in Britain criticised the failure to confer a peerage on 
the man perceived as instrumental to the survival of British rule in India. In January 
1858 the London Quarterly Review made the case in plain language: 
 
The difference between K.C.B. and G.C.B. must be greater in the eye of the Government than in 
that of the nation, since it thought it worth announcing as a reward for a man [Sir John 
Lawrence] who with kingly talent had ruled an excitable country, held down a mutinous army, 
and, at the same time, mightily supported a trembling empire. A coronet was seldom more 
nobly merited.23  
 
This line of criticism was developed over the following year in newspapers such as The 
Times, which on several occasions pressed Lawrence’s claims. An editorial of July 1858 
considered Lawrence’s achievements alongside those of the British generals James 
Neill, Sir Henry Havelock, Sir Archdale Wilson, Sir Henry Lawrence (John’s brother), 
                                                            
21 East India Company Meeting, 25 Aug. 1858.  
22 For example, after Lawrence’s appointment as governor-general of India, Colonel William Sykes (a 
former director and chairman of the East India Company) emphasised that the ‘East India Company’s 
service had produced some of the most distinguished men in the annals of British history, such as 
Clive, Malcolm, Elphinstone, Ochterlony, the two Lawrences, and many others; men who, entering 
the civil and military services as boys, by the force of their character and talents raised themselves to 
high stations unaided by interest.’ Hansard, 173 (8 Feb. 1864), col. 224. 
23 (Lawrence had already received the KCB before the Indian Mutiny.) London Quarterly Review, Jan. 
1858, cited in Times, 5 March 1858, p. 10.  
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Sir James Outram, Sir John Inglis, Sir Hugh Rose and Sir Colin Campbell (who was 
created Baron Clyde in July 1858). 
 
But even among these illustrious men the name of John Lawrence, the Ruler of the Punjab, 
stands supreme. We know of no standard by which we can discriminate between the respective 
merits of these Indian Paladins save by the results of their exertions. Let this, then, be the test. 
Had the mutineers in the earlier stage of the troubles been able to maintain themselves in Delhi, 
and had the Punjab risen in our rear, British India would have been lost... We say, then, that he 
who saved the Punjab and the North-Western Provinces was the man who preserved India to the 
British Crown. That man was John Lawrence!24 
 
It is striking that a civilian could ‘stand supreme’ over all of these victorious military 
leaders, given the praise heaped on the generals by the press.25 The editorial had urged 
that a peerage should be conferred on Lawrence. This was an argument The Times 
pursued in earnest: Lawrence deserved a peerage on merit, and more merit-based 
appointments were needed in order to confer legitimacy on the peerage as a whole. The 
following year, with this accolade apparently denied Lawrence, The Times published 
another editorial, excoriating the basis on which titles were conferred. Three ‘gentlemen 
of ample landed estate, but no very remarkable ability’ (Sir Charles Morgan, Tatton 
Egerton, and Colonel Wyndham) had just been ennobled. The editorial speculated on 
the propriety of these appointments; large ‘contributions’ to party election funds 
possibly having been made by the men in question. Surely Lawrence’s existing awards 
                                                            
24 Times, 29 July 1858, p. 8. 
25 No aspect of the campaign was more praised than the generalship of Havelock, Neill, Lawrence, 
Nicholson, and latterly Campbell. During the Crimean war, the victories had been described as 
‘soldiers’ victories’, with the bravery of the troops acclaimed; the generals, with a few notable 
exceptions, were largely condemned. During the Mutiny however, the vast Indian terrain, isolated 
garrisons and scattered enemy offered scope for a multitude of independent initiatives by the various 
generals: E.M. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914 (London, 1980), pp. 132-4. 
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(baronetcy, KCB, and East India Company pension) were insufficient ‘for saving our 
Indian Empire’? 
 
And this is all that England can do for the bravest, the best, and the wisest of her sons, who, by 
the resources of his unaided genius, has preserved to us the acquisitions of Clive and of 
Hastings, and saved us from losing in one disastrous hour the conquests of Lake, of Wellington, 
and of Napier! To the honours of the Peerage Sir John Lawrence must not, it seems, aspire. He 
must not penetrate into that sublime region inhabited by the Morgans, the Egertons, and the 
Wyndhams, nor overshadow their aristocratic mediocrity by the massive proportions of his 
glory.26 
 
The editorial line taken by The Times can be seen in the context of mid-century 
criticism of aristocratic patronage, and the opportunity presented by the Mutiny—in 
which several middle-class men were pre-eminent—to press for further reform. Many 
of the victorious generals had proved that military prowess and qualities of leadership 
were not confined to the aristocracy: none of Havelock, Campbell, Neill and Nicholson 
had advanced his career by wealth or patronage.27  
 
The crown was not of course the sole source of honours that a Mutiny hero might 
receive. In March 1858, the Corporation of the City of London voted the freedom of the 
city to Lawrence. Its resolution, like the East India Company’s pension award, 
emphasised Lawrence’s heroic deeds.28 However, the addresses made in support of the 
                                                            
26 Times, 26 Apr. 1859, p. 6.  
27 Spiers, The Army and Society, p. 133.  
28 The resolution read as follows: ‘That the freedom of this city be voted to Sir John Lawrence, the Chief 
Commissioner of the Punjab, for the energy manifested by him in crushing the mutinous spirit of the 
Bengal regiments in the Punjab, and for his prompt exertions in maturing the preparations which led 
to the capture of Delhi and the safety of our positions in the north-west of India.’ Meeting of the 
Corporation of the City of London, 4 March 1858, reported in Times, 5 March 1858, p. 10 (hereafter, 
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resolution set great store by Lawrence’s humble social origins. For here was proof that 
‘a middle-class man’ had ‘conferred the greatest benefits upon his country. (Hear, 
hear.)’ The Corporation argued that men of proven merit should have even greater 
administrative responsibilities in India; that the government of India should ‘not be 
intrusted to hands merely because of their connexions and their aristocratic influence’.29 
 
Lawrence and Christianity  
The Corporation of London had also been impressed by Lawrence’s Christian faith. It 
observed that although most British officials had ‘systematically ignored the existence 
of our own religion’, and discouraged its profession among the natives of India, Sir 
John Lawrence had taken the opposite view.30 The Grocers’ Company had made similar 
remarks when presenting the freedom of their guild to Lawrence, partly attributing his 
Mutiny successes to his ‘reliance on the Giver of all Wisdom’.31 There was also a belief 
among some Britons that Lawrence’s role in suppressing the revolt had a providential 
explanation, as was made explicit when he received the freedom of the city of Glasgow. 
For precisely at the moment ‘when we almost feared that our Indian possessions were to 
be torn from us—then did Sir John Lawrence, under Providence, prove himself the 
“saviour of India.” (Great applause).’32 This providential narrative had been a striking 
feature of a meeting in London in June 1859, the purpose of which was the presentation 
of an address to Lawrence. The address bore over seven thousand signatures, including 
those of three archbishops, twenty bishops, twenty-eight peers, seventy-one members of 
the House of Commons, a large number of military and naval officers, civil servants, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
‘Meeting of the Corporation of London, 4 March 1858’). 
29 Speech by Deputy Dakin, Meeting of the Corporation of London, 4 March 1858. 
30 Speech by Deputy Dakin, Meeting of the Corporation of London, 4 March 1858. 
31 Times, 14 July 1859, p. 12. 
32 Presentation of the freedom of the city of Glasgow to Sir John Lawrence, 21 Sept. 1860, reported in 
Glasgow Herald, 22 Sept. 1860, p. 3.  
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and three hundred mayors and provosts, from all parts of the country. The meeting had 
been convened by the Evangelical Alliance, and was chaired by the Bishop of London.33 
The address declared that: 
 
In you, Sir John, we, in common with the great body of your fellow-countrymen, gratefully 
recognize the instrument raised up by an all-wise Providence, to bear a part equal, if not 
superior, to that of any living man in this never-to-be-forgotten service to the British nation.34  
 
The address elevated and yet subordinated Lawrence’s actions in suppressing the 
Mutiny: thanks were naturally due to the ‘Supreme Ruler of all events’, who first placed 
Lawrence in the Punjab and who then used him ‘as the instrument by which the 
ascendancy of a Christian Power was maintained in a large portion of the continent of 
Asia.’35 This interpretation of events was subsequently adopted by Reverend James 
Ellis, in his biography of Lawrence. Ellis presented his subject as a ‘vessel’ chosen by 
God in order to preserve an empire.36 Lawrence for his part was quick to acknowledge 
God’s intervention on the British side. Responding to the address presented to him at 
the Evangelical Alliance meeting, he stated his opinion that Britain’s ultimate victory 
‘against the fearful odds which beset us was alone the work of the great God who so 
mercifully vouchsafed His protection. Nothing but a series of miracles saved us. To 
Him, therefore, alone is the glory due.’37    
 
                                                            
33 Meeting convened by the Evangelical Alliance, London, 24 June 1859, reported in Times, 25 June 
1859, p. 11 (hereafter, the ‘Evangelical Alliance Meeting, 24 June 1859). Sir Richard Temple 
provides some further details: the Bishop of London was Archibald Campbell Tait, afterwards 
Archbishop of Canterbury. Temple, Lord Lawrence, p. 138. 
34 Extract of address read by the Bishop of London, Evangelical Alliance Meeting, 24 June 1859. 
35 Speech of the Bishop of London, Evangelical Alliance Meeting, 24 June 1859. 
36 The term ‘chosen vessel’ was used in the bible to describe St. Paul (Acts IX.) The word ‘vessel’ in 
this context denotes that which is made for some use, and is absolutely helpless and dead except so far 
as it is applied to such use. Ellis, Lord Lawrence, p. 9.  
37 Speech of Sir John Lawrence, Evangelical Alliance Meeting, 24 June 1859. 
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The determination among Christians to praise a fellow-believer who had played such a 
prominent part in the Mutiny may be understood as a defensive response to a perception 
that the religious fervour of some officials and missionaries was a principal cause of the 
revolt. Christians were aware that the post-Mutiny official preference for ‘conciliation’ 
in place of reforming zeal risked derailing many of their projects in India. The Queen’s 
Proclamation, assuming the government of India for the crown, had repudiated any 
‘desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects,’ and enjoined the authorities to 
abstain from interference with the religious beliefs of the people of India.38 As well as 
this official reaction, Christians were confronted by declining popular enthusiasm for 
missionary work.39 Nevertheless, the missionaries still formed a powerful body of 
opinion with a popular appeal, as is evident from their campaign for a ‘Christian policy’ 
in post-Mutiny India. The missionaries denied that an open profession of Christianity by 
the government involved any political danger; indeed they insisted that a Christian 
policy was the best way of avoiding future outbursts of rebellion. One of the specific 
measures they advocated was the introduction of the bible in Indian government 
schools. Successive secretaries of state firmly opposed all such schemes, as did many 
British officials in India, and even some churchmen. Only in the Punjab did officials 
support the missionary programme.40 
 
Lawrence himself was one such supporter. In April 1858 he sent a despatch on 
‘Christianity in India’ to the government of India, in which he argued that the bible 
ought to be taught in government schools to all those ‘willing to receive it’, but should 
                                                            
38 Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt, p. 108. 
39 During the 1860s, popular enthusiasm for missionary work was declining steadily: the C.M.S. 
(Church Missionary Society), the largest Anglican body in India, obtained almost no new recruits for 
the Indian mission field. While the number of missionaries on the rolls in India rose from 54 to 107 
during the 1850s, it stood at only 109 in 1871. The total membership and average annual income of 
the C.M.S. were equally stagnant: Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt, p. 97. 
40 Metcalf, The Aftermath of Revolt, pp. 98-102, 106. 
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not be obligatory. Lawrence sought to distance himself from the more extreme views of 
some of his subordinates in the Punjab administration, and argued that the power of 
government should not be used as an engine of proselytism, and that Christianity should 
not be propagated by secular rewards, force, or persecution. However, Lawrence 
insisted that ‘Christian things done in a Christian way’ would never alienate the people 
of India. On the contrary, he stated that it was only ‘when unchristian things are done in 
the name of Christianity, or when Christian things are done in an unchristian way, that 
mischief and danger are occasioned’.41 
 
Lawrence’s despatch was subsequently made public and was received favourably in the 
columns of The Times.42 The reception of his public statements was perhaps 
understandably warmest among evangelicals. Gratefully repeating Lawrence’s 
statement about ‘Christian things done in a Christian way’, the Bishop of London 
eulogised these ‘memorable words’. Well might evangelicals have offered their ‘fervent 
prayer... that God may long preserve your life, and still continue to employ you as a 
great instrument of the public good.’43 Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Edwardes was well 
placed to understand the sense of marginalisation felt by some Christians in the wake of 
the Mutiny. Edwardes was a friend of Lawrence, one of his subordinates in the Punjab 
administration, and known to the public in Britain for his daring military exploits in 
India.44 Edwardes was an evangelical with robust views on the merits of implementing 
                                                            
41 Despatch of Sir John Lawrence to the government of India on Christianity in India, 21 Apr. 1858, no. 
720, reproduced in Occasional Papers on India, V (1858), Knowsley Pamphlet Collection, (hereafter, 
the ‘Lawrence Despatch on Christianity in India’), pp. 2, 5, 10.  
42 ‘By an open profession of Christianity and an open performance of Christian things in a Christian way 
we should have offended no one; by a mistaken reserve we have suggested delusions and created 
alarms.’ Times, 25 June 1859, p. 9. 
43 Evangelical Alliance Meeting, 24 June 1859. 
44  Edwardes, Sir Herbert Benjamin (1819-68), army and political officer in India. Edwardes achieved 
public renown for defeating a military insurrection at Multan (1848), after which he was made CB, 
thanked by both Houses of parliament and awarded an Oxford DCL. He took ‘prompt and decisive 
action to maintain British authority’ in the Punjab during the Mutiny, was made KCB (1860), and 
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Christian policies in India. Many of his proposals had been rejected by the British 
authorities, and proved too extreme even for many Christians (including Lawrence 
himself in some cases). But Edwardes was able to grasp the essence of Lawrence’s 
appeal to Christian audiences. In 1860 he published a biographical sketch in the Leisure 
Hour, in which he explained why Lawrence was such an alluring figure for British 
Christians. For when men recommended to officials that Christian measures should be 
adopted in India:  
 
they were told that they were fanatics—–well-intentioned, no doubt, but still fanatics, who were 
utterly ignorant about India, and recklessly wanted to carry their miserable rushlight into the 
heart of an imperial magazine. To such arguments the religious community at home had been 
hitherto obliged to submit in silence. But now there had come an end of all that. The one 
governor in India who, in the fiery trial of 1857, had been found master of the occasion, 
celebrated justly for many high and noble qualities, was celebrated above all for this, that he 
was no enthusiast, but rather a hard practical man, the sober genius of common sense—this 
oracle of official life had spoken from out of the very pigeon-holes of tradition, and declared it 
safe to do our duty.45 
 
Christians acclaiming Lawrence were seeking to acclaim the power of their own 
religion. For anything that raised Lawrence, a prominent Christian, in public esteem 
would naturally reflect well on Christianity. It seems reasonable to speculate that this 
was at least part of the motivation for the Evangelical Alliance presentation to 
                                                                                                                                                                              
received a Cambridge LLD. He was commissioner of Ambala and agent for the Cis-Sutlej states 
(1862-64). An evangelical, he pressed the government of India to promote Christianity in India and 
was later vice-president of the Church Missionary Society. Edwardes was made KCSI in 1866, and 
promoted major-general in 1868: T.R. Moreman, ‘Edwardes, Sir Herbert Benjamin (1819-1868)’, 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. May 2007). 
45 Lieutenant-Colonel H.B. Edwardes, ‘Sir John Lawrence, G.C.B.’, Leisure Hour, 419 (5 Jan. 1860), 12 
(emphasis in original). 
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Lawrence, and also for the acts of certain individuals and their efforts to bring even 
greater public attention to Lawrence’s exploits. Arthur Kinnaird provides one such 
example. Kinnaird was at this time the Liberal MP for Perth, and spoke frequently on 
Indian questions. He was also a devout evangelical.46 Kinnaird, doubtless mindful that 
Lawrence was not only faithful to the evangelical cause but a great asset to it, on several 
occasions sought to promote Lawrence’s Mutiny exploits. In April 1859, The Times 
published a letter from Kinnaird urging the government to confer a peerage on 
Lawrence. In his letter, Kinnaird explained that Lord Dalhousie (governor-general of 
India, 1848-56) had offered Lawrence a baronetcy a year before the Mutiny broke out. 
As Lawrence’s previous services had therefore already merited that honour, the 
baronetcy accepted by Lawrence in 1859 could not be said to be in recognition of his 
Mutiny services.47 Kinnaird also used his position in the House of Commons to press 
the government to confer a peerage on Lawrence.48 The relationship between Kinnaird 
and Lawrence is not clear. It seems unlikely that they were acquainted while Lawrence 
was serving in India, but they certainly met on Lawrence’s return after the Mutiny, and 
Kinnaird appeared with Lawrence at the presentation of the freedom of the city of 
Glasgow.49 It seems however that Kinnaird pressed for Lawrence’s claims to a peerage 
not on the grounds of personal friendship, but on the basis of his merits as a Christian 
hero of the Mutiny.  
 
                                                            
46 Kinnaird, Arthur Fitzgerald, 10th Lord Kinnaird of Inchture and 2nd Baron Kinnaird of Rossie (1814-
87): philanthropist, evangelical, banker, politician. Kinnaird was Liberal MP for Perth (1837-39 & 
1852-78). Succeeded his brother Lord Kinnaird (1878). He was ‘a familiar figure’ at the May 
meetings of the evangelical societies at Exeter Hall. F. Prochaska, ‘Kinnaird, Arthur Fitzgerald, tenth 
Lord Kinnaird of Inchture and second Baron Kinnaird of Rossie (1814-1887)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed.). 
47 Kinnaird to editor, Times, 12 Apr. 1859, p. 11. Kinnaird was correct in making this assertion about the 
previous offer of a baronetcy to Lawrence: see Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. II, p. 363. 
48 Hansard, 151 (26 July 1858), col. 2125. 
49  Glasgow Herald, 22 Sept. 1860, p. 3. 
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Character, manliness and duty 
In his biographical portrait of Lawrence in the Leisure Hour, Edwardes sought to 
emphasise his friend’s virtues of manliness and simplicity. Edwardes started by setting 
out Lawrence’s full name and title, as the Herald’s College would have written it: ‘Sir 
John Laird Mair Lawrence, Baronet, Knight Grand Cross of the Bath, and Member of 
Her Majesty’s Privy Council’. Edwardes then explained that to every Englishman in 
India, the subject of his article was ‘plain John Lawrence’. This plainness was, for 
Edwardes, a characteristic Lawrence shared with other great men. ‘So it ever is with 
really great men. We, in our gratitude, bind wreaths around their brows, heap titles on 
their heads, and fling heavy robes of office around their limbs; but they just shake 
themselves, and are men again.’ Edwardes depicted Lawrence as an extremely rugged 
administrator, comfortable in the wild and among Indians; ‘emphatically a man’.50 In 
one passage, Edwardes described the end of a typical day during the period when 
Lawrence worked as a settlement officer: 
 
Work over, out into the fields with horse or gun, for his strong frame and hardy spirit loved wild 
sports. But ever an eye to business: some jungle lair of cut-throats to be explored... And so 
home at sunset, with fine appetite for the simple meal... After that, more air (for the nights are 
hot,) an easy chair outside in the bright moonlight, with our large John in it, without coat or 
waistcoat, and shirt sleeves up over his elbows... altogether much at home; a giant in the act of 
refreshment. One by one the grey-beards of the district drop in too... and squat Eastern fashion 
on their heels and ankles, in a respectfully feudal ring, about their Saxon khan...51  
 
A number of important themes are evident from this short passage: the simplicity and 
                                                            
50 Edwardes, ‘Sir John Lawrence, G.C.B.’, 8 (emphasis in the original, in each case). 
51 Edwardes, ‘Sir John Lawrence, G.C.B.’, 10. 
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plainness of John’s meal and attire; his personal courage (exploring the ‘jungle lair of 
cut-throats’, alone); his sense of duty (‘ever an eye to business’); his isolation (the only 
white man in the sketch); and his personal authority (the native elders or ‘grey-beards’ 
squat around him, ‘in a respectfully feudal ring’). The description presented by 
Edwardes is likely to have resonated with contemporary interest in manliness, duty and 
character. The qualities invoked by ‘character’ were self-restraint, perseverance, 
strenuous effort, courage in the face of adversity, and duty.52 Courage in adversity was 
easier for domestic audiences to imagine if the individual was isolated in some way.53 
British officers in the Punjab were certainly isolated, as the above passage from 
Edwardes made clear. For the Georgian gentleman, the most prized human qualities 
could only be developed in the enjoyment of ‘society’, whereas for the respectable 
Victorian, work was the chief sphere in which moral worth was developed and 
displayed.54 Edwardes described Lawrence as a ‘colossal workman’, who as chief 
commissioner of the Punjab undertook years of ‘Herculean labour’.55 Later biographers 
would amplify these themes. Sir Richard Temple for example wrote that the Punjab was 
the hardest place for officers to work: its Muslim and Sikh inhabitants were ‘quite the 
strongest, manliest and sturdiest that the British had ever had to deal with in India’. 
Moreover, Temple characterised the eight hundred mile border with Afghanistan as ‘the 
most arduous frontier in the Eastern empire.’56 
 
Lawrence and ‘good government’ 
The providential narrative, emphasising the role of God, was not the only explanation 
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offered to contemporaries for Lawrence’s resilience during the Mutiny. Another 
explanation, complementary to the providential version of events, was that the Sikhs 
and Muslims of the Punjab had come to Lawrence’s standard in 1857 because his 
administration had been so good. This account helped explain what was otherwise a 
conundrum: how the Punjab, which in the spring of 1857 had appeared to be the most 
vulnerable province, had in fact proved the foundation of British victory. Public 
attention was accordingly directed to the administration of the Punjab from its 
annexation in 1849 to the outbreak of Mutiny in 1857. Britons were presented with 
reverential descriptions of how a ‘nation of soldiers’ (the Sikhs before annexation) had 
‘literally, in the expressive language of Scripture, beat their swords into ploughshares, 
and their spears into pruning-hooks... (Cheers.)’57 The contrast between the ‘two 
Punjabs’ (before and after annexation) was deemed remarkable: where before there had 
been a desert, Sikh yeomen now ‘stood waist-deep in the exuberant harvest’.58 It was 
this that explained ‘the extraordinary and unique spectacle of a recently conquered 
people drawing the sword in the defence of those by whom they had been subdued.’59 
Contemporaries were thus repeatedly presented with the idea that the Punjab’s 
resilience during the Mutiny was in part a natural result of Lawrence’s beneficent 
administration. This argument seems to have been accepted by some Britons, including 
men in the Corporation of London: ‘the government of Sir John Lawrence was so 
popular that where rebels escaped they were hunted up by the natives and were brought 
back to receive condign punishment. (Hear, hear.)’60 
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Lawrence himself placed great emphasis on the idea that the ‘good government’ of his 
province, with its paternalistic concern for ‘improving the condition of the people’, to a 
great extent explained the Punjab’s resilience during the crisis of 1857-58. As he 
explained in a speech to the Corporation of London in June 1859, on the occasion of his 
presentation with the freedom of the city: 
 
If I was placed in a position of extreme danger and difficulty, I was also fortunate in having 
around me some of the ablest civil and military officers in India. In times of peace we had 
worked so as to be prepared for times of commotion and danger. We had laboured to introduce 
into a new country order, law, and system. Our object had been to improve the condition of the 
people, and obtain their goodwill and sympathies, and hence it happened that, by God’s help, 
we were able to meet the storm which must have otherwise overwhelmed us all. (Loud 
cheering.)61  
 
On this occasion, Lawrence placed less emphasis on the role of divine providence than 
in his address to the Evangelical Alliance. Although he changed the emphasis of his 
arguments to suit the particular audience, he nonetheless continued to include ‘God’s 
help’ as part of his account. There is no suggestion that his religious faith was anything 
other than sincere. But the principal message in the above passage is that a beneficent 
administration, carried out by a small number of British officers in the Punjab, had 
saved India. This was doubtless an attractive narrative for many contemporary Britons. 
It was certainly more flattering to the way they imagined the empire in India than less 
palatable truths about the suppression of the Mutiny. The resilience of the Punjab had in 
fact depended to a great extent on sheer military force, the threat of that force, 
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intimidation through severe measures of retribution and the exploitation of racial 
divisions between Hindus and Sikhs.62 In avoiding mention of these topics, Lawrence 
was following an approach taken in almost all contemporary British accounts of the 
Mutiny. In the same way, technical advantages enjoyed by the victors—such as the 
electric telegraph and Enfield rifle—were barely mentioned in many accounts of the 
conflict. The vital role played by Indian troops fighting on the British side was also 
often overlooked.63 Lawrence’s account of victory also fitted a prevailing notion that 
natives could be ruled through the power of personality, and without evident resort to 
force.64 Again, this was a more palatable idea than relating how Indians had been 
‘blown away’ from guns (a common practice), or discussing details of divide et impera, 
such as the decision to send Hindu troops to parts of the Punjab where the Sikh 
population was naturally hostile to them. 
 
Kathryn Tidrick has argued that John was ‘never admired as extravagantly’ as his 
brother Sir Henry Lawrence, because ‘he did not possess, as Henry was thought to do, 
the supreme quality of effortless dominion over native races. His achievements had no 
mystery. They were too evidently the result of intelligence, endurance, strong nerves, 
and hard work.’65 Certainly, Lawrence’s ‘Herculean labour’ in the Punjab was well 
publicised after the Mutiny, and is likely to have resonated with Victorian attitudes to 
work. However, recognition of Lawrence’s hard work seems to have been accompanied 
by admiration for his personal influence. R.D. Mangles, a director and later chairman of 
the East India Company, observed that if Lawrence’s Punjab administration ‘had not 
been equally just and firm; if he had not won for himself the affections of the people, he 
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never could have denuded so great a province, which had been so lately conquered, of 
those troops which he sent to Delhi. Great indeed must have been the influence which 
he gained over the Sikhs.’66 Robert Cust subsequently took this point even further, 
describing a man with the touch of a conjurer: for John Lawrence had ‘found the Panjab 
a den of wild beasts, and left it an orderly garden’.67 The perceived instrumentality of 
Lawrence’s personal influence had a long afterlife. In 1904 an Indian professor defined 
what was meant by the term ‘saviour of India’, and here there was no mention of God, 
military superiority, or Lawrence’s subordinates in the Punjab: 
 
It is the opinion of many men that it was only the strong mind of Lord Lawrence that so 
influenced the Sikhs of the Punjab that, while other provinces had broken out in rebellion, that 
province remained faithful and loyal to the British Government. If the Sikhs, too, had risen in 
rebellion, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for the British Government to preserve 
a footing on the soil of India. Hence Lord Lawrence was the saviour of India.68 
 
Lawrence and clemency 
In suppressing revolt in the Punjab, Lawrence carried out severe measures of 
retribution. Yet an important part of his appeal to British audiences in the wake of the 
Mutiny was his perceived clemency. This is not necessarily a contradiction, for 
Lawrence’s actions must be understood in the context of the behaviour of his 
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compatriots in India and in the context of the specific period, that is to say the crisis of 
1857-58. A febrile atmosphere developed in many sections of the British community in 
India (and at home) following reports of atrocities, including rape, committed by Indian 
rebels against British women and children. It should be remembered that the governor-
general’s nickname ‘Clemency Canning’ was initially used not in reverence but 
reproach. A letter Lawrence received from Herbert Edwardes on 1 June 1857 sheds 
light on the prevailing atmosphere in Anglo-India. Edwardes’s letter revealed plans for 
the execution of all one hundred and twenty men from a Bengal army regiment. 
Lawrence replied to Edwardes by the next post, urging him to reconsider: ‘I would not 
put them all to death. I do not think that we shall be justified in the eyes of the Almighty 
in doing so.’ Lawrence suggested that executing one-fourth to one-third of the men 
would suffice, as this would demonstrate to the Indian sepoys ‘that we punish to deter, 
and not for revenge… Otherwise, men will fight desperately to the last, as certain they 
must die.’69 In the event forty men, rather than one hundred and twenty, were ‘blown 
away’ in the presence of the Peshawar garrison and spectators from the surrounding 
country.70 Following the recapture of Delhi, the British perpetrated acts of vengeance 
including summary executions for over four months, before Lawrence took the city 
under his charge (in February 1858) and ‘effectively checked’ them.71 Moreover, 
Lawrence’s reputation for clemency was based on the fact that he had advocated an 
amnesty for the rebels from an early stage. He wrote to Lord Canning in February 1858, 
setting out his views: 
 
My Lord, — I do not know whether you may feel disposed or not to grant anything like an 
amnesty in favour of the least guilty of the mutineers and insurgents in Oude and elsewhere. But 
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I feel persuaded that such a measure would be very politic. It is much easier for people to 
advocate the destruction of all offenders, than to show how this can be effected. Now that we 
have taken Delhi, beaten every large body of mutineers in the field, and are prepared to enter 
Oude again in force, we should simplify matters much if we issued a proclamation declaring 
that those mutineers who have not murdered their officers, or women or children, and who gave 
up their arms shall be allowed to go to their homes and live unmolested... We could then deal 
more easily with the desperate characters. At present, all are held together from the very 
desperation of their condition… we should not also forget that, as a ruling power, we have also 
our shortcomings and want of foresight to answer for. We placed temptation and opportunity 
before the mutineers, which it was difficult to resist. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, committed 
themselves simply from the force of circumstances; on the one hand threatened with fire and 
sword if they refused; on the other, plunder and social advantages were pressed on them. Many 
hesitated long, but seeing no vitality in our power, no prospect of succour, they concluded that 
the game was up, and began to act for themselves.72 
 
His letter to Canning shows that Lawrence favoured an amnesty partly on grounds of 
pragmatism: without one, the Mutiny would become a protracted affair, only 
undermining British authority in the eyes of Indian observers. (The amnesty was 
eventually conceded late in 1858.73) Lawrence’s perceived clemency certainly 
impressed his Christian admirers, who emphasised its religious motivation rather than 
its pragmatism. Kinnaird hailed Lawrence as a man: ‘who knew how to be severe when 
severity was necessary to render English life secure and British authority supreme, but 
when our enemy was vanquished knew how to show mercy and to shop the shedding of 
blood’.74 Lawrence’s biographers were also eager to emphasise this clemency. As well 
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as allowing these men to acclaim Lawrence’s sense of ‘justice’ and ‘humanity’, it 
allowed broader conclusions to be drawn about British imperialism, especially when 
contrasted with older colonial powers. This comparison proved irresistible to the 
classical scholar Reginald Bosworth Smith: 
  
That the mosques of Delhi were not desecrated; that the inhabitants were not left to shift for 
themselves as homeless outcasts; that the whole city, with its glorious buildings and its historic 
memories, was not levelled with the ground, and the plough driven over its site; in one word, 
that the lasting shame emblazoned in letters of blood and fire in the annals of Imperial Rome, by 
her ruthless destruction of Carthage and of Corinth, is not written in equally indelible characters 
in the annals of English rule in India, was due, in great part at least, to the justice and the 
humanity, the statesmanship and the Christian spirit of John Lawrence.75 
 
Bosworth Smith was of course Lawrence’s official biographer and presented his subject 
in a flattering light. However, a number of modern scholars have made the same point 
about Lawrence’s instrumentality in arresting the indiscriminate killing perpetrated by 
many of his compatriots.76 In this sense, Lawrence was not merely the ‘saviour of India’ 
but the saviour of Britain’s reputation and its ability to claim a moral legitimacy to 
govern Indians. 
 
How these depictions of Lawrence were actually received is of course difficult to 
measure. Kathryn Tidrick has suggested that although Lawrence became a popular hero 
in Britain, his contribution to the preservation of British India was not in fact fully 
appreciated by the public. This, Tidrick asserts, was because Lawrence’s own 
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statements about ‘good government’ and his faithful subordinates in the Punjab shifted 
attention towards the band of brothers working under him.77 It is difficult however to be 
this exact. The evidence from contemporary newspaper reports certainly suggests that 
Lawrence was very popular in the years after the Mutiny: on public occasions he was 
usually received with loud cheering and jubilation (for example at meetings of the 
Evangelical Alliance, Corporation of London, and Grocers’ Company). Moreover, 
numerous publishers perceived that a variety of material about Lawrence would be 
popular. This material included images of the ‘saviour of India’, thus offering Britons 
the opportunity to glimpse a man about whom so much was being written. In 1858, the 
Illustrated London News reproduced some woodcuts of Lawrence.78 The article by 
Edwardes in the Leisure Hour included a full-page portrait, in which Lawrence appears 
as a physically imposing man, with a somewhat serious, stern face.79 From October 
1859, a wax model of Lawrence was displayed at Madame Tussaud’s in London. The 
Radical Reynolds’s Newspaper was certainly impressed by this model: it had ‘very 
appropriately’ been placed as a companion to the figures of Generals Havelock and 
Campbell, and apparently no expense had been spared by the proprietor and no labour 
by the artist in order to procure an accurate portrait. The happy result was ‘one of the 
best modelled figures in the collection’.80  
 
Dissenting voices 
At the East India Company meeting of August 1858, two men had opposed the 
resolution granting a pension to Lawrence. The first man, one ‘Mr. Crawshay’, alleged 
that the directors were acting ‘in collusion’ with The Times in seeking to secure a 
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peerage for Lawrence. The speaker was almost certainly George Crawshay, variously an 
ironmaster, Radical political activist, and stockholder in the East India Company.81 
Crawshay accused Lawrence of disobeying the orders of the Company by seeking to 
convert Indians to Christianity.82 He further accused Lawrence of committing ‘atrocious 
acts of cruelty’ in suppressing revolt in the Punjab, citing as evidence certain statements 
published in an account by Frederick Cooper.83 Crawshay’s attempt to amend the 
proposed resolution received the support of only one other proprietor. The original 
resolution was thus agreed to, amidst cheering.84 Crawshay’s voice was clearly a 
marginal one, but it nonetheless demonstrates that not all contemporaries accepted 
Lawrence’s account of how the Mutiny was suppressed in the Punjab by good 
government, good men and God’s grace.  
 
Lawrence’s reputation as an evangelical also led to criticism from some publications in 
Britain. The following month an article appeared in the Saturday Review, responding to 
certain proposals on which Lawrence and Herbert Edwardes were agreed: that Bible 
classes could safely be established in Indian government schools, and that religious 
processions should be prohibited throughout India. The Saturday Review argued that on 
these points the great majority of Anglo-Indians took contrary views to Lawrence and 
Edwardes. Lawrence’s ‘error’, according to the article, was that he thought what could 
be achieved by force in the Punjab was possible in all other parts of India. Although the 
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country owed a ‘vast debt’ to Lawrence, ‘his peculiar situation’ (the number of troops 
he wielded in the Punjab) apparently prevented his judgement being conclusive.85 In a 
later piece, the Saturday Review regretted the likelihood that the ‘Exeter Hall people’ 
would seek to raise Lawrence as an instrument in their enthusiasm for ‘the cause of 
Blood and Bibles’ (that is to say, measures of ‘severity’ and a ‘proselytising’ policy).86  
 
Government ministers in Britain may also have been wary of Lawrence’s reputation for 
religious zeal. The peerage that many prominent East India Company officials, 
evangelicals and newspaper columnists had agitated for was not granted to Lawrence. 
Several considerations may have played a part in this decision. For example, the 
directors of the East India Company understood from conversations with government 
ministers such as Lord Stanley that it was more difficult for the Queen to confer 
peerages on the civilian heroes of the Mutiny. When Delhi was captured honours were 
bestowed on military officers, as they were after the relief of Lucknow; but no honours 
were conferred on civilians (except awards in the order of the Bath).87 An official 
explanation was not provided, but when Arthur Kinnaird pressed Lord Stanley in 
parliament on the matter, Stanley enumerated the various honours Lawrence had 
already received.88 It is possible therefore that the government simply determined that 
no further honours were required in Lawrence’s case. Lawrence certainly received 
considerable official recognition for his Mutiny exploits: promotion to GCB, the thanks 
of both Houses of parliament, Privy Counsellorship, an East India Company pension 
(allowing him to accept a previously offered baronetcy), and promotion to lieutenant-
governor. However, it is hard to avoid the sense—especially given the government’s 
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post-Mutiny emphasis on religious toleration in British India—that Lawrence’s 
reputation as an evangelical possibly denied him a peerage. 
 
The government also chose not to appoint Lawrence as governor-general in succession 
to Earl Canning in 1862. Instead the Earl of Elgin was preferred. Elgin came from an 
old aristocratic family and had experience of imperial administration in Canada and 
China, but knew nothing of India.89 Elgin’s tenure was to prove short: he died in 
November 1863, en route to Peshawar. David Steele has suggested that Lawrence’s 
‘evangelical bent’, together with the ‘offence’ given by his views on the deficiencies of 
the British military and on army reform in India, counted against him when the 
government was considering who should succeed Elgin.90 (Lawrence had argued 
forcefully for the irregular system, which allowed Indians more responsibility for 
commanding their own men and was unpopular with many in the British military 
establishment.) However, Lawrence was appointed to succeed Lord Elgin.  
 
It is worth emphasising just how remarkable this decision was. There was something of 
a convention that no servant of the East India Company could serve as governor-general 
of India. There was also an expectation that the governor-general must be a peer, and 
must have gained political experience in Britain or the empire. Lawrence’s candidature 
may have been strengthened by the coincidence of Elgin’s death with an expedition on 
the north-west frontier of India (the Ambela, or Sitana, war; this will be examined in the 
next chapter). Nonetheless, that Lawrence was appointed without satisfying any of the 
normal criteria indicates his standing after the Mutiny. The secretary of state for India, 
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Sir Charles Wood, later told the House of Commons that he knew ‘no one better fitted 
to undertake the Government of India’.91 The government had also been quick to seek a 
little political credit from this merit-based appointment. Wood had therefore reminded 
parliament that Lawrence ‘had raised himself to his present high position unaided and 
unassisted by any extraneous influence, and entirely by the force of his own character 
and abilities.’92 This emphasis on ‘character’ was consistent with opposition to the 
politics of patronage and the idea that ‘true worth’ was unrelated to social position.93 As 
Colonel William Sykes acknowledged, it was ‘creditable to the Government’ that they 
had selected Lawrence, ‘considering that the Viceroyalty of India was such an object of 
ambition to the great families of this country.’94  
 
Reynolds’s Newspaper marvelled at this ‘unexpected plunge from the lofty aristocratic 
cliffs on which the former chief rulers of India were wont to be taken, into the depths of 
middle-class life’. The newspaper explained to its working-class audience that this was 
an excellent appointment for British India, because it provided ‘her with so able and 
experienced a man’. However, Reynolds’s Newspaper was not prepared to give the 
government any credit for a merit-based selection, arguing that it was a middle-class 
appointment by default, because British aristocrats were simply ‘too precious to have 
their lives risked in such a place.’ The paper explained that the Indian climate and a 
governor-general’s duties were not conducive to longevity, and had proved fatal to the 
previous three incumbents: Dalhousie, Canning, and Elgin.95  
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Lawrence as governor-general of India 
On 12 January 1864, Sir John Lawrence returned to India, this time as governor-
general. From this moment he was subjected to more frequent and more intensive 
criticism, especially from within the British community in India. His reputation as an 
evangelical was problematic almost immediately, when he prohibited the Hindu practice 
of throwing their dead into the river Hooghly. For Lawrence, this was a pragmatic 
decision based on the requirements of sanitation (he had just established a sanitary 
commission), but the order was criticised by some of his compatriots as the 
consequence of his religious zeal.96 
 
From 1864, a new criticism of Lawrence emerged. Some Anglo-Indians found 
Lawrence’s manner too austere for the splendid office of governor-general, and 
newspaper correspondents complained about the ‘plainness’ of his rule. As one of his 
biographers later wrote, with considerable understatement, British India was ‘a country 
where external style is much considered’.97 Yet only rarely did Lawrence indulge in the 
sort of pomp that was expected of the governor-general. After the 1866 durbar at Agra, 
the Calcutta correspondent of The Times was relieved that at last ‘Sir John Lawrence 
has, in outward pomp and glittering display of our power, shown himself equal to the 
high office of Her Majesty’s Viceroy.’98 However, even on that occasion, sections of 
the British press regretted that Lawrence’s address to the native chiefs had been ‘unduly 
austere’, and he felt the need to justify his remarks to the secretary of state.99 The 
following month Lawrence was attacked in the Anglo-Indian press for his allegedly 
‘shabby treatment’ of the visiting Duc D’Alençon. Lawrence wrote to the secretary of 
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state, explaining there was ‘not an iota of truth’ in such reports.100 In defending his 
actions, the ‘autocrat of the Punjab’ displayed a sensitivity to press criticism that will be 
examined in chapter VI. British ‘society’ in Calcutta seems to have compared Lawrence 
unfavourably with his aristocratic predecessors, and Reginald Bosworth Smith sought to 
counter allegations of ‘bad manners and parsimony’ in his subject’s viceregal 
hospitality.101 
 
An example of how Lawrence may have been perceived by some Anglo-Indians, 
especially those from outside the Punjab, is provided in the memoirs of John Beames. 
Beames worked in the Indian civil service, almost exclusively in Bengal (1861-93). The 
evidence presented by Beames is problematic: although he made some notes while 
serving in India, his account was written from memory in 1896, once he had returned to 
England. He also claimed that Lawrence had checked his career, and seems to have 
borne a grudge.102 Nonetheless, it is interesting that he depicted Lawrence as ‘a rough, 
coarse man; in appearance more like a “navvy” than a gentleman’. Beames recounts that 
a colleague of his ‘imprudently’ brought a piano with him to the Punjab; Lawrence 
apparently found this an ‘unpardonable refinement’ for an officer, and said he would 
smash it.103 Beames offered this description of Lawrence’s puritanical tastes: 
 
His ideal of a district officer was a hard, active man in boots and breeches, who almost lived in 
the saddle, worked all day and nearly all night, ate and drank when and where he could, had no 
family ties, no wife or children to hamper him, and whose whole establishment consisted of a 
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camp bed, an odd table and chair or so and a small box of clothes such as could be slung on a 
camel.104  
 
It seems likely that Beames’s anecdotes about Lawrence were somewhat exaggerated, 
and it is clear he resented a man who had attended the same school (the East India 
Company college at Haileybury) but gone on to such high office. Nonetheless, it also 
seems likely that this characterisation, although exaggerated, to some extent reflected a 
perception among some contemporaries that Lawrence was too austere. The sensitivities 
of the reader are of course relevant to how these messages would have been received: to 
his biographers his simplicity and plainness remained virtues.105 Herbert Edwardes, in 
his reverential article in the Leisure Hour, might happily have used a description not too 
dissimilar from that provided by Beames; but in praise not criticism of his subject. 
However, there was clearly a difference between the qualities British audiences could 
celebrate in a settlement officer or provincial administrator and the qualities those same 
audiences expected of the governor-general. After the Mutiny, the governor-general was 
styled ‘viceroy and governor-general of India’. As viceroy—the Queen’s representative 
in India—he was required to entertain splendidly. Criticism of Lawrence’s ‘plainness’ 
was very likely exaggerated: for example the ‘puritan’ of the Punjab seemed happy 
enough to wear the star and riband of his GCB.106 But after the end of his term in India, 
the social background of viceroys seemed to be more important than ever, and the four 
men who followed Lawrence were all aristocrats.107  
                                                            
104 Beames, Memoirs of a Bengal Civilian, p. 102.  
105  Reverend Ellis for instance seemed to relish the fact that Lawrence’s ‘simple manners and 
Cromwellian bearing offended some of the empty nobodies of Calcutta.’ Ellis described with obvious 
approval how Lawrence dispensed with most of the escort required by previous governors-general, in 
order to save his men from the heat of the sun. Ellis, Lord Lawrence, p. 78. 
106 When the occasion merited it, as at the presentation of the freedom of the City of London to him, on 3 
June 1859. 
107 After Lawrence, the next four viceroys were: Richard Southwell Bourke, 6th Earl of Mayo; Thomas 
George Baring, 1st Earl of Northbrook (eldest son of Sir Francis Thornhill Baring, 3rd baronet and later 
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* * * 
 
During the Indian Mutiny, Lawrence appears to have been ahead of events: urging the 
recapture of Delhi on ponderous generals; raising vast irregular forces while many 
thought no Indians could be trusted; and pressing for clemency amidst orgies of 
vengeance. However, after his return to India in 1864, some of the characteristics 
celebrated in the hero of the Mutiny became difficult to reconcile with the demands of 
viceregal office. Lawrence the evangelical now had official responsibility for not 
enforcing a Christian policy in India; Lawrence the puritan now found that his manner 
was too austere for some Anglo-Indian tastes; and Lawrence the autocrat of the Punjab 
became shackled by Calcutta politics. Lawrence nonetheless remained a national hero, 
because his achievements continued to be perceived as instrumental to the survival of 
British India in the crisis of 1857-58. His heroic status was subsequently of great 
significance to the determination of British policy in Afghanistan, because it endowed 
him with an enduring reputation for vigour and for knowledge of the frontier province 
that had ‘held firm’.  
 
Critics of his foreign policy later complained bitterly about the authority Lawrence 
exerted on account of his Mutiny exploits. ‘Lawrence’s services to the country were so 
conspicuous,’ one journalist later protested, ‘and his position was altogether so 
exceptional among Anglo-Indian administrators, that there is little wonder in his 
decisions on matters connected with Afghan policy having been accepted by many 
                                                                                                                                                                              
1st Baron Northbrook); Edward Robert Bulwer-Lytton, 1st Earl of Lytton (son of Edward George Earle 
Lytton Bulwer Lytton, 1st Baron Lytton); and George Frederick Samuel Robinson, 1st Marquess of 
Ripon (son of Frederick John Robinson, Viscount Goderich and later Earl of Ripon).  
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people as conclusive, equally above criticism and dissent.’108 Although this assessment 
considerably understated the opposition to Lawrence’s policy, his heroic reputation did, 
as the following chapter will argue, have a significant influence on British policy-
making beyond the north-west frontier. Successive secretaries of state for India, writing 
to the governor-general between 12 January 1864 and 12 January 1869, were not 
corresponding with a mere aristocrat, but with the ‘saviour of India’. 
                                                            
108 D.C. Boulger, ‘Lord Lawrence and Masterly Inactivity’, National Review, 1 (Apr. 1883), 286. 
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II 
British policy in Afghanistan:  
Sir John Lawrence and official decision-making, 1864-1869 
 
Sir John Lawrence’s tenure as governor-general of India coincided with two 
developments that threatened the relative tranquillity enjoyed in Anglo-Afghan relations 
since the end of the first Afghan war in 1842. Dost Muhammad Khan, Amir of 
Afghanistan since 1842, died in June 1863. Although the Dost had nominated his son 
Sher Ali Khan as successor, this choice was contested by some of his relatives, leading 
to a prolonged civil war. Such were the vicissitudes of this fratricidal war that it was 
impossible to predict which contender would emerge victorious, or if Afghanistan 
would split into separate kingdoms. The second development was the renewal of 
Russian military advances in central Asia. The combination of the Afghan civil war and 
Russian expansion allowed an old British nightmare to resurface: that a foreign power 
would establish its influence in Afghanistan. All of this mattered to Britain on strategic 
grounds, because India’s north-west frontier (contiguous with Afghanistan) was 
considered its most vulnerable border. Government ministers therefore had ample 
grounds for asserting their authority for the determination of India’s foreign policy in 
this region. However, four secretaries of state in succession each insisted that Lawrence 
should have considerable latitude for deciding what British policy in Afghanistan 
should be.  
 
The discretion given to Lawrence is not simply a story of responsible ministers allowing 
the ‘man-on-the-spot’ to decide mere details of a general policy with which they agreed. 
The reasons for Lawrence’s authority are therefore worth examining in detail. This 
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chapter will argue that ‘policy-makers’ in Whitehall considered that knowledge of India 
and Afghanistan, and the strength of Britain’s administrators, were so important that 
they readily deferred to a man with a great reputation for both. However, the authority 
exercised by Lawrence on Afghan policy should also be understood in the context of 
political events in Britain. This chapter will examine the extent to which the political 
turbulence of franchise reform and certain other domestic questions, which made the 
tenure of some ministers precarious and short, also served to distract their attentions 
from the India Office.   
 
Responsibility for British policy in Afghanistan 
In 1858, responsibility for the government of India was transferred from the East India 
Company to the crown. The fourteenth Earl of Derby explained the legislative intention 
in the House of Lords: ‘India must be put on the same footing as the other possessions 
of the Crown, and be administered by a Minister responsible to Parliament.’1 That 
minister (the secretary of state for India) had to have regard to other departments, 
especially the Foreign Office, but he was nonetheless expected to wield significant 
powers. The secretary of state would be advised by a new body, the ‘council of India’ 
(sitting in London), but he was not bound by the decisions of his councillors, nor 
obliged to consult them on urgent or diplomatic matters.2 Sir Charles Wood, having 
initially experienced some interference from his councillors, later recorded that he won 
for the secretary of state ‘abundant power in one way or another of enforcing his 
views’.3 Wood was also determined that the British government should exert its 
                                                            
1 Hansard, 151 (15 July 1858), col. 1453. Lord Derby was then prime minister, and the legislation in 
question was the 1858 Government of India Act.  
2 Although where expenditure was required, the minister had to obtain a majority vote of his council: 
R.J. Moore, ‘Imperial India, 1858-1914’, in A. Porter (ed.) The Oxford History of the British Empire, 
Volume III The Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1999), pp. 424-5. 
3 Wood, Charles, 1st Viscount Halifax (1800-85): succeeded to baronetcy, 1846; president of the Board 
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authority over the governor-general, and the government in India, on all matters of 
‘principle’. He explained his approach to Lawrence’s predecessor, the Earl of Elgin: 
 
The Home Govt is the absolute power—& strong as its disposition may be to support the Govt 
in India (as it ought) there are limits to that. In details & urgent matters the Govt of India ought 
to do everything but in matters of principle, it ought to be sure of the support of the Home 
Govt.4  
 
Wood’s relaxation of control over mere ‘details’ was consistent with the government’s 
intention for the 1858 Act.5 However, Wood’s other exception—for ‘urgent matters’—
was being annihilated by improvements in communications technology. By 1865 
Lawrence, in Calcutta, could receive Wood’s London telegrams in just three days.6 This 
technological progress offered government ministers a potential control over imperial 
governors that was not available to their predecessors in the early nineteenth century, 
when communications from London were sent on the six-month voyage via the Cape. In 
that period, governors-general had assumed vast powers, not infrequently confronting 
the home authorities with the fait accompli of territorial expansion.7 Technological 
innovation could not of course make metropolitan control complete: a governor-general 
                                                                                                                                                                              
of Control, 1852-55; secretary of state for India, 18 June 1859 – 16 Feb. 1866; created Viscount 
Halifax, 1866. Wood’s memorandum on Procedure, n.d. [1869], R.J. Moore, Sir Charles Wood’s 
Indian Policy, 1853–66 (Manchester, 1966), p. 39, cited in Moore, ‘Imperial India’, p. 426. 
4 Wood to Elgin, 9 Apr. 1862, British Library, papers of James Bruce, 8th Earl of Elgin as viceroy of 
India, Mss Eur F83 (hereafter ‘Elgin Mss’)/7, f118 (emphasis in original). 
5 The Earl of Derby: ‘with regard to the details of the government of India, the less interference there is 
on the part of Parliament the better prospect will there be of securing the happiness and contentment 
of the people of India.’ Hansard, 151 (15 July 1858), col. 1448. 
6 Lawrence marvelled: ‘Is it not a wonderful thing more like magic than any thing of human invention, 
being able to receive news in less than 4 days?’ Lawrence to Wood, 4 March 1865 (2), Lawrence 
Mss/30, no. 17. 
7 There was a much shorter ‘overland’ (via the Mediterranean and Suez) alternative to the Cape route, 
but this could be cut when Turkey was at odds with Britain. J.S. Galbraith, ‘The “Turbulent Frontier” 
as a factor in British expansion’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2 (Jan. 1960), 151-3.  
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might still exceed his instructions, or ignore them entirely.8 
 
Responsibility for determining policy in Afghanistan was certainly one of those matters 
of ‘principle’ on which the British government should have been the ‘absolute power’. 
This was because of Afghanistan’s geographical location, adjacent to British India’s 
north-west frontier. Policy-makers perceived the north-west frontier as the most 
vulnerable part of British India, on the basis that the Royal Navy and the Himalayas 
guarded all other points of entry.9 If Russia were to invade India directly, then across the 
north-west frontier she would have to advance. Russia also posed a more oblique threat. 
Some British officials and military strategists thought that her expansion in central Asia 
would foment unrest in India. This threat, rendered more acute by the experience of the 
Mutiny, meant that in any future conflict with Russia Britain might have to maintain 
large reserve forces in India in order to prevent native insurrection.10 Ira Klein has 
argued that British fears of Russian advances towards India were responsible, primarily, 
for the first and second Afghan wars (respectively 1838-42 and 1878-81).11 Anxieties 
about the security of this frontier resurfaced with the renewal of Russian military 
advances in the eighteen-sixties. This was by no means an exclusively official 
preoccupation: Afghanistan was, as editorials in The Times acknowledged, ‘a subject of 
imperishable interest’ to its readers.12  
                                                            
8 Lord Lytton may have considerably exceeded his instructions, in pursuing an aggressive frontier 
policy before the second Afghan war. See e.g. M. Cowling, ‘Lytton, the Cabinet, and the Russians, 
August to November 1878’, English Historical Review, 76 (1961), 59-79. Lytton’s instrumentality has 
however been questioned by other historians, and a powerful contrary view is offered by I. Klein, 
‘Who made the second Afghan war?’, Journal of Asian History, 8 (1974), 97-121. 
9 J.L. Duthie, ‘Some further insights into the working of mid-Victorian imperialism: Lord Salisbury, the 
“Forward” Group and Anglo-Afghan relations: 1874-1878’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 8 (1980), 199. 
10  A.P. Thornton, ‘The reopening of the “Central Asian question”, 1864-9’, History, 41 (1956), 125-6. 
11 ‘The British were an insular people,’ Klein adds, ‘but not in India, and Russian proximity troubled 
them more than it would have bothered a continental power, used to contiguity with serious rivals.’ 
Klein, ‘Who made the second Afghan war?’, pp. 120-1. 
12 Times, 9 Dec. 1868, p. 9. 
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However, metropolitan control was not as systematic as anticipated either by the 
legislation of 1858, or Wood’s interpretation of it. In practice, four secretaries of state in 
succession each insisted that Lawrence should have considerable latitude for deciding 
what British policy in Afghanistan should be. This devolution of power illustrates how 
individuals could exercise authority outside constitutional frameworks, not because they 
were headstrong or exploited slow communications, but because such authority was 
voluntarily surrendered to them.  
 
Knowledge and strength 
At the time of his appointment as governor-general, Lawrence’s reputation rested not 
only on his administrative success and vigour in suppressing the Mutiny, but also on his 
knowledge of the country and people around the north-west frontier. His knowledge 
was derived from his long experience in India and the Punjab, as well as from his 
negotiation of the Anglo-Afghan treaties of 1855 and 1857. The 1855 treaty exchanged 
guarantees of territorial integrity and promised ‘perpetual peace and friendship’ 
between the East India Company and Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (and his heirs). The 
1857 treaty conferred money and arms on Dost Muhammad, in order to assist the 
defence of his Afghan possessions from Persia.13 The treaties were tested during the 
Mutiny, when it was feared that the tribes from around the Afghan border would join 
with the Indian rebels. That they did not was seen as a success for Lawrence’s 
negotiation of the treaties. Lawrence was fortunate in being credited with this success, 
because he had been sceptical about the wisdom of negotiating with the Afghans. The 
idea had come from Herbert Edwardes, and was endorsed by governors-general 
                                                            
13 At the time of the 1857 treaty, Britain was at war with Persia. Afghanistan Correspondence, nos. 1 & 
2, pp. 1-2.  
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Dalhousie and Canning.14  
 
In the years after 1858, knowledge of India and its inhabitants was especially prized, 
because the outbreak of the Mutiny had surprised officials in Britain and India. This 
post-Mutiny emphasis on expertise was given legislative force by the 1858 Government 
of India Act, in its creation of the ‘council of India’. The purpose of the council was to 
provide the secretary of state for India with that ‘knowledge which it is utterly 
impossible that any public man, trained in the ordinary school of English 
administration, can possess upon purely Indian questions’.15 A majority of councillors 
was therefore required to have served or resided for at least ten years in India.16 
Lawrence was appointed to the council of India on his return to England in 1859. His 
expertise in council, especially on Afghan and frontier affairs, impressed the secretary 
of state. Sir Charles Wood was at this time urged by Sir Bartle Frere to adopt a more 
forward policy in Afghanistan.17 However, it is Lawrence’s advice to avoid any such 
‘meddling’ that stands out in Wood’s correspondence with Elgin.18 Even when his own 
views were quite contrary, Wood recognised that Lawrence ‘knows the country & the 
people so well that his opinions are worth attending to.’19  
 
The respect for his knowledge of India, and its vulnerable frontier, also explained 
Lawrence’s appointment as Lord Elgin’s successor. In his announcement to parliament 
                                                            
14 Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. I, pp. 449-54. 
15 Lord Stanley, Hansard, 150 (7 June 1858), cols. 1674-6. 
16 In addition, a prospective councillor must not have left India more than ten years before his 
appointment. Moore, ‘Imperial India’, p. 425. 
17 Frere, (Henry) Bartle Edward (1815-84): commissioner Sind, 1851-59; KCB, 1859; governor-
general’s council, 1859-62; governor Bombay, 1862-67; council of India, 1867-77; president Royal 
Geographical Society, 1873-74; baronetcy & GCB, 1876; governor Cape Colony, 1877-80.  
18 See e.g. Wood to Elgin, 18 Apr. 1863, Elgin Mss/8, f97.  
19 The reference to ‘country’ in this letter meant the area around Lahore: Wood to Elgin, 16 Nov. 1863, 
Elgin Mss/8, f263. 
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Wood emphasised Lawrence’s knowledge of India: ‘Sir John Lawrence will, I feel 
confident, justify all the expectations that have been formed from his former career, and 
from his intimate knowledge of the country.’20 At the time the appointment was made, 
British troops were engaged in operations on the north-west frontier (the Ambela, or 
Sitana, war). The Calcutta correspondent of The Times reported that the British 
commander, General Sir Neville Chamberlain, had met with ‘determined opposition’ in 
the Ambela pass. In the month to 20 November 1863, sixteen British officers and one 
hundred and seventy-five men had been killed (of a force of six thousand troops). For 
the Calcutta correspondent, this was sufficient evidence that the border war was 
assuming threatening proportions: 
 
The bazaars of Delhi and Umritsir look to see if we are to be beaten, just as all India looked to 
Delhi in 1857; and thus what was at first a trifling frontier war, such as we have fought 20 times 
since the annexation of the Punjab, has become a matter of Imperial interest.21 
 
In an editorial on the same subject two days later, The Times noted that between the 
north-western frontier of the Punjab and Kabul there lived ‘a number of tribes 
distinguished alike by martial instincts and religious fanaticism.’ It was thought that 
large numbers of Indian mutineers had found refuge among these tribes in 1857. The 
editorial concluded that it was therefore ‘fortunate, under such circumstances, that a 
ruler like Sir John Lawrence should be on his way to India.’22 In fact it seems likely that 
when Wood and his colleagues were considering the appointment of Elgin’s successor, 
Lawrence’s Mutiny record and knowledge of the Punjab weighed even more heavily in 
his favour on account of the coincidence of the Ambela war with Elgin’s death. 
                                                            
20 Sir Charles Wood, Hansard, 176 (21 July 1864), col. 1823. 
21  Times, 9 Jan. 1864, p. 9. 
22 Times, 11 Jan. 1864, p. 6. 
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Bosworth Smith had little doubt that this ‘clenched the appointment beyond the 
possibility of doubt’.23 
 
In the event, by the time Lawrence reached India the Ambela war was over.24 Once 
Lawrence had taken up his post at Calcutta, Wood was able to invoke his name in 
parliament, in order to add weight to particular policy decisions. For example, in June 
1864 Wood had to defend controversial military reforms in the House of Commons. He 
sought to explain and justify the measures on the basis that they had been done with the 
‘sanction and advice’ of Sir John Lawrence, who was ‘the highest authority we could 
have on Indian matters’.25 This was doubtless a useful political shield for the secretary 
of state. However, Wood’s trust in Lawrence’s judgement was sincere. An example of 
this trust is Wood’s decision to defer to Lawrence regarding Britain’s native envoy at 
Kabul. This was scarcely a question of mere details: the absence of British envoys in 
Kabul was one of the main complaints of those who argued that Britain should adopt a 
more active policy in Afghanistan.26 Yet Wood deferred entirely to Lawrence’s 
judgement on this question. ‘Do whatever you like,’ he told Lawrence, ‘we shall 
approve.’27 
 
Lawrence also enjoyed a reputation for ‘adamantine strength’, encapsulated in the 
                                                            
23  ‘Who so fit to deal with this particular danger, who so certain to preserve the peace, as the man who 
had tamed and conciliated the warlike races of the Punjab, and whose name was a household word, 
regarded, sometimes with love, sometimes with fear, but always with awe and veneration, by each 
wild chief of each wild tribe along the dangerous frontier of six hundred miles?’ Bosworth Smith, Life 
of Lord Lawrence, vol. II, p. 385. 
24  The expedition was directed against the Wahabi ‘fanatics’ at Sitana. Chamberlain’s forces reached the 
top of the Ambela pass on 20 Oct. 1863. The fighting was fierce and Chamberlain was seriously 
wounded. Reinforcements were sent under General Garvock and ‘the Yusufzai field force completed 
its task’: E.M. Lloyd, ‘Chamberlain, Sir Neville Bowles (1820-1902)’, rev. J. Lunt, Oxford Dictionary 
of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. Sept. 2011). 
25 Wood also noted that a majority of the council of India had approved the measures: Hansard, 175 (6 
June 1864), col. 1274. 
26 See e.g. the report of the Calcutta correspondent, Times, 1 March 1865, p. 10.  
27 Wood to Lawrence, 17 June 1865, Lawrence Mss/26, no. 38.  
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sobriquet ‘Iron John’.28 Wood certainly seems to have been impressed. Writing to Elgin 
in 1862, he described Lawrence as ‘an iron man’ who was ‘one of a thousand.’29 
Lawrence’s reputation for strength enhanced his authority on frontier questions, for 
when he told ministers the border was tranquil this was the judgement of the ‘iron man’ 
who had pacified the Punjab. The following report must have seemed more authoritative 
to ministers in London than correspondence from less experienced governors: ‘Don’t be 
alarmed at the rumours of war & commotion on the Punjab Frontier. So far as I can hear 
and judge, there is no truth in these reports.’30  
 
The deference with which Wood, a minister with considerable experience of Indian 
administration, treated Lawrence was more pronounced in the three succeeding 
secretaries of state. Wood’s immediate successor was Earl de Grey.31 The disparity in 
the respective knowledge of Lawrence and his nominal chief was considerable. De Grey 
acknowledged this explicitly in his correspondence. Writing to Lawrence in June 1866, 
de Grey acknowledged he stood ‘so much in need of the assistance of your experience 
& judgment.’32 In that letter de Grey had considered himself ‘new’ to his post. Yet only 
one month later he had left the India Office, following a change of government. The 
new minister was the Conservative Viscount Cranborne.33 Cranborne’s tenure also 
proved short; and like de Grey, Cranborne acknowledged his inexperience in Indian 
affairs, later writing that he had been ‘so ignorant of the subject matter of my duties’ on 
                                                            
28 Extract from J.W. Kaye, A History of the Sepoy War in India 1857-1858 (vol. I, London, 1864), 
printed in Times, 13 Apr. 1865, p. 6. 
29 Wood to Elgin, 26 June 1862 (1), Elgin Mss/7, f227. 
30 Lawrence to Wood, 6 Dec. 1865, Lawrence Mss/30, no. 72. 
31 Robinson, George Frederick Samuel (1827-1909): styled Viscount Goderich, 1853-59; succeeded to 
father’s earldom (Ripon) and to a more senior one (that of his uncle, de Grey), 1859; known as de 
Grey until created Marquess of Ripon, 1871; under-secretary of state for India, 1861; secretary of state 
for India, 16 Feb. 1866 – 6 July 1866; governor-general India, 1880-84. 
32 De Grey to Lawrence, 3 June 1866, Lawrence Mss/27, no. 22. 
33 Cecil, Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne (1830–1903): styled Lord Robert Cecil, 1830-65; styled 
Viscount Cranborne, 1865-68; secretary of state for India, 6 July 1866 – 8 March 1867; succeeded as 
3rd Marquess of Salisbury, 1868. 
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taking office.34 The difference in experience certainly struck Lady Gwendolen Cecil, 
Cranborne’s daughter and biographer: ‘Sir John Lawrence was Viceroy; and his young 
chief accepted whole-heartedly his policy of frontier self-restraint and internal 
economic development.’35 The diffidence suggested by Lady Gwendolen Cecil is borne 
out by her father’s correspondence with the governor-general on Afghan policy in this 
period. For example, in August 1866, Sir Henry Green sought to persuade Cranborne 
that British troops should occupy Quetta. Located beyond the existing British frontier, 
Quetta (in Baluchistan) commanded one of the principal routes into India (the Bolan 
pass), and its occupation was frequently on the lips of those who advocated a forward 
policy in Afghanistan. Cranborne reported to Lawrence: ‘I have informed [Sir Henry 
Green] in reply that an expression of opinion from you must necessarily precede any 
expression of opinion on my part.’36 Lawrence’s opinion had ‘necessarily’ to precede 
Cranborne’s opinion simply because Lawrence was so much more knowledgeable on 
the subject. Lawrence duly obliged with a voluminous correspondence on the folly of 
occupying Quetta, and Cranborne accepted Lawrence’s arguments entirely. In October 
1866 the young secretary of state wrote: ‘I quite concur in your views as to the impolicy 
of meddling in Affghan or Russian quarrels.’37 On the specific question of the proposal 
to occupy Quetta with British forces, Cranborne echoed the views of the governor-
general, though with a little more humour: ‘I would as soon sit down upon a beehive.’38 
 
Cranborne resigned in October 1867, and was succeeded at the India Office by Sir 
                                                            
34 Cranborne to Lawrence, 4 March 1867, Lawrence Mss/28, no. 9. 
35 G. Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury (II vols., London, 1921), vol. I, p. 206. 
36 Cranborne to Lawrence, 27 Aug. 1866, Lawrence Mss/27, no. 32. 
37  Cranborne to Lawrence, 2 Oct. 1866, Lawrence Mss/27, no. 35. 
38 Cranborne to Lawrence, 10 Dec. 1866, Lawrence Mss/27, no. 46. Cranborne, in his second stint at the 
India Office (1874-78), would not feel the same confidence, as we shall see in chapter VII.  
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Stafford Northcote.39 The new secretary of state had little time to find his feet on 
Afghan affairs: Lawrence’s first letter conveyed news of the almost certain defeat of 
Sher Ali Khan, whom Britain had recognised as successor to Dost Muhammad. 
Lawrence’s letter explained that Sher Ali would probably now ask for aid, ‘with an 
intimation that if we decline he will be compelled to seek for assistance from the 
Persians or even the Russians’.40 The significance of this intelligence was the 
connection it made between the civil war in Afghanistan and the advance of Russia. In 
reply, Northcote informed Lawrence that he had ‘read with great interest’ this news, and 
had shown the letter to Lord Stanley, the foreign secretary. ‘We are very reluctant to 
intermeddle in any way with these complicated civil wars—and hope you will adhere to 
your policy of entire neutrality.’41 There seemed little doubt about exactly whose 
Afghan policy this was. Similarly, the press perception was that Afghan policy was 
Lawrence’s policy.42  
 
One year later, Northcote was still struggling to see ‘very clearly in the matter of 
Caubul politics.’43 In contrast, official confidence in Lawrence’s judgement remained 
considerable, as a despatch in December 1867 confirmed:  
 
Her Majesty’s Government… place the most implicit confidence in your prudence, and in your 
intimate acquaintance with the political condition of Afghanistan, and feel assured that they 
may safely leave it to your discretion to act as you may think right upon any emergency that 
                                                            
39 Northcote, Stafford Henry (1818-87): succeeded to baronetcy, 1851; secretary of state for India, 8 
March 1867 – 4 Dec. 1868; created Earl of Iddesleigh, 1885. 
40 Lawrence to Northcote, 9 March 1867, Lawrence Mss/32A, no. 16. Lawrence soon confirmed his 
instinct was correct: Lawrence to Northcote, 28 March 1867, Lawrence Mss/32A, no. 21. 
41 Northcote to Lawrence, 10 Apr. 1867, Lawrence Mss/28, no. 17. 
42 Editorials in The Times used this formula, e.g. Times, 23 Aug. 1867, p. 6. 
43 Northcote to Lawrence, 2 July 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 32. 
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may arise.44  
 
This passage captures the devolution of authority to Lawrence. Northcote’s use of the 
word ‘prudence’ was presumably a reference to Lawrence’s circumspection, that is to 
say his preference for avoiding interference beyond the frontiers of India. This no doubt 
was reassuring to ministers in London. But it is explicit that those ministers accepted 
that Lawrence possessed an ‘intimate acquaintance with the political condition of 
Afghanistan’—knowledge they themselves certainly did not have—and that this made 
him an excellent judge of foreign policy from India.  
 
Political circumstances in Britain   
The authority exercised by Lawrence on Afghan policy should also be understood as a 
consequence of certain domestic political events, particularly the question of franchise 
reform. Wood told Lawrence in April 1866 that the House of Commons was ‘so much 
occupied with Reform’ that it was unlikely to scrutinise Indian questions; not even the 
war in Bhutan.45 The reform question also made the tenure of ministers precarious, and 
in some cases exceedingly short. Earl de Grey, having suspected that he would be 
forced from office after three months, in the event survived for just five.46 Such 
transience made it difficult for ministers to form their views on complex questions of 
Indian foreign policy, as de Grey acknowledged. Shortly before he left office, de Grey 
admitted to Lawrence that his tenure had been ‘so short that I have only had time to 
begin to form my views on some of the many important & difficult functions connected 
                                                            
44 Secretary of state for India (Northcote) to governor-general of India (Lawrence), 26 Dec. 1867, 
Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 12, pp. 24-6.  
45 Wood to Lawrence, 2 Apr. 1866, Lawrence Mss/27, no. 17. 
46 De Grey to Lawrence, 3 May 1866, Lawrence Mss/27, no. 20. 
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with Indian Administration’.47 Cranborne lasted a little longer, for eight months, before 
resigning on the reform question. After Cranborne’s resignation, Lawrence expressed 
his frustration at the lack of continuity at the India Office: he thought it was ‘a great 
evil’ that the secretary of state was ‘liable to so constant a change as we have 
experienced during the last few months.’48 Lawrence in this instance was referring to 
Indian domestic policy, but the frequent changes of India Office personnel naturally 
contributed to the devolution of responsibility for Afghan policy on Lawrence. During 
his five-year term as governor-general, Lawrence corresponded with no less than five 
different secretaries of state for India.  
 
The next secretary of state survived for almost two years. Sir Stafford Northcote, 
however, found domestic political circumstances ‘so absorbing that it is difficult to keep 
up with one’s proper work... We are throwing over all our measures in order to 
complete the Reform bills and hasten the dissolution.’49 The general election that 
followed the dissolution was also to prove a significant distraction. Northcote was 
explicit about this in his correspondence with Lawrence, admitting in October 1868 that 
his ‘electioneering distracts me sadly from Indian work.’50 Northcote also found that 
parliamentary debates on the disestablishment of the Irish Church distracted him and 
constrained his capacity for policy-making. This was the case with the question of the 
(British) Indian Navy, a frequent subject of discussion in Lawrence’s correspondence 
with Northcote. The difficulty was that the Indian Navy had been broken up, and the 
Royal Navy could not be placed under the orders of the government of India. This 
clearly left the governor-general in a weak position on questions requiring naval 
                                                            
47 De Grey to Lawrence, 27 June 1866 (2), Lawrence Mss/27, no. 26. 
48 Lawrence to Cranborne, 9 March 1867, Lawrence Mss/32A, no. 17. 
49 Northcote to Lawrence, 8 May 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 23. 
50 Northcote to Lawrence, 14 Oct. 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 49. See also Northcote to Lawrence, 17 
Sept. 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 45. 
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intervention.51 Lawrence wanted to explore the possibilities of reviving the Indian 
Navy, but he would receive no assistance from a distracted secretary of state. Northcote 
wrote to Lawrence in August 1868 and described his ‘dependence’ on what he termed 
‘extrinsic political questions’: 
 
I am very glad you have taken up the question of a partial revival of the Indian Navy. It seems 
to me the right thing; but there will be many difficulties to be overcome, and I feel doubtful of 
being able to carry such a measure in my present political position. It is certainly a disadvantage 
to India that the Secretary of State should be so dependent upon extrinsic political questions. 
We shall deal meagrely and tentatively, instead of boldly, with such questions as an Indian 
Navy, or a Persian policy, or the Govt. of Bengal, because a great battle is being fought over the 
Irish Church.52   
 
This seems like persuasive evidence that domestic political events in Britain, in this 
instance the Irish church question, could interact powerfully with ostensibly unrelated 
matters of British external policy, such as the revival of an Indian Navy. This 
conclusion is consistent with historiographical arguments that there was continuous 
interaction between British external and domestic politics. In a 2006 English Historical 
Review article concentrating on a later period (1898), Thomas Otte declined to assert the 
‘primacy’ of either foreign or domestic spheres of British politics. Instead, Otte argued 
that although foreign policy remained to some extent shielded from public or party-
political interference, ‘there was a constant interaction between the external and 
                                                            
51 The Royal Navy was not under the orders of the government of India, and ‘cannot be placed under 
them.’ Northcote to Lawrence, 12 June 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 28. Lawrence thought it had been 
‘a great mistake breaking up the Indian Navy.’ Lawrence to Northcote, 7 July 1868, Lawrence 
Mss/33, no. 47. 
52 Northcote to Lawrence, 13 Aug. 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 42. 
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domestic spheres of politics’.53 Still more recently, Paul Readman has argued that 
British foreign policy was not insulated from domestic politics and that neither had 
normative ‘primacy’ over the other. Readman instead refers to a ‘dynamic interaction’ 
between the two.54 
 
Contrasts with Elgin and Mayo 
Neither Lawrence’s predecessor nor his successor as governor-general was given so 
much discretion for formulating British policy in Afghanistan. Initially, Sir Charles 
Wood had been keen to exert his authority over Lord Elgin. Elgin had considerable 
experience of imperial administration, though not in India, and one month after arriving 
at Calcutta asked Wood for guidance on the Afghan policy he should ‘follow’.55 This 
was during the period that Lawrence served on the secretary of state’s council of India 
in London, and impressed Wood with his knowledge of Afghanistan. ‘As to Cabul,’ 
Wood wrote in response to Elgin’s question, ‘my policy is to keep clear of all those 
intrigues’.56 Wood became less assertive in stipulating what policy Elgin should follow, 
presumably because the latter seemed deferential and prudent, and expressed himself to 
be ‘very averse to any interference’ in Afghanistan.57 It is striking nonetheless that 
Wood had emphasised that this was his policy. In contrast, the official (and public) 
                                                            
53  Specifically, Otte argues that concerns about the state of public opinion (measured in parliamentary 
by-elections) influenced debates within the government about Britain’s foreign relations, especially 
the merits of the country’s presumed ‘isolation’. T.G. Otte, ‘“Avenge England’s Dishonour”: By-
elections, Parliament and the Politics of Foreign Policy in 1898’, English Historical Review, CXXI 
(2006), 385-6. 
54 Readman suggests that historians may have failed to recognise this because they have searched for the 
wrong thing (politicians being forced into certain courses of action). Policy could be (negatively) 
constrained as well as (positively) forced. In particular, Readman argues that in foreign affairs 
patriotism played a significant role in constraining what politicians could do. Readman, ‘Patriotism 
and the Politics of Foreign Policy’, 260, 269-70. 
55 ‘I should like to have some idea of the policy which you would consider it advisable for me to follow 
here’. Elgin to Wood, 15 Apr. 1862, Elgin Mss/2, f61v. Elgin found different circumstances in 
Afghanistan from those which greeted Lawrence in Jan. 1864: the question for British policy-makers 
in 1862 was the extent of their interference with the attempt of Amir Dost Muhammad to wrestle the 
city of Herat from Persian control. 
56 Wood to Elgin, 19 May 1862 (2), Elgin Mss/7, f184 (emphasis in original). 
57 Elgin to Wood, 16 July 1862, Elgin Mss/3, f47. 
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understanding in the period 1864-69 was that Afghan policy was emphatically 
Lawrence’s policy. 
 
The Earl of Mayo succeeded Lawrence as governor-general in January 1869.58 The 
appointment of Mayo differed from that of Elgin and Lawrence in that it caused some 
political controversy. Mayo had been Conservative chief secretary for Ireland, and was 
appointed by Disraeli shortly before the end of his first ministry. Gladstone 
contemplated recalling Mayo (even though he had already sailed for India) and 
replacing him with the Duke of Argyll, on the basis that a governor-general should not 
be appointed by a government in its ‘last agony’.59 In the event, Mayo continued to 
India and Argyll became secretary of state instead.60 It is possible that the manner of 
Mayo’s appointment coloured their official relations; Argyll initially suspected that 
Mayo had assumed too much authority for determining Afghan policy. Following the 
reception of Sher Ali Khan at Ambala, Argyll regretted Mayo’s pledge that the British 
government would ‘view with severe displeasure any attempts on the part of your rivals 
to disturb your position as Ruler of Cabul’.61 Argyll, referring to the government’s 
agreement with Lawrence’s policy, was concerned that Mayo’s pledge might be 
construed as committing Britain to a particular course of action. In May 1869, Argyll 
explained in an official despatch to Mayo that there were clearly circumstances in which 
‘it would not be for the credit of the British Government to support the Ameer either by 
money or by arms.’62 Argyll accordingly instructed Mayo to explain to Sher Ali that 
                                                            
58 Bourke, Richard Southwell (1822-72): styled Lord Naas, 1849-67; succeeded as 6th Earl of Mayo, 
1867; assassinated by an Afghan convict in the Andaman Islands, 8 Feb. 1872.   
59 Gopal, British policy in India, p. 64. 
60 Campbell, George Douglas (1823-1900): styled Marquess of Lorne, 1839-47; succeeded as 8th Duke 
of Argyll, 1847; secretary of state for India, 9 Dec. 1868 – 17 Feb. 1874.  
61 Secretary of state to governor-general, 14 May 1869, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 18, pp. 91-2. 
62 Argyll suggested one example of such a circumstance: ‘If [Sher Ali Khan] succeeds in establishing a 
government, which is strong but notoriously cruel and oppressive, Her Majesty’s Government ought 
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there should be ‘no expectation on his part of armed intervention’ and that the 
continuance of British support ‘must always depend upon the pleasure of the 
Government of India’.63 Mayo, however, managed to persuade Argyll that his ‘new’ 
policy in Afghanistan was no more than that begun by Lawrence.64 Lawrence had after 
all suggested the meeting with Sher Ali at Ambala, and had given the Amir armaments 
and money before leaving India. Argyll was ultimately satisfied that Mayo was indeed 
continuing Lawrence’s policy. It is striking that ‘Lawrence’s policy’ was utilised in this 
manner, as the reference-point for the correct British policy in Afghanistan.  
 
* * * 
 
The council of India had been established in order to furnish the secretary of state with 
the requisite knowledge to discharge his policy-making functions. However, the same 
intellectual premise that brought the council into being—that ministers who had no 
knowledge of India needed advice from ‘Indian experts’—also explains why the 
constitutional framework for policy-making was, in the period 1864-69, bypassed in 
favour of Lawrence’s judgement. Nominally under orders from a secretary of state 
responsible to parliament, Lawrence in fact found that responsibility for Afghan policy 
was devolved on him because he enjoyed a reputation for knowledge and strength, 
because the relative inexperience and precarious, short tenures of successive ministers 
made it difficult for them to grapple with complex Indian foreign policy questions, and 
because those ministers were also distracted and constrained by domestic British 
political questions such as franchise reform and Irish church disestablishment. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
to be free to withhold all assistance from him.’ Secretary of state to governor-general, 14 May 1869, 
Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 18, p. 92.  
63 Secretary of state to governor-general, 14 May 1869, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 18, p. 92. 




This devolution of power from the imperial metropolis to its periphery illustrates that 
individuals could exercise authority outside constitutional frameworks. In Lawrence’s 
case, this was not because he was headstrong or disobeyed instructions, or because he 
exploited slow communications between India and London; authority for determining 
and developing British policy in Afghanistan was voluntarily surrendered to him. This 
demonstrates that the rules regarding the exercise of decision-making authority for 
Indian foreign policy were subject to both circumstances and personalities (and 
assessments of personality). The circumstances in which this devolution of authority 
occurred were in some respects exceptional, for it was unusual for a governor-general to 
have so much knowledge of India and its north-west frontier, because of the convention 
that the appointment should be made from outside India. It was unusual to acquire such 
knowledge without having served in India, though there were some exceptions to this.65 
The next chapter will examine how Lawrence tried to utilise the authority he had been 
given on Afghan policy. 
                                                            
65 George Nathaniel Curzon (governor-general of India, 1899-1905) had prepared himself for that office 
by extensive travel in, and writing on the subject of, central Asia. J. Darwin, The Empire Project: The 
Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 202-3. 
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III 
The pragmatism of ‘masterly inactivity’ 
  
After the publication in January 1867 of J.W.S. Wyllie’s Edinburgh Review article, 
supporters and critics of Lawrence’s Afghan policy commonly referred to it as one of 
‘masterly inactivity’.1 This popular expression may have encouraged the 
misunderstanding that Lawrence favoured non-interference in Afghanistan in all 
circumstances.2 In fact, it would be more accurate to describe his policy as one of 
‘reluctant interference’ or ‘limited interference’, though these terms of course lack the 
elegance of Wyllie’s formula. This chapter will seek to explain why Lawrence was so 
reluctant to intervene beyond India’s north-west frontier. A number of historians have 
argued that his policy was primarily a reaction to the disasters of the first Afghan war. 
The evidential basis for that hypothesis will be considered, before a more prosaic 
argument is advanced: that ‘masterly inactivity’ was a natural consequence of 
Lawrence’s administrative priorities, and his assessment that the greatest threat to the 
security of British India came from within its existing borders. His stated ambitions as 
governor-general were to consolidate British power and to improve the ‘condition of the 
people’; objectives he believed were interdependent. Lawrence thought that such an 
administrative project was so important, and so demanding of manpower and money, 
that he viewed with extreme scepticism any proposal to spend his limited resources 
beyond India’s frontiers. The chapter will then contrast this administrative approach 
with the more ambitious proposals of Sir Henry Rawlinson, perhaps the most forceful 
advocate of forward measures in the period 1864-69. Finally, in order to assess whether 
                                                            
1  Contemporaries also used several other terms, the most common of which were ‘watchful’, 
‘observant’, ‘circumspect’, ‘cautious’, and ‘passive’.  
2  [G.B. Malleson], ‘Sir John Lawrence—Part III’, Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 105 (June 1869), 
717-9. 
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Lawrence’s stance was representative of the ‘official mind’ in India, the opinions of his 
colleagues in the government of India will also be examined. 
 
The first Afghan war: British captives  
During the first Afghan war, an uncertain number of British men and women became 
captives in Afghanistan. As many of these Britons published accounts of their captivity, 
their experience was, in a sense, shared with their compatriots at home.3 Linda Colley 
has argued that captivity was central to the British experience (actually or vicariously, 
that is to say through literary consumption) of imperial conflict in this period, and to 
how Britons at home understood the empire.4 Colley’s assertion that the reading public 
at home would have had a traumatic identification with the vulnerability of Britons 
abroad has received some criticism from historians of empire. Richard Drayton for 
example, in reviewing Colley’s Captives, questioned how many contemporary readers 
actually had experience of captivity, without which these accounts may simply have 
been received as ‘amusing fictions’, or ‘a light kind of exotic pornography’.5  
 
One of those taken captive during the first Afghan war was George Lawrence, one of 
John’s elder brothers. By the time the news reached John, who was on honeymoon in 
Naples, it was thought likely that George would already have been killed. With this 
                                                            
3 Linda Colley has provided the following figures for the numbers of Britons who were taken captive 
and survived their captivity (and were released in Sept. 1842): 32 officers, over 50 soldiers, 21 
children, and 12 women. Many Britons published narratives of their experiences: there are references 
to accounts by at least 12 British army officers held captive in Afghanistan in 1841-42, although some 
of these texts seem not to have survived. The most famous account is that by Florentia, Lady Sale (A 
Journal of the Disasters in Afghanistan (1843)), which became a best-seller: L. Colley, Captives: 
Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850 (London, 2002), pp. 350-2. 
4 Colley’s expressed intention was not to deny the devastating power and impact Britons had at 
particular times and places, but to show that Britons were not only warriors but also captives. Colley, 
Captives, p. 376. 
5 R. Drayton, ‘Putting the British into the Empire’, Journal of British Studies, 44 (Jan. 2005), 189. For 
other criticisms of Colley’s ‘macro-narrative’, see P.J. Marshall, ‘Captives: Britain, Empire and the 
World, 1600-1850’, English Historical Review, 118 (June 2003), 719-21. 
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probability in mind, John wrote a hurried letter to his sister-in-law, noting a ‘general 
feeling’ in India—from even before this ‘disaster’—that ‘the sooner we get out of 
Afghanistan the better’.6 In the event, George Lawrence was held captive for eight 
months, but lived to tell the tale.7 Some historians have argued that his brother’s 
captivity in Afghanistan caused John Lawrence forever to fear treading in the footsteps 
of 1842. John Lowe Duthie is particularly critical in this regard, asserting that Lawrence 
‘allowed harrowing personal memories to over-influence his judgement of Anglo-
Afghan relations.’8 Duthie supports this hypothesis in three ways. First, he cites the 
‘incoherence’ of the letter Lawrence wrote to his sister-in-law in the immediate 
aftermath of hearing that his brother had been taken captive.9 Although Duthie does not 
say so explicitly, his readers are by implication invited to connect Lawrence’s 
‘incoherence’ in 1842 with his subsequent policy of ‘masterly inactivity’ over two 
decades later. Secondly, Duthie states that Lawrence’s correspondence contained 
‘frequent, malicious stereotypes of the Afghans as perverse, untrustworthy and 
irredeemably given to duplicity.’10 The notion of ‘Afghan treachery’ is certainly a 
strand in Lawrence’s correspondence, although it is often juxtaposed with the 
recognition of Afghan bravery.11 This somewhat schizophrenic assessment of Afghan 
                                                            
6 John Lawrence to Honoria Lawrence (wife of Sir Henry Lawrence), 23 March 1842, Bosworth Smith, 
Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. I, pp. 145-6. 
7 G. Lawrence, Reminiscences of Forty-Three Years in India, ed. W. Edwards (London, 1874), p. v.  
8 J.L. Duthie, ‘Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson and the Art of Great Gamesmanship’, Journal of 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, XI (1983), 258. 
9  The letter seems to have been written in haste, and contains some grammatical errors. Bosworth Smith 
reproduces the letter in full (and without correcting the mistakes) in his Life of Lord Lawrence. The 
first two sentences provide a sufficient impression of the ‘incoherence’ that Duthie seems to consider 
so telling: ‘My dear Honoria, I hardly know how to write to you the last mail has brought us such 
dreadful accounts the death of Sir Wm. [Macnaghten] poor George’s imprisonment and probable 
death and the reported destruction of the whole Cabul army. Is certainly an amount of dreadful which 
has seldom come from India certainly never in my mind…’ John Lawrence to Honoria Lawrence, 23 
March 1842, Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. I, pp. 145-6. 
10 Duthie, ‘Rawlinson and the Art of Great Gamesmanship’, 258. 
11 Lawrence offered this assessment of Afghan character to the secretary of state for India: ‘the Afghan’s 
greed is insatiable. He is faithless, treacherous, and fickle. He will sell his wife, his friends, his 
children, his country, for his personal profit... On the other hand, they are a brave & sturdy people & 
quite capable of making a sturdy resistance to their enemies when so disposed. So long as it is in their 
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character is entirely consistent with British perceptions in this period, and it is 
noteworthy principally because Lawrence, unlike most British commentators, actually 
had personal experience of Afghans.12 Thirdly, Duthie calls a formidable witness—the 
‘astute’ Lord Salisbury—who ‘later suspected the existence of this strong personal 
element in Lawrence’s Afghan policy’.13 Duthie is not alone in relying on Salisbury for 
evidence of what Lawrence and his fellow policy-makers thought about Afghanistan. 
Rose Greaves, surveying British policy in Afghanistan, concluded that for many years 
after 1842, ‘policy makers saw the Afghan ghost and had no enthusiasm for adventures 
in Afghanistan. Many years later Lord Salisbury lamented that the disasters of 1842 had 
entered like iron into their souls.’14 
 
It is not obvious why Salisbury’s suspicions and lamentations should be considered so 
persuasive. He seems to have had a quite unusual relationship with anxiety. In 1845, he 
was removed from Eton College because he had been ‘so enthusiastically bullied’. At 
Christ Church, Oxford, the sickly Cecil secured an honorary fourth-class degree in 
mathematics only by dint of nobleman’s privilege. Until a late age, he would be liable to 
crises he called ‘nerve storms’, bringing depression, lassitude, and hypersensitiveness of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
interest to be on one side, they will fight valiantly.’ Lawrence to Northcote, 18 Aug. 1867, Lawrence 
Mss/32B, no. 49.  
12 Official attitudes to Afghan ‘character’ are recorded in a memorandum prepared by T.H. Thornton 
(secretary to the Punjab government) and forwarded by the government of India to the secretary of 
state for India in Feb. 1868. Thornton quoted large extracts from an earlier report, by Richard Temple, 
describing the independent tribes of the north-west frontier as ‘savages, noble savages perhaps, and 
not without some tincture of virtue and generosity, but still absolutely barbarians nevertheless.’ 
Temple also noted that the tribes were ‘superstitious and priest-ridden’, ‘avaricious’, ‘thievish and 
predatory… The Patan mother often prays that her son may be a successful robber.’ Nevertheless, 
these tribes ‘possess gallantry and courage themselves, and admire such qualities in others.’ 
Memorandum by T.H. Thornton, 18 Nov. 1867, forwarded by the government of India to the secretary 
of state for India on 14 Feb. 1868. Afghanistan Correspondence, No. 12A, Enclosure, pp. 26-31. 
Lawrence met Afghans during his years in the Punjab, including while negotiating the Anglo-Afghan 
treaties of 1855 and 1857. 
13 Duthie, ‘Rawlinson and the Art of Great Gamesmanship’, fn. 26, 271. 
14 R.L. Greaves, ‘Themes in British policy towards Afghanistan in its relation to Indian frontier defence, 
1798-1947’, Journal of the Royal Society for Asian Affairs, XXIV (Feb. 1993), 34. 
91 
touch and hearing.15  
 
The hypothesis that Lawrence’s circumspect policy in Afghanistan was borne out of his 
brother’s captivity there was in fact argued by near contemporaries as well as historians. 
Nearly four years after Lawrence’s death, Demetrius Charles Boulger offered this 
opinion on the origins of ‘masterly inactivity’ in the National Review: 
 
Lord Lawrence’s attention was first attracted to the Afghan question by the tidings, which 
reached him while in Europe, of the destruction of Elphinstone’s brigade in the passes. The 
question came home to him in a very personal manner, as one of his brothers was captive to 
Akbar Khan... on no one had the valour and treachery of the Afghans, and the natural 
difficulties of their country, produced a greater impression than on him. So powerful was the 
spell thus cast over him, by events due solely to the folly and incapacity of a military 
commander, that it became a cardinal point of his policy to have nothing whatever to do with a 
fresh advance into Afghanistan, under any pretext whatsoever.16 
 
Neither Salisbury nor Boulger was an impartial witness. It was Salisbury who, in 1875, 
started the Conservative government’s move away from Lawrence’s cautious Afghan 
policy. By the end of 1878 (the second Afghan war began in November of that year), 
debates about Afghan policy had become polarised, and Lawrence proved an extremely 
awkward opponent for Conservative ministers like Salisbury, and their press supporters, 
like Boulger.17 The evidence offered by Salisbury and Boulger must be treated with 
some scepticism therefore. In fact, it seems highly unlikely that ‘harrowing personal 
                                                            
15 P. Smith, ‘Cecil, Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-, third marquess of Salisbury (1830-1903)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. Jan. 2011). 
16 The reference to ‘the valour and treachery of the Afghans’ is another example of the schizophrenic 
characterisation common in British accounts. Boulger, ‘Lord Lawrence and Masterly Inactivity’, 288-
9.  
17  This will be considered in chapter VII. 
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memories’, or the ‘Afghan ghost’, explained Lawrence’s aversion to interference in 
Afghanistan. The policy of reluctant or limited interference was of course embraced by 
a succession of policy-makers from 1842 until 1875, and presumably very few (quite 
possibly none) of those officials had direct or family experience of captivity in 
Afghanistan.  
 
The primacy of Indian considerations  
Lawrence’s approach to Afghan policy was in fact derived entirely from Indian 
considerations. He thought that his priorities as governor-general—consolidating British 
power and improving the ‘condition of the people’ of India—were interdependent. In 
his speeches in Britain after the Mutiny, Lawrence had connected the attempts of his 
Punjab administrators to ‘improve the condition of the people’ and the support of those 
people in the crisis of 1857-58.18 This argument is not in itself sufficient to explain 
Indian participation on the British side during the Mutiny: as discussed in chapter I, it 
omitted the powerful stimulation of military force, measures of retribution and the 
exploitation of racial divisions between Indians. Nonetheless, Lawrence and many of 
his colleagues set great store by the idea that improving the conditions of Indians would 
reconcile them to British rule. Lawrence’s confidence in the benefits provided by 
British administration is demonstrated by his views on the princely state of Mysore. 
Lawrence favoured Mysore’s ‘lapse’ (to British control) on the anticipated failure of the 
hereditary succession. In June 1867 Lawrence explained the reasons for his views on 
this subject, which were at odds with official post-mutiny policy, to the secretary of 
state: 
                                                            
18 This quotation was cited in chapter I, but is reproduced here for ease of reference: ‘Our object had 
been to improve the condition of the people, and obtain their goodwill and sympathies, and hence it 
happened that, by God’s help, we were able to meet the storm which must have otherwise 
overwhelmed us all. (Loud cheering.)’ Speech made by Lawrence, Presentation of the freedom of the 
City of London to Sir John Lawrence, 3 June 1859.  
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I do not say that there are no points of our administration where the shoe does not pinch; I fully 
admit that the reverse is the case; but what I do affirm, and what I believe enquiry would prove 
is, that the benefits of our system are great and palpable; & moreover are appreciable by all the 
industrious classes... If our Govt of India was not very much better than that of the native 
Chiefs, it would be indeed impossible for us to hold the country with the body of British troops 
allotted for the purpose. If we left India tomorrow I believe that war and rapine would again 
prevail, and that in a few short years it would become very much in the state we rescued it 
from.19  
 
This letter reveals Lawrence’s confidence not only in the ‘great and palpable’ benefits 
of British rule but his belief that Indians recognised this. This confidence helps explain 
Lawrence’s scepticism regarding any proposals to spend scarce resources outside India, 
where no such benefits would accrue to Indians. Those who advocated more active 
measures in Afghanistan pointed to Russian progress in central Asia and the 
uncertainties of the Afghan civil war as circumstances that justified departing from a 
policy of vigilance. Lawrence, however, did not see the advances of Russia in that light. 
In April 1866 he wrote to Earl de Grey, setting out his views on these developments: 
 
In Cabul a fierce civil war is being prosecuted... and doubtless will go on, until one man of great 
vigour arises, or, which is more probable, a large number of leading men are cut off. The result 
no doubt will be to weaken the power of the Affghans, and to some extent to expose them to 
foreign attack. But Affghanistan is strong for defence. The country is very strong & rugged, and 
the people hardy and resolute. I am for letting them alone to adjust to their own affairs. As 
regards Central Asia and the Russian progress in that vast area, I am for securing all the 
                                                            
19 Lawrence to Northcote, 25 June 1867, Lawrence Mss/32B, no. 38. 
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information procurable through intelligent native agency; but not for sending English officers 
into these countries. I am also for not interfering with the Russians, for I am not at all certain 
that their progress will prove injurious to our interests, and at any rate the further they advance 
the greater will be their difficulties & complications. Our interference would not retard their 
advance, while we should waste on the endeavour means & money which can be used to a much 
better effect in India.20  
 
Lawrence’s wish to ‘let alone’ the Afghans was certainly not unqualified. If one of the 
contending parties in the civil war were to receive assistance from Persia or Russia, he 
thought this would change the position entirely. Similarly, Lawrence considered that if 
‘a Chief of real mark or character’ emerged who seemed likely to triumph in the civil 
war, then there would be strong grounds for helping such a man with money and 
armaments.21 However, until such a time Britain should not intervene in the civil war. 
As for Lawrence’s attitude to Russian expansion, there appear to be different reasons 
why Lawrence thought this would not ‘prove injurious’ to British interests. In part, 
Lawrence was confident that the ‘vast area’ of central Asia would provide ample outlets 
for Russian endeavours without threatening the frontiers of India. Lawrence argued that 
in some respects Russian progress would actually benefit British interests, because her 
progress through the Muslim khanates of central Asia would spread Christianity and 
suppress ‘barbarous’ practices. An insight into Lawrence’s attitude is provided by the 
arrival in India, in January 1867, of an ambassador sent by the Amir of Bukhara. 
Lawrence received the ambassador, who asked for assistance to prevent the subjugation 
of Bukhara to Russian forces, an event shortly anticipated. Lawrence offered the 
ambassador no such assistance. As he later confided to Cranborne, Lawrence would in 
                                                            
20 Lawrence to de Grey, 20 Apr. 1866 (1), Lawrence Mss/31, no. 16.  
21 Memorandum by Sir John Lawrence, 25 Nov. 1868, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, Enclosure 
4, p. 60.  
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fact ‘much sooner help the Russians to destroy [the Amir of Bukhara] than aid him 
against them. Such a rule as that of Bokhara can have no sympathy from an 
Englishman.’22 Bukhara could have ‘no sympathy from an Englishman’ because the 
Amir had imprisoned and then executed (by public beheading, probably in 1842) the 
British officers Conolly and Stoddart, an episode that had been well publicised in 
Britain.23 As for Lawrence’s conviction that the further the Russians advanced ‘the 
greater will be their difficulties & complications’, this was a product of his belief that 
the khanates and tribal areas would not support an advancing army.24  His equanimity 
regarding the approach of Russia is evident throughout his correspondence: he was 
consistently ‘doubtful’ that she intended to advance on India, and consistent in his view 
that arrangements with rulers beyond the frontier would give Britain ‘no real strength, 
but on the contrary only tend to waste our resources.’25 His preoccupation with 
resources was a corollary of his difficulties in increasing the revenue available to the 
government of India, a constraint that will be considered later in this chapter. 
 
Lawrence’s determination to protect his scarce resources, and his calmness regarding 
Russian expansion, must also be seen in the context of his assessment of the threats to 
the security of British India. Instead of an existential threat from Tsarist forces or 
Afghan tribes beyond the north-west frontier, Lawrence perceived dangers from within 
India. His concerns are evident in a long letter he wrote to Cranborne in October 1866, 
                                                            
22 Lawrence to Cranborne, 3 Jan. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32A, no. 1.  
23  A.P. Thornton, For the File on Empire: Essays and Reviews (London, 1968), p. 136. 
24  Lawrence had earlier given his opinion to Sir Charles Wood that ‘it would be for our advantage that 
Russia should busy herself in Kokan, Yarkund, and Bokhara; in fact in Central Asia. It will absorb her 
energies and waste her resources. The more she acts in this way, the greater will be her difficulties & 
complications. These countries can never support any considerable armies. She must support them 
from her own Provinces. If she attempts to quarter them on the people of Central Asia, she will turn 
the people against her.’ Lawrence to Wood, 27 May 1865, Lawrence Mss/30, no. 35. 
25  ‘If the Russians are ambitious and acquisitive there is enough in Central Asia to satisfy these feelings, 
to occupy their whole mind, to employ all their means.’ Lawrence to Cranborne, 20 Dec. 1866, 
Lawrence Mss/31, no. 59. 
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the ostensible purpose of which was to counter a recent proposal to occupy Quetta. 
Lawrence explained that while there was ‘no possible advantage’ to be gained from the 
occupation of Quetta he could ‘anticipate it as the beginning of many complications & 
difficulties & much expense…’ He described the inhabitants of Baluchistan as ‘wild & 
fanatical’, and the power of the Khan over them as ‘almost nominal’. Moreover, 
Lawrence was adamant that the greatest risks to British rule originated from within 
India: 
 
Dear Lord Cranborne, believe me, our dangers & perils lie in India and not from beyond the 
border. All our money all our resources are wanted in India. We are educating the people in 
wholesale fashion, and the difficulty will be how to employ the leading spirits, the men who 
will have knowledge, spirit, & aspiration and who will chafe for want of an outlet for their 
energies. We have to consolidate our hold on the country; improve its institutions; pay the 
employees, and in particular the native part of them, better than we now do, and all this without 
adding materially to taxation. How is this to be done, if we go extending our occupation beyond 
the Frontier? We have already in my mind gone too far.26 
 
His experience of the Mutiny presumably made it easier for Lawrence to perceive 
security threats originating from within India. In his subsequent letters to Cranborne, 
Lawrence continued to emphasise the insidious security risks that clearly concerned him 
far more than the progress of Russia. He identified the lack of employment 
opportunities for Indians and ‘the way in which natives are treated by Englishmen’ as 
together constituting ‘the great danger to which our rule in India is exposed.’27 
Lawrence recognised that there was a ‘gulf’ between Britons and Indians, and that this 
                                                            
26  Lawrence to Cranborne, 4 Oct. 1866, Lawrence Mss/31, no. 39 (emphasis in original). Note that the 
extract quoted above did not come from the start of the letter; Lawrence was using the words ‘Dear 
Lord Cranborne…’ not by way of customary salutation but for additional emphasis. 
27  Lawrence to Cranborne, 19 Dec. 1866 (2), Lawrence Mss/31, no. 58. 
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was ‘more or less strong every where but perhaps stronger in Calcutta than in most 
places.’28 He attributed this tension to the Mutiny, which he thought had ‘excited a 
distrust indeed I may say a hatred between the two races which perhaps may never 
subside; and which has certainly not of late years decreased.’29  
 
Sir Henry Rawlinson and the government of India  
Sir Henry Rawlinson was perhaps the most forceful advocate of forward measures in 
Afghanistan during Lawrence’s term as governor-general, even though for most of this 
period he had no official role in the formulation of policy.30 In July 1868 Rawlinson 
wrote a memorandum ‘on the Central Asian Question’ and sent it to the secretary of 
state for India, Sir Stafford Northcote. Northcote then forwarded it to the government of 
India, in order to obtain the views of Lawrence and his colleagues. In his memorandum, 
Rawlinson attributed recent Russian military advances to either a ‘natural law’ or the 
resumption at St Petersburg (or amongst Russian commanders on the spot) of ‘an old 
traditional scheme of territorial conquest’. He thought there was an inexorable 
momentum to these advances: ‘when civilization and barbarism come into contact, the 
latter must inevitably give way’. Rawlinson predicted the extinction of the three 
independent governments of Kokand, Bukhara and Khiva, and the extension of the 
Russian frontier to the river Oxus.31 Initially, Rawlinson stated that the notion Russia 
                                                            
28  ‘The educated Bengallees are sensitive & irritable and dislike the bearing of the English towards them, 
many of whom are inferior to them in wealth & position & also in intellect & knowledge.’ Lawrence 
to Cranborne, 19 Dec. 1866 (2), Lawrence Mss/31, no. 58. 
29  Lawrence to Cranborne, 4 Jan. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32A, no. 2. 
30  Rawlinson, Sir Henry Creswicke, 1st baronet (1810-95): assistant to Sir William Macnaghten in 
Afghanistan, and ‘fought with distinction in 1842 at Kandahar, where he had become political agent 
for lower Afghanistan’. President Royal Asiatic Society (1878-81) and long-time member & president 
of the Royal Geographical Society. Consul-general in Baghdad (1851) and involved with Sir Henry 
Layard in Assyrian excavations. Conservative MP for Frome (1865-68). Made KCB (1856), GCB 
(1889), and created baronet (1891) on Lord Salisbury’s recognition of ‘his distinguished service to the 
state’. R.W. Ferrier and S. Dalley, ‘Rawlinson, Sir Henry Creswicke, first baronet (1810-1895)’, 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. Jan. 2008). 
31 H.C. Rawlinson, ‘Memorandum on the Central Asian Question’, 20 July 1868, originally sent to the 
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would invade India ‘may be dismissed as almost chimerical’. The threat posed by 
Russia instead consisted in the ‘disquieting effect’ her progress in central Asia would 
have on India: ‘every Chief throughout Northern India’ with a real or imagined 
grievance against British rule ‘will at once commence intriguing in the hopes of 
relieving himself from our oppressive shadow’. Rawlinson could not however resist 
indulging in the threat he himself had dismissed as ‘almost chimerical’. If Russia were 
to establish herself in strength at Herat, which he considered the most important military 
position in central Asia, then Rawlinson imagined a nightmare: 
 
It is thus quite within the bounds of possibility that, some years hence, if Russia found herself 
engaged in another war with us, she might launch upon India, from her Herat base, a force of 
50,000 Persian “Sirbaz”, disciplined and commanded by Russian officers, and thus fully 
competent to cope with our best Native troops; supporting such a force with 20,000 Turcoman 
and Afghan horse, than whom there is no better irregular cavalry in the world; and, if she were 
really in earnest, detaching also a small auxiliary body of her own picked troops, to give 
strength and consistency to the invading army.32  
 
Referring to reports of Muslim unrest in India, Rawlinson also envisaged Russia being 
able ‘to set in motion’ the Afghan tribes along the north-west frontier. In order to 
counter such threats Rawlinson proposed that Britain should, without delay, support 
Sher Ali Khan by granting to him a subsidy, armaments, British officers, and possibly 
an auxiliary military contingent. On the question of a British mission at Kabul, charged 
with the distribution of the subsidy and the direction of what Rawlinson termed ‘our 
quasi-protectorate of the country’, he thought the matter could only be decided on the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
secretary of state for India but forwarded by the instructions of that minister (Northcote) to the 
government of India, 21 Aug. 1868. Afghanistan Correspondence, No. 12B, pp. 31-3.  
32 Rawlinson, ‘Memorandum on the Central Asian Question’, pp. 36-7, 40.  
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spot. However, although writing from Britain, Rawlinson had no doubt that Kabul was 
‘a position that we must inevitably occupy sooner or later, unless we are prepared to 
jeopardize our Indian Empire’.33  
 
The government of India did not respond to the proposals made in Rawlinson’s 
memorandum for several months. Their written reply to the secretary of state was sent 
on 4 January 1869, a week before Lawrence’s departure from India. It would doubtless 
have taken some time to collate minutes and memoranda from the many contributors, 
but the slow response suggests that Lawrence and his colleagues may have been seeking 
to provide a detailed and definitive reply to the sort of proposals they had heard in 
various guises, officially and publicly, for several years. This possibility is supported by 
a request in the joint minute that ‘a course of action’ be adopted in order to avoid ‘the 
perpetual recurrence to these exciting topics’, and in order to ‘strengthen the hands of 
those who have to conduct the affairs of India on the spot’.34 The procrastination of 
Lawrence and his colleagues may also have been influenced by the expectation that 
their memoranda would receive more attention after the general election in Britain, 
perhaps from a new secretary of state. In the event, the Liberals won the election and 
the despatch was addressed to the Duke of Argyll, who had replaced Northcote at the 
India Office. The voluminous response comprised: a joint minute, signed by Lawrence 
and most of his executive council; nine individual memoranda written by civil officials 
and military commanders, most of whom had considerable experience of the north-west 
frontier; and three supplementary minutes.35 The signatories to the joint minute wrote 
                                                            
33 Rawlinson, ‘Memorandum on the Central Asian Question’, pp. 37-9.  
34 Government of India to secretary of state for India, 4 Jan. 1869, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, 
p. 45.  
35 The joint minute was signed by Lawrence and Sir William Mansfield (commander-in-chief in India 
and military member of Lawrence’s council), Henry Sumner Maine (law member), Richard Temple 
(financial member and foreign secretary), and John Strachey. The individual minutes were written by 
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‘under a deep sense of our responsibility for the welfare of all classes in India, and for 
the permanence of the British power.’36 They seem to have shared Lawrence’s 
understanding of how such considerations were interdependent; for the joint minute 
emphasised that the security of British India was primarily a question of good 
government within its existing frontiers rather than pre-emptive measures beyond them. 
The joint minute accordingly declared that: 
 
Should a foreign power, such as Russia, ever seriously think of invading India from without, or, 
what is more probable, of stirring up the elements of disaffection or anarchy within it, our true 
policy, our strongest security, would then, we conceive, be found to lie in previous abstinence 
from entanglements at either Cabul, Candahar, or any similar outpost; in full reliance on a 
compact, highly-equipped, and disciplined army stationed within our own territories, or on our 
own border; in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses; in the sense of security 
of title and possession, with which our whole policy is gradually imbuing the minds of the 
principal Chief[s] and the Native aristocracy; in the construction of material works within 
British India, which enhance the comfort of the people, while they add to our political and 
military strength; in husbanding our finances and consolidating and multiplying our resources; 
in quiet preparation for all contingencies, which no Indian statesman should disregard; and in a 
trust in the rectitude and honesty of our intentions, coupled with the avoidance of all sources of 
complaint which either invite foreign aggression or stir up restless spirits to domestic revolt.37 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Brigadier-General Henry Lumsden, Sir Donald McLeod (lieutenant-governor of the Punjab), Colonel 
Reynell Taylor (commissioner of Ambala, who had worked under Henry then John Lawrence in the 
Punjab, and had commanded the Corps of Guides on the north-west frontier), G.N. Taylor, W.H. 
Norman, R.H. Davies, Mansfield, Lawrence and Temple. The supplementary minutes were written by 
Temple, Lawrence and Mansfield. The joint minute records that Maine ‘concurs entirely’ in 
Lawrence’s minute. Government of India to secretary of state for India, 4 Jan. 1869, Afghanistan 
Correspondence, no. 14, pp. 43-84.  
36 Government of India to secretary of state for India, 4 Jan. 1869, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, 
p. 44.  
37  Government of India to secretary of state for India, 4 Jan. 1869, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, 
p. 44. 
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In other words, Indian government officials thought that if foreign power ever 
contemplated invading India or prompting insurrection within it, a military response 
offered only a partial defence. They believed that the security of British India relied 
primarily on civil measures: the ‘previous abstinence’ from ventures in Afghanistan; the 
sympathies of Indian peasants and aristocrats; the construction of infrastructural works; 
and in ‘husbanding’ finances, that is to say not wasting money on speculative advances 
outside India. This emphasis on internal security measures was reinforced in the 
individual memoranda. The memorandum written by Sir Donald McLeod is particularly 
striking in this regard. McLeod was a Haileybury contemporary of Lawrence’s, an 
evangelical, and the serving lieutenant-governor of the Punjab. He argued that ‘the 
devising of means by which our own internal administration of India may be rendered 
more popular than at present... is of far more importance as a means of securing us 
immunity from dangers of whatever kind than all other considerations whatever.’38 The 
lieutenant-governor of the Punjab—on the very spot where Rawlinson envisaged so 
many vulnerabilities—therefore preferred, as a measure of security, administrative 
reform throughout India, rather than garrisons on its frontiers. 
 
These Indian government officials weighed several administrative considerations: the 
difficulties of establishing, supporting, and supplying troops in isolated positions; the 
financial outlay which an advance beyond the existing frontier would entail; and the 
probable effects of such measures on Indians. The signatories to the joint minute argued 
that these pragmatic considerations deserved ‘fully as much attention as the gradual 
advance of Russia in Central Asia... on which many writers have been led too 
                                                            
38 McLeod proposed that the ‘yeomanry’, middle classes, and gentry of India should be given a much 
larger share in the details of administration. Memorandum by D.F. McLeod, 10 Oct. 1868, 
Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, enclosure 2, p. 50.  
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exclusively to dwell.’39 Many of them clearly saw the Russian ‘threat’ as extremely 
remote. The contrast between their practical assessment of Indian priorities and 
Rawlinson’s imaginative memorandum was considerable. While Rawlinson conjured up 
a vision of seventy thousand troops descending on India under Russian leadership, 
government of India officials thought about hard, practical details of administration. 
These officials determined that theoretical or at least distant threats from Russia were 
easily outweighed by immediate concerns of governing.40  
 
The measures proposed by Rawlinson—providing armaments, a subsidy, British 
officers and possibly a military contingent to Sher Ali Khan—would have proved 
extremely expensive. This did not seem to concern Rawlinson, who argued that 
‘whatever the price it must be paid’.41 Rawlinson seems in fact to have been entirely 
unconstrained by the sort of fiscal considerations that preoccupied Lawrence and his 
fellow administrators in India. Rawlinson also favoured the establishment of a British 
garrison at Quetta, an object from which he thought Britain should not be deterred ‘by 
mere considerations of expense’.42 There seemed to be no limit to the amounts 
Rawlinson thought should be spent in order to protect the north-west frontier from the 
dangers he envisaged.43  
                                                            
39 Government of India to secretary of state for India, 4 Jan. 1869, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, 
p. 44.  
40 Another practical detail of administration considered by officials in India was the attitude of Indian 
troops who would be relied on for any forward movement. Colonel Reynell Taylor (commissioner, 
Ambala) considered that Indian troops would at first be eager to discharge a new role (in 
Afghanistan), but in time would bridle at the distant and disagreeable service. Memorandum by 
Colonel R. Taylor, 23 Nov. 1868, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, Enclosure 3, pp. 56-7.  
41 Rawlinson, ‘Memorandum on the Central Asian Question’, p. 38. 
42 Rawlinson, ‘Memorandum on the Central Asian Question’, p. 41. 
43 This contention is reinforced by Rawlinson’s approach to Persian policy. In the same memorandum, 
he also urged the governments (in Britain and India) to support Persia against Russia, on the basis that 
only a strong Persia could resist Russian pressure on Herat. ‘Our officers should again be placed in 
positions of influence and power with the Persian troops... Presents of improved arms, and perhaps 
artillery, would testify to our awakened interest... Investments of English capital in banks, in railways, 
in mining operations, and other commercial enterprises... would create a further bond of union 
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Lawrence’s approach to Indian finance was utterly different. He believed that imposing 
only low levels of taxation was not merely a question of fairness (for Indian subjects), 
but of security (for British rule). As noted in the dissertation introduction, light taxation 
was in Lawrence’s opinion ‘the panacea for foreign rule in India.’44 He thought that the 
level of taxation was critical for the security of British rule because ‘so long as the 
masses are pretty well off, they are fairly content and peaceable. There is much natural 
docility and respect for power and authority in the people.’45 However, it seemed clear 
to Lawrence that ‘all’ Indian subjects were ‘strongly against further taxation’, and that 
they were ‘especially’ hostile to the introduction of any new kinds of taxation.46 He also 
knew from experience that his compatriots in India were extremely reluctant to pay 
what he thought was ‘their share’ of government expenditure.47 Financial questions in 
fact preoccupied Lawrence throughout his tenure as governor-general. ‘Finance’, he 
told Northcote somewhat dejectedly towards the end of 1867, ‘has been the bane of my 
administration’.48 Lawrence’s colleagues in the government of India shared his 
judgement that economy was an essential safeguard for British rule. One of their 
principal criticisms of Rawlinson’s scheme for active interference in Afghanistan was 
its expense. The joint memorandum stated that:  
 
We foresee no limits to the expenditure which [Rawlinson’s proposals] might require, and we 
                                                                                                                                                                              
between the countries... our mission should be kept up on a very liberal scale.’ Rawlinson, 
‘Memorandum on the Central Asian Question’, p. 40. 
44 Lawrence to Cranborne, 5 Nov. 1866, Lawrence Mss/31, no. 48. 
45  Lawrence to Cranborne, 8 Nov. 1866 (1), Lawrence Mss/31, no. 49. 
46  Lawrence to Cranborne, 19 Dec. 1866 (2), Lawrence Mss/31, no. 58. 
47 There were recurrent deficits in the period 1866-68, partly because Lawrence was unable (due to 
opposition from within his executive council) to retain a low income tax. He did manage to pass a 
licence tax on traders and professions, but this was met with protests from the British community in 
India. Lawrence was only able to reintroduce an income tax on the eve of his departure. Steele, ‘Baron 
Lawrence’. 
48  Lawrence to Northcote, 16 Nov. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32B, no. 65. 
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protest against the necessity of having to impose additional taxation on the people of India, who 
are unwilling, as it is, to bear such pressure for measures which they can both understand and 
appreciate.49  
 
In other words, the government of India thought that Indian subjects were unwilling to 
pay taxation even for measures that they might ‘understand and appreciate’, such as 
irrigation projects, roads and railways. To increase taxation in order to finance a 
speculative mission to Afghanistan or the construction of a new post beyond the frontier 
would be resented fiercely, because it would not benefit Indians. These objections were 
made with even greater force in some of the individual responses. R.H. Davies for 
example professed perplexity as to why Russia’s approach to British India’s ‘natural 
and impregnable ramparts’ (meaning the mountains of the north-west frontier) should 
be ‘the pretext for advocating the transfer of our scanty surplus from public works and 
defensive preparations to the fallacious projects of an unavailing, if not mischievous 
diplomacy.’50 
 
The equanimity of Lawrence and his colleagues regarding Russian expansion in central 
Asia seems to be at odds with what historians have said about contemporary British 
attitudes to Russia. Thomas Otte for example has written that a ‘profound mistrust of 
Russia and her ambitions’ was ‘firmly rooted in the Victorian mind’, including in the 
minds of Foreign Office officials and British diplomats. Otte argues that this reflected 
the growth of ‘Russophobia’ in the middle of the nineteenth century, as well as the 
formative political experiences of British officials. The ‘Palmerstonian generation’ had 
reached positions of seniority around 1850, when frictions with Russia were growing, 
                                                            
49 Government of India to secretary of state for India, 4 Jan. 1869, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, 
p. 44.  
50 Minute by R.H. Davies, 27 Dec. 1868, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, Enclosure 9, p. 79.  
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while the ‘high-Victorians’ undertook their political apprenticeships during the Crimean 
war and its aftermath.51 However, it is hard to discern this ‘profound mistrust of Russia 
and her ambitions’ in the arguments of Lawrence and his colleagues. 
 
Envoys  
Lawrence was obdurately opposed to Rawlinson’s proposal that British officers be sent 
to Afghanistan. Lawrence’s opinion was informed by historical precedent (the first 
Afghan war) and by pragmatism (he thought Indian envoys could gather better 
intelligence than British officers). He thought that British political officers had a 
tendency to aggravate Anglo-Afghan relations. Lawrence cited as a precedent the case 
of Sir Alexander Burnes, whose murder in Kabul in 1841 preceded Britain’s disastrous 
retreat from Afghanistan. ‘If we had never sent Burnes to Cabul’, Lawrence told the 
secretary of state, ‘we need never have had a Cabul war.’52 Lawrence knew from 
conversations with the former Amir, Dost Muhammad Khan, that Afghans would 
deeply resent any interference in their domestic affairs. In his memorandum of 
November 1868, Lawrence recounted: 
 
When I met Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan at Peshawur in February 1857, he told me that it was 
his wish, and the earnest desire of all Affghans, that we should not interfere in their quarrels, but 
should allow them to manage their own concerns, and to fight out and settle their own domestic 
broils in their own way. The Chiefs and people of Affghanistan, he assured me, one and all, 
mainly dreaded, and would ever most strongly resent, interference on our part in such affairs.53 
                                                            
51 Otte also argued that official perceptions of Russian ambitions included an expectation (among senior 
British diplomats at least) that Russia’s financial weakness might constrain her territorial expansion in 
central Asia. For part of his argument about official attitudes, Otte cites J.H. Gleason, The Genesis of 
Russophobia in Great Britain. T.G. Otte, The Foreign Office Mind: The Making of British Foreign 
Policy, 1864-1914 (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 42-5. 
52 Lawrence to Cranborne, 4 Oct. 1866, Lawrence Mss/31, no. 39.  
53  Memorandum by Sir John Lawrence, 25 Nov. 1868, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, Enclosure 
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His conversations with Dost Muhammad seem to have convinced Lawrence that the 
presence of British officers in Afghanistan would lead to their maltreatment or death. At 
Peshawar in 1856, Dost Muhammad had told him that although a Muslim Indian would 
be acceptable, he would rather give up his subsidy than have an English officer imposed 
upon him. Lawrence reported the Dost as saying: ‘I cannot be sure of his life. My 
enemies would kill him if only to embroil me with your Govt’.54 On that occasion the 
Dost yielded to pressure from Lawrence (who was acting under instructions from the 
governor-general, Lord Dalhousie) and allowed three English officers to go to 
Kandahar. The mission was led by Henry Lumsden.55 Lawrence cited the experience of 
Lumsden’s mission as evidence of how British officers could obtain no useful 
intelligence in Afghanistan. In his individual memorandum, Lawrence stated:  
 
My belief is that Major H. Lumsden and the Officers with the Mission at Candahar in 1857 
were in great personal danger, and that so it will usually be with Agents similarly situated, 
especially in times of commotion. Nay, more, I am persuaded that they were utterly helpless, 
and in a condition of practical imprisonment. They could have done more at Peshawur than they 
were able to do at Candahar. A native would not be in personal danger in such case, and he 
could make friends and acquire influence and information in a manner impossible with a 
European.56 
                                                                                                                                                                              
4, p. 60. 
54  Lawrence to Cranborne, 22 Jan. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32A, no. 8. 
55  Lumsden was accompanied by Lieutenant Peter Lumsden (his brother) and Dr Henry Bellew. The 
purpose of their mission was to ensure that British subsidies to Amir Dost Muhammad Khan were 
used to pay troops employed to defend Afghanistan against Persia (following the capture of Herat). 
The men arrived at Kandahar on 25 Apr. 1857. Shortly afterwards, news of the outbreak of the Mutiny 
‘made their position extremely hazardous’. They nonetheless remained at Kabul throughout the 
Mutiny, despite constant fears of attack. Lumsden returned to India in May 1858, and was promoted 
lieutenant-colonel and subsequently (1859) made CB. T.R. Moreman, ‘Lumsden, Sir Henry Burnett 
(1821-1896)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed.). 
56 Memorandum by Sir John Lawrence, 25 Nov. 1868, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, Enclosure 
4, p. 63.  
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Lawrence’s assertion that Lumsden and his two compatriots ‘could have done more’ at 
Peshawar (in British territory) reinforced his point that much could be done within the 
existing territories of British India. Lawrence was not alone in this pessimism about the 
prospects of any mission to Afghan cities, which was shared for example by Colonel 
Reynell Taylor. Taylor had extensive experience of the north-west frontier and the 
tribes beyond, having commanded the Corps of Guides.57 In his individual 
memorandum, Taylor expressed his opinion that ‘the re-appearance of fair faces’ in the 
streets of Kabul would be extremely unpopular, on the grounds that they would be 
regarded as the forerunners of occupation.58  
 
Lawrence’s pessimism about British envoys was reinforced by Afghanistan’s isolation 
from British military and naval power. He told Cranborne that a mission ‘to barbarous 
& fanatical people’, like those in Afghanistan, ‘with no means on our part of over awing 
them is sure to come to grief some day.’59 Lawrence later elaborated his concerns in a 
letter to Sir Stafford Northcote, comparing the relative safety of British officers in 
coastal areas with those in isolated, inland posts: 
 
Our representatives in Muscat & Zanzibar are generally speaking quite safe, because the Rulers 
of those countries know that their ports are readily accessible to our Men of War; and that we 
could bombard their towns, stop their commerce in a few days’ notice, & even bring to bear on 
them troops, at a trifling cost, which they could not resist. In these circumstances consists the 
                                                            
57  Taylor served throughout numerous campaigns in India, including the Mutiny, the Ambela war and 
several hill expeditions. He was appointed commissioner of Peshawar (1862) and subsequently 
commissioner Ambala (1865). In 1866 he was made CSI. E.G. Parry, ‘Taylor, Reynell George (1822-
1886)’, rev. M.G.M. Jones, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed.). 
58 Afghan reactions to British officers would be suspicion, dislike and ‘hostile animus’. Memorandum 
by Colonel R. Taylor, 23 Nov. 1868, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, Enclosure 3, p. 58.  
59  Lawrence to Cranborne, 22 Jan. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32A, no. 8. 
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real security of our officers. But if we send our officers into distant countries, difficult of access, 
the Rulers of which are ignorant of our resources, and secure in their isolation… those officers 
will be at the mercy of such Potentates who if angry will not be deterred from doing them 
harm.60 
 
Scholars have identified the absence of naval power as a general limitation on British 
foreign policy in central Asia, although specific examples of when and how this 
constrained official decision-making have proved elusive.61 However, it seems clear 
from Lawrence’s correspondence that his opposition to sending British envoys to 
Afghanistan was reinforced by the country’s location beyond the arc of the Royal 
Navy’s guns, and by his recognition that only a plausible threat of force could provide 
‘real security’ for British officers. As always, everything depended on the specific 
circumstances. Lawrence was therefore prepared to send a British envoy to Kashmir, 
even though that country was isolated from British military and naval power. This was 
because of his assessment of the character of its inhabitants and the allegiance of its 
ruler: whereas the Afghans were ‘barbarous & fanatical people’, Kashmir was 
‘inhabited by a mild and docile people, and belongs to a chief who is our ally and 
feudatory.’62 
 
Lawrence was also determined to prevent British explorers from venturing beyond the 
north-west frontier. In June 1868 Rawlinson had asked the secretary of state for India to 
permit George Hayward to explore parts of the frontier. (This was the month before 
Rawlinson penned his memorandum on ‘the Central Asian Question’.) Rawlinson was 
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at this time a vice-president of the Royal Geographical Society, and he advised the 
Society to protest to the British government regarding the lack of British exploration in 
the Himalayas. Possibly acting on his advice, the Society agreed to finance Hayward’s 
expedition.63 Northcote reported to Lawrence that Hayward wanted to ‘open the road’ 
from Peshawar to Yarkand (through Swat and the Chitral valley) and that, according to 
Rawlinson, Hayward had travelled in Afghanistan before, was ‘quite capable of passing 
for a Mussulman’, and intended to travel ‘at his own risk’ (though with financial 
assistance from the Society).64 Northcote thought that the expedition might lead Britain 
into ‘embarrassments’, despite Rawlinson’s assurance that nobody would ask the 
government to extricate Mr Hayward from ‘any scrapes he might get into.’ Northcote 
was ‘uneasy lest his journey should lead to mischief. He would, if detected, be taken for 
a spy, and his visit might raise suspicions as to our intentions.’ Northcote referred the 
matter to Sir Donald McLeod, recommending that he communicate with Lawrence. 
Northcote also asked Lawrence to write to McLeod on the subject.65 Lawrence was 
unequivocal in his opinion on this matter and replied to Northcote as follows:  
 
I am strongly of opinion that it will be a great mistake to allow [Mr Hayward] to travel from our 
borders into Central Asia. The route through Swat and the Chitral Valley is, I believe, the most 
dangerous of all the routes. I do not think that any European, certainly any Englishman, could 
travel in such a disguise as not to be found out. The news of his intention would proceed him 
from Peshawur to a certainty. Should anything happen to him it will certainly prove 
embarrassing to us, whatever he or Sir H. Rawlinson may say to the contrary. If we allow Mr 
Hayward to try his chance on what principle can we restrain our own officers from undertaking 
similar expeditions? As it is, we have the greatest difficulty in this way. Nothing short of a 
                                                            
63  Duthie, ‘Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson and the Art of Great Gamesmanship’, 255-6. 
64  Northcote to Lawrence, 12 June 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 28. 
65  Northcote to Lawrence, 12 June 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 28. 
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positive command on your part will induce me to relax the existing restrictions. Sir H. 
Rawlinson has not, I suspect, any personal knowledge of the Tribes on our Western Border, and 
of their extraordinary animosity to Europeans.66 
 
In the event Northcote agreed with Lawrence’s assessment, and the restrictions were not 
relaxed. It was however difficult to prevent adventurous Britons from defying such 
orders. Hayward later (while Lord Mayo was governor-general) set off on an expedition 
to explore the Pamirs. Having travelled through Kashmir, in July 1870 he reached 
Darkot, close to the river Oxus. There he was killed in mysterious circumstances.67 
 
Masterly inactivity 
This chapter has argued—contrary to the arguments of some scholars—that Lawrence’s 
approach to Afghanistan should not be understood on the basis of memories of the first 
Afghan war and his brother’s captivity. However, Lawrence did recognise the 
persuasive value of comparing contemporary proposals for interference in Afghanistan 
with the first Afghan war. In response to Rawlinson’s memorandum Lawrence argued 
that ‘any serious attempt to restrain Russia’s advance by active measures on our part in 
Affghanistan would seem to me certainly to lead to a policy resulting in our eventual 
occupation of that country, as was the case in 1838.’68 Some of his colleagues went 
even further in their allusions to this disastrous period of British history. R.H. Davies 
was particularly scathing: ‘I regret that I cannot regard Sir H. Rawlinson’s proposals 
otherwise than as an untimely revival of the policy of 1838, which nearly ruined the 
                                                            
66  Lawrence to Northcote, 7 July 1868, Lawrence Mss/33, no. 47. 
67  By this time Hayward was no longer sponsored by the Royal Geographical Society. Sir Henry 
Newbolt later wrote the poem ‘He Fell Among Thieves’ about Hayward. It has been suggested that 
the Maharajah of Kashmir and the ruler of Chitral were involved in Hayward’s death, but there is no 
evidence for this: P. Hopkirk, The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia (London, 2006), pp. 
340-5. 
68 Memorandum by Sir John Lawrence, 25 Nov. 1868, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, Enclosure 
4, p. 61.  
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empire, and the effects of which we have still to get over.’69 This was an arresting 
comparison, given the spectacular reverses Britain had suffered during the first Afghan 
war, and was an argument Lawrence would later make great use of around the time of 
the second Afghan war.70 
 
On the eve of his departure from India, Lawrence made a farewell speech in Calcutta in 
which all of the pragmatic, administrative concerns discussed in this chapter found full 
expression.   
 
It is true that I have resolutely set my face against any proposal which, in my judgment, 
appeared to have a tendency to draw the Government of India into active interference in the 
affairs of Central Asia. I feel sure that it will prove, unless circumstances change entirely, a 
cardinal error, if we take such a step. Such interference must, sooner or later, involve us in 
hostilities there, either with the people or with their enemies—probably with both. Our true 
policy is to avoid such complications; to consolidate our power in India; to give to its people the 
best government we can; to organise our administration in every department on a system which 
will combine economy with efficiency; and so to make our Government strong and respected in 
our own vast territories. On the Western frontier we should be specially strong and ready, but 
without interfering in the internal concerns of the adjacent hill tribes, except when it becomes 
necessary to do so, in order to maintain peace and security. Active interference in the 
complications of Central Asia would almost certainly lead to war, the end of which no one 
could foresee; and which would involve India in heavy debt, or necessitate the imposition of 
additional taxation, to the impoverishment of the country, and to the unpopularity of our rule. 
On the other hand, by standing fast as long as may be possible on our own border, we can be 
ready to meet invaders with advantage. Invasion may never come, but if it do come, it should 
                                                            
69 Minute by R.H. Davies, 27 Dec. 1868, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, Enclosure 9, p. 79.  
70  This will be considered in chapter VII. 
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find us well prepared to repel it.71  
 
This speech provides a much better insight into Lawrence’s Afghan policy than 
speculation about the ‘Afghan ghost’. His public words echoed much of what he had 
told ministers privately and officially: Britain’s ‘true policy’ was ‘to consolidate our 
power in India’ within existing—and already ‘vast’—territories, and ‘to give to its 
people the best government we can’. The departing governor-general warned that 
abandoning this policy would ‘almost certainly lead to war’ and the creation of 
indebtedness or additional taxation, ‘to the impoverishment of the country, and to the 
unpopularity of our rule’. 
 
* * * 
 
Lawrence’s approach to Afghanistan was therefore a consequence of his administrative 
priorities in India. He remained, after the ruptures of the Mutiny, confident about the 
‘great and palpable’ benefits of British rule; and he was determined that the limited 
resources of the governing power must not be wasted. Lawrence was in this sense a 
pragmatic imperialist, deploying his resources only where he thought they would secure 
some return. In contrast, Rawlinson was more adventurous, and utterly unconstrained 
by fiscal and administrative considerations. Comparisons with his colleagues in the 
government of India suggest that Lawrence was in this sense representative of many 
senior administrators. Accustomed to making choices with limited resources, 
Lawrence’s colleagues recognised both the likely costs and opportunity costs of 
adopting a more active policy in Afghanistan: money expended against a Russian 
                                                            
71 Farewell speech of Sir John Lawrence, reproduced in [Malleson], ‘Sir John Lawrence’, 720. 
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chimera could not be used on the administrative projects in India that provided more 
effective security for British rule.  
 
Defending his Afghan policy in his farewell speech in Calcutta, Lawrence had also 
alluded to the importance of prestige. He explained that if British officers were sent to 
Afghanistan they would most likely suffer some type of maltreatment, and Britain 
would, as a matter of prestige, have to punish this by military force.72 In this sense, the 
greatest hazard in sending officers to Afghanistan was not the likelihood they would be 
killed, but that their deaths would provoke an expedition of vengeance that would divert 
Britain’s imperial project in India. This important question of prestige will be examined 
in the following chapter, although by reference to an example in Africa not India. 
 
                                                            
72 Farewell speech of Sir John Lawrence, reproduced in [Malleson], ‘Sir John Lawrence’, 720. 
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IV 
The importance of prestige: 
Britain, India and Abyssinia, 1867-1868 
 
Lawrence recognised that an ostensibly small act, such as sending British officers as 
envoys to Afghanistan, could set off a chain of events requiring ever-increasing 
intervention outside India. This risk of escalation—in significant part a consequence of 
the imperatives of ‘prestige’—was starkly illustrated by the British expedition to 
Abyssinia, 1867-68. The decision to launch the expedition was taken by the Foreign 
Office and then endorsed at a cabinet meeting of the minority Conservative 
government.1 Although the expedition was sent to Africa it was very much a British 
Indian affair: it was planned in India, commanded by officers from the Bombay army 
and relied on Indian troops, supplies and transport animals. Its official objective was to 
liberate a small number of British subjects—in particular a consul and envoy—held as 
captives by King Tewodros II in his mountain fortress at Magdala.2 However, the 
foreign secretary and other officials justified the expedition by arguing that liberating 
the captives and ‘punishing’ Tewodros were necessary in order to maintain the prestige 
that they, in common with many journalists, perceived was essential for the control of 
India. This chapter will argue that prestige has been neglected in the existing 
scholarship about Britain’s empire; and that official perceptions about prestige 
constrained as well as induced particular policy decisions. The chapter will also 
consider the connections between policy in Abyssinia and Afghanistan, by contrasting 
the boldness of British action in Africa with Lawrence’s circumspection in central Asia.  
 
                                                            
1  Parliament was asked to approve its costs, but not the expedition itself.  
2  Hansard, 189 (21 Aug. 1867), col. 1635. 
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Historians of empire have identified a perceived need to maintain prestige as a general, 
if somewhat vague, consideration in the conduct of British foreign policy. For example, 
Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher argued in Africa and the Victorians that foreign 
secretaries and party leaders, throughout the partition of Africa, ‘had to respect the 
public’s thirst for peace, economy and prestige, its traditional shibboleths of trusteeship 
and anti-slavery. No powerful business interests must be offended or jettisoned. 
Disasters in Britain’s foreign ventures had to be avoided.’3 Prestige is thus identified as 
one of several considerations for policy-makers. There is no specificity about exactly 
how prestige influenced particular policy decisions; nor is any evidence offered in 
support of the assertion that the public had a ‘thirst’ for prestige, and that ministers had 
to respect this. There is no examination of the conflict between pursuing peace and 
economy while maintaining prestige. 
 
More recently, Ronald Hyam has proved less reticent on the subject of prestige. In 
Britain’s Imperial Century, he first attempts to define the term, favouring Harold 
Nicholson’s ‘power based upon reputation’ and the formula of Dean Acheson (former 
US secretary of state) that ‘prestige is the shadow cast by power’.4 Hyam identifies 
prestige as a factor in some specific cases of imperial expansion: ‘[i]n part the 
acquisition of Sindh (1839-43) was an act of pre-emptive expansion against the French. 
Prestige entered in, because the British had been defeated in Afghanistan, and they 
needed a victory to halt the erosion of imperial confidence. Personal ambitions also 
played a part…’5 However, although there is some specificity in Hyam’s discussion, 
                                                            
3  R. Robinson and J. Gallagher with A. Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of 
Imperialism (London, 1981), p. 23. 
4  R. Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, 1815-1914, A Study of Empire and Expansion (Basingstoke, 
2002), pp. xvi-xvii. 
5  Hyam, Britain’s Imperial Century, p. 32. The personal ambitions were those of Lord Ellenborough 
(governor-general of India), who ‘conceived the desire to be an empire-builder’, and General Sir 
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there is little examination beyond the assertion—for which no evidence is offered—that 
prestige was a factor in British territorial expansion. It will be argued in this chapter that 
the importance of prestige has been significantly underestimated in existing scholarship, 
and that the expedition to Abyssinia illustrates how it could constitute not merely a 
context but a significant motive for intervention. 
 
The British captives in Abyssinia 
In January 1862 Charles Duncan Cameron, British consul to Abyssinia, took up his post 
at Massawa on the east African coast. In the same year, King Tewodros II of Abyssinia 
(usually referred to as Theodore in contemporary British accounts) decided to ‘sound 
out’ certain European governments on his preparations for hostilities against Egypt. 
Cameron was asked to go to England personally and to return with Queen Victoria’s 
reply. Instead, he sent Theodore’s letter home and visited some Sudanese border 
provinces. This aroused Theodore’s suspicions, and when a courier arrived from 
London in November 1863 without any message to the King but with instructions for 
Cameron to leave Abyssinia and return to Massawa, ‘the storm broke loose’.6 In 
January 1864 Cameron was arrested, on the charge of interfering with the internal 
politics of the kingdom, and put in chains. He was then sent to Magdala, Theodore’s 
fortress in the Abyssinian highlands, along with two missionaries who had been arrested 
on other grounds. In response, the Foreign Office sent Hormuzd Rassam, first assistant 
political agent at Aden, to obtain Cameron’s release. When Rassam reached Theodore’s 
camp in January 1866 he was initially received favourably, but ultimately he too was 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Charles Napier, who ‘was determined to redeem an otherwise lack-lustre career’. 
6  S. Rubenson, ‘Ethiopia and the Horn’, in J.E. Flint (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa Volume 5 




In July 1867, Henry Seymour proposed in the House of Commons that more active 
measures, including military force, should be taken in order to procure the release of 
consul Cameron and the other British subjects.8 Seconding the motion, Sir Henry 
Rawlinson presented the matter as one of duty, arguing that liberating the British 
officers was imperative in order to ‘vindicate the national honour’.9 Rawlinson first 
summarised the three arguments he had heard against sending an expedition to 
Abyssinia: the risk to the lives of the captives; the overwhelming difficulties of 
operating in a distant, inhospitable territory; and the disproportionate cost in terms of 
men and money. Rawlinson then attempted to refute all of these objections. He first 
observed that all attempts at conciliation had failed, and that previous examples (in 
China and Afghanistan) suggested the proximity of British troops would tend to 
improve the captives’ prospects, rather than endanger them. Secondly, Rawlinson 
conceded that an expedition to Abyssinia would certainly meet with great hazards, but 
mere difficulty was no reason why Britain should ‘flinch’ from its duty.10 Finally, 
countering the objection to the inevitable expense of any expedition, Rawlinson offered 
an explanation of the importance of prestige to British control of India. It is worth citing 
at some length, because subsequent parliamentary debates concentrated to a significant 
extent on this question of prestige, and because leading ministers referred to 
Rawlinson’s arguments as persuasive authority. 
 
                                                            
7  Rubenson, ‘Ethiopia and the Horn’, p. 79. H.M. Chichester, ‘Cameron, Charles Duncan (d. 1870)’, 
rev. L. Milne, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. May 2006). 
8   Henry Seymour (MP for Poole), Hansard, 189 (26 July 1867), cols. 234-7. Seymour had served as 
joint secretary to the Board of Control from 1855 until the East India Company’s abolition in 1858. 
9   Sir Henry Rawlinson (MP for Frome), Hansard, 189 (26 July 1867), col. 238.   
10  Rawlinson, Hansard, 189 (26 July 1867), cols. 238-41.   
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I have now, Sir, to refer to the third objection, which concerns the cost of the expedition, and 
which declares such cost to be out of all proportion to the benefit to be derived from it. This 
objection is chiefly urged by Gentlemen who disregard, or at any rate undervalue, the 
advantages of ‘prestige’… ‘Prestige’ may not be of paramount importance in Europe, but in the 
East, Sir, our whole position depends on it. It is a perfect fallacy to suppose that we hold India 
by the sword. The foundation of our tenure, the talisman—so to speak—which enables 100,000 
Englishmen to hold 150,000,000 of Natives in subjection, is the belief in our unassailable 
power, in our inexhaustible resources; and any circumstance therefore which impairs that belief, 
which leads the Nations of the East to mistrust our superiority and to regard us as more nearly 
on an equality with themselves, inflicts a grievous shock on our political position. It is 
impossible, Sir, in such matters to trace cause and effect with mathematical precision—much 
must depend upon opinion; but in illustration of what I have said, I will give it as my opinion, 
derived from a very careful scrutiny of passing events, that the Sepoy outbreak in 1857 was 
mainly—I will not say wholly—attributable to the loss of ‘prestige’ we had incurred from our 
exhibition of weakness in the Affghan War. Since we had allowed our Envoys, Colonels 
Stoddart and Conolly, to be murdered at Bokhara without making any effort to avenge their fate, 
and since by retiring from Affghanistan we had confessed our inability to hold the country, it 
was evident that we were human and might succumb to pressure; and hence, I believe, arose the 
germ of that confidence of the Sepoys in their own power which led them to try conclusions 
with us. And if, Sir, a Nemesis thus overtook us in 1857, the same Nemesis may again overtake 
us now, if we exhibit to the East such a miserable example of moral cowardice and military 
weakness, as to allow our Envoys to perish in an Abyssinian dungeon and yet make no sign, 
show even no desire to wipe such a stain from the escutcheon of England.11 
 
In subsequent parliamentary debates, several prominent officials made arguments that 
shared the logic of Rawlinson’s assertions about prestige. However, there was no 
                                                            
11  Rawlinson, Hansard, 189 (26 July 1867), cols. 241-2. 
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consensus about the intended audience for this demonstration of Britain’s military 
strength and moral resolve. Rawlinson explicitly envisaged an audience comprising 
India and her neighbours in ‘the East’, and made no reference to Britain or Europe. 
Although ministers to some extent shared this concern for Indian audiences, they also 
considered reactions in both Britain and continental Europe.  
 
That is however to anticipate events somewhat. At the time of Rawlinson’s speech (July 
1867), the government was not prepared to commit itself to an invasion of Abyssinia. 
The Conservatives had spent very little of the previous decade in government, but in 
June 1866 the Earl of Derby was able to form his third cabinet.12 In this minority 
government it was Derby’s son and heir, Lord Stanley, who became foreign secretary. 
In response to the motion, Stanley first expressed his agreement that ‘nothing could be 
more repugnant to our feelings as a nation, nothing less creditable to us as a matter of 
honour’, than to leave Cameron and the other British subjects at the mercy of 
Theodore.13 However, Stanley was anxious to explain to parliament the myriad risks of 
an expedition to Abyssinia. His concern was not that significant military resistance 
would be encountered, but that Abyssinia’s climate, remoteness and topography would 
make operations there extremely dangerous. Stanley elaborated at some length on these 
perils: the climate was hostile (extreme heat at one season, heavy rains at another); 
Magdala was at least three hundred miles from the coast, and would have to be 
approached through mountainous terrain without any roads; much of this country was 
thought to be destitute of water; and through this desert any British force would have to 
carry its supplies. There were several ‘unknowns’ in all of this, including how 
Abyssinians would respond to the presence of armed strangers. Lord Stanley declared 
                                                            
12  Derby’s first cabinet lasted from Feb. 1852 to Dec. 1852; his second from Feb. 1858 to June 1859.  
13  Lord Stanley, Hansard, 189 (26 July 1867), col. 251. 
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that it would be unwise for the government to commit to an expedition without much 
more information about its practicability: 
 
I am sure, therefore, that the House will feel that, however anxious we may be to attain the 
object we all have in view, it would be madness to throw a British army into an unknown 
country, in a tropical climate, far from the sea, very far from its reserves and its supplies, 
without a full previous investigation as to the means of moving, feeding, and keeping them in 
health.14 
 
The risks outlined by Stanley were daunting, and he acknowledged that an invasion of 
Abyssinia might bring military and political disaster.15 He revealed that inquiries would 
be made of the relevant authorities (the War Office and the India Office) but warned 
parliament that the government would not undertake an expedition unless it satisfied a 
test of proportionality, such that it was ‘practicable with only a reasonable expenditure 
of men and means.’16 Stanley is usually regarded as a cautious foreign secretary, and the 
editor of his journals concluded that he was opposed to the expedition.17 There seems to 
be no evidence for this from the published journals, which reveal only Stanley’s 
reluctance to write anything about Abyssinia.18 Other historians have also concluded 
that Stanley was opposed to the enterprise; and that he insisted on making further 
inquiries in the hope that the authorities ‘might solve his problem’ by declaring an 
                                                            
14  Lord Stanley, Hansard, 189 (26 July 1867), cols. 251-2. 
15  Lord Stanley, Hansard, 189 (26 July 1867), col. 252. 
16  Lord Stanley, Hansard, 189 (26 July 1867), cols. 252-3. 
17  Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party: Journals and Memoirs of Edward Henry, Lord Stanley, 
1849-1869, ed. J.R. Vincent (Hassocks, 1978), p. xvi. 
18  The reader of the published journals learns only that the ‘the rescue of the Abyssinian prisoners’ was 
the first of the ‘chief questions’ under discussion at the Foreign Office on 1 Nov. 1866, and that at a 
cabinet meeting of 11 May 1867 the government had resolved not to send an expedition to Abyssinia. 
Entries for 1 Nov. 1866 & 11 May 1867, Journals and Memoirs of Lord Stanley, ed. Vincent, pp. 269, 
308. 
121 
invasion of Abyssinia to be impossible.19 
 
The India Office however told Stanley that British Indian forces were able to invade 
Abyssinia and reach the captives, though it also reminded him that the decision whether 
or not they should rested with the Foreign Office.20 Less than a month after Stanley’s 
attempts to dampen public expectations, Britain’s commitment to use military force in 
order to free the captives was included in the Queen’s statement at the prorogation of 
parliament.21 Stanley had stated that the expedition would only be launched if inquiries 
indicated that it could be carried out with merely ‘a reasonable expenditure of men and 
means’. Given the scale of the undertaking, it is hard to understand how it satisfied that 
test of proportionality. The expedition comprised thirteen thousand soldiers (nine 
thousand of whom were Indian troops), twenty-four thousand camp-followers, and fifty-
five thousand mules and other transport animals, all conveyed from India to the east 
African coast by a fleet of nearly three hundred ships.22 Lieutenant-General Sir Robert 
Napier, commander-in-chief at Bombay, was appointed to lead the expedition. This 
seemed to be upping the stakes even more; a less senior officer would have been less 
risky to British prestige, should anything go amiss in Abyssinia. The objective of this 
imperial armada was to rescue one British consul (Cameron), one British envoy 
(Rassam), and perhaps three other British subjects.23 The projected financial cost was 
                                                            
19  N. Rodgers, ‘The Abyssinian Expedition of 1867-1868: Disraeli’s Imperialism or James Murray’s 
War?’, Historical Journal, 27 (1984), 140. 
20  Rodgers, ‘The Abyssinian Expedition’, 142. 
21  This was not a declaration of war as such, but a declaration of intent. The Queen’s statement read as 
follows: ‘The Communications which I have made to the reigning Monarch of Abyssinia, with a view 
to obtain the Release of the British Subjects whom he detains in his Dominions, have, I regret to say, 
thus far proved ineffectual. I have therefore found it necessary to address to him a peremptory 
Demand for their immediate Liberation, and to take Measures for supporting that Demand, should it 
ultimately be found necessary to resort to Force.’ Hansard, 189 (21 Aug. 1867), col. 1635. 
22  A. Moorehead, The Blue Nile (Harmondsworth, 1962), pp. 233-5. 
23  The only other British subjects seem to have been Lieutenant Prideaux (Bombay army) and Dr Henry 
Blanc (Indian Medical Service), who had accompanied Rassam on his special mission, and Henry 
Stern, a missionary. According to the list sent by Napier to the secretary of state for India shortly after 
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commensurate with this massive military and logistical challenge: the government 
estimate in November 1867 was that the total expenditure would be £3,800,000.24 This 
estimate eclipses the £2,300,000 subsequently sought from parliament in order to 
underwrite the 1882 expedition to Egypt; and makes the £300,000 requested for the 
Gordon relief expedition seem almost trifling.25 The government’s estimate for the 
Abyssinian expedition however proved extremely optimistic. The Conservatives later 
increased their estimate to £5,000,000, and raised the income tax from fourpence to 
sixpence in order to meet the expense. The revised estimate had in turn to be increased, 
and the Liberal government in 1869 put the total expense at £9,000,000.26 This figure 
comfortably exceeded the total cost of all civil departments of government in 1867, was 
approximately sixty per cent. of the amount spent on the army and ordinance, and on its 
own constituted more than one eighth of Britain’s gross public expenditure for 1867.27 
 
Press opinion 
Rawlinson’s arguments about the importance of prestige to British rule in India were 
consistent with opinions expressed in many newspapers, especially those on the 
political right. The day after the Queen’s declaration at the prorogation of parliament, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Magdala had been stormed, there were sixty captives in all: Cameron, Rassam, Prideaux, Blanc, Stern, 
and a number of predominantly German, Swiss, and French missionaries and artisans, together with 
their wives and children. Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier to the secretary of state for India, 14 
Apr. 1868, Appendix G (List of the Captives), Abyssinian Expedition. Copy of two despatches from 
Sir Robert Napier to the Secretary of State for India, dated respectively 14th April and 12th May 1868, 
Parliamentary Papers 1867-68 (337) (hereafter ‘Parliamentary Papers Abyssinian Expedition’), pp. 7-
8. Although these ‘Europeans’ were liberated by the British expedition, they had not been referred to 
in the Queen’s parliamentary declaration of Aug. 1867. 
24  Disraeli (chancellor of the exchequer), Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), col. 192. 
25  Expenditure for the expeditions to Egypt and the Sudan are taken from Robinson and Gallagher, 
Africa and the Victorians, pp. 115-7, 144. 
26  W.F. Monypenny and G.E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield (VI vols., 
London, 1910-20), vol. V, p. 45. 
27  British government expenditure for the year 1867: army and ordnance, £15.1 million; navy, £10.7 
million; education, art and science, £1.42 million; works and buildings, £0.82 million; salaries of 
public departments, £1.54 million; law and justice, £3.55 million; colonial, consular and foreign, 
£0.54 million; gross public expenditure, £67.2 million. B.R. Mitchell, Abstract of British historical 
statistics (Cambridge, 1962), p. 397. 
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the Standard signalled its approval of this display of resolve: Theodore ‘must be 
punished and the prestige of our name restored, however high the cost may be.’28 In a 
later article, the Standard amplified its arguments in favour of military action:  
 
Whatever injury has accrued to us through the captivity of our countrymen in Abyssinia has 
been of a kind to affect directly and principally that prestige which is the basis of British 
dominion in the East, and the maintenance of which is a matter of vital consequence to British 
India… There are doubtless many thousands jealous and curious eyes turned from the East to 
the Abyssinian question—watchful, with no vague or sentimental interest, to see how far 
England is able to protect her subjects from outrage against the Abyssinian tyrant. There can be 
no greater mistake for us than to suppose that the natives of India generally are careless 
observers of our foreign policy. They are naturally even more interested than we are ourselves, 
in watching the rise and fall of that prestige which represents to them the empire of England.29  
 
Like Rawlinson, the Standard considered that the audiences for which British prestige 
had to be restored were Indian and eastern. In support of this contention, it offered 
practical reasons why Indians were not indifferent to events in Abyssinia: there was 
commercial intercourse between the Abyssinian coast, Aden, the Persian Gulf and 
India, and thousands of Indian Muslims made the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.30  
 
Some sections of Anglo-Indian opinion were even more insistent that the British 
government had to take action in Abyssinia. In this piece, which appeared in the Pall 
Mall Gazette just under a month after the original had been published in India, the 
Bombay Gazette described a belligerent attitude among the British community in India: 
                                                            
28  Standard, 22 Aug. 1867, p. 4 (emphasis in original). 
29  Standard, 10 Oct. 1867, p. 4 (emphasis in original). 
30  Standard, 10 Oct. 1867, p. 4. 
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We believe that we are correct in stating that the general feeling throughout the Bombay 
Presidency, and indeed throughout India generally, is that our honour and prestige imperatively 
call upon us to chastise those semi-barbarous natives of Abyssinia in a summary manner. 
Indeed, it may be said that some indignation has been aroused here at the dilatoriness and 
seeming indifference and apathy with which the Home Government moves in this matter. It has 
even been proposed by a writer in a Bengal journal that, in case the Home Government decides 
to take no warlike action in the matter, an expedition be got up in India of 200 British 
volunteers, who would be despatched to Abyssinia to fight their way to the prison house of 
Consul Cameron and his fellow captives at Magdala.31  
 
The prospect of two hundred British volunteers charging into the desert and possibly 
swelling the ranks of the Abyssinian captives may now seem absurd or even comic. But 
such an undertaking would have seemed entirely plausible to ministers in London. Lord 
Stanley had in fact received several offers from gentlemen eager to lead a mission into 
the country.32 (There was subsequently an unofficial—and unsuccessful—mission to 
liberate the captives, as we shall see.) The enthusiasm for action evident in the Bombay 
Gazette article may have been encouraged by the expectation that an expedition would 
draw its troops principally from the Bombay presidency, as ultimately proved to be the 
case.  
 
The Pall Mall Gazette also argued for an expedition to Abyssinia, although it used 
different language to make the case. Professing distaste for the word prestige, it instead 
                                                            
31  Bombay Gazette, 9 Aug. 1867, printed in the Pall Mall Gazette, 5 Sept. 1867, p. 6. 
32  Stanley had, unsurprisingly, declined such offers: ‘Whatever the original motive of the King in 
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189 (26 July 1867), col. 250. 
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preferred to advocate an expedition on grounds of ‘duty’. This proved to be a theme in 
the parliamentary debates, where a number of politicians seemed reluctant to refer 
directly to prestige. This reluctance may in part be explained by etymology: 
contemporary definitions suggested prestige was a French word denoting primarily 
‘illusion produced by sorcery’, and secondarily illusion of any sort effected by the arts 
that appeal to the eye of the imagination.33 The Pall Mall Gazette’s substitution of 
‘duty’ for ‘prestige’ seems to have been a matter of semantics; its argument avoided the 
word prestige but was made expressly on the basis of what impression would be made 
in India, should Britain not wipe off its ‘disgrace’ in Abyssinia.34 
 
The Times was more sceptical about the relationship between war in Abyssinia and 
British prestige or honour. An editorial in September 1867 complained that ‘[t]he 
prestige of the English name, concerning which our countrymen in the East always 
evince the most unnecessary anxiety, will not be increased by a fruitless, or even by a 
successful, incursion into Abyssinia. The honour of England is not to be advanced by a 
war with a tribe of savages.’35 However, a subsequent editorial (only one month later) to 
some extent accepted the logic of the prestige argument, providing this assessment of 
public opinion in Britain: 
 
Still, the country acquiesces in the war as inevitable, and nine people out of ten would give the 
same reason for supporting it. It is essential to the maintenance of our ‘prestige in the East,’ and 
upon our ‘prestige in the East’ depends not only the security of our Indian Empire, but the 
                                                            
33  Liverpool Mercury, 28 Nov. 1867, p. 6. 
34   The Gazette argued that ‘we have a special interest in doing [our duty] in the present case, inasmuch 
as a failure to discharge that duty would be regarded all over India as peculiarly disgraceful, and 
inasmuch as disgrace in India is a most serious matter.’ Pall Mall Gazette, 29 Nov. 1867, p. 1. 
35  Times, 12 Sept. 1867, p. 6. 
126 
personal safety of thousands of our countrymen.36 
  
The Times conceded that by leaving ‘Consul Cameron and his fellow-captives’ to their 
fate ‘we should probably imperil more lives than we stake upon the expedition.’37 The 
logic of this argument was that abandoning Cameron and Rassam would embolden 
rulers in ‘barbarous’ courts to insult, incarcerate or even kill British envoys. This 
argument was itself premised on questions of reputation and prestige: invading 
Abyssinia was meant to show tyrants wherever situated that they too would receive such 
punishment were they to mistreat British officers. The Times also contended that even if 
Theodore left Magdala on hearing news of the British mission, his flight, combined with 
the recovery of the prisoners, ‘may produce a permanent and salutary impression on the 
Oriental mind.’38 The word ‘impression’ is significant in this context, and suggests that 
The Times shared the logic of the prestige argument. 
 
The Liberal Daily News was scathing in its criticism of the wisdom of an expedition to 
Abyssinia. It was extremely sceptical that the invasion would build up ‘in India that 
prestige which our great Indian authorities so often assure us needs repair.’ The Daily 
News even adopted a mocking tone to the logic behind the expedition: it was ‘an odd 
thing to send a consul to build up British influence in a country where the cities are 
villages... It is an odd thing to send two-and-thirty thousand people to Abyssinia to set 
two at liberty. It is an odd thing to send the native subject Indian to fight for us in 
another country, in order to impress him with the extent of our power to hold his 
own.’39 These sounded like powerful criticisms: would Indians really be impressed by 
                                                            
36  Times, 12 Oct. 1867, p. 6. 
37  Times, 12 Oct. 1867, p. 6. 
38  Times, 12 Oct. 1867, p. 6. 
39  Daily News, 27 Dec. 1867, p. 4. 
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Britain’s imperial strength if Indian troops were sent to rescue British subjects in 
Africa? One might have expected some leading Liberal politicians to criticise the 
government’s policy along these lines. In late 1867, they had an opportunity to do so in 
parliament. 
 
Parliament and prestige  
Parliament was recalled for an emergency session in November 1867, so that the 
government could obtain approval for paying the expenses of the expedition. By the 
time politicians gathered at Westminster, an advance brigade had already landed on the 
east African shore (at Zula, on 30 October) in order to construct a railway and two piers, 
for disembarking troops and stores.40 The government was therefore seeking approval 
for costs some of which had already been incurred; a state of affairs that concerned 
Disraeli.41 Disraeli was at this time chancellor of the exchequer and leader of the 
Conservatives in the House of Commons. However, he seems to have made most of the 
arrangements for the November session, as the prime minister was ill.42 
 
During this emergency session the arguments of leading ministers, in seeking to justify 
the invasion of Abyssinia, echoed much of what Rawlinson had said in July about 
prestige, duty and honour. The main debate in the Commons took place on 26 
November, as part of the vote of supply. Disraeli set out the government’s position and 
sought approval for an initial credit of £2,000,000, premised on an estimated total 
                                                            
40  T.R. Moreman, ‘Napier, Robert Cornelis, first Baron Napier of Magdala (1810-1890)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. May 2008). 
41  As far back as 8 Sept., Disraeli had shared his anxiety with the Earl of Derby: ‘I must call your 
consideration to the difficult and dangerous position to which, it seems to me, your Government is 
drifting. We are carrying on a war, and an expensive war, without the sanction of Parliament.’ Disraeli 
to Lord Derby, 8 Sept. 1867, cited in Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Beaconsfield, vol. IV, pp. 568-9. 
42  Derby was afflicted by a fit of gout in late Sept. 1867. Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Beaconsfield, 
vol. IV, p. 569.   
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expenditure of £3,800,000. He summarised the government’s position, claiming that 
military intervention was now imperative: ‘it was absolutely necessary to the interests 
of this country that there should be a recourse to arms, in order to vindicate the honour 
of the Throne’.43 Disraeli thus invoked the ‘honour of the Throne’, a formulation that 
suggested he had non-Indian audiences in mind for the impending display of British 
military might.  
 
In contrast, the foreign secretary clearly had Indian audiences in mind. Lord Stanley’s 
speech is of particular importance, because the Foreign Office had primary 
responsibility for the decision to launch the expedition. As we have seen, in July 
Stanley had been at pains to explain the multitudinous risks of action in Abyssinia. Now 
however, he argued that the (prestige-driven) security of India made the expedition 
imperative: 
 
We have to consider opinion in India as well as here. If Europe alone were concerned… 
[Britain’s] diplomatic position would have been somewhat affected: but still I suppose no very 
serious evil in an Imperial sense would have arisen. But how would it be in India? The 
possession of India is no doubt a great glory, but it is also a great responsibility, and under some 
circumstances a great danger. We rest our position there on what is vaguely called prestige. We 
hold our power in India not indeed exclusively by the exercise of force, but in a great measure 
by the knowledge that, however mildly and justly British authority may be exercised, it is 
backed in the last resort by a power which cannot be resisted. It follows as a consequence of this 
position that whatever it may cost we cannot allow that idea to be dispelled; we cannot accept 
an insult from any uncivilized tribe, and merely say we are very sorry, but it is out of our power 
                                                            
43  Disraeli, Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), cols. 181, 189-90, 192. 
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to punish it.44 
 
This is a striking statement by Lord Stanley. It is explicit not only that he had an Indian 
audience in mind but that Indian interests were driving British foreign policy. The 
perception in Anglo-Indian organs such as the Calcutta Review was that the influence 
was very much the other way around.45 Stanley’s parliamentary explanation for the 
decision to send the expedition is also striking because its conceptual and geographical 
scope appeared to be limitless: ‘whatever it may cost’ Britain could not let an idea be 
dispelled (the knowledge that British authority was ‘backed in the last resort by a power 
which cannot be resisted’). In fact, Stanley went on to suggest that there were limits to 
this logic, but only very distant ones: where an undertaking was ‘physically impossible’ 
there would be no duty to intervene. In support of this judgement, Stanley gave the 
example of Colonels Stoddart and Conolly, who were imprisoned and subsequently 
executed in Bukhara (this was the episode Rawlinson had claimed was a main cause of 
the Indian Mutiny).46 On this basis Stanley distinguished the present case. For all the 
hazards of a march to Magdala, it was not impossible; and where an undertaking was 
possible then there was ‘in honour and duty no choice but to go forward.’47 This was a 
remarkable precedent to set. Had Lawrence read Stanley’s speech—and he did 
scrutinise parliamentary debates on Indian questions—he might have grimaced. It was 
                                                            
44 Lord Stanley, Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), cols. 211-2. 
45  For example, in May 1867, writing on the subject of the British captives in Abyssinia, the Calcutta 
Review asserted there was ‘no doubt that in the main, the foreign policy of India must be made to bend 
itself to the requirements of the mother-country, but at the same time England’s prestige is now so 
intimately interwoven with her Indian administration, that it seems to us the height of folly to 
overlook for merely European considerations the effect of English policy upon the stability of our rule 
in India.’ Anon., ‘The British Captives in Abyssinia’, Calcutta Review, 89 (May 1867), 215. 
46  Stanley explained that it was believed at the time ‘that to send an expedition from India to Bokhara 
was an undertaking physically impossible. England was not then in possession of the Punjaub; the 
distance from the then existing boundaries of India was over 1,200 miles; the road lay over some of 
the highest mountains in the globe, through countries very thinly peopled, and whose inhabitants, 
where any existed, were fanatically hostile. The rescue of those officers was therefore not attempted 
simply because it was judged to be impossible.’ Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), col. 212. 
47  Stanley, Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), cols. 212, 214. 
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exactly this type of prestige-driven response to the ‘insult’ of envoys that reinforced his 
conviction that none should be sent to central Asia, where the behaviour of an Amir or 
Khan might make Theodore’s conduct seem merely eccentric. 
 
The Commons debate continued two days after Stanley’s speech. Austen Layard spoke 
with particular force about the importance of prestige to Britain’s interests, and not only 
in India. Layard was at this time the Liberal MP for Southwark, but he had been under-
secretary (to Earl Russell and then the Earl of Clarendon) at the Foreign Office from 
1861 to the fall of the Liberal government in 1866.48 He had therefore worked at the 
responsible department during the events that culminated in the captivity of Cameron 
and Rassam. Earl Russell relied on Layard as a specialist in eastern matters, and the 
selection of Rassam as envoy seems to have been heavily influenced by Layard.49 
Layard declared that: 
 
It is no question of ‘Indian prestige;’ but it is a question of the prestige of England—that is to 
say, of her reputation, honour, power, as a great nation both in the East and in the West, of her 
ability to avenge and punish insult, and to protect her representatives and her subjects... This is 
an Imperial question and one not limited to India alone, although it no doubt arises from the fact 
of our being an Eastern as well as a European Power. Whilst we hold our Indian Empire we 
must be prepared to maintain our influence, our interests, and our position in the East… The 
very maintenance of our Indian Empire depends upon the conviction that its populations 
entertain of our greatness and strength, of our power to punish insults and to enforce our rule.50  
                                                            
48  Layard was later British ambassador at Constantinople. J. Parry, ‘Layard, Sir Austen Henry (1817-
1894)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. May 2006). 
49  Nini Rodgers describes Rassam as a ‘protégé’ of Layard’s. Rodgers argues that Earl Russell blamed 
James Murray (assistant under-secretary and head of the consular department in the Foreign Office) 
for Cameron’s captivity, and avoided using Murray as an Abyssinian adviser after May 1864, leaning 
increasingly on Layard. Rodgers, ‘The Abyssinian Expedition’, fn. 46, 138. 
50  Austen Layard, Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), col. 274. 
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Layard thus shared the logic of the prestige argument made by Rawlinson and Lord 
Stanley, but envisaged an imperial as well as an Indian audience watching Britain’s 
response to events in Abyssinia. Sir Stafford Northcote spoke after Layard. As secretary 
of state for India, Northcote had a particular interest in the expedition, the planning and 
execution of which fell to his department. Northcote first made an observation about the 
preceding debate: ‘[s]ome people say we are going to war, not only for prestige, but for 
prestige in India.’51 Northcote said he disliked the word prestige, and explained that the 
purpose of prosecuting a war in Abyssinia was upholding the principle of inviolability 
of the sovereign’s envoys. This, Northcote argued, was of particular importance to 
India, because British envoys to ‘semi-barbarous countries’ were typically envoys of the 
Indian empire. He provided examples of British ambassadors, envoys, or political 
agents in Burma, Nepal, Cashmere, Zanzibar, Muscat and Aden.52 Northcote thus made 
the same argument elaborated in The Times’s editorial of one month before: leaving 
Cameron and Rassam to their fate would jeopardise the safety of their compatriots in 
similar positions throughout the world, especially ‘the East’. Although Northcote was 
reluctant to use the word prestige, his justification for intervention was premised upon 
it. As he asserted later in his speech, ‘India really gains something by the organization 
of so powerful a force, and by the display of her strength to her neighbours.’53 The idea 
of such a ‘display’ of military strength fitted squarely within the prestige arguments 
made by Rawlinson, Stanley and Layard, although those men were prepared to make the 
case by embracing the actual term. 
 
                                                            
51  Northcote, Hansard, 190 (28 Nov. 1867), col. 371. 
52  ‘In fact, Envoys or Agents, accredited by the Indian Government are scattered over all parts of the 
East.’ Northcote, Hansard, 190 (28 Nov. 1867), cols. 371-2. 
53 Northcote, Hansard, 190 (28 Nov. 1867), col. 379. 
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Northcote’s immediate predecessor as secretary of state for India, Viscount Cranborne, 
also found the word prestige somewhat distasteful. Like Northcote, he sought to 
emphasise different motives for sending the expedition: 
 
I confess it appears to me that if the motives which the Government have assigned for this war 
are the real ones, or anything like them, it is one of the most wicked wars ever undertaken. I 
believe that the nation generally consents to go into this war on this very clear and distinct 
principle—that a person employed on behalf of England to go on a service of danger has while 
on that service been maltreated and imprisoned, and that, therefore, on every consideration of 
honor, it is the duty of England to relieve him from his position. Well, when there is a principle 
of honor in the case, and when, representing our honorable nation, we desire to carry that 
principle into effect, it seems to me to be a degrading course of proceeding to parade before 
Europe and the world all those wretched considerations, such as the effect the expedition may 
have on the minds of populations in this or that part of the East, or what it may do in 
maintaining for us that mysterious something which we call ‘prestige.’… I wish that by 
common consent we could banish from the Parliamentary vocabulary a word which has so 
unpleasant an etymological connection with deceit.54 
 
Cranborne supported the decision to invade Abyssinia, endorsing ‘the thorough justice 
and necessity of this war’.55 His protest against the terminology used by his colleagues 
is potentially misleading. Although Cranborne recoiled from speaking of prestige, his 
emphasis on the more palatable constructs of ‘honour’ and ‘duty’, and his argument as a 
whole, shared much of its logic with the earlier arguments of Rawlinson, Stanley, 
Layard and Northcote. As Cranborne acknowledged later in the same speech, if Britain 
did not rescue its agents ‘from the hands of barbarous or half-civilized Courts’, the 
                                                            
54  Cranborne, Hansard, 190 (28 Nov. 1867), cols. 404-5. 
55  Cranborne, Hansard, 190 (28 Nov. 1867), col. 407. 
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effect ‘would be fruitful of evil’. This was not something specific to India, but ‘as much 
an Imperial interest as anything that could be named.’56 The reason of course that failing 
to take action would be ‘fruitful of evil’ was that elucidated by The Times and by 
Northcote. This was a matter of reputation, honour and prestige, however unpalatable 
the latter word was to some ministers. Many years later, Salisbury acknowledged the 
importance of prestige in governing India. However strong frontiers and fortresses were, 
‘if the prestige of the Power coming against you is greater than your own, it will 
penetrate through that barrier; it will undermine your sway; it will dissolve the loyalty 
and patriotism of those you rule’.57 
 
The reluctance of some ministers to invoke prestige as a justification or motive for 
invading Abyssinia merits some comment. It seems likely that what Cranborne had 
indicated expressly—the etymology of the term—caused some unease. It also seems 
possible (although one can only be tentative) that what Northcote and Cranborne found 
distasteful was not so much the word prestige, or the idea of going to war for it, but the 
notion of somehow playing to the public gallery. These men may have perceived that an 
emphasis on prestige was consistent with the politics of demagoguery, rather than 
rational debate and detached foreign policy-making. Cranborne later showed 
considerable frustration regarding public pressure to respond in kind following German 
and Russian seizures of ports in China.58 
                                                            
56  Cranborne, Hansard, 190 (28 Nov. 1867), cols. 404-5. 
57  R.L Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892: A study in the foreign policy of the third 
Marquis of Salisbury (London, 1959), p. 67 (emphasis in original). 
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The idea that maintaining British prestige was necessary for the control of India seems 
to have been reinforced by official anxiety about the danger posed by rumours 
circulated within the subcontinent. Such rumours might be imported from outside India 
through trade connections or religious pilgrimage; considerations to which ministers 
showed great sensitivity. In his parliamentary speech, Northcote emphasised that Indian 
traders from Bombay had contacts at Massawa and around the Red Sea. He also 
described how ‘hundreds and thousands’ of Indians travelled to Mecca each year, and 
naturally heard reports of events in the countries bordering the Red Sea. If these 
pilgrims heard ‘anything affecting the character and conduct of England’ they would 
spread these tidings across India on their return.59 Layard explained the risks this posed 
in the case of the British captives in Abyssinia: 
 
the thousands of Indian Mussulman pilgrims who yearly flock to Mecca would inevitably hear 
that a petty sovereign, whose dominions were not far off, had imprisoned and maltreated an 
Envoy of the Queen of England and had defied her power, and that we had accepted the insult 
and taken no step to release her messenger. They would return to India and spread these tidings 
through the length and breadth of the land—as they come from all parts of the peninsula—and 
the result would be a contempt for the power of England, which would inevitably lead to the 
most serious results.60 
 
Ministers were mindful of anecdotal evidence about the power of rumours in India. For 
example, Lord Stanley recollected that news of the disaster at Kabul (1841-42) was 
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60  Layard, Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), cols. 274-5. 
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known in the bazaars of the Madras Presidency before it had reached the British 
authorities. For Stanley, this was proof of ‘how far and how fast intelligence sometimes 
travels among an Oriental population’.61 Stanley was anxious to describe not merely the 
speed of rumours but their potency, and to this end offered some observations about 
their role in the origins of the Mutiny: 
 
I believe that the conviction which the Sepoys had come to entertain of their own power—a 
conviction without which the great mutiny would never have taken place—was founded to a 
very considerable extent on the rumours—no doubt greatly exaggerated and distorted 
rumours—of what was said and thought in England with respect to what was called the break-
down of our military system in the Crimean war.62 
 
Layard had a different theory about the origins of the Mutiny. He had visited India at 
the time, in order to ascertain for himself its causes. The cause Layard heard more than 
any other was the loss of British prestige following the mutiny of two Indian regiments 
(at Hyderabad and Berhampore) that Lord Dalhousie had ‘passed over and condoned’. 
The natives of India, Layard was told, understood from these events that the 
government of India was not powerful enough to punish the offenders. For Layard this 
was proof of ‘the incalculable disasters which may arise from what is termed, for want 
of a better word, “loss of prestige.”’63 
 
It seems clear therefore that a number of leading British officials and politicians were 
sensitive to considerations of prestige, and that in the case of Abyssinia such 
considerations constituted not merely a context for the decision to send the expedition 
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but a principal motive for it. Further, the fact that officials (including the foreign 
secretary, Lord Stanley) placed such emphasis on prestige in their parliamentary 
speeches either advocating or justifying the invasion suggests they thought arguments 
about prestige would have rhetorical force. The essence of these arguments was that a 
tangible force in India (British soldiers) was in itself insufficient to safeguard British 
interests on the subcontinent and beyond, and that an intangible force (prestige) was 
also necessary for this purpose. It followed from this premise that maintaining an 
impression of strength was fundamental to British power. Some of the evidence cited by 
the politicians who spoke most forcefully about the importance of prestige was 
inconsistent, as they for example ascribed different causes to the Mutiny of 1857. 
Rawlinson pointed to the loss of prestige during the first Afghan war (1838-42); Stanley 
cited the Crimean war (1854-56); and Layard referred to the mutiny of two native 
regiments in India (1857). But although these men disagreed about the ways it might be 




Layard seems to have spoken about the importance of prestige with more force than his 
Liberal colleagues. One might in fact have expected many Liberals to contest the idea 
that invading Abyssinia was necessary for the sake of British prestige. Most Liberals 
instead chose to criticise the government on constitutional grounds relating to various 
alleged ‘abuses’ of parliament. They protested that the government had kept parliament 
in ignorance of its preparations for war, and had only announced its intentions at the 
August prorogation.64 Liberals also claimed that the 1858 Government of India Act, 
                                                            
64  See e.g. the speech of Robert Lowe (MP for Calne), a former secretary to the Board of Control (1852-
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which prohibited the use of Indian revenues for military operations beyond the frontiers 
of India, had been breached.65 Gladstone voiced his objections on both of these 
constitutional questions.66 Gladstone did not, however, protest about the merits or 
objectives of the expedition: 
 
I am wholly unprepared to censure or condemn the policy which the Government have 
pursued… the Government appear to me in their general conduct to have been guided on the 
one hand by those mingled sentiments of regard to the honor of the country and the fair and just 
lights and claims of British subjects, more especially of a British Envoy, and on the other hand 
by that love of peace, which upon the whole is what we wish to find in those by whom the 
affairs of the country are administered…This expedition having been undertaken in the name of 
the country, and in a cause which is undoubtedly just, the first wish of our hearts and minds 
must be for its success.67  
 
It is possible that Gladstone’s muted criticism of government policy was part of a 
temporary political truce during the November session, following the serious illness of 
Disraeli’s wife.68 But it is nonetheless striking that he chose to protest solely about 
constitutional questions, rather than the politics of prestige. Liberals who criticised the 
government’s emphasis on prestige during the November session in fact seem to be 
                                                                                                                                                                              
55) and later chancellor of the exchequer (1868-73) and home secretary (1873-74), Hansard, 190 (26 
Nov. 1867), cols. 193-203: ‘We are asked to vote money, a great portion of which has been already 
spent, and to give our sanction to an expedition which has already started.’ 
65  Section 55 of the Act: ‘Except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of Her Majesty’s Indian 
possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without the 
consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation 
carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions by Her Majesty’s forces charged upon 
such revenues.’ Hansard, 190 (28 Nov. 1867), col. 359. 
66  Gladstone argued that when the government determined to send an expedition from India to Abyssinia 
it should have announced that intention in parliament. Further, Gladstone complained that it was ‘at 
least doubtful whether the Act of 1858 has been obeyed.’ Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), cols. 299-
300. 
67  Gladstone, Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), cols. 296-7. 
68  R. Shannon, Gladstone: Heroic Minister 1865-1898 (London, 1999), p. 45. 
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rather elusive. Only Lord Lyvedon and Henry Fawcett seem to have done so. Lyvedon 
objected to the word prestige, noting that it originally meant ‘illusions’, and challenged 
the government’s contention that Britain’s reputation in India depended upon the 
invasion of Abyssinia.69 Fawcett was the MP for Brighton and was at this time earning a 
reputation for his ‘individualism, and independence of party managers’.70 He was 
certainly blunt in his criticism of the government’s position:  
 
As to loss of prestige… The people of India—or at least the intelligent people of India, who 
alone would be likely to hear of it—would have concluded, if we had declined to send an army 
to Abyssinia, that our refusal arose, not for fear of King Theodore, but solely from an 
unwillingness to intrust, for the sake of a few prisoners, some thousands of men to a pestilential 
climate and an unknown country.71  
 
In some Radical publications the tone was also scathing. Lloyd’s Weekly Newspaper 
sought to made a patriotic argument based on the constitutional ‘abuses’ committed by 
the government. It complained that ‘the English people—whose credit has been used to 
the extent of at least four millions sterling—have had no more control over the war with 
Abyssinia than the subjects of Napoleon. The English public will not show themselves 
ready to buy prestige in the East, at the expense of their rights at home.’72 This was the 
sort of argument made by leading Liberals such as Gladstone and Lord Hartington a 
decade later, when they attacked Disraeli’s government for pursuing ‘prestige-driven’ 
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foreign policy in Afghanistan and southern Africa.73 In 1867 however, it was left to 
Radicals like Fawcett and publications such as the Daily News and Lloyd’s Weekly 
Newspaper to condemn the Conservative government’s stated appetite for prestige. It is 
hard to be certain why Liberals were so reticent on this question. One possibility is that 
Liberals felt uncomfortable criticising the government because much of what had gone 
wrong in Abyssinia—including the appointment and captivity of Cameron and later 
Rassam—had occurred during the Liberal administration of 1859-66. Liberal criticism 
may also have been muted in part because the objections of the expedition were in a 
sense defensive (liberating the captives) rather than aggressive (acquiring new territory 
for example). That hypothesis would certainly be consistent with Liberal reaction after 
the completion of the expedition, when Gladstone expressed his satisfaction that it had 
been confined to its original objectives.74  
 
Sir John Lawrence and Abyssinia 
Lawrence mentioned Abyssinia in a letter to Northcote in July 1867, before the 
government had committed itself on the question. Lawrence thought that the British 
captives should not be left to perish, and that a military force would succeed in an 
attempt to liberate them.75 This opinion occupied only a few lines in a long letter 
covering the varied terrain of irrigation works, prison construction, the degree of control 
exercised by central government over the Bombay presidency, and certain misdeeds of 
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flattering and seductive.’ Hansard, 193 (2 July 1868), col. 527. 
75  ‘I must say that I think we ought not to leave the captives to perish, without making a suitable effort to 
release them. Mere expostulation and diplomacy will do nothing. A Military force under a good 
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Northcote, 18 July 1867, Lawrence Mss/32B, no. 43. 
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officers in Burma. At no point in Lawrence’s correspondence with the secretary of state 
did he suggest that liberating Cameron and Rassam was necessary for (or even that it 
would be beneficial to) the security of British India. On hearing that the government had 
resolved to send an expedition, Lawrence conveyed his satisfaction to Northcote: ‘I am 
glad of this. I am sure that we owe it to our prestige, and above all to the captives, to 
make a thorough effort for their release.’76 However, Lawrence envisaged a non-Indian 
audience for the prestige to which he had referred. His subsequent letters make clear 
that he thought the expedition was not necessary for Indian security, a point he made 
emphatically in January 1868: 
 
I cannot admit that India has the slightest interest in the question at issue between England and 
King Theodore. We shall be neither stronger nor weaker out here, if he is duly punished for his 
misdeeds. Abyssinia is too distant from India; the communications between the two countries 
are too slight for the people of India to take any interest in what goes on in the former part of the 
world. The true grounds of the war are the vindication of England’s honour, and the propriety of 
doing all we can to release the captives.77 
 
Lawrence had a reason to downplay the importance of the expedition, because he was in 
disagreement with Northcote about which government would pay the ordinary expenses 
of the troops deployed from India. Lawrence thought it ‘quite obvious’ that the British 
government was to blame for allowing Cameron to leave his ‘proper post’ at Massawa 
and become entangled in Abyssinian politics in the interior: why he asked ‘should India 
bear a share of the cost of a war thus brought on?’78 Nonetheless, it seems clear from 
                                                            
76  Lawrence to Northcote, 3 Aug. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32B, no. 47. 
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Lawrence’s earlier and subsequent correspondence that his assertion to Northcote (that 
inflicting punishment on Theodore would make the British position in India ‘neither 
stronger nor weaker’) reflected his sincere assessment of the situation. When Lawrence 
heard of the success at Magdala he was certainly pleased: it was ‘glorious’ news, the 
dangers of a long campaign had been averted, and the troops and ‘equipage’ sent from 
India were ‘generally approved’. Lawrence even expressed his hope that the 
government would grant his friend Sir Robert Napier a pension. But at no point did 
Lawrence express satisfaction or relief that the security of India had been strengthened 
because an Abyssinian ruler had been punished and the captives liberated.79  
 
Lawrence’s stance demonstrates that it was possible and indeed logical for 
contemporaries to value prestige and yet not accept that the expedition to Abyssinia was 
necessary in order to defend the British hold on India. There seems to have been a 
genuine disagreement on this matter between Lawrence and Northcote. Northcote made 
arguments to Lawrence that were consistent with his earlier statements in parliament, 
and seemed surprised that Lawrence did not share his assessment of the security 
repercussions: ‘do you seriously believe that such tameness would fail to produce its 
effect in India, or in the countries adjoining India?’80 Yet Lawrence did believe that 
‘such tameness’ (that is to say, not sending an expedition to Abyssinia) would have no 
impact on the security of British India. 
 
Lawrence’s approach to the Abyssinian captives was in important respects consistent 
with the sentiments of the Calcutta Review and the Times of India. Before the 
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announcement of the expedition, the Calcutta Review had argued that efforts should be 
made to liberate the British subjects, especially Cameron and Rassam, because the 
‘insult and disgrace’ of their captivity had to be ‘wiped out’.81 This would also have 
been the place for the Calcutta Review to argue that the expedition was necessary for 
the prestige-driven security of India, but it did not do so. Similarly, in a later article, 
written after the expedition had returned, the Calcutta Review characterised the 
undertaking in terms of the ‘national honour’ of ‘England’, rather than the security of 
India.82 It offered no comment on the effect the successful expedition had had on 
Indians and their regard or fear for the power of Britain. Instead the article concentrated 
on the effect in Britain.83 The Calcutta Review acknowledged that the ‘excessive 
expenditure’ of the campaign was severely criticised, both in Britain and India, but 
asserted that nonetheless ‘the Abyssinian war was a glorious enterprise’ and the 
enormous cost was ‘perhaps justified’ by the results (although the piece is silent on 
what these results were).84 All of this is consistent with Lawrence’s opinion that the 
‘true grounds’ of the invasion were ‘the vindication of England’s honour, and the 
propriety of doing all we can to release the captives’ (rather than restoring prestige for 
the sake of British rule in India). The news of the capture of Magdala and the release of 
the captives reached Bombay on 30 April 1868. The Times of India stated that 
throughout India this news would be met ‘with a sense of relief and much rejoicing, as it 
has been in Bombay’.85 The reasons for such ‘relief and rejoicing’ seem to have been 
that scarcely any loss had befallen the British forces, and that all of the captives had 
been liberated without the ‘slightest harm’; not that British India was more secure 
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because of the restoration of British prestige. 
 
Lawrence was however mindful of a threat to the security of India consequent on the 
expedition to Abyssinia. Its vast scale, and reliance on troops from the Bombay army, 
meant that the military presence in India had been significantly reduced. Lawrence told 
the secretary of state in December 1867 that the number and strength of infantry 
regiments in India was consequently ‘on as low a scale as is safe’. Lawrence was 
acutely sensitive regarding the need, on security grounds, to maintain a visible presence 
of these soldiers:  
 
the presence of these troops is very important in a political point of view. They are if I may use 
such an expression the open & visible emblems of our power. They prevent mischief. I believe 
that India is now as quiet and the people as well disposed as they have ever been since the 
Mutiny: as they are ever likely to be. But the full complement of British troops is very important 
to keep everything in its proper place.86 
 
Cranborne had recently made this very point, during the November parliamentary 
debates. He warned that India would be less secure for the duration of the expedition, 
simply because her garrison would be smaller. The only guarantee that this reduction in 
troop numbers would not ‘pass into any real danger’ was that the governor-general had 
the power to raise any additional troops that he thought were necessary. However, 
Cranborne thought this was a dangerous precedent, as much would depend upon the 
character of the particular governor-general: 
 
I have such confidence in the stern mould in which the character of Sir John Lawrence has been 
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formed as to feel certain that, regardless of the smiles or of the frowns of any Ministry, if he 
should think that India needed the raising of more troops he would raise them in a moment. It is 
not any present danger I fear as resulting from the present step; but, having regard to the future, 
I do not like India to be looked upon as an English barrack in the Oriental seas from which we 
may draw any number of troops without paying for them. It is bad for England, because it is 
always bad for us not to have that check upon the temptation to engage in little wars which can 
only be controlled by the necessity of paying for them. But it is bad—very bad—for India, 
because if there were a weak, or a timid, or too facile a Governor General in that country at the 
time of any similar operation, you might have India seriously denuded of troops in order to suit 
the Imperial interests, while there would be this precedent to prevent you from censuring any 
officer who pursued such a course.87 
 
Although Lawrence considered that India was not particularly vulnerable at the time the 
expedition was sent, it is worth emphasising that the Mutiny had taken place only ten 
years earlier. Yet in 1867, thirteen thousand soldiers were removed from their duties in 
India, for an indefinite period, in order to invade Abyssinia. This illuminates one of the 
consequences of official perceptions about prestige: they could exert a distorting effect 
on priorities of security. By the logic of Rawlinson’s prestige argument, it was safer for 
British India that this proportion of its garrison was sent to another continent in order to 
rescue a British consul, than it was to leave the full complement of troops in India and 
risk Indians hearing rumours about the indignities to which the Queen’s representatives 
were subject at the hands of an African ruler. Rawlinson seems to have seen nothing 
odd about this. He even claimed that ‘by sending Indian troops to Abyssinia for the 
purpose of vindicating our national honour, we were only taking a measure of 
precaution as legitimate as would be the enlistment of fresh Indian battalions for the 
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purpose of overawing a disaffected district [in India].’88  
 
The special status of consuls and envoys 
Arguments in favour of sending an expedition to Abyssinia concentrated not on 
ordinary British subjects but on the two British subjects who were acting as 
representatives of the Queen and therefore of the state. These men were Charles Duncan 
Cameron (British consul to Abyssinia) and Hormuzd Rassam (a sort of special envoy to 
Theodore, following Cameron’s captivity). The motives for intervention may therefore 
be distinguished from those cited by Lord Palmerston in relation to ‘Don’ Pacifico in 
1850. In that case Palmerston had deployed British warships in order to collect 
relatively modest compensation due to (among others) David Pacifico, a Gibraltarian 
Jew. Defending his actions in the Commons, Palmerston asserted that ‘as the Roman, in 
days of old, held himself free from indignity, when he could say Civis Romanus sum; so 
also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful 
eye and the strong arm of England will protect him against injustice and wrong.’89 To 
some extent the Don Pacifico case was exceptional: the House of Lords condemned 
Palmerston’s actions, his own colleagues had misgivings, and only his oratory in the 
Commons may have saved him from censure there too.90 
 
However, in 1867 there was a clear consensus that it was the special status of Cameron 
and Rassam that made intervention imperative. The distinction between mere subjects 
and the higher category of Britain’s official representatives was evident in the 
arguments of Henry Seymour, who had proposed the parliamentary motion in favour of 
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a rescue mission. Seymour had argued that if Britain ‘invested any person, however 
humble, with the sacred character of Ambassador, he should, by reason of the office he 
filled, be as much considered as though he were the highest noble in the land.’91 The 
critical term here is invested: the distinguishing factor between an ordinary subject and 
Britain’s official representatives was that the latter had been invested by the state with 
special status. Officials were unanimous in emphasising this distinction. Lord Stanley 
stated that the Britons held captive by Theodore were ‘not merely our fellow-
countrymen, but Envoys who have been commissioned by the Sovereign’.92 Similarly, 
Disraeli said that the government was disposed ‘to exhaust every possible means of 
obtaining the freedom of these persons, especially those who represented the Majesty of 
the country’.93 Gladstone also made this distinction, when considering the government’s 
obligations to ‘the fair and just lights and claims of British subjects, more especially of 
a British Envoy’.94 This distinction was also clear in newspaper commentary in Britain 
and India. As the Pall Mall Gazette put it: ‘it is our duty to protect our fellow-subjects, 
and our imperative duty to protect our diplomatic representatives, against insult and 
injury’.95 The Calcutta Review was of the same opinion: ‘there are not only British 
subjects, but two representatives of Her Majesty to be released’.96  
 
Press opinion and political reaction to the expedition’s success 
In proposing his motion for action in Abyssinia, Henry Seymour had claimed that the 
captives’ fate had aroused great interest among the public.97 Government ministers 
acknowledged as much in the subsequent parliamentary debates. Disraeli for example 
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recognised ‘the general interest which for a long time the subject has commanded 
throughout the country’.98 The likely popularity of announcing a mission to Abyssinia 
was a tactical consideration Disraeli weighed when considering whether parliament 
should be recalled in November 1867. The alternative was holding the matter over until 
February 1868, by which time even more expenses would have been incurred without 
the sanction of parliament. Disraeli confided to Derby that although the prospect of 
recalling parliament early was ‘a very disagreeable one’ it also had one significant 
advantage: ‘[a]t present the contemplated expedition is popular with the country, and 
the expenditure already incurred would not only be condoned, but might, under the 
peculiar circumstances, be justified.’99  
 
Policy-makers may also have been emboldened in their decision to launch the 
expedition by their perception of supportive public opinion. Lord Stanley was 
remarkably frank on this score. When asked in the Commons why the government had 
not resolved to send a mission earlier, Stanley was explicit about the role of public 
opinion: 
 
Moreover, between the period of the debate and the time at which we agreed to send out the 
expedition, the subject had been much in the public mind and had been much discussed in the 
public press, and we felt convinced in adopting a policy of action we should have the support of 
public opinion, of the existence of which up to that time we could not satisfy ourselves, and 
without the support of which in this country no enterprize can be reasonably undertaken. 
Without these three things—first, the conviction that the employment of force was necessary; 
next, that the expedition was physically possible; and lastly, that we should be supported by 
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public opinion in the use of it—we could not, and we ought not to have decided to act.100 
 
Fortunately for Lord Stanley and the government, the Abyssinian expedition was a 
complete military success. Napier engaged Theodore’s troops on a plain below the 
fortress at Magdala on Good Friday, 10 April 1868. Seven hundred of Theodore’s men 
were killed (and over one thousand wounded), while losses among Napier’s forces 
amounted to only twenty men wounded.101 The following day Theodore released the 
captives. Napier demanded that Theodore should surrender and, following his refusal, 
on Easter Monday Magdala was stormed. Just before the first British soldiers reached 
him, Theodore shot himself.102  
 
The British military victory at Magdala was decisive, and the Abyssinian expedition is 
remembered as a one-sided affair. Napier’s troops were armed with breech-loading 
rifles; Theodore’s cavalry had only shields and spears. This asymmetry however 
obscures just how vulnerable Napier’s forces were, particularly once they had left the 
coast. They were fortunate that Theodore made no attempt to harass them on their 
march inland. It was also fortunate that Theodore’s army (at its peak nearly eighty 
thousand strong) had disintegrated to the extent that only four thousand men remained 
to fight at Magdala.103 Moreover, British military superiority would have counted for 
little had Theodore chosen to kill his captives before disappearing into the Abyssinian 
highlands. Theodore had ample opportunity to do this. In such an eventuality, the 
British rescue mission would have evolved into a punitive mission, seeking vengeance 
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for the death of the Queen’s representatives.104 But Napier’s large force, operating in 
trackless desert, was not equipped for such an operation. This not unlikely scenario 
would surely have injured British prestige much more than merely abandoning the 
captives.  
 
Napier’s despatches reveal his anxiety about the reaction of Abyssinian tribes to the 
presence of the British forces, for he was reliant on their collaboration for flour and 
grain for his soldiers and animals. He admitted to the secretary of state that he could not 
have reached Magdala without native assistance.105 Certain rebel chiefs had not only 
granted Napier the right to march through their territories, but assisted him with guides, 
provisions and pack animals.106 Napier also reported that Theodore’s fortress at 
Magdala was one of the strongest he had ever seen, and might have been made ‘quite 
impregnable’. Had Theodore ‘been properly supported by his soldiers,’ Napier 
concluded, ‘we could not have escaped very severe loss in entering it.’107 
 
In the event these risks did not materialise, and government ministers were eager to 
celebrate the success of the mission. On 2 July 1868 Disraeli moved that the thanks of 
the House of Commons be given to those who had planned and accomplished ‘one of 
the most remarkable military enterprizes of this century.’108 Although much of the 
subsequent parliamentary debate concentrated on Napier and his troops, government 
                                                            
104  Rawlinson had argued that the expedition should be sent even if the captives were killed, in order to 
‘exact retribution for their fate’: Hansard, 189 (26 July 1867), col. 242. Layard agreed that such a 
course would be necessary: ‘even should the King—as it has been suggested that he may do—put his 
captives to death, even then we shall be bound to persevere in this war in order to punish him for the 
outrage he has committed.’ Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), col. 277. 
105  Napier to the secretary of state for India, 14 Apr. 1868, Parliamentary Papers Abyssinian Expedition, 
p. 4. 
106  Rubenson, ‘Ethiopia and the Horn’, p. 81. 
107  Napier to the secretary of state for India, 14 Apr. 1868, Parliamentary Papers Abyssinian Expedition, 
p. 5. 
108  Disraeli, Hansard, 193 (2 July 1868), col. 522. 
150 
ministers sought political credit for having appointed him, and for the success of the 
expedition. According to Disraeli, when the invasion ‘was first mooted it was 
denounced as a rash enterprize, pregnant with certain peril and probable disaster. It was 
described, indeed, as one of the most rash undertakings which had ever been 
recommended by a Government to Parliament.’109 This was a considerable 
exaggeration, because (as we have seen) parliament had been remarkably united in 
supporting the government. Disraeli then described the hazards encountered by the 
troops, in order to emphasise the scale of the achievement. He singled out Napier for 
particular praise:  
 
Over this land [Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Napier] guided cavalry and infantry, and—what 
is perhaps the most remarkable part of the Expedition—he led the elephants of Asia, bearing the 
artillery of Europe, over African passes which might have startled the trapper and appalled the 
hunter of the Alps.110 
 
Napier had indeed ‘led the elephants of Asia’ across Abyssinia: forty-four of them had 
been shipped out from Bombay, in order to carry the heavy guns during the march to 
Magdala.111 The elephant seemed a potent symbol—immediately conjuring up an 
oriental image—of Britain’s status as an ‘Eastern power’. Disraeli could not resist 
indulging in more patriotic rhetoric, remarking that the expedition had resulted in ‘an 
event of peculiar interest to an Englishman… the standard of St. George was hoisted on 
the mountains of Rasselas.’112 Disraeli’s rhetoric was presumably intended to extract 
political capital out of an undertaking that although not as controversial as he suggested, 
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had certainly been fraught with risks, as well as incredibly expensive. The 
Conservatives had been out of office for a considerable period, and even now enjoyed 
only a minority government. By acclaiming the expedition’s success, Disraeli was 
drawing attention to the Conservatives’ capacity to make hard choices, and carry them 
through, in the vital arena of imperial policy.  
 
Disraeli also expressed a sense of righteousness that the expedition had not been 
motivated by a desire to acquire a new empire in Africa, and had not resulted in the 
annexation of new territory: 
 
When it was first announced that England was about to embark on a most costly and perilous 
Expedition merely to vindicate the honour of our Sovereign and to rescue from an unjust but 
remote captivity a few of our fellow-subjects, the announcement was received in more than one 
country with something like mocking incredulity. But we have asserted the purity of our 
purpose. In an age accused, and perhaps not unjustly, of selfishness and a too great regard for 
material interests, it is something, in so striking and significant a manner, for a great nation to 
have vindicated the higher principles of humanity. It is a privilege to belong to a country which 
has done such deeds. They will add lustre to the name of this nation, and will beneficially 
influence the future history of the world.113 
 
Disraeli’s choice of the word ‘lustre’ accords with the emphasis the government had 
placed on prestige. There was of course an element of bombast in his language. Yet the 
satisfaction Disraeli expressed publicly seems to have been consistent with his private 
correspondence. Reflecting on this episode some years later, Disraeli maintained the 
pride he had expressed in parliament in 1868: ‘I do not look back to the Abyssinian 
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[war] with regret: quite the reverse. It was a noble feat of arms, and highly raised our 
prestige in the East.’114  
 
In the House of Lords, the Earl of Derby also rejoiced in the success of an undertaking 
that he proclaimed would ‘ever be memorable in the annals of our country.’115 Derby 
reminded parliament that the two principal aims of the enterprise had been achieved: ‘to 
vindicate the honour of the country’ and to relieve the sufferings of the captives.116 The 
triumph was emphatically an imperial one, which had harnessed the diverse resources of 
a global empire: ‘it is no light matter that troops raised in the centre of Asia should, 
under the conduct of a British General, obtain a triumphal success in the heart of Africa, 
in a region which the boldest travellers had hardly ever penetrated.’117 
 
It is clear then that both Derby and Disraeli sought to extract political advantage from 
the success of the Abyssinian expedition. As we have seen, Disraeli and Stanley thought 
that their decision to go to war had been a popular one, based on positive press 
coverage. However, it is difficult to discern if the Conservatives’ approach was shaped 
by assumptions or calculations regarding the legion of new voters enfranchised in 1867. 
There were valid reasons for exulting in the expedition’s triumph irrespective of the 
increased electorate, and not only because it allowed a minority government to claim 
administrative competence on imperial questions. It was in a sense only natural that the 
government should seek some credit after the mission’s success, for had it ended in 
military disaster, or had the captives been killed, the government would certainly have 
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received the blame. Derby was in no doubt about this political risk.118 Moreover, the 
enterprise had proved exceptionally expensive; ministers presumably hoped that 
exulting in its success might blunt Liberal criticism about its financial costs.119 
 
Although the Conservatives clearly sought to profit politically from the success of the 
Abyssinian expedition, it is hard to find evidence in support of Freda Harcourt’s 
hypothesis that the expedition emanated from a ‘new’ imperialism that emerged circa 
1867. This imperialism was ‘new’, Harcourt suggested, because of its ‘intimate 
association’ with the political conditions following the second Reform Act. Harcourt 
cited the Abyssinian expedition as an example of this new imperialism in practice, 
claiming that Disraeli was able ‘to mould the Abyssinian Expedition into a national 
cause involving all the classes’.120 Harcourt however offered no evidence in support of 
this hypothesis. In contrast, Nini Rodgers has argued that the second Reform Act and 
the expedition were ‘coincidental rather than consequential’. For Rodgers, the decision 
to launch the campaign was the product of a departmental government rather than an 
initiative from a Disraelian cabinet.121 Rodgers concluded that it was ‘happenings in 
Africa, rather than a spirit of ‘new imperialism’ at home, which shaped the behaviour of 
Britain’s governors.’122 
 
A consciousness of the new electorate may however have been evident in the 
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government’s recognition of the role of all ranks in the expedition’s success. The 
resolutions moved in parliament explicitly acknowledged the ‘Discipline, Gallantry, and 
Endurance’ displayed by the men of the army and navy, as well as the officers.123 Some 
individual privates were even singled out for praise during the parliamentary debates. 
For example, the Earl of Malmesbury (Lord Privy Seal), having mentioned the names of 
‘the gallant Generals’, also provided ‘two names of another class in our force—the 
names of Drummer M’Guire, and Private Bergin of the 33rd Regiment, who were the 
first two men at the storming of Magdala.’124 Similarly, the Duke of Cambridge lauded 
the commitment of all ranks, from ‘the gallant General, who commanded, down to the 
youngest drummer’.125 
 
Abyssinia and Afghanistan 
During the November parliamentary debates, Sir Stafford Northcote sought to link 
British policy in Abyssinia with that in Afghanistan. He did this by arguing that the 
invasion of Abyssinia would allow Lawrence more latitude for pursuing his cautious 
policy in Afghanistan. Northcote told the House of Commons: 
 
I say that at the present moment the policy of Sir John Lawrence, which has been characterized 
sometimes half sneeringly, I am afraid, as ‘a policy of masterly inactivity,’ is what we ought in 
every way to support and strengthen, and I can conceive of nothing more important to a 
Governor General who is anxious to carry out that policy than that it should be understood that 
he is actuated by a deliberate conviction, and not by any doubt as to his strength. I say therefore 
it is of the utmost importance that Sir John Lawrence’s hands should be strengthened by 
unmistakable evidence that India has strength, and that the Government of England has force 
                                                            
123 The Earl of Malmesbury, Hansard, 193 (2 July 1868), col. 476. 
124  The Earl of Malmesbury, Hansard, 193 (2 July 1868), col. 478. 
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and determination to avenge insults and secure the liberties of her subjects.126  
 
This is an intriguing statement by the secretary of state for India. Northcote’s argument 
suggests that policy-makers wishing to avoid active interference in some places might 
have to intervene elsewhere, in order to prove that their passivity in the first place was 
not borne out of weakness. Recognising certain criticism of Lawrence’s Afghan policy, 
Northcote therefore asserted that such policy would be supported by ‘unmistakable 
evidence that India has strength’; and what better evidence could be provided than 
sending a force from India to a mountain fortress in Abyssinia? The audience in this 
case comprised Britons (critics of Lawrence’s Afghan policy), whether at home or in 
India. Northcote thus anticipated that Lawrence’s critics would find it harder to 
complain that the British authorities were indifferent to Indian security if British troops 
were engaged in a mission ‘to avenge insults’ in Africa. In making this argument 
Northcote was in one sense responding to criticism of ‘indifference’ prevalent in some 
newspapers in India and Britain. As the Calcutta Review had complained before the 
announcement of the expedition:  
 
But of late it would seem as though we had been acting on the laissez faire principle, simply 
drifting with the stream,—as though the Abyssinian question had been characterised by that 
‘masterly inactivity,’ for which we are becoming so famous, and which may some day cost us 
so dear.127  
 
The question of envoys also connected British policy in Abyssinia and Afghanistan. At 
the same time that parliament was acclaiming the success of the expedition, Rawlinson 
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sent his memorandum on the ‘Central Asian Question’ to the secretary of state. One of 
his main proposals was that British envoys should be sent to Afghanistan, and 
Rawlinson seized on the opportunity to suggest that events in Abyssinia made this 
recommendation even sounder. He claimed that Britain’s triumph in east Africa would 
inoculate British envoys from harm in central Asia: ‘the prestige of our recent 
Abyssinian triumph would, no doubt, give an additional personal security to our 
envoy.’128 
 
The notion that prestige would somehow protect British officers in central Asia held no 
attraction for Lawrence. He told Northcote that ‘no matter how completely we may 
punish Theodore’, British officers sent to distant countries that were ‘secure in their 
isolation’ would remain very much ‘at the mercy’ of potentates.129 As discussed in 
chapter III, Lawrence thought that envoys to ‘barbarous’ courts far from the sea, and 
thus the protection of British naval power, would always be vulnerable. To Lawrence’s 
mind, the Abyssinian expedition only illustrated this vulnerability. Lawrence was not 
alone in having reached a conclusion quite contrary to Rawlinson’s optimistic assertions 
about British envoys. Disraeli acknowledged in parliament, with considerable 
understatement, that in future it would be ‘wise to be more cautious in opening relations 
with Sovereigns such as the King of Abyssinia.’130 Disraeli’s admission illuminates an 
important characteristic of prestige: that it acted to constrain as well as prompt certain 
policy decisions. One manifestation of this was the reluctance of officials to send 
British envoys to hostile parts of the world, because they recognised the potential for 
entanglement should such envoys be maltreated. To put it more simply, if British 
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officers were ‘insulted’ in any way, then the maintenance of prestige would demand a 
mission in order to extract redress (or rescue the officers from captivity, or avenge their 
deaths). Such missions were not only expensive, as Abyssinia had proved, but 
extremely dangerous, as Abyssinia might have proved. At his farewell speech in 
Calcutta, Lawrence explained the path to escalating intervention he envisaged by 
sending officers to remote, ‘lawless’ places such as Afghanistan: 
 
If we send agents into remote countries where the government is rude, and the people bigoted 
and lawless, we subject them to ill-treatment and insult, which we must be prepared to punish 
by force of arms. I know how strong and how admirable is the spirit of enterprise and devotion 
which would prompt hundreds of my countrymen cheerfully to incur such risks: but we must 
look to the national consequences that may result, and I for one cannot say that they justify 
sanction to such undertakings.131 
 
This constraining factor also helps to explain Lawrence’s insistence that Indian Muslims 
(and not British officers) should be sent to Afghanistan in order to gather information 
about events in central Asia. Not only were the former of more practical use in 
obtaining intelligence, they were less likely to be attacked by their fellow-Muslims in 
Afghanistan. In any case, they were more ‘expendable’ than the British alternative, in 
that their incarceration or even death would not produce demands for punitive missions. 
Some ministers seem to have thought that the same logic might apply to junior British 
officers. The man chosen to negotiate Cameron’s release, Hormuzd Rassam, was a 
relatively junior officer (first assistant political agent at Aden). The Earl of Clarendon 
(foreign secretary at the time of the appointment) had deliberately selected a junior 
officer because he thought that if anything happened to a more senior official Britain 
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would have been obliged to send an expedition to obtain his release, or avenge his 
death.132 Clarendon’s tactic had not been successful. The difficulty for policy-makers 
was that once a man, however junior, was sent on an official mission he was connected, 
by appointment and purpose, to the British crown and state. Even the objects such a 
man carried might elevate his status. In this case, Rassam carried a letter signed by the 
Queen, and politicians were sensitive to this fact. Disraeli was particularly animated on 
this point: ‘Her Majesty even deigned that her Envoy should be the bearer of a letter 
bearing the Sign Manual of Her Majesty.’133  
 
It was possible for politicians to draw other lessons from the experience of Abyssinia. 
Layard deprecated the pressure put on the Foreign Office by meddling and adventurous 
Britons:  
 
And for heaven’s sake let this unhappy business serve as a lesson to us in future to avoid that 
brood of adventurers, schemers, speculators, and intriguers, who are for ever thrusting upon the 
Foreign Office their plans and recommendations for the extension and establishment of British 
influence, interests and trade, in distant and barbarous lands, regardless of the result to this 
country and to the difficulties and dangers in which they may involve us.134 
 
Layard possibly had one particular ‘intriguer’ in mind: Charles Tilstone Beke. Dr Beke 
(the university of Tübingen awarded him a doctorate in 1834) had spent the years from 
1840 to 1843 travelling in Abyssinia, seeking to advance commerce, aid the suppression 
of the slave trade and elucidate the sources of the Nile. Beke produced propaganda on 
Abyssinian affairs, and ‘angled’ unsuccessfully for appointment as British consul to 
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Abyssinia.135 In response to the captivity of Cameron and the other British subjects, Dr 
Beke wrote numerous letters to newspapers and to the Foreign Office, and also gave 
public addresses on the subject. He then accepted a commission from the family of 
Henry Stern (a missionary, and one of the British captives) to travel to Abyssinia in 
order to seek his release. Beke twice went to Abyssinia, the second time in 1866, but 
after apparent initial success ultimately failed in his objective and was blamed, 
‘probably unfairly’, for exacerbating a delicate situation.136 After the failure of his 
unofficial mission, Dr Beke urged the Foreign Office to assist materially one of the 
Abyssinian chiefs hostile to Theodore. Beke identified a suitable candidate, and offered 
to return to Abyssinia (as British ambassador) to organise this rebel chief’s bid for the 
crown.137  
 
Britain, Europe and India 
The arguments made by officials advocating or justifying the use of military force 
against Theodore envisaged a variety of audiences for whom the maintenance of British 
prestige was thought to be important. For Rawlinson, audiences in India and 
neighbouring eastern countries were clearly paramount. This was true to some extent in 
Northcote’s case, though the way he linked criticism of Lawrence’s Afghan policy and 
more active measures in Abyssinia made it clear that the secretary of state also 
conceived of a British audience. Stanley’s speech during the emergency autumn session 
of 1867 was explicit in envisaging an Indian audience for the expedition. But his 
journals suggest he also had European audiences in mind: 
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The award in 1870 of a civil-list pension of £100 per annum mollified him somewhat. Crummey, 
‘Charles Tilstone Beke’. 
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20 Apr. 1868. News came of the storming of Magdala, and death of Theodore, with slight loss 
on our side. Thus ends, more fortunately than could have been expected, a war on which we 
embarked with extreme reluctance, and only from a sense of the impossibility of doing 
otherwise. It has cost £5,000,000, or nearly so, but the money has been well spent, for it has 
proved not only that an English army could fight, which was not doubted, but that it can march 
and shift for itself in an extremely difficult country, which was not thought to be our strong 
point.138  
 
As foreign secretary, Stanley would have been sensitive to how Britain was perceived in 
continental Europe. What he wrote in his journals about the perception of the ‘English 
army’ was presumably made with that European audience in mind. This would be 
consistent with Jonathan Parry’s contention that empire resonated in British politics 
because of continental competition. Parry has argued that in foreign politics, ‘Europe 
was always at the centre of the plot, even when the action was set somewhere else.’139 
Of course it was possible to conceive of Indian and European audiences, as Stanley 
seems to have done. It was also possible to imagine a still wider audience. The Calcutta 
Review for example seems to have conceived of a global audience for the expedition. 
‘The world scarcely knows’, it proudly declared in January 1870, ‘whether to admire 
most the excellent organisation which ensured success, or the moderation and clemency 
with which that success was associated.’140  
 
The Abyssinian expedition also illuminates the influence of India on British foreign 
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policy. The authors of Africa and the Victorians argued that British officials, throughout 
the nineteenth century, recognised the ‘imperative’ of preserving the communications 
between Britain and India, on grounds of both security and commercial prosperity.141 In 
this way Robinson and Gallagher demonstrated that British foreign policy was driven 
by concerns for the security of India (specifically the sea routes to India, through the 
Suez canal and around the Cape). Although the authors were reluctant to consider the 
influence of perceptions about prestige in this account, it is not inconsistent with their 
argument to suggest that this preoccupation with security included a concern for 
prestige in India. Viewed in this way, it was not only ‘the safety of the routes eastward’ 
that had to be defended, but also Britain’s prestige; variously to British, European and 
global audiences. Without recognising that perceptions about prestige also influenced 
British officials, it would be impossible to understand why a vast army was sent from 
India to Africa to rescue a few British subjects. 
 
Robinson and Gallagher’s theory was premised on the utility of India to Britain, which 
they explained in military terms: with the control of India came ‘the control of an army 
and of an almost inexhaustible reserve’. Moreover, Indian taxpayers bore the cost of 
their own occupation, and about half of the British army was billeted upon them. ‘The 
Indian empire thus provided a uniquely self-financing army, which allowed Victorian 
governments to exert power in the Far and Near East without always having to foot the 
whole bill.’142 Robinson and Gallagher argued that the ‘ambit of Indian power is 
described by the movement of her troops’, providing the Abyssinian expedition as one 
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example of this.143 This must be correct: without control of India and thus the ability to 
use its human resources to fight overseas, Britain would not have been able to ‘punish’ 
the King of Abyssinia. India did not only provide the troops, supplies and animals for 
the invasion of Abyssinia, but the expedition was planned in and commanded by 
officers from India, a fact that attracted some comment in Britain.144 
 
However, the expedition also demonstrates something quite different: not the military 
power gained by controlling India, but the (prestige-driven) vulnerabilities it created. 
For without an empire in India, officials would not have perceived the same imperative 
to rescue the captives and thereby demonstrate that Britain had the power to ‘punish’ 
the King of Abyssinia. To put it another way, British control of India made the 
expedition to Abyssinia both possible and necessary. In this way, the Abyssinian 
expedition of 1867-68 illuminates not only the ‘ambit of Indian power’, but its 
vulnerabilities too.  
 
* * * 
 
Sir Robert Napier was richly rewarded for his success in Abyssinia. He was thanked by 
parliament, raised to the peerage as Baron Napier of Magdala and Caryngton, and 
awarded a pension of two thousand pounds per annum. He was also made a knight 
grand commander of the Star of India (GCSI), and received the freedom of the City of 
London, citizenship of Edinburgh, and a doctorate of civil law from the university of 
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Oxford.145 Consul Cameron fared less well. He returned to England in July 1868, retired 
on a pension of three hundred and fifty pounds per annum, and died less than two years 
later.146  
 
The vote of thanks to Napier avoided the word prestige. Instead it acclaimed the 
‘Energy, Courage, and Perseverance with which he conducted the recent Expedition 
into Abyssinia, resulting in the Defeat by Her Majesty’s Forces of the Army of King 
Theodore and the Vindication of the Honour of the Country by the Rescue from 
Captivity of Her Majesty’s Envoy and other British Subjects, and by the Capture and 
Destruction of the strong Fortress of Magdala.’147 Referring to the ‘vindication of the 
honour of the country’ was more palatable for etymological and political reasons. 
However, it is explicit in the arguments made by several government ministers and 
other politicians (as well as journalists), that the decision to launch the expedition was 
both motivated and understood to a significant extent as a question of maintaining the 
prestige that was thought essential to the control of India. There was certainly little 
tangible to be gained at Magdala, and no question of economic motives: official returns 
showed no British trade at all between India and Abyssinia.148 Without acknowledging 
the influence of prestige on policy-makers, it would be hard to understand why in 1867 
the British government resolved to send thirteen thousand soldiers from their prized 
possession to the east African coast, there to trek hundreds of miles across almost 
unknown desert, in order to set at liberty a consul, an envoy and a handful of other 
British subjects. It was emphatically an imperial enterprise, a point sometimes 
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misunderstood because no new territory was annexed. According to Sven Rubenson, 
writing in The Cambridge History of Africa, the expedition ‘was in no way part of a 
colonial venture.’149 It is hard to imagine a more sonorously colonial venture: Indian 
troops, commanded by British officers from India (later decorated with imperial 
honours), assisted by Indian supplies, Indian elephants and other transport animals, all 
sent in an imperial flotilla from India to Africa to a significant extent because of 
perceptions about prestige and its importance in India.  
 
The expedition also hints at the sort of difficulties Lawrence encountered in maintaining 
his policy of vigilance in Afghanistan. This chapter referred to an article in the Bombay 
Gazette that revealed a belligerent attitude among the British community in India before 
the government had announced its decision to invade Abyssinia. According to the 
Bombay Gazette, ‘indignation’ had been aroused among Anglo-Indians ‘at the 
dilatoriness and seeming indifference and apathy’ of the British government in taking 
action. The article also described reports that, if the government did not send an 
expedition, two hundred British volunteers from India would take it upon themselves to 
do just that.150 This was the restless, bellicose spirit Lawrence encountered on the north-
west frontier, where the stakes were much higher. This was also the sort of belligerence 
that publications in Britain commonly attributed to officers in India. These metropolitan 
perceptions will be considered in the following chapter. 
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V 
‘Our Indian armies pine for war’! 
Perceptions of army officers in India, c.1864-1869 
 
In the first half of the nineteenth century, the army had been generally regarded as an 
arm of state oppression and a ‘taxpayer-funded aristocratic bolthole’.1 In her article on 
the growth of ‘Christian militarism’ in mid-Victorian Britain, Olive Anderson argued 
that the Crimean war began ‘a dramatic change in the attitude towards the army of 
British society in general, and of the religious public in particular’. The Indian Mutiny 
was also important in changing perceptions: throughout 1858, preachers identified 
Christian virtues with military ones. The Mutiny and the Crimean war had together 
given credibility to the idea of the ‘soldier-saint’. Anderson concluded that by the late 
eighteen-sixties many different sections of the religious public in Britain had adopted 
‘broadly sympathetic’ attitudes towards the officers and men of the army, the external 
aspects of military life ‘and even towards the military ethos’. This was a new 
development and a rapid one (accomplished in little more than a decade). Anderson 
therefore traces the Christian militarism of late nineteenth century Britain to the time of 
the Crimean war, the Indian Mutiny, and the American civil war.2 
 
Subsequent and influential research by Anne Summers has suggested that competing 
forms of militarism existed in Britain; that popular enthusiasm for militarism as a 
sporting pastime (the Volunteer corps) was often accompanied by ‘a deep aversion’ to 
the forces of the crown. Summers argued that it was possible and respectable to preach 
the ideal of British subjects united in defence of their homeland while at the same time 
‘decrying the imperialistic adventures of the Regular Army’. In the middle of the 
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century, the ‘deepest antipathy’ between popular and professional militarism was 
‘vividly expressed by the refusal of the mid-Victorian Volunteer corps to wear uniforms 
of a regimental scarlet colour.’ Summers concludes that it may not have been until the 
shock of reverses in the Boer war that British society would support anything 
resembling a continental militarism.3  
 
Summers’s arguments complement slightly earlier research by Hugh Cunningham into 
the Volunteer Force. Cunningham found that volunteering was popular: by the end of 
the summer of 1860, there were more than one hundred thousand volunteers. Although 
the Volunteers were envisaged as an institution for the middle-classes, within ten years 
they were largely working-class in composition. For Cunningham, this is the most 
striking feature of volunteering, given that it usually required some financial expense. 
Britons seem to have taken to volunteering for social as well as military reasons. 
Cunningham attributes its working-class appeal to the varied attractions of recreation, 
the desire for social mobility and respectability, patriotism and perhaps pressure from 
employers who were already officers in the corps.4 
 
John MacKenzie has argued that colonial war played a vital part in transforming the 
reputation of the army. He positions India as central to this transformation: men trained 
to suppress domestic disorder in Britain were instead deployed, much more acceptably 
to the British public, throughout the subcontinent. Although the Mutiny provided ‘the 
moral touchstone’, MacKenzie asserts that subsequent campaigns on the north-west 
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frontier and in Afghanistan were also ‘suffused’ with some of this holy purpose. In this 
sense, the army became the instrument of a ‘moral purpose’ in the world.5  
 
The present chapter questions some of this historiography, particularly the contention 
that the army enjoyed a much-improved public image after the Mutiny. It argues that in 
the period 1864-69, metropolitan newspapers depicted British army officers in India as 
restless, bellicose and ‘ambitious’ (for promotion and honours). This portrait was 
particularly prevalent in the Liberal press, which viewed the British community in India 
as a ‘military society’ where public opinion was indistinguishable from military 
opinion. Such publications consequently attributed the affinity many army officers had 
for more active policies in Afghanistan to this militarism. Newspapers on the political 
right scorned some of these perceptions, but they also recognised that the ambition of 
frontier officers might lead Britain into another Afghan war. Such pessimistic 
assessments were by no means confined to journalists. A number of officials in Britain 
and India—including Sir Charles Wood, Lord Elgin and Sir John Lawrence—ascribed 
similar motivations to those who bridled at the policy of frontier restraint. The officials 
also worried about the independent power of the military authorities in India, especially 
the commander-in-chief. Some senior military commanders were themselves frustrated 
by the belligerence of those clamouring for British intervention in Afghanistan. The 
focus of the present chapter is the perceptions of army officers in the British press; 
however, in order to understand the cultural purchase of these perceptions, some of the 
evidence available to contemporaries will be examined. It will be argued that these 
perceptions have important implications for our understanding of the army’s public 
image, and the vitality, in at least part of the British world, of a species of militarism; 
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one that was prevalent long before the Boer war and patriotic leagues of late Victorian 
and Edwardian Britain.  
 
Military critics of ‘masterly inactivity’  
Some of the strongest criticism of Lawrence’s policy of ‘masterly inactivity’ came from 
serving or former British army officers in India. Sir Henry Rawlinson provides one such 
example: he had served as an army officer in India, Persia and Afghanistan (1827-42), 
and by 1858 held the rank of major-general following a brief stint as British minister to 
Persia.6 Rawlinson advanced his arguments not just privately, as with his memorandum 
on the ‘Central Asian Question’ (which he sent to the secretary of state for India in July 
1868), but in public through articles in periodicals such as the Quarterly Review.7 
Several army officers also criticised Lawrence’s policy in published accounts of 
particular campaigns or memoirs of their service on the frontier. Lieutenant-General Sir 
Sydney Cotton for example publicly lambasted the unsatisfactory condition of security 
arrangements in India and the folly of ‘inactivity’ in Afghanistan. Cotton had been 
deployed all over India in a long and distinguished career starting in 1810. He had 
served in and commanded a number of hill expeditions on the north-west frontier, and 
during the Mutiny successfully commanded an expeditionary force sent to ‘punish’ 
mutineers that had crossed the Yusufzai border. For his frontier services Cotton was 
made KCB (promoted GCB in 1873).8 In 1868 Cotton published Nine Years on the 
North-West Frontier of India, from 1854 to 1863. This was partly a memoir of his 
service, but also a tract in which he advocated several forward measures in Afghanistan, 
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along lines similar to those proposed by Rawlinson. Cotton claimed that Britain’s 
position in India was precarious, and that the north-west frontier was particularly 
vulnerable: ‘we live in India, and more particularly on a disturbed frontier, like the 
Affghan border, continually, as it were, on a mine with a burning fuse ready for 
explosion’. Cotton argued that Kabul should be occupied by British troops, as this 
would provide ‘a sure and certain check upon the progress of foreign powers’ in central 
Asia, and thus constituted a ‘very necessary measure of security to our Indian Empire.’ 
His stated concern was not a direct invasion of India, but that Russia would be able to 
take advantage of discontent among the people of India (who were ever ready to shake 
off the British ‘yoke’).9 The general also scoffed at the notion that commercial interests 
were driving Russia’s advances in central Asia: 
 
Russia has something more in view than an extension of her trade; and is, at this moment, 
gradually working on towards the Golden Prize. She may have, perhaps, no easy matter to 
accomplish her object, if left to herself, but she well knows the frailty of our institutions, and 
must be well aware that an empire of such magnitude, composed of such restless and disaffected 
materials, cannot easily be held together amidst foreign and domestic difficulties, more 
especially with our existing systems of civil government... Is it the old policy of pooh-poohing 
all indications of impending evils, that causes us to be inactive?10  
 
Cotton’s prescription for ‘the frailty’ of British India’s institutions was that military 
rather than civil government should prevail in all recently acquired Indian possessions. 
He therefore insisted that civil officials within the government of India ‘must yield 
implicitly to military necessities’. Similarly, mere ‘financiers’ in India ‘must be made 
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subservient to all the important requirements of the troops, and not the troops to the 
views and desires of the financiers.’11  
 
The Liberal press 
British newspapers writing in support of Lawrence’s Afghan policy seemed in little 
doubt that his critics were motivated by martial enthusiasm. This assessment was 
prevalent in The Times, which expressed considerable suspicion regarding the motives 
of those who advocated active interference in Afghanistan. The Times regretted that the 
announcement of the Abyssinian expedition had created a ‘military ferment’ in 
Bombay. An editorial of December 1867 explained its understanding of the motives of 
army officers in India and the nature of Anglo-Indian society: 
 
In plain words, what Abyssinia is at present to the Bombay army, Afghanistan is at all times to 
the armies of India at large. There is hardly a soldier, certainly not an officer, in either of the 
three Presidencies who would not hear with delight that an invasion of Central Asia had been 
decided upon... The officers are panting for preferment and burning for action of any kind, and, 
as soldiers give the tone to Indian society, civilians fall in with their views. It is loudly argued, 
therefore, that the progress of Russia in Central Asia should be encountered by advances from 
our own side; that we should at once enter Afghanistan and occupy, as strategical positions 
against a future conflict, Quettah, Candahar, Cabul, and perhaps Herat, and that our North-
Western frontier should thus be carried up to the borders of Persia and Tartary.12 
 
This short passage includes several important themes in the metropolitan discussion of 
Anglo-Indian militarism. First, a distinction is made between soldiers and officers; it 
was the latter whose motivations were dissected in British broadsheets. Secondly, the 
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officers are characterised as ‘panting for preferment and burning for action of any kind’; 
that is to say they were perceived to be eager for promotion, as well as combat. Thirdly, 
it is considered self-evident that civilians within the British community in India would 
share the sentiments of their compatriots in the army, because ‘soldiers give the tone to 
Indian society’. Fourthly, proposals for territorial expansion into Afghanistan are 
understood as originating with military personnel. Finally, it is implied that army 
officers would use the ‘progress of Russia’ as a pretext for initiating military advances 
that appealed to them on martial grounds. The Times thus interpreted proposals for 
interference in Afghanistan not as a strategic response to the propinquity of a rival 
power (Russia) in central Asia, but as a natural product of the instinctive belligerence of 
British officers in India. In an editorial the following week, this implication was made 
explicit: 
 
[Sir John Lawrence’s] arguments, however, though irresistible in themselves, produce but little 
effect in India, where the real influence at work is not the fear of Russia, but the desire of 
military employment. Our Indian armies pine for war, and the prospects for war are upon the 
whole most alluring upon the north-western frontier.13 
 
The Times perceived no difference between the ‘public opinion’ of the British 
community in India and the opinion of the British armies in India.14 The newspaper had 
for some time characterised British India as a ‘purely military society’, where another 
expedition to Afghanistan would inevitably prove popular.15 This perception was not 
unique to metropolitan publications; it had for some time been a prevailing view among 
                                                            
13 Times, 18 Dec. 1867, p. 8. 
14 ‘Public opinion in India—that is, the opinion of the Indian armies, is strongly in favour of intervention 
[in Afghanistan]’. Times, 2 Jan. 1868, p. 6. 
15 Times, 8 Sept. 1863, p. 6. 
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civilian officials in India. As Lawrence had explained to the governor-general, Lord 
Dalhousie, before the Mutiny: ‘public opinion is essentially military in India. Military 
views, feelings and interests are therefore paramount.’16 That military views and 
interests should be paramount has been understood by historians as a consequence of a 
‘garrison mentality’ that prevailed within British India.17 A corollary of this mentality 
was an enthusiasm for warfare, as the contemporary historian (and former army officer 
in India) John William Kaye observed.18 In his history of the first Afghan war, Kaye 
explained matter-of-factly that in India ‘every war is more or less popular. The 
constitution of Anglo-Indian society renders it almost impossible that it should be 
otherwise.’19  
 
Several post-Mutiny measures may have reinforced the grip of this ‘garrison state’ and 
its attitudes to warfare. Britain’s military presence had been significantly increased, so 
that from 1858 at least sixty thousand regular British soldiers were stationed in India 
(roughly three times the pre-Mutiny number). A ratio of approximately one British to 
two Indian soldiers was maintained until 1914. Moreover, Indian soldiers were no 
longer entrusted with artillery, arsenals and the principal forts, all of which were now 
held by British soldiers. These measures were implemented in an attempt to ‘overawe 
the Indian soldiery’ and to minimise the chances, or at least the seriousness, of another 
                                                            
16 John Lawrence to Lord Dalhousie, 20 Sept. 1850, cited in D. Peers, ‘The Indian Army and the British 
Garrison State in India, c.1800-1858’, p. 57, in A.J. Guy and P.B. Boyden, Soldiers of the Raj: The 
Indian Army 1600-1947 (London, 1997).  
17 Peers, ‘The Garrison State’, p. 58.  
18  Kaye is an important observer. He served as an artillery officer in India (1831-42), before embarking 
on a literary career. He established (1844) and edited the Calcutta Review, before returning to England 
c.1845. His published works include History of the War in Afghanistan (1851), The History of the 
Sepoy War in India, 1857–8 (III vols., 1864-76) and Lives of Indian Officers (1867). His prolific 
writing did not prevent him working as a civil servant: in 1856 he joined the East India Company, and 
in 1858 succeeded John Stuart Mill as secretary of the foreign department of the India Office. He was 
made KCSI in 1871. His Sepoy War remains a standard work. E.J. Rapson, ‘Kaye, Sir John William 
(1814-1876)’, rev. R.T. Stearn, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed.). 




According to the editorial line in The Times it was not merely the prospect of combat 
that led army officers to favour military intervention in Afghanistan:  
 
The invasion of Afghanistan for the purpose of obtaining command of the country would be 
popular in India, because it would mean war, and because war implies not only active 
employment for a military population, but chance of promotion, glory, and gain. Anglo-Indians 
therefore speak on this subject with a prepossession so strong as to impair the value of their 
conclusions.21 
 
There were practical reasons why army officers in India may have been motivated by 
opportunities for promotion and ‘gain’. It was not until 1871 that the practice of 
promotion by purchase was abolished; before that time promotion for less wealthy 
officers could be extremely slow. Such officers could not afford to make the ‘over-
regulation’ payments, and consequently had to wait for promotion without purchase.22 
There were proportionally more impecunious officers on the subcontinent than in 
Britain: men from less wealthy backgrounds ‘usually sought service in India’, where the 
sport and social life enjoyed by the home officer could be experienced at much reduced 
expense.23 However, the peacetime difficulties of obtaining promotion were alleviated 
                                                            
20  In 1869, the garrison included 64,858 British and 120,000 Indian troops: Spiers, The Army and 
Society, p. 138. 
21 Times, 2 Sept. 1868, p. 6. An earlier editorial had made the same argument: ‘When the British troops 
were returning from Magdala their satisfaction at the close of the war was, we were told, greatly 
enhanced by the prospect of a fresh expedition. Of Abyssinia they had seen enough, but the 
expectation of a campaign on the North-Western frontier of India inspired them with new hopes of 
employment and distinction.’ Times, 10 June 1868, p. 9. 
22 Vacancies caused by deaths (or by full-pay retirements) were not common in peacetime: in the period 
1849-53 only 30% of all promotions were filled without purchase (none in the Brigade of Guards and 
only 8% in cavalry regiments). Promotion could not be purchased in the ‘scientific’ branches of the 
army (the artillery and engineers), and was extremely slow. Spiers, The Army and Society, p. 19. 
23 Spiers, The Army and Society, p. 23.  
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by the advent of war, which presented quite different opportunities for advancement. 
When an officer was killed his commission was forfeited to the crown, thereby enabling 
the senior officer of the lower rank to be promoted without purchase.24 A war or 
‘campaign’ such as those that frequently occurred on the north-west frontier of India 
also offered opportunities for promotion not dependent on the death of other officers. 
Traditionally brevet promotions had been distributed only on special royal occasions, 
but after 1854 they were awarded more frequently. Officers might therefore transfer to 
different regiments, in order to serve in as many campaigns as possible, where 
distinguished service could be rewarded by brevet promotion.25  
 
As for the opportunities for ‘gain’ offered by warfare, this was partly a question of cash: 
officers who served in campaigns tended to receive generous field allowances and more 
chances of prize money.26 What The Times meant by opportunities for ‘glory’ is more 
complex. This was usually construed in the metropolitan press as the desire to obtain 
honours and awards that carried social prestige, and will be considered later in this 
chapter. There were, therefore, entirely practical reasons why officers in India might 
have welcomed any proposal that made action in Afghanistan more likely. Although the 
first Afghan war had demonstrated that fighting there was very dangerous, many 
officers clearly perceived it as a considerably less perilous venture than fighting a 
European power. Lieutenant-General Cotton certainly had no fears on this score.27  
                                                            
24 The same was true of death caused by illness; officers stationed in unhealthy tropical cantonments 
might also receive promotion more quickly than would otherwise have been possible: see Spiers, The 
Army and Society, p. 19. 
25 A brevet promotion conferred an army rank on its recipient, but not a regimental rank (e.g. an officer 
who was a major within his regiment could rank as a brevet lieutenant-colonel and hold the latter rank 
when away from his regiment): Spiers, The Army and Society, p. 19. 
26 Peers, ‘The Garrison State’, p. 58.  
27 ‘There is really nothing whatever to dread in Afghanistan. It is a mere bugbear. A few resolute men, it 
is well known, might have saved our troops and our credit at that unfortunate period of our Indian 
history.’ That ‘unfortunate period of our Indian history’ was a reference to the first Afghan war. 
Cotton, Nine Years on the North-West Frontier, p. 133. 
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The Times’s characterisation of British army officers in India was consistent with the 
prevailing view in several Liberal newspapers. The Daily News looked on Anglo-Indian 
‘ambition’ regarding Afghanistan with particular suspicion, as this piece from 
December 1867 illustrates: 
 
Almost every mail from Calcutta brings us intelligence of the difficulty which the Governor-
General has in restraining the bellicose ardour of a powerful party in the Indian service. Our 
Indian officers are a noble set of fellows; they are in fact only of too generous a temper. One 
half of them cannot live without somebody to govern and bring under “rhythmic drill” and the 
other half will soon die of vexation if we do not give them leave to go and fight somebody. For 
the last two years a grand expedition into Affghanistan has been their sleeping and their waking 
dream. With Sir John Lawrence it is very clear that such an enterprise is contrary to sound 
policy, but impetuous spirits are not convinced by his reasoning. They cannot bear to see the 
revenues extracted from the rice-eaters of India frittered away upon tanks, and irrigation canals, 
and anicuts, when Affghanistan is an unappropriated prize, and they burn to go where glory 
awaits them.28 
 
Although the Daily News here adopted a mocking tone not evident in The Times, its 
points were essentially the same: it was difficult for Lawrence to restrain ‘the bellicose 
ardour’ of British officers, who constituted a ‘powerful party’ within Anglo-Indian 
society, and who viewed Afghanistan as a ‘prize’. It is perhaps not surprising, given this 
cynicism about the motives of army officers, that the Liberal press also articulated a fear 
that military authorities in India would exploit expeditions on the north-west frontier as 
pretexts for much larger military objectives. This anxiety seems to have surfaced 
                                                            
28 Daily News, 27 Dec. 1867, p. 4.  
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whenever large forces were massed on the frontier. As the Daily News commented on 
an expedition mounted in 1868 against certain Hazara tribes on the north-west frontier: 
‘it does not appear probable that this formidable army was brought together merely to 
punish some turbulent hill-men.’ For it would be only too easy for the ‘party of 
aggression and annexation... to pick out of these frontier operations some casus belli 
with the Afghans.’29 A later piece contrasted the commander-in-chief unfavourably with 
the governor-general: it was rumoured that Lawrence favoured ‘moderate and 
inconspicuous measures’ for quelling a local disturbance, while Sir William Mansfield 
‘inclined to the plan of a striking display of military power, the fame of which might 
reach to Cabul and Herat and Teheran, and even to the Russian outposts on the Oxus.’30  
 
Unlike the Daily News, the Pall Mall Gazette was critical of Lawrence’s Afghan policy 
and advocated more active steps on the north-west frontier, including the occupation of 
Quetta.31 The Pall Mall Gazette was nonetheless suspicious of militarism within Anglo-
Indian society, and interpreted news of frontier expeditions in the same unflattering 
light as the Daily News:   
 
There has been displayed by portions of the press in Calcutta and the North West Provinces, and 
by the military correspondents thereof, a blind or perverse determination to make of the Hazara 
disturbance an occasion for the movement of an army far larger than was deemed needful to 
invade the terra incognita of Abyssinia, and for the disposal of that force in such a way as 
would have confirmed the Affghans in their chronic dread of invasion projects from this side of 
the Indus. This politico-military restlessness, countenanced, it is to be feared, by our ambitious 
Commander-in-Chief, and restrained with difficulty by our strong-handed Viceroy, reveals the 
                                                            
29 Daily News, 24 Sept. 1868, p. 4. 
30 Daily News, 8 Oct. 1868, p. 4. 
31 Pall Mall Gazette, 30 May 1867, p. 1. 
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presence in our commonwealth of elements which the weak and inexperienced Viceroy elect 
will be powerless to restrain. In the face of these perils we can only trust to the firmness of the 
more thoughtful civilians whom Sir John Lawrence will leave behind.32 
 
The Daily News had also expressed its anxiety about the consequences of Lawrence’s 
departure (his term as governor-general would expire in January 1869). It praised 
Lawrence for having ‘struggled persistently and not unsuccessfully against the 
aggressive impulses of the official classes in India’, but speculated that after the Earl of 
Mayo’s arrival there would be ‘a strong temptation to let go the tight rein which alone 
has bridled-in heretofore the warlike temper of the Anglo-Indians.’ The Daily News 
seemed extremely pessimistic on this score: it was ‘as likely as not that Lord Mayo, 
through ignorance or through vanity, may deliberately reverse the course of the State 
ship’.33 A suspicion underlying this fear may have been that Mayo, a Tory, would prove 
more susceptible to ‘the warlike temper of the Anglo-Indians’ than his predecessor, but 
this does not seem to find expression in the press commentary.34 It is however clear 
from the Pall Mall Gazette piece that it was not only British army officers but also 
British journalists in India who were perceived as bellicose. This equality of treatment 
is consistent with the metropolitan view that militarism thrived across Anglo-Indian 
society.  
 
The Pall Mall Gazette also contrasted attitudes to the military in Britain with those 
prevalent in the British community in India. Contemplating the large armies of France 
                                                            
32 Note the use of the term ‘ambitious’ to describe the commander-in-chief, Sir William Mansfield. Pall 
Mall Gazette, 30 Oct. 1868, pp. 9-10.  
33  Daily News, 24 Sept. 1868, p. 4. 
34  Some prominent advocates of intervention in Afghanistan (including Rawlinson) were Conservative 
MPs. However, the identification of the Conservative party with forward policies in Afghanistan did 
not come until the Conservative administration of 1874-80. 
178 
and Prussia, Britons at home simply moralised on the ‘wickedness and folly of it all’, 
and were proud of their one hundred and fifty thousand reservists who, in the case of 
real need, would constitute merely ‘an armed mob of brave men’. In contrast, ‘a certain 
proportion of our countrymen in India would like nothing so much as to go to war in 
Afghanistan for the sake of the various attractions which war always offers to what is 
essentially a military society.’35 This distinction has important implications in 
historiographical terms, for it suggests that although Britain itself in this period 
remained hostile to it, militarism nonetheless flourished in a part of the British world 
long before the Boer war and the various patriotic leagues that are thought to have 
heralded the arrival of militarism in the mother country. This is a view also supported 
by the correspondence of certain officials, as we shall see. Before turning to that, some 
different perceptions in the Conservative press will be considered.  
 
The Conservative press 
Conservative publications were less critical than their Liberal counterparts in depicting 
British army officers in India. Newspapers such as the Standard scorned the idea that 
the military authorities in India would use frontier expeditions as pretexts for larger 
operations, or for advances into Afghanistan. It claimed that such concerns were ‘purely 
the creation of certain alarmists in the English press.’36 In the case of the 1868 
expedition against the Hazara tribes (that caused alarm in the pages of the Daily News 
and the Pall Mall Gazette), the Standard regretted that General Wilde’s campaign had 
been subjected ‘to a good deal of that kind of criticism at home, which consists in 
investing every active step taken by the Indian Government as a move towards a new 
conquest and a fresh annexation.’ Certainly, Wilde was commanding a large number of 
                                                            
35 Pall Mall Gazette, 30 Dec. 1867, pp. 1-2. 
36 Standard, 8 Jan. 1868, p. 4. 
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troops; but it was false economy (as ‘history showed’) to deal with unrest on the north-
west frontier without large forces. The Standard noted that the last eighteen years had 
witnessed no less than twenty-three different expeditions against the Hazara tribes.37 
 
However, publications on the political right also recognised that British officers were 
themselves a risk to peace in India. Surveying the strength of the north-west frontier in 
1864, the Morning Post made the following observation: 
 
We are amply strong enough just now in that quarter, and have probably more to fear from the 
restlessness and presumption of our own people than from any provocation which we are likely 
to receive for some time to come at the hand of others.38  
 
It says much about metropolitan perceptions that a Tory publication, less than six years 
after the Mutiny, saw more danger to Indian peace from ‘the restlessness and 
presumption’ of British officers than from insurrection in India (on its own or in 
combination with a foreign power). It is also striking that Conservative publications 
such as the Quarterly Review recognised that the ‘ambition’ of frontier officers may 
lead Britain into another Afghan war. An article in April 1865 considered British and 
Russian policy in equivalent terms: 
 
Russian policy has always run in the groove of political intrigue, and her agents cannot perhaps 
extricate themselves from it if they would; we too are under constant temptation to coquet with 
the politics of these [central Asian] states; either party may be led by Asiatic adroitness, the 
ambition of frontier officers, or other causes, into a course which may lure both parties on into a 
                                                            
37 Standard, 9 Oct. 1868, p. 4. 
38 Morning Post, 26 Jan. 1864, p. 4. 
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monstrous expenditure of blood and treasure.39 
 
The first Afghan war was of course an obvious precedent for such a ‘monstrous 
expenditure of blood and treasure’. Yet the Quarterly Review also published, shortly 
afterwards, an article by Rawlinson warning that ‘outworks are as necessary to the 
defence of empires as of fortresses’, and that accordingly Herat and Candahar offered 
necessary strategic positions for the defence of India from ‘Russian encroachment.’40 
The fact that a leading Tory organ, which provided an outlet for Rawlinson’s forward 
proposals in Afghanistan, also recognised the danger posed by British officers suggests 
that the perceptions prevalent in the Liberal press had a cultural purchase that to some 
extent straddled different political affiliations. 
 
Officials  
The depiction of British army officers in India in the metropolitan press was to some 
extent consistent with the perceptions of a number of prominent officials. Sir Charles 
Wood, Lord Elgin and Sir John Lawrence seem to have been extremely wary of the 
difficulty of maintaining civilian control over the military authorities in India, and of the 
restlessness, bellicosity and ambition of British officers. While secretary of state for 
India, Wood on several occasions urged Elgin to keep the commander-in-chief close at 
hand: 
 
I think the Commander in Chief should not absent himself too much from the seat of Govt. 
There is a natural tendency in everybody in that position to set up for an independent power. 
The best means of avoiding that evil is to have him down in the presence of the Governor 
                                                            
39 Anon., ‘Travels in Central Asia’, Quarterly Review, 117 (Apr. 1865), 515. 
40 [Rawlinson], ‘The Russians in Central Asia’, 581. 
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General; where he must be subordinate. Therefore do not allow [Sir Hugh] Rose to be too much 
away from you.41 
 
In subsequent letters to Elgin, Wood elaborated his concerns. He worried that the 
commander-in-chief was too much of an independent power in India, describing him as 
‘a potentate’ with too much patronage at his disposal. Moreover, when the particular 
incumbent was rather ‘awkward’ (like Sir Hugh Rose) it made the governor-general’s 
position very difficult.42 In order to increase civilian control over the commander-in-
chief, Wood investigated a proposal to convert the post into a combined ‘minister of 
war’ and commander-in-chief, resident at Calcutta (thus in the same place as the 
governor-general).43 Wood’s correspondence shows that he was concerned both with 
the institutional structure (the office of the commander-in-chief) and the personality of 
the particular incumbent at this time (Rose). General Rose may of course have been an 
unusually awkward commander-in-chief.44 Wood certainly seems to have thought so, as 
he described Rose as both ‘wrongheaded’ and ‘tiresome’.45  
 
Lawrence also seems to have found Rose rather difficult, even though he generally got 
on very well with military men. Lawrence’s father and two elder brothers had served as 
army officers in India, and he had considered following in their footsteps. As he happily 
told a subsequent secretary of state, he had lived all his life among soldiers and had ‘a 
strong personal feeling towards them.’46 Nonetheless, Lawrence shared Wood’s unease 
                                                            
41  Wood to Elgin, 10 May 1862, Elgin Mss/7, f147. 
42  Wood to Elgin, 30 Oct. 1862 & 26 Nov. 1862, Elgin Mss/7, f428 & f452. 
43 Wood to Elgin, 26 Nov. 1862, Elgin Mss/7, f452. 
44 Rose, Hugh Henry (1801-85): commander-in-chief in India, 4 June 1860 - 31 March 1865; KCSI 
(1861); GCSI (1866); created Baron Strathnairn (1866). Rose ‘was not a popular commander’ and 
could come across as ‘autocratic’: B. Robson, ‘Rose, Hugh Henry, Baron Strathnairn (1801-1885)’, 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. Oct. 2008). 
45  Wood to Elgin, 30 Oct. 1862, Elgin Mss/7, f428. 
46 Lawrence to Cranborne, 4 Jan. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32A, no. 2. 
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about the power of the commander-in-chief in India. Lawrence favoured Wood’s 
proposal to curtail that officer’s powers by making him also a ‘minister of war’ resident 
at Calcutta, to the extent that it would ‘place the military power under the civil 
authority’. Lawrence withdrew his support only after further enquiries revealed that the 
military authorities in India had developed Wood’s proposal such that it would actually, 
in Lawrence’s opinion, ‘consolidate & increase the military authority in India & render 
it practically independent of any control in India.’47 Lawrence was also determined that 
the governor-general should be able to exercise the prerogative of clemency and thus 
interfere in the decisions of courts martial and the commander-in-chief.48 Moreover, 
Lawrence not only supported Wood’s proposals for reducing the number of British 
troops garrisoned in India, but was prepared to go even further in such reductions.49  
 
Wood’s concerns were not limited to the power of the commander-in-chief. He also 
perceived dangers from senior commanders whose belligerence rendered their opinions 
on frontier wars inherently untrustworthy. His suspicions came to the fore during a war 
against Bhutan (1864-65).50 Wood suspected that officers favoured extending the 
territorial scope of the conflict not on account of strategic necessity, but because of their 
martial enthusiasm. This is explicit in a letter he wrote to Lawrence in August 1865: 
 
I shall be quite satisfied about Punakha if you determined on going there... I believe and will 
believe whatever you tell me you are satisfied of yourself in such matters. I thoroughly trust you 
& I am disposed to trust Mansfield’s opinions on such points; but in regard to operations against 
                                                            
47  Lawrence to Wood, 15 Jan. 1865, Lawrence Mss/30, no. 5. 
48 Lawrence to Wood, 15 Jan. & 1 July 1865 (2), Lawrence Mss/30, nos. 5 & 42. 
49  Lawrence to Wood, 18 Sept. 1865 (2), Lawrence Mss/30, no. 55. 
50  In 1863, Ashley Eden was sent on a mission to Bhutan, in order to negotiate a treaty intended to 
secure free trade and halt raids into British territory. Eden’s mission had no military support; he 
became a ‘virtual prisoner’ of the Bhutanese and was forced to sign a ‘humiliating’ treaty. Britain 
accordingly went to war against Bhutan in Nov. 1864. See H.M. Stephens, ‘Eden, Sir Ashley (1831-
1887)’, rev. K. Prior, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed.). 
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native tribes in the hills I do not believe in the opinions of mere military men.51 
 
It is striking that Wood also trusted the new commander-in-chief in India, Sir William 
Mansfield.52 Lawrence too was greatly relieved by the appointment. He told Wood that 
‘Mansfield & I get on very well together. I find him an excellent man of business, 
prompt, intelligent, and thoughtful. I thank God every day for the change.’53 It is clear 
therefore that individuals mattered, as well as institutional structures.  
 
The thirst for honours 
An essential feature in the metropolitan portrait of army officers in India was 
‘ambition’, a term used to suggest officers’ desire for honours as well as promotion. 
Around the time of Lawrence’s viceroyalty, the crown dispensed a variety of honours to 
the officer class. Generals could aspire to a peerage.54 Less senior officers might hope to 
obtain a baronetcy, knighthood or at least one of the lower awards in the chivalric 
orders. There were several paths to a knighthood, including through the ‘Most 
Honourable Order of the Bath’ and the ‘Most Exalted Order of the Star of India’. Since 
its expansion in 1815, the order of the Bath had been divided into three different classes 
(of increasing seniority): companion (CB), knight commander (KCB), and knight grand 
cross (GCB). The separate classes allowed service to the state to be ranked and 
classified. They also provided a structure through which men could strive to advance; ‘a 
ladder of advancement for the ambitious in the army, the navy and the civil service.’55 
                                                            
51 Wood to Lawrence, 12 Aug. 1865 (3), Lawrence Mss/26, no. 45 (emphasis in original). 
52 Mansfield, William Rose (1819-76): commander-in-chief in India, 14 March 1865 - 8 Apr. 1870; 
created Baron Sandhurst, 1871. 
53 Lawrence to Wood, 14 Aug. 1865, Lawrence Mss/30, no. 49. 
54  By way of example, and using only officers already appearing in this dissertation, Sir Colin Campbell 
(after the Indian Mutiny), Sir Robert Napier (after the Abyssinian expedition), Sir Hugh Rose and Sir 
William Mansfield (in each case after serving as commander-in-chief in India) all received peerages. 
55  D. Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British saw their Empire (London, 2001), p. 86.  
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The Star of India was a much more recent order (established in 1861) and followed the 
same ranking system as the Bath, thus comprising: companion (CSI), knight 
commander (KCSI), and knight grand cross (GCSI). It was however very different to 
the order of the Bath, in that it was conferred both on British and Indian subjects; 
typically British governors, Indian princes and the civil servants of both countries.56  
 
The ‘ladder of advancement’ is illustrated by Lawrence’s progression through 
increasingly senior and prestigious ranks of the honours system. His career 
demonstrates that receiving one knighthood was no impediment to receiving others; he 
was in fact a knight four times over. Lawrence was made KCB in 1856 (for his 
administration in the Punjab), and promoted GCB in 1857 (for his Mutiny exploits). He 
became a baronet in 1859, and was made KCSI in 1861 (at the inception of the order), 
subsequently promoted GCSI in 1866. In 1869, having completed his five years as 
governor-general, he was created Baron Lawrence of the Punjaub and of Grateley.57  
 
John Mackenzie has identified a ‘scramble’ to participate in colonial conflicts on the 
part of British officers. He ascribes their enthusiasm to a variety of motives: the 
excitement of the ‘sporting event’, the desire for promotion and the ‘lust’ for medals 
that developed in the later nineteenth century.58 However, historians have been reluctant 
to go further and suggest that military ‘ambition’ was itself a cause of British imperial 
expansion. British historians have nonetheless made this argument in the case of Russia. 
H.H. Dodwell, writing in The Cambridge History of the British Empire, asserted that 
                                                            
56 An even more prolific period for honours lay ahead, and two further Indian orders were established in 
1878 (to coincide with Queen Victoria’s assumption of the imperial title): the Most Eminent Order of 
the Indian Empire, and the Imperial Order of the Crown of India (for women). See Cannadine, 
Ornamentalism, p. 80.  
57 Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’.  
58 MacKenzie, ‘Popular imperialism and the military’, p. 11.  
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Russia’s advances through central Asia were partly motivated by ambition: ‘[m]ilitary 
organisation, too, made for expansion. Military governors could not look for rewards 
and promotion by a peaceful administration.’59 This account of Russian motivation was 
written when Britain still ruled India, but it is to some extent supported by more recent 
research. Rose Greaves has argued that Russia’s conquest of central Asia was in part 
carried out by over-zealous officers who acted unofficially, although it also resulted 
from decisions taken by the central government, requiring expenditure on forts and 
railways (and later subsidies).60 Historians may of course be susceptible to the same 
assumptions about Russian motives that preoccupied some contemporary Britons. 
Rawlinson was in little doubt that military ambition was a factor in Russian expansion, 
as his 1868 ‘Memorandum on the Central Asian Question’ underlined: 
 
Russia has always attributed to her military chiefs a degree of power in influencing the national 
policy which in this country we find it difficult to realize. She used to explain the slow progress 
that was made in subjugating the Caucasus by pointing to the self-interest of the army, which 
forbade the premature closing of so fertile a source of promotion and honours.61  
 
In Imperialism and Social Classes J.A. Schumpeter argued that imperial expansion was 
undertaken by aristocrats, whose status and security were threatened at home (by 
industry, urbanisation and democracy) and who thus sought consolation in knightly 
                                                            
59 Dodwell continued: ‘In 1869 Kaufmann’s appointment as governor-general was defended by Prince 
Gortchakoff expressly on the ground that he had already gained every honour that a Russian general 
could hope for.’ H.H. Dodwell, ‘Central Asia’, p. 408, in H.H. Dodwell (ed.), The Cambridge History 
of the British Empire, Volume V The Indian Empire 1858-1918 (Cambridge, 1932). 
60 Greaves, ‘Themes in British policy towards Afghanistan’, 37. 
61 Rawlinson, Memorandum on the Central Asian Question, p. 32. This was an argument often made in 
periodicals, including in this case the Saturday Review. ‘Little definite as is our knowledge of Russian 
movements in Central Asia, a variety of information from different sources, no less than the analogies 
of Indian conquest, leads to the conclusion that the zeal of individual officers, and a sort of public 
opinion seconding it, have had more to do with aggression on the Tartar principalities than any 
schemes concerted at St. Petersburg.’ Anon., ‘Afghanistan and India’, Saturday Review, 29 (19 March 
1870), 369. 
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endeavour on the imperial frontier.62 His hypothesis has not proved popular with 
historians of Britain. David Cannadine for example has argued that the British 
aristocracy played only a subordinate role in the creation of the British empire.63 For 
Cannadine, the expansion of the British honours system has great sociological 
significance. It offered a means by which Britons could visualise the diverse 
constituents of the empire as a whole; a sociological equivalent of maps with British 
territories coloured red. Indians as well as Britons were awarded many of the same 
honours (such as the Star of India) and this sort of social hierarchy ‘homogenised the 
heterogeneity of empire’. Cannadine certainly found anecdotal evidence that many 
people ‘yearned’ for honours, but he did not consider the impulses to territorial 
expansion possibly created by such yearnings.64 Similarly, Edward Spiers has recovered 
evidence that subalterns in India were eager to ‘see some action’ and win medals for 
gallantry, but he did not explore whether this enthusiasm contributed to the forces 
driving imperial expansion.65  
 
Lawrence’s correspondence as governor-general suggests he devoted considerable 
attention to scrutinising candidates for a variety of awards, in particular the Star of 
India. His attention to this topic was in part a consequence of the post-Mutiny policy of 
seeking to attach the ‘traditional’ or ‘natural’ rulers of India to British rule. However, 
much of the demand came directly from British officers, putting themselves forward for 
awards. Lawrence was in no doubt that the grant of such honours was ‘greatly valued’ 
                                                            
62 J.A. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes (1919).  
63 However (as Cannadine recognised), Schumpeter had not intended to explain British expansion. D. 
Cannadine, ‘The empire strikes back’, Past and Present, 147 (1995), 180-194.  
64 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, pp. 85-90, 98.  
65  Spiers argues that, following news of the first outbreak of mutiny in 1857: ‘Many of the younger 
subalterns looked forward to the campaign as an opportunity to see “some action” and win a few 
medals, including the much coveted Victoria Cross. Lieutenant, later Field Marshal Earl, Roberts 
wanted this reward more than any other: “Oh! if I can only manage it”, he confided to his mother, 
“how jolly I should be!”.’ Spiers, The Army and Society, p. 128. 
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by recipients, and provided the state with ‘a cheap way of recognising merit & making 
men contented.’66 Some economy was also necessary, and Lawrence quickly dismissed 
claims from candidates he considered unworthy. Honours and distinctions ‘will do more 
harm than good’, he told Northcote, ‘unless they are given with a sparing hand.’67 Part 
of the value of awards, according to Lawrence, was that they could ‘stimulate’ men to 
‘do their duty’. He wrote to Sir Charles Wood in this vein in January 1865, while 
putting forward the claims of Sir Robert Montgomery: 
 
Montgomery has done very well as Lt Govr of the Punjab. His administration has been very 
successful; & he leaves the country prosperous & contented. I hope that you will be able to 
recommend to Her Majesty that some mark of honor be conferred on him. He was made a 
K.C.B. for his services in Oude. I do not think that it would be too much to make him a Baronet. 
I know that he would like this very much. If not, he should have the 1st class of the Star of India, 
but he would greatly prefer the Baronetcy. Such things from the State, after all, are well 
bestowed, if they stimulate men in such positions to do their duty.68 
 
Presumably Montgomery would have ‘greatly preferred’ a baronetcy because he was 
already a knight of the Bath; and because a baronetcy, unlike the various knighthoods, 
was a hereditary honour and in this sense a step up the ladder of advancement.69 It is 
implicit from this letter that Montgomery had spoken to Lawrence on the subject. In 
Lawrence’s correspondence there are in fact numerous examples of men who pressed 
                                                            
66 Lawrence to Wood, 5 Jan. 1865 (2), Lawrence Mss/30, no. 3. 
67  Lawrence to Northcote, 7 July 1868, Lawrence Mss/33, no. 47. 
68  Lawrence to Wood, 23 Jan. 1865 (1), Lawrence Mss/30, no. 7. 
69  In the event Montgomery was not to receive a baronetcy. Instead, he was awarded (in Feb. 1866) what 
Lawrence had suggested to Wood as the alternative, the GCSI. Montgomery had received the KCB in 
1859. On his return to England in 1868 he was appointed a member of the council of India. At least 
one of his relatives went on to receive higher honours: Bernard Law Montgomery, 1st Viscount 
Montgomery of Alamein, was his grandson. J.A. Hamilton, ‘Montgomery, Sir Robert (1809-1887)’, 
rev. P. Penner, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed.). 
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their claims on him, often with great specificity about which class of which award they 
desired. This illustrates the sensitivity many Anglo-Indians had to subtle differences in 
rank, and the social prestige conferred by different categories and classes of honours.  
 
The subtle gradations in the honours conferred on officers can be distinguished from the 
awards available to ordinary soldiers. A new medal for military service on the north-
west frontier was pressed on officials by army officers and like-minded MPs in 1868. 
These sorts of medals had a certain democratic quality, in that they were awarded to all 
soldiers who had served in particular campaigns. Those who advocated the grant of 
such medals recognised that the ‘social value of this honorary distinction to the soldier 
who wears it on his breast is immense, and the country reaps the benefit in the 
aspirations excited throughout the army, and the recruits who are drawn by an 
honourable ambition.’70 The secretary of state told Lawrence that he was ‘favourable to 
such rewards where there is any fair ground for them’. Northcote however also seemed 
concerned that each award generated the appetite for more. He observed that the grant 
of a medal for service in New Zealand had ‘set every one agog for similar rewards.’71 
 
Lawrence recognised that the thirst for honours could stimulate officers to do rather 
more than their duty. In a letter to Cranborne, he identified officers’ hopes for achieving 
‘distinction’ as one of the factors behind their desire to extend British frontiers: 
 
I cannot understand what impels our leading men every now & then to overlook all that we have 
to do in ‘British India’; and to try to bring us into contact with the people in distant, difficult & 
                                                            
70 Note the emphasis that in this case the ambition was ‘honourable’. A. Kinnaird to editor, Times, 31 
July 1868, p. 10. See also parliamentary questions from A. Kinnaird and Colonel Sykes, Hansard, 193 
(27 July 1868), cols. 1822-3. 
71  Northcote to Lawrence, 21 July 1868, ‘Lawrence Mss/29, no. 38. 
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hostile regions. I presume it must be the love of novelty, the desire for change, the hope of 
distinction. British Officers at a long distance from controlling influence, & having little on 
their hands, must do something if it were only to shew that they are necessary. They thus are 
imperceptibly led to concoct schemes & propound undertakings...72 
 
The restlessness Lawrence described may in part have been a consequence of the long 
periods of leave granted to officers: as much as four months annually for captains, five 
months for majors, and six months or more for colonels in the Brigade of Guards.73 
Lord Elgin was even more forthright in attributing the desire for more active frontier 
policies to officers’ aspirations to win honours and distinction. During his tenure as 
governor-general, Elgin shared his assessment of the motivation of a notable advocate 
of forward policies with the secretary of state, Sir Charles Wood: 
 
[Sir Bartle] Frere, you tell me, finds fault with our policy in Affghanistan. I have no doubt that it 
is considered slow by a good many of his friends on the frontier. What chances of diplomatic 
distinctions, and perhaps even Military Rewards, we are foregoing!… I am wholly opposed to 
that prurient intermeddling policy which finds so much favor with certain classes of Indian 
officials. It is constantly thrusting us into equivocal situations… Nothing in my opinion can be 
more fatal to our prestige and legitimate influence… As to Frere. He is a great deal too hasty in 
his judgements on such matters for my taste.74 
 
Later events in southern Africa suggested that Frere was indeed ‘a great deal too 
hasty’.75 Elgin seems to have had no doubt that in at least some instances the impulses 
                                                            
72 Lawrence to Cranborne, 4 Oct. 1866, Lawrence Mss/31, no. 39. 
73 Spiers, The Army and Society, p. 26. 
74 Elgin to Wood, 21 May 1863, Elgin Mss/5, f152.  
75  ‘Disraeli’s government with some justification made Frere the scapegoat’ for the disaster which 
obliterated the 1st / 24th Imperial regiment at Isandlwana on 22 Jan. 1879. J. Benyon, ‘Frere, Sir 
(Henry) Bartle Edward, first baronet (1815-1884)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 
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to territorial expansion emanated from British officers eager for honours and distinction. 
This suggests that the arguments made by contemporary Britons, and by some 
historians, about the motives of Russian advances in central Asia might also be applied 
to British expansion on the Indian frontier. Although there was no expansion into 
Afghanistan while Lawrence was governor-general, when Lord Salisbury as secretary of 
state for India in 1875 resolved to send British officers to Kabul he was influenced by a 
number of former army and political officers in India. Chief among the influential 
advisers to Salisbury at that time was none other than Sir Bartle Frere.76  
 
Mountstuart Grant Duff also connected contemporary criticism of Lawrence’s Afghan 
policy with the desire of British officers to open up new fields for distinction. Grant 
Duff was parliamentary under-secretary of state for India during the Liberal 
administration of 1868-74, during which time he handled most Indian business in the 
Commons, because the secretary of state (the Duke of Argyll) sat in the Lords.77 In a 
Commons debate on Indian finance in 1870, Grant Duff praised Lawrence’s resilience 
in the face of a ‘mania’ among British officers for obtaining the knighthood of the Bath: 
 
Sir John Lawrence, in spite of discouragement, in spite of taunts, in spite of Russophobia, and 
that still more dangerous complaint, which ever raged along the Indian frontier line, and was 
known as the K.C.B. mania, held his hand, and preserved an attitude of friendly observation.78  
 
Grant Duff also considered that British and Russian expansion were similar at least in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
2004; online ed. Jan. 2008). 
76  Duthie, ‘Lord Salisbury, the “Forward” Group and Anglo-Afghan Relations: 1874-78’, 193. 
77  Duff, Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone Grant (1829-1906): Liberal MP for Elgin burghs, 1857-81; under-
secretary of state for India, 1868-74; made Privy Counsellor, 1880; governor of Madras, 1881-86; 
CIE, 1881; GCSI, 1887; president of the Royal Geographical Society, 1889-93; president of the Royal 
Historical Society, 1892-99. H.C.G. Matthew, ‘Duff, Sir Mountstuart Elphinstone Grant- (1829-
1906)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. Jan. 2008). 
78 Hansard, 203 (5 Aug. 1870), col. 1620. 
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the sense that each was propelled by the respective officers’ thirst for honours. In 
parliament, he later offered this assessment of the connection between officer 
motivation and state expansion: ‘Russia is impelled and dragged forward towards our 
border partly voluntarily, partly involuntarily. She is dragged forward involuntarily by 
her own officers, who suffer under a disease which we may call the St. Ann mania, and 
which is as nearly allied to that K.C.B. mania which we know so well in India as 
scarlatina is to scarlet fever.’79 This perception regarding the motivation of British 
officers seems in fact to have been not uncommon among Liberal politicians with 
experience of Indian administration. Shortly before the British invasion of Afghanistan 
in 1878, Lord Halifax (Sir Charles Wood had been created Viscount Halifax in 1866) 
warned the secretary of state for India that military men would always favour military 
campaigns as a source of honours and promotion.80  
 
Officials were also frustrated by what they perceived as the tendency of army officers to 
exaggerate the likelihood of another mutiny.81 Elgin seems at times to have been 
exasperated on this score.82 Some officials also seem to have been wary of a sort of 
natural momentum that a forward move in Afghanistan might initiate. This momentum 
                                                            
79  Grant Duff, Hansard, 215 (22 Apr. 1873), col. 856. 
80 Halifax to Lord Cranbrook, 19 Sept. 1878, cited in R.J. Moore, Sir Charles Wood’s Indian policy 
1853-66 (Manchester, 1966), p. 152. 
81 Cotton provides one such example. In his memoirs he claimed to have seen intercepted letters (written 
after the Mutiny) from Hyderabad, addressed by Muslim sepoys of a rearmed corps at Peshawar to 
fellow Muslims in the Nizam of Hyderabad’s territory, calling on Muslims generally to rise and rid 
themselves of the ‘common enemy’. Cotton, Nine Years on the North-West Frontier, p. 305. 
82 Elgin wrote to Wood in June 1862 about the ‘follies’ committed by ‘military panic mongers in the 
North West’ of India. Elgin was ‘disgusted’ with a letter he had received from the commander-in-
chief, Sir Hugh Rose, which was ‘full of all the trash which his gossiping officers report to him’. 
Apparently (Elgin reported to Wood) ‘the stock in trade of these blockheads now is the existence of 
designs for the assassination of Europeans.’ Elgin felt he knew enough of his ‘Military friends’ to feel 
‘quite sure that a topic of this kind, when once broached, must be the subject of conversation at every 
mess table’. Elgin understood that in the wake of the Mutiny, ‘it will not do for me to adopt the happy 
go lucky tone and to pooh pooh what professes to be information. To preach common sense from a 
safe distance is equally futile. It therefore occurred to me that the only thing practically to do would be 
to go to the headquarters of the panic, surround myself by native troops, and put a stop to the nonsense 
by example.’ Elgin to Wood, 17 June 1862, Elgin Mss/2, f130v. 
192 
could be attributed not necessarily to the ambition of British officers for distinction and 
honours, but to their ‘energy and spirit of enterprise’. This was a point made by Richard 
Temple in a minute he wrote in response to Rawlinson’s memorandum on the ‘Central 
Asian Question’ in 1868. Temple is an important observer in that he was (at the time of 
writing) the financial member of Lawrence’s executive council, and also foreign 
secretary to the government of India. He thought that the ‘energy’ of British officers led 
to the ‘onward tendency’ of British India. Temple accordingly argued that even a 
limited intervention in Afghanistan—such as sending envoys to Kabul—would 
inevitably beget further intervention: 
 
The study of British political affairs in Asia generally, and on the north-west frontier of India in 
particular, impresses me with a sense of the onward tendency which ever impels us. So long as 
some rigid bounds are observed it is just possible (and no more) to check this tendency. Once 
those bounds are over-passed the tendency becomes irresistible. If British Officers cross the 
Affghan border troops will follow sooner or later. If one part of Affghanistan is occupied the 
occupation will spread to other parts, till the whole is occupied, or until some tremendous 
consequence arises. The very energy and spirit of enterprise which happily distinguish our 
countrymen generally would in this case prove irrepressible. And the Government, once 
embarked on such a course, would be committed by the proceedings of its own servants, if by 
nothing else, to go on and on.83 
 
Temple might have had the first Afghan war in mind as a precedent for this ‘onward 
tendency’, or perhaps the annexation of the Punjab. Africa also provided an example, in 
the form of the Abyssinian expedition: once consul Cameron had left his post on the 
coast and entered Abyssinia, Britain found itself reacting to events in a way which begat 
                                                            
83 Minute by R. Temple, 8 Dec. 1868, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, enclosure 5, p. 68.  
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more intervention (Cameron’s captivity; Rassam’s mission to relieve Cameron; 
Rassam’s captivity; and ultimately the invasion).  
 
Reinforcing perceptions of Anglo-Indian militarism  
Political affiliation or inclination would naturally have influenced an individual’s view 
of the army. Sir Charles Wood and Grant Duff were members of the parliamentary 
Liberal party, and Elgin and Lawrence could reasonably be described as Liberal-leaning 
in this period. Many Liberals thought that the army needed reform to make it less of a 
sectional interest, and Liberal governments implemented reform in 1871 (abolition of 
purchase) and throughout their administration of 1880-85.84 However, Wood and Grant 
Duff were unusual in that they served long terms at the India Office (and in Wood’s 
case also at its precursor, the Board of Control) and therefore had experienced the ways 
in which army officers and the military authorities could seek to influence policy 
decisions. Moreover, the evidence available to contemporaries from a variety of 
stridently non-Liberal sources—British journalists in India and army officers 
themselves—must have contributed in their own right to the perceptions discussed in 
this chapter. The reports and observations made by journalists in India were often 
disseminated in the British press, for example by newspapers such as The Times that 
had the financial resources to engage ‘Indian’ correspondents. That paper’s Calcutta 
correspondent was apt to remark how the exhilaration of war relieved the ‘dullness’ of 
life in cantonments. Thus in 1868, when the government of India had ‘wisely resolved 
to mass a large force at Abbotabad’, the correspondent observed that ‘the dullness all 
India has been complaining of is likely to come to an end sooner than was expected.’85 
Similarly, after the expedition to Abyssinia had been announced, the Calcutta 
                                                            
84  Parry, The Politics of Patriotism, pp. 78-9. 
85 Calcutta correspondent, Times, 15 Sept. 1868, p. 7.  
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correspondent treated it as a tonic for the British community alongside the arrival of 
cooler weather at the end of the long Indian summer. ‘What with Abyssinia and the cold 
weather’, the relieved correspondent reported, ‘India begins to revive.’86 
 
Officers themselves also contributed to assumptions about their ambition. Lewis Pelly, 
an army and political officer in India, writing in 1865, described reaction to the news 
that Britain was to invade Afghanistan in 1838: both the ‘pick of the civil service and 
the flower of the army sought the frontier at any sacrifice of emolument, and feverishly 
impatient of unknown roads to honour and power.’87 The memoirs of Lieutenant-
General Cotton probably did little to improve the metropolitan image of army officers in 
India. Cotton argued that ‘real soldiers’ could only be found where there were 
opportunities for learning (that is to say, wars). As a consequence of the frequency of 
warfare in India, it was natural that India offered Britain great opportunities for military 
training. Cotton in fact viewed India as an enormous ‘military nursery’.88  
 
A review of Cotton’s book in Reynolds’s Newspaper suspected more than an element of 
self-interest in the general’s motivation: ‘we suspect, whilst penning his “solemn 
warnings” to the English Government, and recommending the appointment of a military 
bashaw to rule India, he was sitting before a mirror, having himself in his own eye all 
the time.’89 Other newspapers adopted a similar approach in considering proposals for 
                                                            
86  Calcutta correspondent, Times, 5 Nov. 1867, p. 12. 
87 L. Pelly, ‘British India’, Fortnightly Review, 2 (15 Aug. 1865), 34. 
88 Cotton, Nine Years on the North-West Frontier, p. 313. Cotton had written to Mansfield in this vein in 
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Years on the North-West Frontier, p. 320. 
89 Reynolds’s Newspaper, 24 May 1868, p. 2. (The word ‘bashaw’ seems to be a variant of ‘pasha’, 
meaning a sort of chief, or provincial governor.) 
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military rule in India. For example, a piece in the Times of India (and reprinted in the 
Daily News) was sceptical regarding the motives of those who advocated the occupation 
of Quetta. Those advocates were ‘arraigned before the bar of public opinion on a double 
indictment—Russophobia and ambition.’ The Times of India noted that the idea of 
occupying Quetta had originated with the late General John Jacob (in 1854, as war with 
Persia approached). It was suspected that Jacob had wanted an entire army under his 
independent control, in a trans-frontier empire of which he would have been ‘the virtual 
ruler, if not actual dictator’.90 
 
This chapter has necessarily concentrated on civilian perceptions of army officers and 
military authority in India. However, it was quite possible for senior officers themselves 
to interpret proposals for forward policies as expressions of belligerence. Sir William 
Mansfield was commander-in-chief in India and a member of Lawrence’s executive 
council. In his official response to Rawlinson’s memorandum on the ‘Central Asian 
Question’ in December 1868, Mansfield stated that he ‘thoroughly concurred with his 
Excellency the Viceroy in the policy pursued during the last four years.’ Mansfield also 
recorded his ‘conviction’ that Britain had already ‘reached the proper limits of territorial 
development’ in India. Mansfield’s minute was in important respects similar to the 
concerns and complaints his civilian colleagues in the government of India had made 
about those who proposed advancing beyond the existing frontier. Mansfield thus 
declared: ‘I entirely decline to follow in the wake of those who are constantly striving to 
excite the military spirit in England and India against Russia.’91 This at first seems a 
remarkable statement by a British general, let alone the commander-in-chief in India. 
                                                            
90 Times of India, reprinted in the Daily News, 21 Aug. 1867, p. 6. 
91 Minute by W.R. Mansfield (24 Dec. 1868), Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, enclosure 8, pp. 75-
6.  
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However, it seems less remarkable when seen in the context of government of India 
officials worn down by constant repetition of forward proposals by serving and former 
army officers, and given the ubiquity of suspicions about the fertile ground Anglo-India 
offered for militarism.  
 
* * * 
 
Anne Summers has argued that the ‘process by which professional militarism became 
popularised and domesticated was a slow and difficult one.’ Only by the end of the 
nineteenth century was the ‘Regular’ army, as distinct from the Volunteers, coming to 
be adopted as ‘a truly national institution’ in Britain.92 In 1858 John Bright had 
described Britain’s military and foreign policies as ‘a gigantic system of outdoor relief 
for the aristocracy’.93 The period 1864-69 seems much closer, not just chronologically 
but in terms of attitudes, to Bright’s speech than to the militarism of late nineteenth 
century Britain. The evidence examined in this chapter also supports two linked 
hypotheses. First, if Summers (whose arguments have been influential) is correct that 
militarism in Britain flourished only from the end of the nineteenth century, then it 
seems to have had a much earlier antecedent in the wider British world. For it is clear 
that during Lawrence’s tenure as governor-general a powerful strand of metropolitan 
and official opinion regarded army officers in India with great suspicion, and Anglo-
India as fertile soil for militarism. In other words, militarism may have flourished (and 
was certainly perceived by many Britons to flourish) in the British world (specifically, 
in India) long before the various patriotic leagues and ‘shock’ of Boer war reverses that 
are thought to have heralded the arrival of militarism in Britain itself. 
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Secondly, it is possible that some of the evidence used by scholars may have 
contributed to unduly positive assessments about the army’s enhanced image, or the 
speed with which that enhanced image arrived in Britain after the Mutiny. Edward 
Spiers for example seems to be persuaded of the enhanced reputation of the army on the 
basis of the ‘ecstatic receptions’ received by returning regiments.94 However, as 
acknowledged by Spiers, the army suffered recruiting difficulties from as early as 
January 1858.95 Moreover, reactions during the febrile atmosphere of the Mutiny and its 
aftermath are potentially a very misleading barometer of public opinion. This is because 
contemporary Britons may have understood the heroics of the army in 1857-58 as 
actions in defence of something. This perhaps straightforward observation seems to 
have been underestimated in the existing literature. Exactly what the army was 
perceived to be defending would have depended on an individual’s perspective, but it 
was possible to interpret the army’s actions as defending the ‘honour’ of violated 
women, or Christianity, or the British empire in India, or the empire more broadly in the 
sense of its associated prestige. Scholars seem to acknowledge as much, without ever 
saying so explicitly: Havelock’s troops were after all ‘avenging’ something which had 
already happened (the Cawnpore massacre); and many pious Britons interpreted the 
Mutiny as a challenge to Christianity itself.96 By analogy one might make the same 
point about the Volunteer corps, the raison d’être of which was home defence.97 In 
contrast, the idea that Britain needed garrisons in Afghanistan as an immediate 
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defensive measure was far from self-evident. Estimates varied, but even by the end of 
Lawrence’s term as governor-general Russia remained at least seven hundred miles 
from the north-west frontier of India.98 Of course, seven hundred miles seemed a little 
too close for some, who documented the ‘alarming’ advance of Russia towards British 
India’s vulnerable frontier in a variety of media. The influence of those arguments and 
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VI 
The limits of ‘masterly inactivity’, 1864-1869 
 
Sir John Lawrence’s ‘masterly inactivity’ was publicly criticised on the basis that 
Britain’s apparent passivity would allow Russia to establish her influence at Kabul. In 
order to counter this threat, these critics argued that Britain should take more ‘active’ 
measures, including the provision of armaments and money to one of the protagonists in 
the Afghan civil war. For the first four years of his term as governor-general, Lawrence 
resisted all such proposals. Many writers in the imperial metropolis celebrated his 
refusal to yield to the pressure of the ‘panic-mongers’. However, Lawrence feared that 
repeated press criticism in Britain would, inevitably, condemn his policy to 
modification after his departure from India. By the end of his term, he remained 
steadfast on what he considered the most important policy decision; accordingly no 
British envoys or troops crossed the frontier into Afghanistan. However, on two other 
matters, Lawrence seems to have offered concessions to public pressure for more 
forward measures in Afghanistan. His acquiescence in the construction of new railway 
lines to the north-west frontier, and his decision to provide material assistance to Sher 
Ali Khan, were made in the hope of reducing the likelihood of ‘plunging’ into 
Afghanistan. Although Lawrence was probably too pessimistic when assessing the 
breadth and seriousness of criticism of his Afghan policy, he cannot be seen as 
exceptional in this sense, for his anxieties were shared by many of his colleagues in the 
government of India. These officials ascribed much greater weight to their perceptions 
of press and public opinion than historians who have considered the ‘official mind’ have 
allowed. This chapter will therefore argue that portraits of British policy-makers 
exhibiting a ‘rational detachment’ from external influences such as press opinion may 
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require some qualification. 
 
Press criticism: Indian domestic policy 
The Orissa famine of 1866, in which an estimated one million Indians died, was perhaps 
the greatest failure of Lawrence’s tenure as governor-general.1 His reaction to the 
reporting of this event shows Lawrence’s sensitivity to criticism in the British press. 
Some metropolitan newspapers criticised Lawrence’s irrigation policy, his response to 
the famine and the possible adverse effects of the government of India’s summer ‘exile’ 
in Simla. Lawrence had initiated the annual migration to Simla on grounds of his own 
health and the government’s increased productivity in the cooler climes of the hills 
(Simla was located in the north-west of the country, in the foothills of the Himalayas).2 
This decision had already provoked some criticism, which was now amplified; the 
government’s absence from Calcutta allowed it to be depicted as geographically remote 
and indifferent to the famine’s victims (Orissa lay in the east, nearer Calcutta). Having 
read criticism of his policy in The Times, Lawrence offered his resignation to the 
secretary of state for India, Viscount Cranborne:  
 
I see that some of the good folks at home attack me for my shortcomings regarding the famine, 
& complain of my going up to the Hills every year. Being personally interested in this question 
I am probably a bad judge in the case, and I am therefore resolved to put myself in your hands. 
If you think it is desirable that the G.G. should not go to the Hills in the hot season, I shall in no 
wise demur to this view, & I am ready to give up my Commission in that case & go home in the 
Spring.3  
                                                            
1  Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
2  Lawrence’s medical advisers said he should not remain in Calcutta during the hot season: see 
Lawrence to Cranborne, 6 Dec. 1866 (1), Lawrence Mss/31, no. 52. 
3 Lawrence to Cranborne, 6 Dec. 1866 (1), Lawrence Mss/31, no. 52. 
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Cranborne seems to have thought this was a disproportionate reaction to what was 
merely predictable press criticism. He reassured Lawrence that his resignation would be 
‘nothing less than a calamity’.4 Cranborne thought that the criticism of Lawrence 
personally had been ‘wholly unjust’ and wrote in this vein to the editor of The Times, 
J.T. Delane. However, Cranborne was not at all surprised at the newspaper criticism.5 
Lawrence’s sensitivity to this criticism would presumably have been made more acute 
by his sense of responsibility for having failed to prevent an enormous loss of life. His 
sense of responsibility is evident from the letter in which he offered to resign: 
 
It is possible that I might have been more alive to what was going on in [Orissa] had I been in 
Calcutta... We had heard that a great scarcity was anticipated. I urged the [lieutenant-governor 
of Bengal, Sir Cecil Beadon] to active measures such as the importation of grain; but he, resting 
on local information objected to act and the views of the Council generally were with him. I 
might & perhaps ought to have overruled them, & insisted on prompt action. I blame myself for 
not so doing.6  
 
However, even allowing for his sense of responsibility, Lawrence seems to have 
overestimated the seriousness of the criticism of his policy and conduct regarding the 
famine. After the original piece in The Times, Cranborne ‘observed no further attack of 
the kind’.7 If the subsequent parliamentary debates are any guide to metropolitan 
opinion, then Lawrence does not seem to have been subjected to particularly harsh 
criticism. He must have read the records of these debates, as his later letters refer to 
                                                            
4 Cranborne to Lawrence, 18 Jan. 1867, Lawrence Mss/28, no. 3. 
5 ‘I confess I do not wonder at the attacks—though they were wholly unjust towards you. There has 
been something grievously wrong either about the personnel, or the system, of the Public Works Dept 
in India.’ Cranborne to Lawrence, 10 Dec. 1866, Lawrence Mss/27, no. 46.  
6 Lawrence to Cranborne, 6 Dec. 1866 (1), Lawrence Mss/31, no. 52.  
7  Cranborne to Lawrence, 10 Dec. 1866, Lawrence Mss/27, no. 46.  
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them in some detail.8 Although he had been accused of ‘apathetic indifference’ to the 
plight of the famine’s victims, this accusation came from a backbencher; in contrast 
government ministers exonerated him from blame. The new secretary of state, Sir 
Stafford Northcote, first noted that the governor-general ‘was especially distinguished 
for his intense interest in the welfare of the people of India’. Northcote judged that ‘no 
blame whatever could be imputed’ to Lawrence for having not overruled the authorities 
in Bengal.9  
 
It seems therefore that Lawrence displayed greater sensitivity to press criticism than 
ministers in London thought was warranted. Commenting on separate criticism in the 
British press that concerned Lawrence, Northcote seemed barely perturbed: ‘I had not 
seen the attacks to which your letter alludes: but if such attacks are the worst which you 
have to encounter you may I think sleep very quietly on your pillow.’10 Although 
neither Cranborne nor Northcote had been personally criticised in these newspaper 
‘attacks’, their muted reactions suggest that Lawrence’s sensitivity may partly have 
reflected his relative inexperience of British politics and public life. That was certainly 
the hypothesis put forward in a review of Lawrence’s administration in Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine: 
 
We do not hesitate to avow that Sir John was extremely sensitive to the attacks of the press. 
This is easy to account for. He had not been trained in that rough public life through which an 
English statesman has to hew his path... As Chief Commissioner of the Punjaub he had been 
                                                            
8 Lawrence to Northcote, 4 Oct. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32B, no. 56. 
9 The backbencher was Patrick Smollett (MP for Dunbartonshire). Hansard, 189 (2 Aug. 1867), cols. 
786, 816-7. 
10 The ‘attacks’ in question were made in British newspapers following the Agra durbar of 1866. 
Lawrence’s address to the assembled Indian chiefs had received criticism for being ‘unduly austere’. 
Northcote to Lawrence, 2 Apr. 1867, Lawrence Mss/28, no. 15. 
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held up by the press as a pattern administrator. After the terrible events of 1857, the English 
press vied with the Anglo-Indian in endeavouring to do him honour. It was only after he became 
Viceroy... that the tone of the Indian press changed. Then he was attacked; then he was loaded 
with abuse... Sir John felt these attacks, and winced under them; they annoyed and vexed him; 
but not one of them affected his policy.11  
 
Lawrence’s private correspondence suggests that his sensitivity to press criticism was 
also a consequence of his belief that the printed word—irrespective of its veracity—
exercised a powerful influence on readers. British press reporting of the Bhutan war in 
1865 seems to have disturbed Lawrence. He complained to Sir Charles Wood that 
parliamentary debates on the subject demonstrated not only the ignorance of many 
speakers but ‘how much people at home are misled by newspaper reports.’12 He 
subsequently shared with Wood his pessimism regarding the powerful effects of press 
criticism. ‘Constant iteration of the same accusations, however fallacious,’ Lawrence 
believed, ‘produces an impression both in India & in England’.13 He was so concerned 
about the influence of misleading reports in the press that he later explored the 
possibility of establishing some outlet for the government of India’s official views. 
Northcote thought that such an outlet was ‘a necessary weapon of defence in these days. 
Even in England it would have its advantages; but in India I should fancy it was 
essential.’14 The proposal was however dropped due to a lack of agreement in 
                                                            
11 [Malleson], ‘Sir John Lawrence’, 743. The article was published anonymously but The Wellesley 
Index to Victorian Periodicals, 1824-1900 attributes it to George Bruce Malleson, an army officer and 
military historian. Malleson served in India from 1842 until 1877, when he retired with the (honorary) 
rank of major-general. He was made CSI in 1872. Malleson was a ‘frequent contributor’ to the 
Calcutta Review from 1857, and was also a correspondent of The Times. His publications included 
History of the Indian Mutiny (III vols., 1878-80, in continuation of vols. I & II of J.W. Kaye’s A 
History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857–1858, III vols., 1864-76).  See E.M. Lloyd, ‘Malleson, 
George Bruce (1825-1898)’, rev. J. Falkner, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; 
online ed.). 
12 Lawrence to Wood, 2 June 1865, Lawrence Mss/30, no. 36. 
13 Lawrence to Wood, 21 Dec. 1865 (1), Lawrence Mss/30, no. 73. 
14  Northcote to Lawrence, 29 Oct. 1867, Lawrence Mss/28, no. 46. 
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Lawrence’s executive council.15  
 
It is possible that the speed of communications between Britain and India increased 
Lawrence’s sensitivity to press criticism. By 1865, the governor-general at Calcutta 
could receive telegrams from London in three days.16 Telegrams however were used 
only sparingly, for the transmission of urgent information.17 Letters sent from London, 
and voluminous articles, editorials and reports of parliamentary debates from the 
imperial metropolis took from four to six weeks to reach India.18 One can only be 
tentative, but it is conceivable that the delay in receiving such detailed reports increased 
Lawrence’s sense of anxiety about events in distant Britain.  
 
In defence of ‘masterly inactivity’ 
The famous Edinburgh Review article defending Lawrence’s foreign policy was 
published anonymously in January 1867. Its author declared that Lawrence’s ‘opinions 
with respect to Russia… tend clearly towards the conclusion which the quietists would 
advocate—a masterly inactivity.’19 Although published anonymously, The Times was in 
no doubt that the article conveyed practically an official representation of the governor-
general’s ‘real policy and views’.20 That assessment was correct. Its author was J.W.S. 
                                                            
15  Some of his colleagues (Richard Temple and Sir William Mansfield) favoured an official government 
of India organ, ‘open & avowed’; others (Henry Maine and John Strachey) preferred a ‘secret service 
system’; while Sir Henry Durand was ‘against any regular paid understanding with the Press’. 
Lawrence inclined to the first opinion. Lawrence to Northcote, 11 Aug. 1868 (2), Lawrence Mss/33, 
no. 58. 
16 Lawrence to Wood, 4 March 1865 (2), Lawrence Mss/30, no. 17. 
17  Based on a review of his correspondence, telegrams were used during Lawrence’s term as governor-
general for conveying urgent details regarding: the outbreak, progress and termination of military 
operations (including the Abyssinian expedition and several expeditions on the north-west frontier); 
resignations and appointments of ministers (and ministries) in Britain; and appointments to the 
government of India sanctioned by the India Office. 
18  The speed of communications between Britain and India was discussed in the dissertation 
introduction.  
19 [Wyllie], ‘Foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence’, 44.  
20 Times, 23 Jan. 1867, p. 6. 
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Wyllie, under-secretary in the Foreign Department of the government of India, and he 
had written the article at Lawrence’s express request.21 Wyllie deprecated that the 
‘phantom of a Russian invasion’ had survived in the minds of many Englishmen, 
especially in India among the ‘panic-mongers of the Calcutta press’.22 His article’s 
target audience was however quite clearly in Britain. That explained the choice of 
periodical: this was an attempt by Lawrence to counter the publicity won by his 
opponents in Britain. The length of the article (forty-seven pages) and its serious tone 
were consistent with Lawrence’s views on the power of written arguments to affect 
public opinion. Moreover, Wyllie included voluminous extracts from Lawrence’s 
official correspondence with the contending parties in the Afghan civil war; 
correspondence that before this point had never been revealed to the public (and which 
would not be published officially until 1878). This approach was novel, as the author 
noted.23 In this sense the article may have been an experiment in the approach Lawrence 
was then considering for the diffusion of the government of India’s views. 
 
The article sought to persuade readers—on strategic, financial and practical grounds—
that a forward policy in Afghanistan would be most unwise. Wyllie thus emphasised 
some diverse themes: the difficulties which Russia would face in any attempt to invade 
India; the strategic wisdom of defending India from the existing frontier; the intractable 
nature of Afghanistan and its inhabitants; and the enormous expense of establishing new 
garrisons beyond the existing border. Wyllie also reassured readers that Lawrence was 
not at all indifferent to events in Afghanistan; in fact he secured useful intelligence from 
                                                            
21 J.W.S. Wyllie, Essays on the external policy of India, ed., with a brief life, by W.W. Hunter, (London, 
1875), p. xx.  
22 [Wyllie], ‘Foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence’, 42. 
23 [Wyllie], ‘Foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence’, 2. The correspondence was published officially in 
1878 in Afghanistan Correspondence.  
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a variety of sources and ‘scouts’.24 This last revelation was almost certainly intended to 
counter press criticism that Lawrence’s inaction was tantamount to ‘indifference’.25 
Wyllie’s public arguments against interfering in Afghanistan—developed in a second 
article, this time published in the Fortnightly Review—echoed much of what Lawrence 
had written in his correspondence with ministers in London.26  
  
Press criticism: Afghan policy 
Journalists in Britain assumed that an invading army’s most likely route from central 
Asia to India would be through the Khyber pass, though occasionally they reported 
rumours that Russia had found new ways through the Himalayas.27 On account of the 
perceived strategic significance of the Khyber pass, Lawrence understood that a 
proposed railway route from Lahore to Peshawar (at the foot of the Khyber) would 
attract public support from those anxious about Russian advances in central Asia. 
Lawrence however believed that the construction of irrigation works should have 
priority over railways. He told Cranborne that irrigation was of ‘very much more 
importance than new lines of communication’. This was partly on account of the human 
consequences of famine in India, which Lawrence seemed anxious to convey to 
ministers in London: ‘[t]he misery, the loss of life, the poverty which follow a failure of 
the rain at the usual period in India, are almost inconceivable to those who have not 
lived among the people in a famine year.’28  
                                                            
24 [Wyllie], ‘Foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence’, 44-7. 
25 An editorial in The Times, published in the same month as the Edinburgh Review article, thought the 
charge that Lawrence had ‘no foreign policy’ had been so ‘persistently repeated’ that it was proper to 
consider the whole question again. Times, 23 Jan. 1867, p. 6. 
26 J.W.S. Wyllie, ‘Masterly Inactivity’, Fortnightly Review, 6 (Dec. 1869), 585-615. By this time, Wyllie 
was no longer serving in an official capacity, and wrote in his own name.  
27 E.g. it was reported in late 1868 that a route by way of Kashmir might also be practicable. See Times, 
9 Dec. 1868, p. 9. 
28  Lawrence to Cranborne, 31 Aug. 1866, Lawrence Mss/31, no. 31. Lawrence had experienced the 
effects of famine first hand as a settlement officer in the drought-stricken Etawah district of the North-
Western Provinces, c.1838: Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
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Lawrence’s preference for irrigation was also a question of finance: he was doubtful 
that any new railway lines would prove remunerative, but confident that irrigation 
works would ‘prove a profitable investment’ for the government. If railways had to be 
constructed, Lawrence preferred (on financial grounds) to complete India’s internal 
communications by the construction of feeder lines. As for proposed new lines: ‘in our 
present financial difficulties, I am for postponing them all.’29  However, notwithstanding 
his clear, strong views on this matter, Lawrence agreed to proceed with the construction 
of railways to the north-west frontier. He wrote a letter to Northcote in October 1867, 
explaining the reasons for his acquiescence: 
 
I am firmly of opinion that any advance of the Russians in the present generation in India is a 
perfect delusion; but, on the other hand, I think... that if we could quiet men’s minds and put a 
stop to an agitation which may lead to some foolish movement forward, that it would be a 
politic measure. If you consider that there is no danger of any such agitation proving successful, 
then I am for taking our time, and consolidating and developing our resources, by completing 
and undertaking such lines in the interior of India, which are likely to prove remunerative in a 
short time after completion. But, if you think that there may be danger from the excitement 
which may then arise, then I am willing to go in for such a moderate scheme.30 
 
In a later letter, Lawrence consoled himself regarding the likely costs of the Lahore-
Peshawar line: ‘if its construction will only satisfy those who cry out for interference in 
Central Asia it may repay in that way the cost of construction’.31 By January 1868, his 
                                                            
29 Lawrence to Cranborne, 31 Aug. 1866, Lawrence Mss/31, no. 31. Lawrence’s reference to ‘our 
present financial difficulties’ contemplated forthcoming annual deficits. As discussed in chapter III, 
there were recurrent government of India deficits in the period 1866-68. 
30 Lawrence to Northcote, 23 Oct. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32B, no. 60. 
31 Lawrence to Northcote, 19 Dec. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32B, no. 72. 
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surrender was complete. He reported to the secretary of state: ‘I am ready to accept 
whatever you may decide on as regard railways from Lahore to Peshawur… Anything is 
better than plunging into Afghanistan.’32 It seems clear therefore that Lawrence’s 
acquiescence in the construction of the railway line to Peshawar was in his mind a 
concession to public anxiety about Russian advances and related criticism of his 
‘passive’ Afghan policy. Lawrence’s fear is explicit: that public ‘agitation’ about 
Russia, if unchecked, might lead to ‘some foolish movement forward’ into Afghanistan. 
He was not alone in making this connection between public opinion and policy-making, 
for Northcote also thought that constructing such railways would ultimately strengthen 
the case for ‘abstention’ in Afghanistan. The secretary of state had informed Lawrence: 
‘I entirely approve of your views on the Central Asian question: but I think it will 
strengthen the hands of the abstention party if we show that we are taking steps to 
strengthen our N.W. frontier.’33 In other words, the calculations of ministers in the 
metropolis, as well as officials on the imperial periphery, took account of their 
perceptions of public pressure. They were prepared to make concessions to that 
pressure, in the hope of protecting more cherished policy objectives. 
 
This preparedness to offer concessions on particular policy questions also seems to have 
been evident in Lawrence’s belated decision to support Sher Ali Khan. Lawrence had 
recognised the late Dost Muhammad’s son and nominated successor, Sher Ali Khan, as 
Amir of Afghanistan. However, several of Dost Muhammad’s other sons contested the 
succession, and for extended periods Sher Ali’s position seemed extremely precarious. 
However, such were the vicissitudes of the civil war that it was impossible for officials 
to predict which one of the contending parties would ultimately emerge triumphant. 
                                                            
32 Lawrence to Northcote, 2 Jan. 1868, Lawrence Mss/33, no. 2. 
33 Northcote to Lawrence, 17 Nov. 1867, Lawrence Mss/28, no. 49. 
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Having already recognised Sher Ali as Amir of Afghanistan, Lawrence was determined 
to avoid recognising another chief as anything more than the Amir of a particular 
Afghan province. Lawrence was also determined that no assistance (whether money, 
weapons, British officers or troops) should be offered to any of the protagonists. 
Supporting a particular chief ran the considerable risk that if he were then defeated this 
would damage British prestige and prejudice subsequent relations with him. An official 
despatch from the government of India to the secretary of state in April 1866 outlined 
this policy of ‘strict neutrality’: 
 
The cause of the Ameer Shere Ali is by no means finally lost, and we consider that, until such a 
result is reached, we are bound equally by good faith and by considerations of policy to 
recognise no other Chief as Ameer of Affghanistan. Should the present contest terminate in a 
disruption of the kingdom into two or more principalities, it will be time enough to give these 
our recognition when they develope themselves in a form having some appearance of stability. 
In the meantime we intend maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality, leaving the Affghans to 
choose their own rulers, and prepared to accept with amity whatever Chief may finally establish 
his power in the country.34 
 
Lawrence and his colleagues in the government of India planned to observe 
developments from a distance by obtaining intelligence from Indian agents, until such 
time as one protagonist proved himself sufficiently powerful to attract British support. 
From his conversations with Dost Muhammad, Lawrence was confident that the 
warring chiefs would have no objection to such a policy. He was therefore frank in 
explaining his neutrality, as in this letter to Amir Muhammad Afzal Khan (who at the 
                                                            
34  Government of India to the secretary of state for India, 21 Apr. 1866, Afghanistan Correspondence, 
no. 5, p. 9. 
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time of writing had established himself at Kabul, in place of his rival Sher Ali): 
 
My friend! the British Government has hitherto maintained a strict neutrality between the 
contending parties in Affghanistan. Rumours, I am told, have reached the Cabul Durbar of 
assistance having been granted by me to Ameer Shere Ali Khan. I take this opportunity to 
request your Highness not to believe such idle tales. Neither men, nor arms, nor money, nor 
assistance of any kind, have ever been supplied by my Government to Ameer Shere Ali Khan. 
Your Highness and he, both equally unaided by me, have fought out the battle, each upon your 
own resources. I propose to continue the same policy for the future... My friend! as I told your 
Highness in my former letter, the relations of the British Government are with the actual Rulers 
of Affghanistan.35 
 
Lawrence went on to explain that for as long as Sher Ali held Herat (and maintained 
friendship with the British government) he would be recognised as the ruler of that 
place. Upon the same principle, Lawrence was prepared to recognise Afzal Khan as 
Amir of Kabul and Kandahar. Lawrence in return expected Afzal Khan to recognise as 
binding the engagements concluded between the British government and his father, 
Dost Muhammad (the Anglo-Afghan Treaties of 1855 and 1857). Lawrence also 
requested that, in accordance with the 1857 treaty, a vakeel (Muslim envoy) be deputed 
to Kabul. Afzal Khan accepted this request in April 1867.36 
 
However, the longevity of the civil war tested the patience, and possibly the nerves, of 
some of Lawrence’s compatriots. By January 1868, Colonel John Adye could contain 
himself no longer. The colonel wrote to the editor of The Times, in protestation at the 
                                                            
35 Khureeta to His Highness Ameer Mahomed Ufzul Khan, Walee of Cabul and Candahar, 25 Feb. 1867, 
Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 7, p. 14.  
36 Khureeta to His Highness Ameer Mahomed Ufzul Khan, Walee of Cabul and Candahar, 25 Feb. 1867, 
Afghanistan Correspondence, nos. 7 & 9, pp. 14 & 18. 
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apparent passivity of ‘masterly inactivity’: 
 
Instead of standing aloof and allowing them to fight out their miserable squabbles [in 
Afghanistan], we should associate ourselves with the legitimate sovereign of the country, lend 
him our support by the presence of a befitting envoy, and assist him with money and arms if 
necessary, to maintain his position... “Masterly inactivity” is, in short, a selfish attempt to ignore 
the responsibilities of our high and powerful position in the East; it is at best but a poor and 
ignoble policy, and in reality its success is impossible.37  
 
It may or may not have been a coincidence that Colonel Adye’s book on the Ambela 
war had just been published.38 But it was certainly easier to demand assistance be given 
to Afghanistan’s ‘legitimate sovereign’ than it was to identify such a person. In one 
sense the ‘legitimate sovereign’ was Sher Ali Khan, Dost Muhammad’s son and 
nominated successor. In a practical sense however—as Lawrence had acknowledged in 
his letter to Afzal Khan—the relations of the British government were with ‘the actual 
Rulers’ of Afghanistan. In this sense the ‘legitimate sovereign’ was simply whichever 
Amir won the civil war; and at the time of Adye’s letter to The Times that remained a 
very uncertain matter. Lawrence read the letter and then (about six weeks after it had 
appeared in The Times) wrote to Northcote, observing that Colonel Adye had been 
‘trying his hand’ on the question of Afghan policy, and had ‘got a good deal beyond his 
depth.’39  
 
                                                            
37 Colonel J. Adye to editor, Times, 4 Jan. 1868, p. 6.  
38  Adye’s book was Sitana: a mountain campaign on the borders of Afghanistan in 1863 (London, 
1867): it was at this time regularly featured in the classified section of The Times. Adye, Sir John 
Miller (1819-1900): Royal Artillery officer; served in the Crimean war and Indian Mutiny; from 1859 
commanded the artillery in the Madras presidency; deputy adjutant-general of artillery in India, 1863-
68; CB, 1855; KCB, 1873; GCB, 1882. See E.M. Lloyd, ‘Adye, Sir John Miller (1819-1900)’, rev. J. 
Lunt, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed.). 
39 Lawrence to Northcote, 16 Feb. 1868, Lawrence Mss/33, no. 10. 
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Yet later that year Lawrence decided to support Sher Ali Khan with armaments and 
money. Lawrence had always made it clear that any such support should only be 
granted if Britain could have confidence that the protagonist, once supported, would 
thereafter defeat his enemies.40 However, at the time Lawrence chose to intervene, all 
the intelligence suggested Sher Ali’s position was extremely vulnerable, as Lawrence 
himself recognised in a letter to Northcote at the end of October 1868. Lawrence judged 
that Sher Ali’s position at Kabul was ‘very precarious’: he had done some ‘unwise 
things’ since his return to Kabul, still had ‘a formidable rival’ in the form of his nephew 
Abdur Rahman Khan, and had reason ‘even to distrust his own son Yakoob Ali’.41 
Lawrence had hitherto cited the uncertainty in Afghanistan as a reason for not 
interfering. Now, he argued that the very precariousness of Sher Ali’s position was a 
reason for doing exactly the opposite. In December 1868, he explained this altered logic 
to the new secretary of state, the Duke of Argyll: ‘as I see that the difficulties of the 
Ameer to maintain his army are very great, I have told the L.G. of the Punjab to send 
him 6 lakhs of rupees, or to allow him to draw to that extent on Peshawur.’42 The closest 
Lawrence comes to explaining this change of tack is in an earlier letter to Northcote: 
 
I doubt much the efficacy of any attempt at mediation on our part. I believe that it would only 
lead to misconception and further distrust. Should Sher Ali succeed in recovering power, and I 
see any hope of doing good, I will be prepared to help him (as I see this is the view in England) 
in the shape of some money. But... I am afraid that he is touched in the head & cannot be relied 
on. My own opinion is that we cannot do better than leave both parties alone, until some man of 
ability and character comes to the front.43 
                                                            
40 Lawrence to Northcote, 29 July 1868, Lawrence Mss/33, no. 53. 
41 Lawrence to Northcote, 29 Oct. 1868, Lawrence Mss/33, no. 75. 
42 Lawrence to Argyll, 22 Dec. 1868, Lawrence Mss/33, no. 84. Six lakhs of rupees were worth 
approximately sixty thousand pounds. 
43 Lawrence to Northcote, 17 Aug. 1868, Lawrence Mss/33, no. 60. 
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Lawrence’s comment ‘as I see this is the view in England’ was unlikely to have been a 
reference to directions from the India Office. As discussed in chapter II, Northcote was 
at this time distracted from Indian questions by electioneering and other domestic 
political questions, and had devolved considerable latitude on Lawrence for the 
determination of policy in Afghanistan. Given Lawrence’s views on the power of 
journalism and his sensitivity to press criticism, it seems likely that what he meant by 
his expression ‘the view in England’ was public criticism of his ‘inactivity’. That 
interpretation is consistent with an argument made at the time by J.W.S. Wyllie. The 
decision to aid Sher Ali Khan roused Wyllie to write a third article on Indian foreign 
policy, and historians have treated this as a continuation of his public defence of 
Lawrence’s frontier policy.44 However, in this article Wyllie criticised Lawrence for 
succumbing to the clamour for interference in Afghanistan, and excoriated the ‘new’ 
policy of alliance with Sher Ali.45 Wyllie’s explanation of Lawrence’s eleventh hour 
decision is worth recovering: 
 
For his own part Sir John Lawrence still believed that the right thing to do was nothing, or next 
to nothing. Yet on all sides he felt a pressure to do something. He had braved the impatient 
taunts of the Anglo-Indian press for nearly five years; but now there were signs of restlessness 
among his own official advisers. Voices began to be heard in the council-chamber, arguing from 
the analogy of international custom in Europe that British officers should be deputed as 
diplomatic agents to the principal cities of Central Asia; a course to which Sir John Lawrence 
entertained deep-seated objections. He looked to England for guidance, and found cold comfort 
there. He saw that there existed among some portion of his countrymen at home a craving for 
                                                            
44 E.g. David Steele treats Wyllie’s three articles as a consistent series expounding ‘Lawrence’s case’ on 
Afghan policy: Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’.  
45 J.W.S. Wyllie, ‘Mischievous activity’, Fortnightly Review, 7 (March 1870), 278-308. 
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action and intervention; but from the stand-point of Simla he had no means of gauging the 
extent or depth of the sentiment, and his apprehensions magnified its proportions out of all 
semblance to the reality.46  
 
This article seems to have attracted little notice in the contemporary press.47 Lawrence 
himself thought very highly of Wyllie, and had recommended him for his successor’s 
private secretary.48 Presumably, as Wyllie recognised, Lawrence’s decision also had 
other causes; one of which may have been the news that Sir Henry Rawlinson was 
shortly to be appointed to the council of India in London.49 Lawrence would have been 
concerned by the appointment of such a prominent advocate of forward policies to the 
secretary of state’s advisory council. Although Rawlinson’s various public and private 
proposals had hitherto been fended off, Rawlinson would obviously now have a much 
greater opportunity for influencing policy. Furthermore, his views might be more 
persuasive if made in combination with other councillors. The impact of Rawlinson’s 
appointment to the council might thus be compounded by the existing presence there of 
Sir Bartle Frere, the man whose ‘hasty’ approach to frontier questions Lord Elgin had 
found alarming in 1863. Although Lawrence could not know what effect Rawlinson’s 
appointment would have, he knew that Rawlinson had consistently agitated for more 
active measures in Afghanistan, and was unlikely to stop now that an official door had 
opened to him. Lawrence also knew that at least one of his colleagues now favoured 
limited measures of intervention.50  
                                                            
46 Wyllie, ‘Mischievous activity’, 282-3.  
47 The Saturday Review printed a very short piece discussing Wyllie’s article: see Anon., ‘Afghanistan 
and India’, 368-9. There seems to have been little other contemporary comment.  
48 ‘Lord Mayo could hardly get a better man’: Lawrence to Northcote, 16 Oct. 1868, Lawrence Mss/33, 
no. 73. 
49 Northcote to Lawrence, 30 Sept. 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 47. Lawrence would have learned of 
Rawlinson’s appointment in late Oct. 1868 or shortly thereafter.  
50 Government of India to secretary of state for India, 4 Jan. 1869, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, 
pp. 43-81. In his memorandum, Brigadier-General Henry Lumsden expressed his ‘cordial agreement’ 
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Although news of Rawlinson’s admission to the council of India in London must have 
increased Lawrence’s pessimism about the survival of his cautious policy, Wyllie’s 
assertion that Lawrence observed ‘a craving for action and intervention’ in Britain and 
that ‘his apprehensions magnified its proportions’ seems to be the most powerful factor 
behind his belated decision to support Sher Ali Khan. The outgoing governor-general 
clearly felt that he had failed to counter the public arguments of his critics. The previous 
year, he had urged Northcote to assist him in this endeavour, requesting permission for 
the publication of papers that demonstrated the complexity and fluidity of the political 
situation in Afghanistan, the consequent difficulty of predicting which chief would 
prevail, and the possibility that four distinct territories might ultimately emerge, each 
controlled by one of the protagonists (based respectively at Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and 
Balkh): 
 
I hope you will allow these papers and the previous ones connected with the occupation of 
Quetta to be printed; the Press is agitating for a movement, and their constant repetition 
gradually influences men’s minds, particularly if they do not hear the other side of the 
question.51  
 
Northcote however would not accede to this request, much to Lawrence’s regret.52 
Wyllie’s Edinburgh Review article had manifestly not stemmed public criticism of 
Lawrence’s policy. The expression ‘masterly inactivity’ was still used in praise of that 
                                                                                                                                                                              
with Rawlinson’s ‘general views of the subject’, but suggested that a military contingent should be 
sent alongside a subsidy to Sher Ali Khan. Lumsden was not representative however, and Lawrence 
had strong support from most of his councillors (see minutes of R. Temple, W.H. Norman, W.R. 
Mansfield and R.H. Davies (enclosures 5, 6, 8, 9)). 
51 Lawrence to Northcote, 8 Oct. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32B, no. 58. 
52 ‘I am sorry that you consider that the papers on the Central Asian policy had better not be published. 
The opposite party have had their say; indeed Sir H. Green’s views on the occupation of Quetta have 
been published in extenso.’ Lawrence to Northcote, 20 Jan. 1868, Lawrence Mss/32B, no. 75. 
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policy, as Wyllie had intended, but it was also used in criticism.53 From some quarters, 
criticism of Lawrence’s policy was in fact becoming more intense. In March 1865 the 
Calcutta correspondent of The Times had observed merely a ‘desire’ among some 
Anglo-Indians ‘by means of subsidies and political agents to make Affghanistan and 
other Powers on our frontier “political buffers” between us and Russia.’54 Two years 
later, the correspondent’s reports had become more urgent and strident. In May 1867 
(four months after Wyllie’s Edinburgh Review article) the correspondent declared that 
Britain should have seized several Afghan outposts long ago:  
 
Undoubtedly, the time seems approaching when to seize Quetta, Cabul, Candahar or Herat will 
be too late, and we may have reason to regret that we have deliberately left ourselves without a 
support in Central Asia. Inaction is so cheap at the time that it is forgotten how dear it proves in 
the long run.55 
 
At the same time, the Pall Mall Gazette was demanding the occupation of Quetta.56 The 
Standard adopted a similarly critical approach, and in early 1868 condemned the ‘cheap 
forbearance’ of Lawrence’s policy. Apparently providence had ordained that the Afghan 
mountains (rather than the Indus river) were British India’s ‘true frontier’. It was simply 
‘monstrous to pretend that we have no business in Afghanistan. Nature has made our 
business there, and we have accepted the dispensation.’57 It seems therefore that 
Lawrence’s belated decision to interfere in Afghanistan was a concession to public 
                                                            
53 As discussed in chapter IV, during the parliamentary debates about the decision to launch the 
Abyssinian expedition, Sir Stafford Northcote had observed: ‘I say that at the present moment the 
policy of Sir John Lawrence, which has been characterized sometimes half sneeringly, I am afraid, as 
“a policy of masterly inactivity,” is what we ought in every way to support and strengthen’. Hansard, 
190 (28 Nov. 1867), cols. 373-4. 
54  Letter of the Calcutta correspondent, Times, 1 March 1865, p. 10. 
55 Letter of the Calcutta correspondent, Times, 28 May 1867, p. 12. 
56 ‘With an advanced post at Quettah we should be in a far better position to treat, when the time comes, 
with the de facto ruler of Afghanistan.’ Pall Mall Gazette, 30 May 1867, p. 1. 
57  Standard, 8 Jan. 1868, p. 4. 
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criticism of ‘masterly inactivity’ in Britain. As he had done on the question of railways 
to the frontier, Lawrence seems to have concluded that a mere gift of rupees and 
muskets was ‘better than plunging into Afghanistan’. 
 
Lawrence and the ‘official mind’ 
Lawrence’s sensitivity to press criticism is hard to reconcile with the existing 
scholarship on the ‘official mind’. Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, in their 
account of the motives of Victorian expansion in Africa, described policy-makers 
making rational decisions, based primarily on strategic factors, with an aristocratic 
detachment from outside influences. Public opinion emerges as a possible influence on 
policy-making only fleetingly.58 In Thomas Otte’s recent account of the Foreign Office 
‘mind’, press and public opinion are almost entirely absent. Otte concentrated 
exclusively on the Foreign Office and the diplomatic service; official thinking about 
Afghanistan does not enter his account until around 1873, when the Foreign Office 
recognised that central Asian affairs could no longer be seen in isolation from 
developments in Europe.59 Certainly, in the eighteen-sixties, the Foreign Office seems 
to have shown little interest in Afghanistan, except where it affected Persian policy.60 
Paul Kennedy has however considered the influence of press opinion on British 
‘external policy’ (not just policy made at the Foreign Office). He concluded that it was 
only when normally supportive newspapers criticised particular policy decisions that 
                                                            
58 Although the authors seem to have been reluctant to consider the influence of public opinion it briefly 
entered their story after the death of General Charles Gordon. ‘On 5 February, 1885, news reached 
London that Khartum had fallen and that Gordon was dead. The public was shocked and there were 
loud cries for revenge. On 6 February the Cabinet, fearing the danger to lower Egypt and the upsurge 
of opinion, took up Hartington’s policy and ordered Wolseley’s Nile expedition to grapple with the 
Mahdi.’ Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 151-2.  
59 Otte, The Foreign Office Mind, p. 73. 
60 E.g. following Dost Muhammad Khan’s advance on (and subsequent capture of) Herat. Wood to 
Elgin, 9 Nov. 1862, Elgin Mss/7, f435. Responsibility for Persian policy had been transferred from the 
India Office to the Foreign Office in 1859. 
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officials needed to be worried.61  
 
Had Lawrence followed the pattern of behaviour suggested by Kennedy, he would have 
been reassured by support from Liberal publications like the Daily News and the 
Manchester Guardian, and not unduly concerned by the criticism of his policy in 
Conservative publications such as the Standard. ‘We certainly agree with the Governor 
General’, the Manchester Guardian declared in January 1867, ‘that whatever danger 
may threaten us from the side of Russia is remote, and that in any case we had better 
keep quiet till the suspicions of the panic-mongers are better confirmed.’62 The Daily 
News was still more supportive of Lawrence, and critical of Anglo-Indian belligerence. 
Britons in India, ‘to a man’, were ‘ardent to wrest from the approaching hand of Russia 
the unknown and barbarous regions of Central Asia... Against this tide of aggressive 
feeling Sir John Lawrence has fought manfully, and with success’.63 The Daily News 
thought Lawrence’s ‘passive resistance’ was fortunate for both India and for England. It 
also agreed with Lawrence’s confidence about the strength of the existing frontier: 
while ‘the Sikhs are faithful to their salt we can defy in the Punjab any foreign foe; and 
if the Sikhs rise, it will not be to put a Russian Governor instead of an Englishman in 
Lahore. Our Indian frontier now is all but perfect’.64 Moreover, had Lawrence followed 
the pattern of behaviour described by Kennedy he would have been especially reassured 
by coverage in The Times. In reading The Times—and it is clear from Lawrence’s 
correspondence that he scrutinised its coverage of Indian affairs—he would have seen 
that the editorial line supported and in fact praised his policy throughout his term in 
India. The Times also had no doubt that Lawrence’s Afghan policy was popular with his 
                                                            
61 Kennedy, Background Influences on British External Policy, p. 56. 
62 Manchester Guardian, 22 Jan. 1867, p. 4. 
63  Daily News, 2 Jan. 1868, p. 4. 
64  Daily News, 2 Jan. 1868, p. 4. 
219 
compatriots in Britain: ‘Sir John Lawrence may reckon with confidence on the 
concurrence of his countrymen at home.’65 This resolute editorial support entirely 
overwhelmed the criticism from the newspaper’s Calcutta correspondent. In any case, 
the Calcutta correspondent’s views were not representative of all Anglo-Indian opinion; 
the Calcutta Review for example offered Lawrence strong backing. When that journal 
reviewed his administration in April 1869, it gladly endorsed ‘Lawrence’s policy of 
watchfulness, without premature alarm or mischievous activity—an attitude which has 
been approved by Secretaries of State of both parties; and so far as it has been 
understood, approved by all moderate men.’66  
 
Lawrence, however, does not seem to have been reassured by the opinions of the 
‘normally supportive newspapers’. Moreover, his perception of a growing public 
enthusiasm for intervention in Afghanistan was shared by some of his (serving and 
former) colleagues in the government of India. Charles Edward Trevelyan had 
considerable experience of Indian administration, having served as governor of Madras 
(1859-60) and then as finance minister in the government of India (1862-65) for part of 
Lawrence’s viceroyalty. In January 1868 Trevelyan complained in a letter to The Times 
that there had developed ‘a craving for action of some sort, and if this restless feeling is 
not turned into the right channel, it will sooner or later work us woe.’67 Similarly, 
Richard Temple, setting out his reasons for opposing Rawlinson’s forward proposals, 
observed that ‘a large section of public opinion has been, is now, and probably will be, 
in favour of advancing. Considerable pressure is even now put on Government in this 
                                                            
65 Times, 23 Jan. 1867, p. 6. 
66 Anon., ‘Administration of Sir John Lawrence’, Calcutta Review, 48 (Apr. 1869), 241-2.  




The perceptions of Lawrence and his colleagues suggest that scholars may have placed 
too much emphasis on the detachment of the ‘official mind’, a distortion perhaps 
increased by the associated assumption that policy was made in the imperial metropolis. 
The ‘aristocratic detachment’ of Foreign Office officials that impressed Robinson and 
Gallagher may be a concept of much less relevance to decision-making within the 
government of India. The five secretaries of state for India during Lawrence’s 
viceroyalty were aristocrats without exception.69 However, the social background of 
Indian government officials was quite different. Although some of them (like 
Lawrence) received peerages or baronetcies during or on completion of their service, 
very few were born aristocrats.  
 
* * * 
 
It seems clear that Lawrence was sensitive to criticism in the British press. He was not 
exceptional in this sense, as many of his colleagues in the government of India also 
appeared anxious about the effects of public criticism at home. In Lawrence’s case, this 
sensitivity may have been a reflection of his inexperience in British political and public 
life, and his belief in the power of the printed word. Possibly these factors were 
rendered more acute by his distance from Britain. Having concluded that his Afghan 
                                                            
68 Minute by R. Temple, 8 Dec. 1868, government of India to secretary of state for India, 4 Jan. 1869, 
Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, enclosure 5, p. 68.  
69  Sir Charles Wood succeeded to a baronetcy in 1846 and was created Viscount Halifax in 1866; 
George Frederick Samuel Robinson succeeded to his father’s earldom (Ripon) and to a more senior 
one (de Grey, his uncle’s) in 1859, and was created Marquess of Ripon in 1871; Robert Arthur Talbot 
Gascoyne Cecil (styled Viscount Cranborne, 1865-68) succeeded as third Marquess of Salisbury in 
1868; Sir Stafford Northcote succeeded to a baronetcy in 1851 and was created Earl of Iddesleigh in 
1885; George Douglas Campbell succeeded as 8th Duke of Argyll in 1847. 
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policy was doomed to modification, Lawrence made concessions on two policy 
decisions by acquiescing in the construction of new railway lines to the north-west 
frontier and providing material assistance to Amir Sher Ali Khan. His correspondence is 
explicit that the former decision was made in the hope that it would check public 
‘agitation’ that may otherwise lead to ‘some foolish movement forward’. It seems very 
likely that the latter decision was made in the same hope. For both decisions were 
clearly preferable, in Lawrence’s mind, to ‘plunging into Afghanistan’. For this was the 
policy decision that really mattered, and Lawrence remained resolute that ‘plunging into 
Afghanistan’ (that is to say, sending British envoys to Afghanistan, with or without 
supporting troops) was suicidal folly. His decisions on railways and supporting Sher Ali 
were tactical concessions designed to safeguard this more important strategic objective. 
In this Lawrence was successful, and not only during his term as governor-general. The 
two men who succeeded him at Calcutta, Lords Mayo and Northbrook, showed no 
appetite to depart from this cardinal provision of ‘masterly inactivity’. On this aspect of 
Afghan policy, Lawrence’s sway in fact held until around 1875. The belated decision to 
back Sher Ali Khan was something of a gamble, as Lawrence recognised. Subsequent 
events suggested that Lawrence had backed the right Afghan horse: Sher Ali survived, 
defeated his rivals and consolidated his grip on Afghanistan. The Amir of Afghanistan 
would not, however, survive the more active policy of the Conservative administration 




Lord Lawrence, the Liberals and Afghanistan, c. 1878 
 
This chapter begins by tracing the continuation of Lawrence’s Afghan policy during the 
Liberal administration of 1868-74. It then considers why the Conservative government 
of 1874-1880 resolved to force a British envoy on Amir Sher Ali Khan, placing this 
decision in the context of prevailing anxieties about Russian expansion in central Asia. 
The chapter then examines how certain prominent Liberals harnessed Lawrence’s 
expertise about India and Afghanistan. Earl Granville and William Gladstone first 
consulted Lawrence in order to gather information about events in a country of which 
they knew little but with which Britain would soon be at war. Liberals also recognised 
that Lawrence’s ‘weight’, and his reputation as a moderate, gave him great ‘utility’ as a 
public opponent of the government’s policy. Lawrence was therefore encouraged to 
amplify his public condemnation of the abandonment of ‘masterly inactivity’ in advance 
of other Liberals, who would follow his example once more facts emerged about events 
on the north-west frontier. Moreover, when Liberals spoke publicly about the war they 
made repeated reference to Lawrence’s name, in order to add authority to their 
arguments. It seems therefore that after nearly a lifetime on the imperial periphery 
Lawrence exerted a discernible influence on politics in the metropolis. His significance 
has however been neglected in the existing scholarship about Liberal opposition to the 
second Afghan war, in which Gladstone’s rhetoric about the ‘rights of the savage’ has 
assumed a central importance. This chapter will argue that, notwithstanding Gladstone’s 
historiographical allure, Lawrence’s alternative humanitarian critique of government 
policy was more representative of the approach of many Liberals to war in Afghanistan.  
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Britain and Afghanistan, 1868-1874 
Gladstone’s first Liberal administration (December 1868 to February 1874) 
enthusiastically embraced Lawrence’s Afghan policy. The secretary of state for India 
throughout this period was the Duke of Argyll, who had arrived at the India Office five 
weeks before the end of Lawrence’s term as governor-general.1 It was thus to Argyll 
that Lawrence (in January 1869) sent the voluminous government of India minutes 
responding to Rawlinson’s memorandum of the previous summer. These papers may 
have impressed Argyll, given his subsequent statements on Afghan policy. Argyll was 
already acquainted with the outgoing governor-general, as Lawrence had stayed at 
Inverary Castle as the Duke’s guest during his furlough in Britain after the Mutiny.2 It 
was in fact Argyll who recommended Sir John for a peerage on his return from India, an 
honour conferred in April 1869.3 The impression Lawrence made on Argyll is evident 
from the subsequent parliamentary debates on the abandonment of Kandahar (1881). On 
that occasion, the Duke of Argyll declared that of all ‘the great Indian authorities with 
whom I have been brought into contact there is not one who for solidity of judgment, 
for breadth of view, for strength and simplicity of character is, in my judgment, to be 
compared with Lord Lawrence.’4  
 
There was some initial friction between Argyll and Lawrence’s successor as governor-
general, the Earl of Mayo, following the durbar with Amir Sher Ali Khan at Ambala.5 
                                                            
1  Argyll was secretary of state for India from 9 Dec. 1868 to 17 Feb. 1874; Lawrence’s term expired on 
12 Jan. 1869.  
2  Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. II, p. 367. 
3  Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. II, p. 597. Lawrence was created Baron Lawrence of the 
Punjaub and of Grateley on 3 Apr. 1869. Parliament extended for the life of his first successor in the 
peerage the pension voted by the East India Company in 1858: Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
4  Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. II, p. 368. 
5  This was discussed in chapter II. The essence of the initial friction was Argyll’s concern that Mayo’s 
overtures to the Amir might be construed as committing Britain to a particular course of action. Mayo 
however explained to the secretary of state that he was continuing Lawrence’s policy and Argyll 
accepted this. Secretary of state to governor-general, 14 May 1869 and government of India to 
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However, it became clear that Mayo also favoured abstinence from interference in 
Afghanistan’s domestic affairs. At the Ambala durbar, Mayo presented the Amir with 
an additional six thousand muskets, but made no request for sending British envoys or 
troops into his territories. In return, Sher Ali was merely required to increase facilities 
for trade, and maintain order in parts of the Afghan borderlands over which he had 
influence. Sher Ali also sought from Mayo an increased subsidy, a treaty of ‘mutual 
assistance’, and a promise that Britain would refuse to recognise any of his rivals as 
Amir. Mayo resisted all of these requests.6 Sher Ali thus had to be satisfied with Mayo’s 
assurance that Britain would ‘view with severe displeasure’ any attempts on the part of 
his rivals to disturb his position as ruler of Kabul. 
 
Lawrence’s policy was the yardstick by which Argyll seems to have judged Mayo’s 
actions relating to Afghanistan. Writing to Mayo in May 1869, Argyll made it plain that 
the government agreed with Lawrence’s policy and expected to see it continued.7 Argyll 
also used Lawrence’s policy as a public reference-point, in order to counter criticism 
that policy had changed since the arrival of the new governor-general. For example, in 
April 1869, Argyll defended Mayo’s actions in the House of Lords, where he provided 
this reassurance: ‘I have every reason to believe that Lord Mayo has consistently 
pursued the same policy of non-intervention and of the avoidance of entangling 
engagements, which was pursued by my noble Friend the late Governor General of 
India (Lord Lawrence).’8  
 
Mayo was assassinated in the Andaman Islands (by an Afghan convict) in February 
                                                                                                                                                                              
secretary of state, 1 July 1869, Afghanistan Correspondence, nos. 18 & 19, pp. 91-100. 
6  S. Gopal, ‘Bourke, Richard Southwell, sixth earl of Mayo (1822-1872)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. Jan. 2008). 
7 Secretary of state to governor-general, 14 May 1869, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 18, pp. 91-2. 
8 Argyll, Hansard, 195 (19 Apr. 1869), cols. 1087-8.  
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1872. The new governor-general was the Earl of Northbrook, who ‘adhered to 
Lawrence’s school’ on questions of frontier policy.9 Northbrook had no desire to send 
British envoys to Afghanistan and thought that Russia’s advances in central Asia would 
actually increase her vulnerability. Argyll and Northbrook thus resisted continued calls 
for Russian expansion to be countered by a corresponding British movement beyond the 
north-west frontier.10  
 
Some of this pressure for intervention in Afghanistan came from within the India 
Office. John Lowe Duthie has traced the emergence and activities in the period 1868-78 
of a ‘cabal’ inside the secretary of state’s council of India, comprising Sir Henry 
Rawlinson, Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Robert Montgomery and Sir John Kaye. The cabal 
argued that a more robust diplomatic stand against Russian advances should be paired 
with active measures beyond the existing Indian frontiers leading to closer British 
relations with Afghanistan, Persia and Baluchistan. During the Liberal administration of 
1868-74, these arguments were pressed on Argyll and Grant Duff (the under-secretary 
of state), but there was no change in policy.11 It was only after a change of government 
in February 1874 and Lord Salisbury’s return to the India Office that the pressure 
exerted by the cabal became more effective.12 
 
The Liberal administration did however seek a diplomatic understanding with Russia. 
Lawrence and some of his colleagues in the government of India, in their response to 
Rawlinson’s memorandum, had suggested that the British government should seek 
                                                            
9 D. Steele, ‘Baring, Thomas George, first earl of Northbrook (1826-1904)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. May 2009). 
10  Northbrook’s stance on Afghan affairs was reinforced by his determination to reduce Indian 
government expenditure and the deficit he had inherited. See Steele, ‘Earl of Northbrook’. 
11 Duthie, ‘The “forward” group in the India Office during Gladstone’s first ministry’, 36-40, 72.  
12  Duthie, ‘Lord Salisbury, the “Forward” Group and Anglo-Afghan Relations: 1874-78’, 181-208. 
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some understanding with Russia directly (rather than send envoys or troops to 
Afghanistan in order to pre-empt or forestall Russian influence). The intermittent 
Clarendon-Gorchakov negotiations ran from September 1869 to January 1873, and 
concentrated on what the northern limits of Afghanistan should be. It was understood in 
Britain that Russia had agreed to ‘keep clear of Afghanistan’ and that in return Britain 
would ‘cease to importune’ about Russia’s activities in districts of central Asia far from 
the Afghan frontier.13 
 
Frontiers of fear 
Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne Cecil, 3rd Marquess of Salisbury, served as secretary of 
state for India during the first four years of the Conservative administration of 1874-80. 
This was Salisbury’s second stint at the India Office; his first had lasted for nine months 
during Lawrence’s viceroyalty.14 At that time, secretary of state and governor-general 
had worked in harmony on frontier questions, as the young Cecil embraced Lawrence’s 
reluctance to meddle in Afghanistan. The following words were written by the future 
Marquess, in 1866, but they might easily have flowed from Lawrence’s own pen: 
‘Indian resources are wanted for other work besides extension of territory just now. 
Several able men appear to regard the advance of Russia with apprehension: but I 
cannot bring myself to look on those advances even seriously.’15 During his second 
term at the India Office, Salisbury was confronted by renewed Russian activity in 
                                                            
13  Thornton, For the File on Empire, pp. 167-8. 
14  Salisbury’s first tenure as secretary of state for India (when he was styled Viscount Cranborne) had 
lasted from 6 July 1866 to 8 March 1867. 
15 Cranborne to Lawrence, 27 Aug. 1866, Lawrence Mss/27, no. 32. One month earlier, Cranborne had 
made similar remarks in public during a speech at Stamford: ‘statesmen of all parties have arrived at 
the conclusion that we now hold in India pretty well as much as we can govern, and that, at all events, 
until we have more thoroughly consolidated our authority there, and have left the marks of it by 
diffusing all the benefits of the civilization which we ourselves enjoy among the population of that 
vast empire… we should be pursuing an unwise and dangerous policy if we tried to extend our 
borders or to lessen the power or the permanence of those native rulers upon whose assistance we 
have so long relied. (Cheers).’ Viscount Cranborne at Stamford. Times, 13 July 1866, p. 6. 
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central Asia. After a five-year lull, in 1873 Tsarist forces had made further advances and 
in March of that year the city of Khiva became a Russian protectorate.16 Salisbury 
nonetheless appeared to maintain his previous equanimity about the risk to British India 
posed by Russia. In 1877 he offered the following observation to the House of Lords: 
 
I cannot help thinking that in discussions of this kind, a great deal of misapprehension arises 
from the popular use of maps on a small scale... the distance between Russia and British India is 
not to be measured by the finger and thumb, but by a rule. There are between them deserts and 
mountainous chains measured by thousands of miles, and these are serious obstacles to any 
advance by Russia.17 
 
However, Salisbury’s private correspondence suggests that he had in fact become 
increasingly anxious on this issue. Over two years earlier, he had confided to the prime 
minister, Disraeli, that he was ‘getting uneasy as to our lack of information from 
Afghanistan... we know nothing.’18 In contrast, there was no dearth of reports of Russian 
‘intrigue’. For example, in the same year that Salisbury was ‘getting uneasy’, Rawlinson 
published his alarmist England and Russia in the East. There was much old material in 
this book, which contained several of Rawlinson’s earlier articles and memoranda 
(including his 1868 memorandum on the ‘Central Asian Question’), and just two 
chapters of new material. It was published in March 1875 and by August had run to a 
second edition, with over one thousand copies sold.19 In retaliation for the anticipated 
Russian occupation of Merv, Rawlinson advocated the occupation of Herat, either with 
Amir Sher Ali Khan’s consent (in which case Britain would be establishing something 
                                                            
16 Duthie, ‘The “forward” group in the India Office during Gladstone’s first ministry’, 56-7.  
17 Hansard, 234 (11 June 1877), col. 1565. 
18 Salisbury to Disraeli, 2 Jan. 1875, cited in Cecil, Life of Salisbury, vol. II, p. 71. 
19  Duthie, ‘Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson and the Art of Great Gamesmanship’, 264-5. 
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resembling a protectorate in Afghanistan), or without it. Rawlinson claimed he had used 
only personal correspondence (not official records) to write England and Russia in the 
East, and that its arguments were his own rather than those of the government.20 
However, while many of his earlier publications had been written without official 
responsibility, Rawlinson had been a member of the secretary of state’s council of India 
since 1868, and was by 1875 much less of a marginal figure than he had seemed during 
Lawrence’s viceroyalty.21 Moreover, it seems that Rawlinson’s long-held views were 
now beginning to resonate with increasing anxiety about Russia in the metropolitan 
press. 
 
An example of the extent of this anxiety is provided by a piece in The Times from 1879, 
which reassured its readers that the Tsar’s new yacht would not—contrary to 
speculation—be equipped with any more powerful guns than four-pounders for saluting 
(nor be defended by armour).22 This was an odd rumour; not least because the yacht in 
question was being built on the Clyde. However, speculation of this sort was not 
confined to newspaper columns. Some politicians warned that, without a forward 
movement by Britain, ‘hordes of Cossacks would swarm like locusts over our frontier to 
feed and fatten upon the resources of India.’23 Anxiety about Russia could also 
transcend political allegiance: a great ‘Russophobe’ like David Urquhart could therefore 
achieve considerable popularity amongst Radical, working-class Britons.24 Frederick 
                                                            
20  Duthie, ‘Sir Henry Creswicke Rawlinson and the Art of Great Gamesmanship’, 264-5. 
21 It was more difficult to regard Rawlinson as isolated in his views about Russia, as Salisbury had done 
in 1867. At that time Salisbury could tell Lawrence: ‘I quite agree in your views about the advance of 
the Russians in Central Asia. In fact, with the possible exception of Sir Henry Rawlinson I never 
heard of any body in [Government] who took the opposite view.’ Cranborne to Lawrence, 4 Feb. 
1867, Lawrence Mss/28, no. 5. 
22 Times, 20 Oct. 1879, p. 4. 
23 Lord de Mauley, Hansard, 234 (11 June 1877), col. 1563. The same debate had elicited Salisbury’s 
remarks about the ‘popular use of maps on a small scale’.  
24 H. Cunningham, ‘The Language of Patriotism, 1750-1914’, History Workshop Journal, 12 (1981), 21. 
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Burnaby, the Conservative parliamentary candidate for Birmingham, in 1878 went as 
far as proclaiming: ‘[w]ould to God we were at war with Russia!’25 Burnaby had 
published an account (in its ninth edition by 1877) of the situation in Afghanistan, 
which included translations of Russian publications presenting her existing possessions 
in central Asia as merely ‘an étape on the road to further advance’.26 In the 1880 general 
election, Burnaby attacked Gladstone and leading Liberals as ‘friends of Russia’. 
Although defeated, Burnaby gained over fifteen thousand votes in the Radical 
Birmingham stronghold of John Bright and Joseph Chamberlain.27  
 
These were the winds by which Salisbury was buffeted. It seems unlikely that he was 
immune from their effects, because what he perceived to be the absence of reliable 
information from Afghanistan gave him nothing to set against myriad reports of Russian 
plots. As he had confided to Disraeli in 1875: ‘it is very uncomfortable to think that for 
all we know Russia may have covered the country with intrigue.’28 On the eve of the 
second Afghan war, a letter to The Times compared reports of Russian plots to a 
‘troublesome nightmare, whether real or unreal’.29 This was Salisbury’s predicament: he 
did not know whether that ‘troublesome nightmare’ was real, or unreal. Salisbury’s 
anxiety was not limited to fears about Russian progress: there were persistent rumours 
that Muslims would rise in a jihad against the British, and Salisbury was also concerned 
about Muslim ‘fanaticism’, whether organised or spontaneous.30 In 1871, W.W. 
Hunter’s The Indian Mussalmans—which viewed Muslims in India as ‘seditious masses 
                                                            
25 Times, 5 Nov. 1878, p. 8. 
26 F. Burnaby, Ride to Khiva: Travels and Adventures in Central Asia (II vols., 1877), vol. I, pp. v-vii. 
27 R.T. Stearn, ‘Burnaby, Frederick Gustavus (1842-1885)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford 2004; online ed.). 
28 Salisbury to Disraeli, 2 Jan. 1875, cited in Cecil, Life of Salisbury, vol. II, p. 71. 
29 Times, 10 Oct. 1878, p. 10. 
30 Gopal, British Policy in India, pp. 95-8, 104. 
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in the heart of our Empire’—had both described and nourished these sorts of anxiety.31 
Without definite information it was difficult to measure the extent of any Russian or 
Muslim threat (or combination thereof). Salisbury’s considerable anxiety about events 
in Afghanistan is explicit in the official despatch he sent to Northbrook on 22 January 
1875, directing that British officers be sent into the Amir’s territories: 
 
Her Majesty’s Government have followed with anxious attention the progress of events in 
Central Asia… [and] cannot but be struck with the comparative scantiness of the information 
which it is in your Excellency’s power to supply… Her Majesty’s Government are of opinion 
that more exact and constant information is necessary to the conduct of a circumspect policy at 
the present juncture. The disposition of the people in various parts of Afghanistan, the designs 
and intrigues of its Chiefs, the movement of nomad tribes upon its frontier, the influence which 
foreign powers may possibly be exerting within and without its borders, are matters of which a 
proper account can only be rendered to you by an English Agent residing in the country… I 
have therefore to instruct you to take measures, with as much expedition as the circumstances of 
the case permit, for procuring the assent of the Ameer to the establishment of a British Agency 
at Herat. When this is accomplished it may be desirable to take a similar step with regard to 
Kandahar. I do not suggest any similar step with regard to Cabul, as I am sensible of the 
difficulties which are interposed by the fanatic violence of the people.32 
 
Salisbury’s description of the government’s ‘anxious attention’ regarding events in 
central Asia, the impression of the ‘scantiness of the information’ on which it had to 
rely and ‘the influence which foreign powers may possibly be exerting’ (Russia is not 
actually named) should be seen in the context of increasing anxiety about Russian 
                                                            
31 Gopal, British Policy in India, p. 100. 
32 Secret despatch of the secretary of state for India to the government of India, 22 Jan. 1875, 
Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 31, pp. 128-9. 
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expansion and the security of India before and during the ‘Eastern crisis’ (1876-80). It is 
worth emphasising the significance of Salisbury’s instructions to the governor-general: 
by directing that a British agency be established at Herat (at this time, within the Amir’s 
Afghan territories) the government was not merely abandoning the ‘masterly inactivity’ 
of Lawrence’s tenure in India but a continuous line of policy practised since the end of 
the first Afghan war in 1842. Historians have recognised the repercussions of 
Salisbury’s new policy; Duthie for example has asserted that the Herat decision 
‘contributed in large part’ to Northbrook’s subsequent resignation as governor-general, 
and to the declaration of war on Afghanistan in 1878.33 For the purposes of the present 
chapter, Salisbury’s despatch also suggests that, notwithstanding his jocular 
parliamentary remarks about the unnecessary anxiety caused by ‘the popular use of 
maps on a small scale’, he had lost his nerve over two years earlier.34 For Salisbury did 
not just conceive of the Herat agency in terms of intelligence gathering: it was also 
intended to pre-empt any Russian influence.35 
 
It was not just Salisbury who appears to have lost his nerve. By the time of the second 
Afghan war, a language of fear had become commonplace among leading 
Conservatives and in The Times. Lord Beaconsfield (Disraeli had been created Earl of 
Beaconsfield in 1876) in December 1878 claimed he was unable to ‘indulge in the 
fancy’ that the frontier with Afghanistan was secure.36 This type of terminology was 
ubiquitous in The Times, which by 1878 had adopted the language Rawlinson had used 
for some time. For example, in his England and Russia in the East, Rawlinson had 
                                                            
33  Duthie, ‘Lord Salisbury, the “Forward” Group and Anglo-Afghan Relations: 1874-78’, 181. 
34  Salisbury’s parliamentary statement was made on 11 June 1877; his dispatch to Northbrook regarding 
Herat was dated 22 Jan. 1875.  
35  J.L. Duthie, ‘Pragmatic diplomacy or imperial encroachment?: British policy towards Afghanistan, 
1874-1879’, International History Review, 4 (1983), 479. 
36 Hansard, 243 (10 Dec. 1878), col. 515. 
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written of ‘the giant strides which Russia is now making in the East’; three years later 
almost this exact phrase echoed in The Times. ‘One gigantic stride after another has 
been taken’, The Times observed with alarm, ‘and still Russia is moving on.’37 The 
Times also emphasised the vulnerability of the north-west frontier and even wondered 
whether Britain’s imperial race was in decline.38 The attitude of The Times is of 
particular significance in understanding increasing British anxiety to Russian progress 
in central Asia, because it had unequivocally supported Lawrence’s circumspect policy 
while he was governor-general. 
 
During his second term at the India Office, Salisbury seems to have exhibited an anxiety 
about British India’s vulnerability that is difficult to reconcile with his stance during his 
first term. At that time, Salisbury had been eager to convince Lawrence that he would 
not even countenance the idea of a forward movement beyond the north-west frontier. 
Thus responding to a proposal to occupy Quetta in 1866, Salisbury had quipped to 
Lawrence: ‘I would as soon sit down upon a beehive.’39 Yet in 1876, British forces 
occupied Quetta. His biographers have commonly ascribed Salisbury’s altered policy to 
external factors such as the ‘approach of the Russians and the obstinacy of the 
Afghans.’40 However, Russian advances and Afghan ‘obstinacy’ were not new 
developments. Salisbury had contemplated both in 1866, yet concluded that Britain was 
‘strong enough to give’ Russia or any other foes ‘a warm reception’ in the event of 
hostilities.41 What appears to have changed by 1875 was principally a question of 
interpretation: Salisbury’s decision to give a pessimistic reading to the limited 
                                                            
37 H. Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East (London, 1875), p. v; Times, 10 Sept. 1878, p. 7. 
38 See e.g. Times, 10 Oct. 1878, p. 10 & Times, 9 Sept. 1879, p. 8. 
39 Cranborne to Lawrence, 10 Dec. 1866, Lawrence Mss/27, no. 46. 
40 E.D. Steele, ‘Salisbury at the India Office’, in R. Blake and H. Cecil (eds.), Salisbury: The Man and 
his Policies (1987), p. 129. Salisbury’s daughter also made this argument, in 1921: Cecil, Life of 
Salisbury, vol. II, p. 70. 
41 Cranborne to Lawrence, 2 Oct. 1866, Lawrence Mss/27, no. 35.  
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intelligence received from the frontier, one which accorded with certain prevailing 
anxieties about British vulnerability. It is ironic therefore that Salisbury contrasted his 
own ‘confidence’ with the supposed susceptibility of Liberals to what he termed 
‘Lawrentian pessimism’.42 Lawrence in fact continued to express confidence about the 
dangers posed by Russian expansion.43 Certainly, Salisbury appeared confident (unlike 
Lawrence) about invading Afghanistan: it was ‘not likely to entail upon us any 
considerable efforts’, as he breezily put it.44 But Salisbury no longer appeared confident 
about Britain’s capacity to resist Russian influence in Afghanistan. He would become 
more distrustful of Russia.45 From the splendid isolation of Hatfield House, Salisbury 
appears to have been increasingly guided by fear, and placed an increasing emphasis on 
the importance of fear as an instrument of government. Attacking Liberal Afghan policy 
in 1884, Salisbury argued that the tribes of Afghanistan, those ‘vast uncivilised 
multitudes, are not governed merely by the sword. They are governed by their 
imagination. (Hear, hear). They are governed by their fears.’46 Moreover, the 
repercussions of Salisbury’s pessimistic approach to Afghanistan would subsequently 
be felt far beyond the frontiers of India. In 1889, he determined that if Britain was to 
hold Egypt, then no other power could be allowed a hold over any part of the Nile 
valley. When Salisbury put this strategy into practice, ‘the defensive psychology which 
kept watch over northern India had been transplanted into Africa. The frontiers of fear 
were on the move.’47   
 
                                                            
42 J.L Duthie, ‘Lord Salisbury, the “Forward” Group and Anglo-Afghan relations: 1874-78’, 197-8. 
43 Lawrence also remained sceptical about the likelihood of an invasion by Russia: it would never occur 
‘should she follow the course which her own interests dictate’. See e.g. letter of Lawrence to editor, 
Times, 10 Jan. 1878, p. 4.  
44 Hansard, 243 (5 Dec. 1878), col. 63. 
45 L.M. Penson, ‘The principles and methods of Lord Salisbury’s Foreign Policy’, Cambridge Historical 
Journal, 5 (1935/37), 96. 
46 Salisbury at Manchester, Times, 17 Apr. 1884, p. 6. 
47 Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, p. 288. 
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By the summer of 1878, the government of India had still not succeeded in carrying out 
Salisbury’s instruction to place a British envoy in Afghanistan. In contrast, Britons that 
August learned that a Russian mission, ‘escorted by Cossacks’, had reached Kabul and 
apparently been received warmly by the Amir.48 For those fearful of Russia, the most 
compelling explanation for this inequality of treatment was that the Afghan Amir had 
become increasingly susceptible to Russian influence.49 A British mission was therefore 
despatched to Afghanistan in order to restore the diplomatic balance. It was refused 
passage beyond the Afghan border. This event was reported with some consternation in 
The Times (‘THE MISSION STOPPED’), where it was noted that the Russians all the 
while remained at Kabul.50 Journalists attuned to the perceived demands of prestige 
were quick to draw out the significance of the repulse of the mission. The Times 
observed gravely that ‘this insolent rebuff’ had occurred in the presence of Indians, and 
thus worried about its impact ‘in the bazaars of India’.51 The Conservative press lined 
up to demand ‘satisfaction for our outraged dignity.’52 An ultimatum was despatched by 
the government of India on 2 November 1878, demanding that the Amir agree to 
receive a permanent British mission by 20 November. Silence followed. Then on 21 
November 1878 the war with Afghanistan began. 
 
When parliament was convened in early December, the government argued that its 
invasion of Afghanistan was necessary in order to secure the north-west frontier of 
India. The government apparently also felt obliged to deny that it was ambitious for new 
territory. ‘We have never desired’, Sir Stafford Northcote (now chancellor of the 
                                                            
48 Times, 13 Aug. 1878, p. 3. 
49 Times, 23 Sept. 1878, p. 5. 
50 Times, 23 Sept. 1878, p. 5. 
51 Times, 23 Sept. 1878, p. 5; Times, 27 Sept. 1878, p. 5. 
52 See e.g. Morning Post, 24 Sept. 1878, p. 4 & Standard, 24 Sept. 1878, p. 4. The Liberal Daily News 
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exchequer) reassured the Commons, ‘to enlarge our territories or to annex fresh soil, 
and certainly not such a country as Afghanistan; but what we have felt it our duty to 
provide for as well as we could was the security of India. Let me remind the House that 
it is a question not of ambition, or prestige, or covetousness, or anything of that kind.’53 
Northcote however seemed to be making his case for invasion to a significant extent on 
the logic of prestige. He argued that it was necessary ‘to maintain the confidence of the 
Native population in the British rule. Our power in India rests upon two bases—justice 
and strength, and it is absolutely impossible you can maintain security unless you are 
known to be strong.’ This was a variation of the prestige argument made at the time of 
the Abyssinian expedition. This became still clearer later in Northcote’s speech, when 
he referred to the prestige lost by the Amir’s refusal to allow the British mission to enter 
Afghanistan: ‘we should take steps to vindicate our honour, which is essential as part of 
our strength in India’.54 
 
Lawrence and the Liberals  
Since his return from India in 1869, Baron Lawrence of the Punjaub had lived quietly. 
For a time he had served as chairman of the first London School Board (1870-73). He 
spoke in the House of Lords only occasionally. Lawrence was not therefore particularly 
conspicuous in British politics or public life in this period. He was suffering 
increasingly from ill health and this, together with his disinclination to appear in the 
public eye, made him a rather unlikely leading public critic of the Conservatives’ new 
Afghan policy. Nonetheless, Lawrence remained adamant that sending British envoys to 
Afghanistan would be a cardinal error. He thus wrote a series of letters to the editor of 
The Times, starting in January 1878—almost a year before the invasion—questioning 
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and criticising the government’s altered policy. 
 
The Times of 10 January 1878 included a long letter from Lawrence considering the 
merits of the recent British advance to Quetta.55 Lawrence did not anticipate that 
Afghans or Baluchis would directly attack the British garrison at Quetta; his concern 
was that in times of hostility its communications and supplies would be cut off. This, he 
was quick to point out, was exactly what had happened in the first Afghan war. 
Lawrence also took the opportunity to express his criticism of a forward policy 
generally, because he was convinced that the occupation of Quetta was the first step in 
that direction. It would be followed by the occupation of Herat and Kandahar, as they 
were all links ‘in one great chain’. Lawrence thus advanced several practical, political 
and military arguments against a forward policy. He was insistent that the Afghans 
would resent and ultimately resist the presence of foreign forces in their territories, and 
that Britain would have ‘the mass of a warlike people against us’. The difficulties for 
British troops would be aggravated by the Afghan climate, the scarcity of water, the 
poverty of the land and its people, as well as the long distances between tracts of 
civilisation. In any case, Lawrence contended that in the unlikely event of an invasion 
of India, a more forward position would in fact prove a less advantageous line of 
defence (here he referred to the views of several illustrious generals, including the Duke 
of Wellington, Sir Henry Lawrence (his brother) and Sir Neville Chamberlain). 
Characteristically, Lawrence the administrator also noted that Indian and British 
soldiers alike would find occupying Afghanistan intolerable. Equally characteristically, 
Lawrence asserted not only that a forward policy would lead to ‘evil consequences’, but 
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would ‘give a fatal blow to the already over-burdened finances of India.’ Finally, 
Lawrence argued that British trade would not benefit from an advance to Afghanistan.56 
 
Lawrence thus used many of the same arguments he had relied on to resist forward 
proposals during his viceroyalty. Parliamentary Liberals would ultimately make the 
same points to attack Conservative policy, though from much later in 1878. As 
governor-general, Lawrence had usually expressed his opinions in his private and 
official correspondence, whereas he now had to make his arguments publicly.57 His 
biographers subsequently portrayed him as somewhat ill at ease in public debate. There 
seems to be some truth to this depiction, and his letters to The Times and his 
parliamentary speeches sometimes lacked the fluency enjoyed by his colleagues and 
critics. However, Lawrence understood that the public audiences to which he was 
speaking in 1878 might have different sensitivities from the officials to whom he had 
been speaking when governor-general. He certainly appreciated the polemical value of 
contrasting contemporary events with those preceding the first Afghan war; his letters to 
The Times made much greater use of this than had his correspondence from India. This 
was particularly evident on the old question of sending British envoys in Afghanistan. 
‘Can we follow the policy of 1838-39’, Lawrence asked in a later letter to The Times, 
‘without, in all probability, incurring similar results?’58  
 
Lawrence’s expertise seems to have helped some prominent Liberals, including William 
Gladstone and Earl Granville (Liberal leader in the Lords), to form their own views 
about Afghanistan. Granville’s reaction to developments even seems to have been based 
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partly on what he learned from Lawrence and Northbrook (whom he referred to as 
‘Hommes spéciaux’). As Granville explained to Gladstone in September 1878: ‘I am 
much alarmed about Affghanistan. Lawrence & Northbrook think the state of things 
most dangerous.’59 Granville on several occasions sought Lawrence’s opinions, 
reporting to Gladstone later in September: ‘I have been in communication with Lord 
Lawrence, who is... coming here for a night tomorrow’.60 Gladstone’s diaries record that 
he also made use of Lawrence’s expertise: the two men met on 2 December, in order to 
discuss Afghan affairs. This presumably helped Gladstone prepare for his long speech 
(two and a quarter hours) during the Afghan debate in the Commons on 10 December 
1878.61  
 
Granville recognised that Lawrence offered not only essential knowledge about 
Afghanistan, but great political utility as a public opponent of government policy. 
Granville shared his thinking with Gladstone: ‘[Lord Lawrence’s] opinion must have 
great weight, and is entirely free from the objections to which our utterances are 
liable.’62 Granville meant that Lawrence’s opinions could plausibly be presented as non-
partisan. This seems a reasonable supposition, based on his parliamentary record. 
Lawrence made only thirty-one speeches during his time in the House of Lords (1869-
79), many of them extremely short. He spoke several times on the subject of education 
but most frequently on Indian questions. His speeches were, therefore, limited to 
subjects of which he had direct experience. Moreover, Lawrence’s language on 
contentious political issues had always been much more moderate than that used by the 
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Liberal party’s leaders. For example, Lawrence’s criticism of the 1876 Royal Titles Bill 
was measured and rather polite (he suggested that a word comprehensible to Indians 
might be substituted for ‘Empress’), in contrast to Granville’s forceful, partisan rhetoric 
(comparing the Bill to the pretensions of continental emperors).63    
 
Lawrence’s utility to the parliamentary party was not only his knowledge of 
Afghanistan and his reputation as a moderate Liberal. It was also possible for him to 
attack the government, without the Liberal leaders having to risk getting on the wrong 
side of events or public opinion. These tactical considerations are evident in a letter 
Granville wrote to Gladstone in November 1878:  
 
I cannot help thinking that the opposition made by persons supposed to have special knowledge 
will have more effect, if you Hartington & I do not at present join in. Dizzy’s answer to Lord 
Lawrence may oblige us to consider what course we should take. But a false move might do 
mischief at this moment. Every day must add to the conviction of sensible people that the new 
policy is wrong. On the other hand if the Ameer gives in and matters are patched up, our 
position would be a false one.64  
 
This passage merits some explanation. One of Granville’s aims in writing was to 
persuade Gladstone not to join the ‘Afghan committee’ chaired by Lawrence. The 
committee had been formed in order to call for the publication of certain official 
correspondence, and to demand the recall of parliament in order to debate recent 
developments on the north-west frontier and the government’s altered Afghan policy. 
One of Granville’s concerns was that Gladstone’s presence would enable Conservatives 
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240 
to claim the committee was motivated by party spirit, rather than national interest.65 
Gladstone, initially eager to join the committee, ultimately agreed with Granville’s 
logic.66 What Granville termed ‘Dizzy’s answer to Lord Lawrence’ was Beaconsfield’s 
response to a letter written to him by Lawrence (and also published in The Times), 
asking him to receive a deputation from the Afghan Committee.67 Granville’s 
circumspection is also evident: ‘a false move might do mischief at this moment... if the 
Ameer gives in and matters are patched up, our position would be a false one.’ 
Prominent Liberals would have been taking a political risk in joining such a committee: 
at the time of its formation, it was not certain what casus belli the government would 
present against the Afghan Amir. This official reticence was itself a source of criticism 
by the committee.68 If it transpired that the government had a strong case for 
intervention in Afghanistan (had for example the Amir invited Russian forces to occupy 
parts of his territory), members of the committee might well have been left on the 
wrong side of public opinion. Lawrence was in this sense expendable. On several 
grounds—as a former ruler of the neighbouring Punjab, as a former governor-general of 
India, as a hero of the Mutiny, and as the signatory to the Anglo-Afghan treaties of 1855 
and 1857—Lawrence had a standing to make his expert views known. Were he proved 
wrong, his reputation may of course suffer; but the Liberal party probably would not.  
 
It was not until more facts emerged, and the second Afghan war had actually 
commenced, that most Liberals began to criticise the government in earnest. Even then, 
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many of them remained cautious. Granville for example confined his criticism of 
government policy in late 1878 to what he called ‘constitutional questions’.69 A year 
later, Lord Hartington (Liberal leader in the Commons) was still using very moderate 
language to criticise the government’s Afghan policy.70 Even Gladstone, though he 
seems to have been much less inhibited than his colleagues, held his fire until 
November 1878, when Beaconsfield made a speech at the Guildhall claiming that the 
existing north-west frontier was ‘a hap-hazard, and not a scientific one’ and therefore 
required ‘rectification’.71 Seeing in Beaconsfield’s speech ‘a new starting point’, 
Gladstone was soon afterwards making enthusiastic use of Afghanistan in his more 
general critique of the government.72 But this was a matter of days before hostilities 
opened (21 November 1878); ten months after Lawrence had outlined the basis of his 
opposition to the new policy by writing to The Times.  
 
When Liberals criticised government Afghan policy, they often did so by explicit 
reference to Lawrence’s name, his knowledge about India and Afghanistan, and the 
policy he had pursued as governor-general. Gladstone was particularly enthusiastic 
about using Lawrence in this way. On 30 November 1878, Gladstone addressed about 
three thousand of his constituents at Woolwich, nine days after Britain had declared war 
on the Amir of Afghanistan.73 This speech seems to have been ignored by some of 
Gladstone’s biographers.74 Gladstone advanced three main arguments: constitutional, 
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moral and strategic. The constitutional argument was that parliament had been ‘abused’ 
because information about Britain’s altered relations with Afghanistan had been 
withheld from it. Furthermore, when parliament was eventually convened it was not in 
order to debate the merits of the war but to approve the necessary funding. Gladstone 
presented this as ‘the insidious beginnings of a system which is intended to narrow the 
liberties of the people of England. (Hear, hear.)’75 Gladstone’s moral argument was that 
the war in Afghanistan was unjust, and that there would be profound moral and 
religious repercussions of an unjust war. His strategic argument was that the forward 
policy was an error on military and political grounds. In making the first two arguments 
Gladstone had little need for Lawrence’s weight, but the strategic criticism was not one 
a metropolitan politician could make without supporting evidence. Gladstone thus 
invoked the names of a succession of Indian governors-general who had followed a 
policy of cautious vigilance in Afghanistan: Lords Canning, Elgin, Lawrence, Mayo and 
Northbrook. Referring to these men allowed Gladstone to argue that the determined 
reluctance to interfere in Afghanistan was not a party matter. The Earl of Mayo, 
Gladstone reminded his constituents with enthusiasm, had of course been ‘a Tory of the 
first water’.76 It also allowed Gladstone to claim that Liberal opposition had a historical 
legitimacy.77 The history of Anglo-Afghan relations may have seemed particularly 
resonant to contemporaries, because of the memory of the first war and the annihilation 
of a British force of sixteen thousand retreating from Kabul in 1842. That defeat was 
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relived in a proliferation of publications and paintings around 1878.78 Gladstone, teasing 
out the sense of imperial hubris (in 1842 and, by implication, in 1878), urged his 
audience to remember that, ‘when apparently masters of the country... the greatest 
military disaster that has fallen upon England for generations was suffered with shame 
in the valleys of Afghanistan.’79  
 
Lawrence’s name was not merely invoked alongside those of other imperial 
administrators; it was given a special status. In an earlier speech in north Wales, 
Gladstone imputed particular significance to Lawrence’s testimony: ‘I need hardly tell 
you that of all living authorities, Lord Lawrence is undoubtedly the highest’. Gladstone 
then proceeded to quote Lawrence at length.80 Audience reaction is of course difficult to 
measure, but when Gladstone referred to Lawrence during his Woolwich speech, his 
constituents cheered.81 Gladstone, careful to observe and record public reaction to what 
he said, must have thought this was an effective tactic; even after Lawrence died (in 
June 1879), Gladstone continued to refer to him in this way.82  
 
It is striking that even Liberals who, unlike Gladstone, had first-hand experience of 
Indian foreign policy nonetheless used Lawrence as a reference-point in their speeches. 
For example, the Earl of Northbrook, in a short speech on Afghan policy at Winchester, 
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referred to Lawrence no less than eleven times.83 Northbrook had been governor-
general himself, and more recently than Lawrence (1872-76). Of course, this very fact 
may have encouraged Northbrook to say little on his own part. However, this respect for 
his predecessor seems to have been genuine. As Northbrook told parliament, there was 
simply no man ‘whose opinion carries so great weight, both with the Natives and the 
English’.84  
 
It was not only Liberals who recognised Lawrence’s central position in the public 
debate about Afghanistan. The Times supported the government’s new policy, but 
acknowledged that ‘no reasonable man would wish to make up his mind’ about events 
on India’s north-west frontier without first hearing Lawrence’s arguments.85 The Times 
in fact published numerous letters written by Lawrence to the editor in 1878, which 
were fiercely critical of the forward policy.86 Although The Times sometimes juxtaposed 
Lawrence’s letters with those taking a contrary position, it nonetheless offered him a 
public forum for his arguments.87 This forum was important in terms of reaching public 
audiences because parliament was not sitting in the months immediately preceding the 
war. The Times thus provided a sort of proxy for the debates which otherwise would 
have taken place at Westminster.  
 
Conservatives also recognised Lawrence’s importance in public discussion about 
Afghanistan. The Earl of Ravensworth, presenting the government’s case for war in 
parliament, sought to emphasise the danger of a Russian advance through Afghanistan 
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by citing (fragments of) Lawrence’s own viceregal despatches.88 The prime minister 
too, although he publicly effected a sarcastic disdain for the ‘Afghan committee’ 
chaired by Lawrence, privately seemed anxious about the strength of public opinion 
behind its demand to convene parliament.89 In the event, the committee’s two 
objectives—the recall of parliament and publication of the secretary of state for India’s 
despatches—were both conceded in December 1878. Furthermore, Beaconsfield’s 
argument about ‘scientific’ frontiers was presumably intended to counter what 
Lawrence and other Liberals had said about the prohibitive expense of invading 
Afghanistan. A month after his speech at the Guildhall, Beaconsfield explained the 
benefits of ‘rectification’ to parliament: ‘a scientific Frontier may be defended with a 
garrison of five thousand men; while, with a hap-hazard one, you may require for its 
defence an army of one hundred thousand men’.90 His argument was that a ‘scientific’ 
frontier would, in the long run, prove much cheaper to defend than the existing frontier. 
Lawrence’s influence on metropolitan debates about Afghanistan also seems to have 
been evident in the choice of officer to lead the (August 1878) mission to the Afghan 
Amir. Sir Neville Chamberlain was apparently selected because he was the greatest 
pupil of Lawrence; Conservatives hoped that if the Amir snubbed a prominent 
‘Lawrentian’ such as Chamberlain, Lawrence’s arguments against the government 
would be weakened.91 It seems therefore that throughout 1878 Lord Lawrence—having 
spent so much of his life in the imperial ‘periphery’—was able to exert a discernible and 
significant influence not just on the Liberal party but on public debate in the metropolis.  
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Lawrence and the language of patriotism 
Lawrence offered great utility in defence as well as attack, because he acted as a shield 
against Conservative claims that Liberal policy was pacifist, or not patriotic. On the eve 
of war, Lawrence declared ‘that to go to war with [the Amir] for refusing to receive our 
Mission, or for the rectification of our frontier, or, indeed, for any other cause which can 
at present be fairly brought against him, would be a gross injustice and a grave stigma 
on the character of the English nation.’92 In response some Conservatives accused their 
opponents of pacifism, a tactic endorsed by the prime minister himself, who sought to 
denigrate Liberals as the ‘peace-at-any-price’ party.93 These sorts of attack were also 
directed against Lawrence personally, presumably on account of his public prominence 
in the press, the Afghan Committee, and in Liberal speeches. It was however extremely 
difficult to attack Lawrence in this way, and Liberals contested these patriotic claims 
with vigour. For example, when in parliament the Duke of Somerset questioned 
Lawrence’s patriotism, Lord Northbrook’s response was immediate:  
 
I must say I do not think the noble Duke behind me (the Duke of Somerset) was quite fair in his 
remarks about the noble Lord a late Governor General (Lord Lawrence) for having joined the 
Afghan Committee... The noble Duke says that my noble Friend is not patriotic... Few men in 
this country have given such proofs as my noble Friend has done of patriotism, of vigour, of 
honour, and of a desire at any risk to maintain the British Empire in India; and yet, because he 
does not happen to agree with the noble Duke, he is to be spoken of in such terms. It is 
repugnant to all my feelings of justice and to every sentiment of propriety that a man of such 
distinguished services should be so spoken of in this House.94 
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Northbrook did not need to describe Lawrence’s heroic actions during the Mutiny; it 
was sufficient merely to allude to them. The conspicuousness of Lawrence in Liberal 
discourse challenged the Conservatives’ claim that the war in Afghanistan was justified 
on the grounds of imperial patriotism (that is to say, that their policy was necessary in 
order to safeguard Britain’s empire in India). As Sir Stafford Northcote explained: 
‘when we saw that a Russian Mission was received at Cabul at a time when an English 
Mission was refused... it was absolutely impossible, if we were to have regard to the 
question of our security, for us to remain inactive.’95 Beaconsfield, adapting the imperial 
rhetoric of his 1872 Crystal Palace speech to the circumstances in Afghanistan, argued 
that Britons would expect nothing less than the ‘maintenance of Empire’.96 The refrain 
‘security of our frontier’ was paired with ‘security of our Empire’: Conservatives cited 
the former as a prerequisite for the latter.97 The problem for Conservatives was that the 
man whom the nation, themselves included, recognised as the ‘saviour of India’ was so 
publicly adamant that the ‘vulnerable’ frontier was in fact perfectly secure.98  
 
Lawrence was in this sense a peculiarly awkward opponent for the Conservatives. The 
language he used to oppose Conservative policy, and his prominence as a patriot, are 
hard to reconcile with Hugh Cunningham’s argument that the Conservatives 
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monopolised the language of patriotism at this time. In his 1981 History Workshop 
Journal article, Cunningham argued that the language of patriotism—once the 
legitimation of opposition—came to be closely identified with the political right. A 
striking aspect of his persuasive argument is its specificity: Cunningham identifies a 
particular moment—the political turmoil of the Eastern Question, in late 1877 and early 
1878—which prompted a ‘decisive shift’ in the language of patriotism from Radicals to 
Conservatives.99 Cunningham’s argument remains influential, although it has been 
qualified to some extent by more recent research highlighting the vitality of the 
patriotism articulated by Liberals and various left-wing organisations.100 Some of the 
language used by Lawrence was explicitly patriotic, such as his assertion that war with 
the Afghan Amir would be ‘a grave stigma on the character of the English nation’. 
Moreover, Lawrence made these arguments in late 1878, on the eve of the second 
Afghan war; therefore after Cunningham’s ‘decisive shift’ in the use of the language of 
patriotism to the Conservatives. Lawrence’s use of patriotic language and his 
prominence in the public debate about government policy and war in Afghanistan seem 
therefore to further qualify Cunningham’s argument.  
 
The Liberal critique of the second Afghan war 
One of Lawrence’s objections to an advance beyond the north-west frontier was that its 
financial cost would ‘inevitably prove enormous’.101 An aversion to indebtedness came 
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naturally to many Liberals, including Gladstone, who told Granville he was ‘in horror at 
the prospect of heaping the new load of debt on India.’102 Sir William Harcourt 
concentrated on the question of Indian finance when he attacked government Afghan 
policy at the 1879 meeting of the Sheffield Liberal Association. Harcourt argued that ‘if 
there is any task which is worthy of the determined energies of the Liberal party it is 
that of retrieving the desperate condition of Indian finance. (Cheers.)’103 Later in his 
speech, Harcourt explained why the question of Indian finance was so important: ‘we 
are in India on the brink of a financial precipice which threatens the very existence of 
our dominion in the East’.104 Harcourt’s concern for ‘our dominion in the East’, that is 
to say the security of India, accords with what historians have concluded about the 
political influence of India on British policy-makers.105  
 
However, Lawrence made the financial case against war in Afghanistan by 
concentrating on humanitarian considerations rather than the security of British India. 
The administrative lens through which he viewed events showed most clearly the 
detrimental effects war in Afghanistan would have on India, and Indians. Since his 
return to Britain, Lawrence had emphasised the importance of great infrastructural 
works in India such as irrigation projects and the construction of roads.106 He 
understood that these projects would be jeopardised as a consequence of war. There was 
a precedent for this, as Lawrence had recognised after the first Afghan war: ‘we 
chucked away fifteen millions in the Afghan war, and could not afford the material 
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improvements India required.’107  
 
Of course, ‘improvements’ benefited the governors, as well as the governed. A 
government of India despatch during Lawrence’s viceroyalty acknowledged this: the 
construction of infrastructural works in India would ‘enhance the comfort of the people, 
while they add to our political and military strength’.108 This inherent duality occludes 
the question of whether particular administrators favoured such works primarily on 
security or humanitarian grounds. In Lawrence’s case, his Indian administration had 
been characterised by an unusual concern for the welfare of the governed.109 Moreover, 
the coincidence in 1878 of war in Afghanistan with famine in India helps illuminate the 
emphasis on administrative-humanitarian (as opposed to security) considerations that 
characterised Lawrence’s opposition to government policy. The famine had started early 
in 1876, and an estimated five million Indians were ultimately to die of starvation.110 
Lawrence frequently connected Indian finance with Indian famine, thus imbuing his 
opposition to government policy with a humanitarian resonance.111  For Lawrence, it 
was a matter of fairness and good government that Indians should not have to foot the 
bill for a war that was ‘unjust’.112 As he argued in a letter to the editor of The Times, 
published two days before the start of the war:  
  
The expenses of the Afghan war of 1838-42 were very large, and those for the impending war 
must prove greater. We have not yet heard a word as to who is to bear them. I, for one, do not 
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believe that the people of England will endure them, and as for the inhabitants of India, they are 
already, in my judgment, taxed beyond the public burdens which they ought to bear... The 
droughts and famines in many parts of the country of late years have caused great misery.113 
 
Lawrence’s sensitivity to famine was unlikely to have been shared universally, or even 
broadly. Many British administrators, weaned on the ‘grim doctrines’ of Thomas 
Malthus and on Adam Smith’s strict injunctions against state interference in ‘free’ 
markets, accepted the ‘inevitability’ of famines.114  However, the Indian famine was an 
important component not only of Lawrence’s opposition, but that of a number of other 
Liberals with experience of Indian administration. Northbrook, in the parliamentary 
debates on the use of Indian revenues to finance the Afghan war, argued that ‘India 
should not be called upon to bear the cost... India has suffered recently from two severe 
famines; the people are impoverished’.115 Liberal administrators whose experience was 
derived not from India but the India Office could also see the war in this way. The Duke 
of Argyll (secretary of state for India, 1868-74) provides one such example. After 
Lawrence, Argyll was perhaps the most conspicuous Liberal opponent of government 
Afghan policy. As early as 1877, he had warned Lord Salisbury that it would be folly to 
force a British resident on the Amir.116 Argyll published a book on the ‘Afghan 
question’ in 1879, condemning government policy with such force that The Times 
declared him the ‘Opposition’s champion’.117 A great landowner, Argyll had experience 
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of famine because his tenants had suffered during the famine period of the eighteen-
forties and eighteen-fifties.118 In 1874, his administrative experience led Argyll to 
conclude that famines demanded ‘increased responsibility on those who have charge of 
India’.119 In 1879, Argyll argued that this ‘increased responsibility’ had not been 
discharged by the government, which had ‘diverted to the purposes of a foreign war... 
taxation which we had promised to devote to insurance against the effects of famine.’120  
 
The third Earl Grey perhaps provided the clearest exposition of how some Liberal 
administrators perceived the connections between war in Afghanistan, and famine, 
finance and works of improvement in India. Grey had been colonial secretary (1846-52) 
and was one of the organisers of the Afghan committee.121 In December 1878, Earl 
Grey told the House of Lords: 
 
I believe the people of India to be already over-taxed and to require relief. We know what heavy 
burdens have been thrown on the Indian Treasury by successive famines; we know, too, that 
various public works which are urgently wanted, and some of which would greatly assist in 
averting future famines, have been postponed, owing to the difficulty of finding money to carry 
them on. In such a state of things it seems to me that to employ the Revenues of India in 
carrying on an unrighteous war not to the advantage, but probably to the detriment, of India, 
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would be most unjust.122   
 
The approach taken by Lawrence, Argyll, Northbrook and Grey suggests that Liberal 
humanitarianism around the time of the war in Afghanistan concentrated on Indians, 
rather than Afghans. This has been neglected in the existing scholarship, as historians 
have been drawn to Gladstone’s rhetoric about Afghans during his Midlothian 
campaigns. One speech has proved particularly alluring, in which Gladstone declared 
that ‘the sanctity of life in the hill villages of Afghanistan among the winter snows, is as 
inviolable in the eye of Almighty God as can be your own.’123 There are valid reasons 
for examining Gladstone’s ‘rights of the savage’ speech: historians have for example 
considered its relationship with ‘moral’ foreign policy, and the extent to which it 
explains Gladstone’s ‘appeal to mankind’.124 It is tempting therefore to view his famous 
speech as representative of Liberal humanitarianism at the time of the war. Modern-day 
Liberals succumbed to this temptation on the eve of a more recent British invasion of 
Afghanistan, reciting Gladstone’s speech in parliament and arguing that Britain should 
‘learn from history’.125 However, Lawrence, Argyll, Northbrook and Grey show that an 
alternative humanitarian critique of government policy was popular among several 
leading parliamentary Liberals in this period.  
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The different emphases of Gladstone and Lawrence are further illuminated if their 
attitudes to ‘punitive expeditions’ against the Afghans are considered. In his ‘rights of 
the savage’ speech, Gladstone attacked this practice: ‘[t]he meaning of the burning of 
the village is, that the women and the children were driven forth to perish in the snows 
of winter. Is not that a terrible supposition?’126 Gladstone was referring to allegations 
that General Roberts had issued orders for the ‘looting and burning’ of Afghan villages, 
and that Afghan prisoners had been tied in ropes and then ‘slaughtered in their 
bonds’.127 In contrast, Lawrence had authorised similar expeditions on India’s north-
west frontier while he was governor-general, and he had also explained to the secretary 
of state why burning villages was occasionally necessary.128  Lawrence appears to have 
considered that such practices were an administrative necessity. He had previously 
explained to parliament that where the frontier tribes could not be ‘restrained’ from 
invading British India ‘by purely defensive measures, we had nothing for it but to 
retaliate and invade the lands of the spoilers. These expeditions, as a rule, had the best 
effect. It had been rare that a second expedition against a tribe became necessary’.129 In 
1878, Lawrence argued that Britain should by all means try to conciliate the Afghans, 
but ought never to forget ‘the necessity of the iron hand in the velvet glove’.130  
 
A number of other contrasts might be drawn between Gladstone on the one hand, and 
Lawrence and other Liberals on the other. For example, although Gladstone also 
connected the war in Afghanistan with the famine in India, he presented it as evidence 
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of the perfidy of the administration. He told his audience at Glasgow that money raised 
from Indian taxpayers and intended to provide insurance against the effects of famine 
had not been used for that purpose: ‘[t]he taxation was levied. The pledge was given. 
The pledge has been utterly broken.’131 For Gladstone, there was also political merit in 
linking Conservative policy in Afghanistan with other claimed foreign policy errors. In 
particular, Gladstone often juxtaposed the Afghan and Zulu wars. Gladstone’s rhetoric 
on the Zulus in some respects echoed his ‘rights of the savage’ passage: ‘a nation whom 
we term savages [the Zulus] have in defence of their own land offered their naked 
bodies to the terribly improved artillery and arms of modern European science’.132 
There were of course similarities between Afghan and Zulu wars: both involved British 
military defeat, considerable expense and could be contrasted with traditional Liberal 
policy in those theatres.133 However, Gladstone’s rhetorical equivalence was 
presumably intended to support one of his principal charges at Midlothian: that the 
government’s errors were linked.134    
 
Lawrence, however, appears not to have uttered a single word on the Zulu war. Argyll, 
so vociferous in his condemnation of the government’s Afghan policy, actually 
supported the Zulu war. He argued that the Zulu threat had to be faced, and that Sir 
Bartle Frere ‘had done nothing to compromise the honour of the Crown, or fair name 
and fame of England.’135 Historians have argued that Liberal criticism in this period was 
highly partisan, and directed ‘to an exceptional degree’ against Beaconsfield 
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personally.136 Yet Lawrence appears never to have criticised Beaconsfield.137 Liberal 
opposition, at least on the subject of Afghanistan, seems to have been less partisan and 
more moderate than historians have allowed.  
 
One issue that seemed to unite Gladstone and his fellow Liberals was the constitutional 
critique of the Conservative party. Most Liberals seem to have made the sort of 
constitutional criticisms that Gladstone had advanced during his speech at Woolwich: in 
all international spheres, they condemned the government for acting without adequate 
parliamentary consultation.138 Liberals claimed that the government’s foreign policy 
was not merely a break with Liberal (even Palmerstonian) policy, but akin to ‘the 
bastard imperialism of the Second Empire’.139  Comparisons with France’s ‘Second 
Empire’ (and therefore ‘foreign despotism’) were made easier by the apparent aim of 
the Conservatives to advance in Afghanistan until they had reached ‘natural 
boundaries’, a term associated with Napoleon III.140 Similarly, other Liberals made 
legal arguments, based on their interpretation of the Anglo-Afghan treaties of 1855 and 
1857, which they claimed bound Britain not to interfere in the Amir’s territories.141 
However, Lawrence himself—who had signed the treaties—seems not to have made 
any such argument.  
 
Gladstone was in step with Lawrence, Argyll and most leading Liberals on the question 
of Russian expansion into Afghanistan. These men argued that fears of Russian 
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progress—dubbed ‘Mervousness’ by Argyll—were exaggerated; an opinion shared by 
the Liberal cabinet of 1880.142 In this sense most Liberals continued to express (in 
opposition and office) a mid-Victorian confidence that most Conservatives no longer 
felt inclined to share.143 There were some exceptions to this from Radicals within the 
Liberal party. For example, Sir Charles Dilke’s arguments about British policy in 
Afghanistan are in some respects hard to distinguish from those of the Conservatives. 
He made a speech at Hammersmith in September 1878 (over two months before the war 
began) in which he contrasted the refusal of the Afghan Amir to receive an English 
mission with the ‘splendid reception’ afforded to the Russians. Dilke was suspicious 
both of the Amir and the Russians, and spoke in dark tones about the prospects of 
Cossack boots treading the streets of Kabul. Dilke even seems to have thought that it 
was axiomatic that war should follow a refusal by the Amir to receive Britain’s mission, 
a position utterly different to that adopted by the majority of his party.144  
 
* * * 
 
Lawrence’s public criticism of the government’s Afghan policy provided further proof, 
in the eyes of some of his biographers, of their subject’s dutiful heroism. Bosworth 
Smith wrote that ‘there is no single step in the whole of his heroic life which was taken 
from purer motives, which showed a more lively sense of honour, a more genuine 
patriotism, a more unflinching moral courage; in a word, which is more characteristic of 
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the man, than this.’145 This is a bold statement, but it has some force. Lawrence had 
shunned a conspicuous public life after his return from India in 1869, sheltering in the 
obscurity of the London School Board and speaking only occasionally in the House of 
Lords. It seems highly unlikely that assuming the role of a prominent critic of 
Conservative policy was in any way congenial to him. His reluctance can only have 
been increased by his age and poor health (he died in June 1879). Lawrence also had 
little to gain personally from his actions, and in the event incurred the wrath of some 
leading Conservatives. The enmity created by his public opposition is evident in 
Beaconsfield’s (unsuccessful) objections to Lawrence’s burial in Westminster Abbey.146  
 
Lawrence’s influence on parliamentary Liberals and on the contours of public 
discussion about Afghanistan also allows historians to explore new territory about him. 
His ‘utility’ for the Liberal party was manifold: as the ‘saviour of India’ he had an 
enduring patriotic reputation; as a former lieutenant-governor of the Punjab and 
governor-general of India he was perceived as an expert on policy matters pertaining to 
the north-west frontier; and his previous mild-mannered parliamentary interventions 
allowed him to appear as a moderate. The fact that Liberals recognised and then 
exploited what Earl Granville called this ‘utility’ demonstrates that homecoming 
imperial administrators, even in their twilight, could exert a significant influence on 
politics in the metropolis.  
 
                                                            
145 Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, vol. II, p. 635. 
146 Steele, ‘Baron Lawrence’. 
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VIII 
Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, Afghanistan and imperialism in British culture, c.1879 
 
There is a rich historiography regarding the ‘imperial factor’ in British culture. In his 
influential Propaganda and Empire John MacKenzie argued that an ‘ideological 
cluster’ in the late nineteenth century ‘came to infuse and be propagated by every organ 
of British life’. This ‘ideological cluster’ comprised a renewed militarism, devotion to 
royalty, hero-worship and racial ideas associated with Social Darwinism. Together these 
constituted a ‘new type of patriotism’, which derived special significance from Britain’s 
‘imperial mission’. Although MacKenzie argued that much of this propaganda was 
successful he acknowledged that more precise evidence was required about its effects.1 
More recently, Catherine Hall has asserted that British culture was not only ‘permeated 
with empire’ but that ‘British identities were constituted through empire’. Hall is 
particularly impressed by the impact of British emigrants to empire—apparently ‘each 
brought their stories home’—and by the prevalence of the ‘fruits of empire’ such as tea 
and (for the rich) luxury goods like Kashmiri shawls.2 
 
Bernard Porter has however called for more rigour in the way historians write about 
imperialism. In The Absent-Minded Imperialists, his starting premise was that although 
Britain was undoubtedly an imperial nation, historians should not assume that it was 
also an imperial society. Having examined evidence for domestic imperialism 
empirically and sceptically, Porter criticised the tendency to ‘discover and describe’ 
what he termed ‘shards’ of imperial evidence without evaluating them or setting them in 
                                                            
1 J.M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The manipulation of British public opinion 1880-1960 
(Manchester, 1984), pp. 2, 253. 
2 C. Hall, ‘Culture and Identity in Imperial Britain’ in S. Stockwell (ed.), The British Empire: Themes 
and Perspectives (Oxford, 2008), pp. 201-2, 217.  
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the context of other evidence. He also criticised the presumption that imperial factors 
must have been overwhelming, instead arguing that the increase in imperial propaganda 
around 1880 may in fact suggest the difficulty imperial ideas had in establishing any 
purchase within British culture. For Porter, the British empire was primarily a project of 
certain élites (a ‘caste’ within the upper- and upper-middle-classes); an enterprise that 
neither required nor had the participation of significant numbers of Britons.3 
 
The different conclusions reached by these historians may be explained partly by 
significant differences in methodology and definition. Porter insists on an empirical 
approach, whereas Hall rejects the ‘darkness of empiricism’ and emphasises 
unconscious, implicit assumptions.4 Porter defines ‘imperialism’ quite strictly, by 
reference to its Latin roots, whereas MacKenzie treats it as a much broader ‘ideological 
cluster’.5 However, even allowing for these differences in methodology and definition 
there remains a fundamental scholarly dispute about the strength of imperialism in 
British culture.  
 
Peter Marshall has offered a different perspective by highlighting the importance of 
considering the empire over a long period (from the late eighteenth century to the 
nineteen-fifties). He has argued that the length of commitment to empire means that 
attempts to treat it as an ‘exogenous element’ in British history and isolate an ‘imperial 
factor’ are problematic. Marshall concluded that ‘empire acquired an enhanced position 
in any collective sense of British identity and probably maintained that position into the 
                                                            
3 B. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society, and Culture in Britain (Oxford, 2004), 
pp. vii-xxiii. Porter has also published an essay on empire and British national identities, in which he 
argues that any imperial element was subordinated to stronger conceptions of national identity, like 
liberty: B. Porter, ‘Empire and British National Identity, 1815-1914’, in H. Brocklehurst and R. 
Phillips (eds.), History, Nationhood, and the Question of Britain (Basingstoke, 2004), p. 270. 
4 Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists, p. xiii; Hall, ‘Culture and Identity in Imperial Britain’, p. 200. 
5 Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists, p. viii; MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire, p. 2. 
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1950s.’ However, he identified alternative authoritarian and libertarian interpretations of 
that identity, observing that the authoritarians (Chamberlain, Milner and Curzon) failed 
to impose their version of an imperial identity. Marshall also found that working-class 
support for empire remained somewhat elusive. Furthermore, prowess in classics or 
mathematics dominated the competitive examination for the Indian civil service, while 
overtly imperial subjects (like geography) never won academic prestige. Finally, 
Marshall argued that the great waves of emigration in fact had only limited connections 
with empire.6 
  
This chapter considers the strength of imperialism in British culture by examining 
metropolitan reactions to the death of Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, the British envoy in 
Afghanistan. Major Cavagnari and his entire military escort were killed in September 
1879, during an attack by Afghan soldiers on the British residency in Kabul. The prime 
minister’s immediate impression was that these events constituted a ‘national disaster’ 
that would have severe political repercussions for the Conservative government. Some 
historians have argued that the consequences were indeed as serious as Beaconsfield 
had feared. However, the present chapter will argue that this was not the case. First, 
British fears of Russia—which explained the perceived need for an envoy in Kabul—
were undiminished after the attack. Secondly, a consensus on the need to avenge 
Cavagnari’s death blunted the force of Liberal criticism. Vengeance was immediately 
framed as a patriotic necessity, on grounds of national honour, dignity and prestige. 
This prestige-driven demand for vengeance was of course why Lawrence had been so 
adamant that British envoys should not be sent to Afghanistan. Ironically, the clamour 
                                                            
6 In the period 1815-1914, 62% of British emigrants went to the United States, by comparison with 
30% to Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Only in the 1920s and 1950s did Commonwealth 
countries become the major destination. See P.J. Marshall, ‘No fatal impact? The elusive history of 
imperial Britain’, Times Literary Supplement, 12 March 1993, 8-10. 
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to avenge Cavagnari made it much harder for Liberals to oppose government policy 
after it had unravelled in exactly the way they had predicted. Thirdly, the attack on the 
residency may also have frustrated Liberal opposition because sheer excitement in a 
good story suppressed sober consideration of the steps that had taken Cavagnari to 
Kabul in the first place (a break with the policy of successive governments since 1842). 
Newspapers reported that Cavagnari and his small escort (less than eighty men) had 
maintained a ‘heroic defence’ against thousands of ‘mutinous’ Afghans, killing 
hundreds before finally being overwhelmed.7 The evidential basis for this account was 
thin, but it made for good copy. However, although newspaper reporting of Cavagnari’s 
demise contained several imperial strands, these were not coherently presented and need 
to be set against other strands that had conflicting meanings. In particular, there was a 
morbid interest in exactly how the ‘gallant major’ had been killed, and what had 
happened to his body afterwards. Moreover, interest in Cavagnari seems to have been 
only fleeting. For these reasons this chapter argues that metropolitan reactions to 
Cavagnari’s death do not provide persuasive evidence for the strength of imperialism in 
British culture around 1879.  
 
Major Sir Louis Cavagnari 
Following the repulse of General Sir Neville Chamberlain’s mission to Sher Ali Khan in 
September 1878, Britain had invaded Afghanistan and defeated the Amir’s forces. Sher 
Ali Khan died in February 1879 and was succeeded by his son Yakub Khan, who began 
peace negotiations with Britain. The result of those talks was the treaty of Gandamak 
(signed on 26 May 1879), by which the new Amir had to accept control over his foreign 
policy and a British envoy at Kabul. The man chosen as envoy was Major Sir Pierre 
                                                            
7 Standard, 15 Sept. 1879, p. 5. 
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Louis Napoleon Cavagnari, KCB, CSI, an army and political officer who had 
‘distinguished himself’ during several frontier expeditions between 1868 and 1878.8 It 
was Cavagnari who negotiated the treaty of Gandamak, for which he was made KCB in 
July 1879. Cavagnari is thought to have gained the favour of the governor-general, Lord 
Lytton, and apparently influenced him by encouraging his forward policy in 
Afghanistan. Lytton for his part seems to have advanced Cavagnari’s career, and 
appointed him envoy at Kabul.9 
 
Cavagnari and his small escort entered Kabul on 24 July 1879.10 Lord Salisbury seemed 
quite satisfied with the turn of events in Afghanistan, declaring in August that the 
government had ‘strengthened so that it is impregnable the only assailable frontier of 
India.’11 The Times also appeared confident regarding the prospects for Cavagnari’s 
mission. On 30 August 1879 it provided some auspicious details from the mission’s 
entry into Kabul: an Afghan band had played the British national anthem, the conduct of 
the crowd was ‘orderly and respectful in the extreme’ and two elephants (with gilt and 
silver howdahs) had been placed at the envoy’s disposal. After this ‘honourable and 
ostentatious reception’ there was ‘every hope’ that the Afghans would ‘no longer resent 
                                                            
8  Cavagnari was born (in France) to an Italian father and Irish mother but was naturalized as a British 
subject in Dec. 1857. Having attended the East India Company military college at Addiscombe, 
Cavagnari arrived in India in July 1858, joined the 1st Bengal European fusiliers and served 
throughout the Oudh campaign (1858-59). In July 1861 he was appointed an assistant commissioner 
in the Punjab. In May 1877 he was appointed deputy commissioner of Peshawar and the following 
month was made a companion of the Star of India (CSI). G.C. Boase, ‘Cavagnari, Sir Pierre Louis 
Napoleon (1841-1879)’, rev. J. Lunt, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online 
ed. Sept. 2011). 
9  Both Lytton and Cavagnari intended that he should bring Afghanistan more under British influence: 
Boase, ‘Sir Louis Cavagnari’. 
10  Cavagnari had chosen a small escort on the grounds that the Afghans would resent a large escort, and 
because in any case his safety depended on the Amir. The escort comprised a secretary, a doctor, 25 
men of the Guides Cavalry and 50 men of the Guides Infantry commanded by Lieutenant Walter 
Hamilton, VC. See B. Robson, The Road to Kabul: The Second Afghan War, 1878-1881 (London, 
1986), p.118. 
11 Salisbury at Hatfield Park, Times, 5 Aug. 1879, p. 4. 
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or view with suspicion the presence of British officers in any part of the country.’12 The 
Times published an editorial on the page following this report, acclaiming the success of 
the government’s new policy in Afghanistan: 
 
No doubt Sir Louis Cavagnari has difficulties before him to contend with... But the whole moral 
of the narrative is to make it clear that the policy which has brought this Embassy to Cabul bids 
fair to be crowned with success. It was a signal departure from the passive, almost indifferent, 
demeanour of several able Viceroys, and, among others, of the late Lord Lawrence... The events 
which have occurred under the guidance of Lord Lytton have been the subject of a long 
controversy in this country. But with the successful conclusion of the war and the arrival of the 
Embassy at Cabul all the main differences in opinion will, it is to be presumed, be discarded... 
No Government could abandon the position which has been acquired. The maintenance of an 
English representative, with a view to obtain exact and constant information, and for other 
pacific purposes, in Afghanistan, has become a fixed principle, from which there will be no 
reason and scarcely any temptation to depart.13 
 
Four days later, there was an attack on the British residency in Kabul. Cavagnari and his 
entire escort were killed.14 According to George Buckle, the news of Cavagnari’s death 
(received at Hughenden on 6 September) was a ‘crushing blow to Beaconsfield’. The 
prime minister immediately sent a telegraph to the Queen in which he admitted to being 
‘quite overcome’. Three days later, he wrote to Lord Salisbury. ‘This is a shaker,’ 
Beaconsfield told the foreign secretary, ‘and it is difficult, at the first breath, to 
recognise all the consequences of such a disaster. I fear they will be extensive and 
                                                            
12 Times, 30 Aug. 1879, p. 8. 
13 Times, 30 Aug. 1879, p. 9. 
14  The sequence of events is not clear. It is thought that Afghan soldiers belonging to some Herat 
infantry regiments (in Kabul on routine relief) had demanded arrears in their pay from Cavagnari (on 
the basis that there may be gold in the British residency). Cavagnari firmly refused to meet these 
demands. The soldiers returned with their rifles and, aided by some inhabitants of Kabul, attacked the 
residency, setting it on fire. See Robson, The Second Afghan War, p. 120. 
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manifold.’ The following day Beaconsfield described the event in a letter to Lady 
Bradford as an ‘awful catastrophe’ and a ‘national disaster’.15 Historians have argued 
that the consequences of this ‘disaster’ were as serious as Beaconsfield had feared. 
R.C.K. Ensor, writing in The Oxford History of England, stated that when news of the 
attack and Cavagnari’s death reached England it ‘created a profound revulsion against 
the Beaconsfield policy.’16 
 
However, that does not appear to have been the case. For one thing, although reports of 
the attack were rather opaque, some Britons nonetheless discerned the sinister influence 
of Russia. As the Daily News acknowledged: ‘very little is known for certain beyond 
our outposts on the frontier. We must trust for our information to rumours.’17 It was this 
very opacity that allowed contemporaries, if they were so inclined, to see Russian 
‘intrigue’ behind the attack. The Times had initially approved of government policy on 
the basis that otherwise Afghanistan might become ‘a centre of Russian intrigue, and a 
possible base for Russian military movements.’18 Although it cited the arrears of pay of 
Afghan regiments as a possible motive for the attack, The Times had doubts about the 
allegiance of the Amir: why for example had the Russian mission not suffered a similar 
fate?19 The Standard was less equivocal, its Vienna correspondent reporting that ‘there 
is no one in Vienna who does not believe that Russian intrigue was the cause of that 
slaughter.’20 The Times continued to support government policy in Afghanistan on the 
                                                            
15 Beaconsfield to Salisbury, 9 Sept. 1879 & Beaconsfield to Lady Bradford, 10 Sept. 1879, cited in 
Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Beaconsfield, vol. VI, pp. 478-81.  
16 ‘It was the shock of Isandhlwana redoubled.’ R.C.K. Ensor, England 1870-1914 (Oxford, 1936), p. 
63. 
17 Daily News, 15 Sept. 1879, p. 4. 
18  Times, 10 Sept. 1878, p. 7. 
19 Times, 8 Sept. 1879, p. 8. 
20 Standard, 15 Sept. 1879, p. 5. 
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basis of anxiety over Russia.21 Their resolve had been stiffened by the attack; there were 
now more, not less, reasons for supporting government policy in Afghanistan.22  
 
As staunch supporters of the government’s forward measures in Afghanistan, it is 
perhaps not surprising that The Times and the Standard reacted to the attack on the 
British residency and the death of Cavagnari in this way. It is much more significant 
that although Liberals who had opposed government policy continued to do so, in the 
aftermath of the attack they seem to have found such opposition more difficult to 
maintain publicly. One problem for Liberals was that an apparently broad consensus on 
the need for vengeance blunted the force of their opposition. Avenging the death of the 
‘English’ envoy—whose Italian father had fought with Napoleon at Waterloo—was 
framed as a patriotic necessity, on grounds of honour, dignity and prestige. Many 
newspapers therefore reiterated arguments they had made in September 1878, when 
Chamberlain’s mission had been repelled at the Afghan border. Days after the attack, 
The Times argued that prestige was a particular concern in Afghanistan, ‘where force 
alone commands respect’. Accordingly The Times insisted that ‘exemplary 
chastisement’ was required in order to maintain the security of India.23 The Liberal 
Daily News (which had opposed the war) seemed not to demand, but to accept the 
inevitability of vengeance.24 P.W. Clayden, who had vehemently opposed government 
policy in Afghanistan, shared this sense of resignation. His views were influential 
among Liberals, and Gladstone later used Clayden’s research in his second Midlothian 
campaign.25 Clayden acknowledged that, in the aftermath of the attack, there was ‘of 
course, no difference of opinion among Englishmen as to the necessity of promptly 
                                                            
21 Times, 9 Sept. 1879, p. 3. 
22 Times, 8 Sept. 1879, p. 5. 
23 Times, 9 Sept. 1879, p. 3.  
24 ‘No time will be lost in avenging the outrage committed.’ Daily News, 9 Sept. 1879, p. 5. 
25 Matthew, Gladstone, p. 307. 
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avenging this treacherous massacre.’26 It was one thing to oppose the government’s 
decision to send a British envoy to Kabul, but despatching a large army there, in order 
to avenge his death, was not so much a policy that could be debated, as a patriotic duty. 
As a relieved Saturday Review concluded, there was ‘happily little conflict of opinion as 
to the necessity of an advance on Cabul.’27  
 
In this political atmosphere, it seems to have been difficult to attack the government 
without appearing to celebrate a British defeat. It was perhaps for this reason that the 
Daily News was somewhat timid in its condemnation of the government, and careful to 
acknowledge Cavagnari’s perceived bravery. It found a formula for this when on 10 
September it wrote that ‘Cavagnari stuck courageously to his post, resolved to fulfil to 
the bitter end the insane mission with which he had been charged.’28 This however 
seems to have been a difficult balancing act. Despite the hubris before the attack of 
newspapers such as The Times that had supported the war and prematurely acclaimed 
the success of government policy, the Daily News, rather than asserting its vindication, 
merely reprinted some of the statements made in favour of, and against, the 
establishment of British envoys in Afghanistan.29 It appears that only in the letters 
columns did any sense of vindication find expression.30 Abandoning this cautious 
criticism of the government could be politically dangerous, as Grant-Duff (Liberal 
under-secretary of state for India, 1868-74) learned after a speech at Elgin. Grant-Duff 
                                                            
26  P.W. Clayden, England Under Lord Beaconsfield: The political history of six years from the end of 
1873 to the beginning of 1880 (London, 1880), pp. 469-80, 490-2. 
27 Saturday Review (reported in Pall Mall Gazette, 20 Sept. 1879, p. 3).  
28 Daily News, 10 Sept. 1879, p. 4. 
29 Daily News, 11 Sept. 1879, p. 2. 
30 ‘Sir,—The country is not likely to forget the sneers of the Prime Minister at what he was pleased to 
style the “copious explanations” of the late Lord Lawrence, when that noble patriot uttered his solemn 
warnings against the Afghan policy of the Government... the startling news of this week has 
sufficiently shown the unwisdom of [Lord Lawrence’s] detractors...’ The writer of the letter ended on 
a positive note however: ‘with a novelist ruling here, and a poet in India, it is lucky no worse calamity 
has yet befallen us.’ (Beaconsfield had published prose and Lord Lytton had published poetry.) Daily 
News, 11 Sept. 1879, p. 5. 
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was reported to have said that Salisbury’s ‘obstinate and wicked folly had been the 
death-warrant of the British Embassy at Cabul’. He was promptly condemned for 
appearing ‘to exult over the calamity which has befallen us at Cabul.’31 The following 
month Sir William Harcourt did cite Cavagnari’s death as evidence of the failure of 
government policy, but he treaded very carefully by describing the envoy as a hero and 
by lauding the strength and valour of British soldiers. Harcourt was reluctant to say 
more about Afghanistan, ‘because in the presence of so dire a disaster every man will 
forbear to embarrass a situation full of danger in future’.32  
 
Similarly, what Gladstone did not say about Cavagnari and the attack on the British 
residency is instructive. In his Woolwich speech of December 1878 Gladstone had 
declared: 
 
It is written in the eternal laws of the universe of God that sin shall be followed by suffering. An 
unjust war is a tremendous sin... the day will arrive—come it soon or come it late—when the 
people of England will discover that national injustice is the surest road to national downfall. 
(Loud and prolonged cheering.)33  
 
During his Midlothian speeches, Gladstone could have presented the disastrous events 
in Kabul as the ‘suffering’ following the ‘sin’ of the British invasion. The timing of 
Gladstone’s campaign certainly provided an opportunity to do so: the residency was 
attacked on 3 September 1879, and Gladstone delivered his famous ‘rights of the 
savage’ speech on 26 November 1879. However, he seems to have made no reference at 
                                                            
31 Daily Telegraph, 12 Sept. 1879 (reported in Pall Mall Gazette, 12 Sept. 1879, p. 2) & Aberdeen 
Weekly Journal, 12 Sept. 1879, p. 4. 
32 Harcourt at Southport, Daily News, 3 Oct. 1879, p. 6. 
33  Gladstone at Woolwich, Times, 2 Dec. 1878, p. 7. 
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all to Cavagnari in his Midlothian speeches.34 This no doubt proved frustrating for 
Gladstone, who later professed perplexity as to why Cavagnari’s demise did not have 
the political impact of General Gordon’s death.35 An important distinction between 
Cavagnari and Gordon was that apparently neither the public nor the government had 
known of the specific danger to which the former was exposed.36 In contrast, it was 
known publicly that Gordon was in peril long before his death; a relief expedition was 
eventually despatched, but arrived at Khartoum two days too late. It was therefore 
possible for Conservatives to present Gordon’s fate as the natural consequence of his 
‘abandonment’ by the Liberal government.37 It is difficult to understand Gladstone’s 
reticence about Cavagnari and the reluctance of Liberals to attack government policy in 
the immediate aftermath of the attack, unless it is recognised that it was not in fact the 
‘disaster’ Beaconsfield had feared. On the contrary, the death of an envoy—although in 
one sense the unravelling of government policy and the vindication of pre-war Liberal 
predictions—seems to have frustrated Liberal opposition in a curiously effective 
manner. 
 
Jonathan Parry has argued that after the Conservatives adopted the policy culminating 
                                                            
34  Quinault, ‘Afghanistan and Gladstone’s Moral Foreign Policy’, 31. 
35 J. Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone (III vols., London, 1904), vol. III, pp. 151-2. 
36 Cavagnari himself knew of the danger, but this only came to light after the attack. Daily News, 10 
Sept. 1879, p. 4. Sir Stafford Northcote later explained to parliament that before the attack the 
government ‘had no reason to believe that the position of our gallant Envoy Sir Louis Cavagnari and 
his colleagues was one of anxiety or danger.’ Northcote, Hansard, 250 (5 Feb. 1880), cols. 108-9. 
Some Liberals later challenged the government’s supposed ignorance of the specific danger to 
Cavagnari on the basis that it was widely known that sending British officers to Kabul was always 
going to be dangerous. See e.g. the speech of Earl Granville: ‘The noble and learned Earl [Lord 
Cairns, the lord chancellor] said the attack could not have been anticipated… but the event which 
happened was always declared to be a certainty by Dost Mahomed, by Shere Ali, by Lord Lawrence, 
and by every experienced Anglo-Indian’. Granville, Hansard, 250 (20 Feb. 1880), cols. 1089-90. 
However, Granville did not suggest that the government had knowledge of any specific danger of the 
attack. 
37 A Conservative pamphlet thus asked: ‘Upon whose head lies his blood?’ Publication of the National 
Union, No. 117, LSE Selected Pamphlets (1885), LSE Library. Gordon was prominent in 
Conservative propaganda, particularly at Primrose League meetings. See J.H. Robb, The Primrose 
League 1883-1906 (New York, 1942), pp. 183-8. 
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in the 1878 invasion of Afghanistan, it appeared to Liberals that ‘Disraelian 
imperialism’ rested not only on a forward policy in Asia (and in southern Africa) but 
‘on the un-English idea of “prestige”: the desire for military glory, new territory and 
Napoleon’s idea of universal domination.’38 However, as we have seen, contemporaries 
(Liberals included) seem to have understood the word ‘prestige’ not only in the sense 
described by Parry but also in a more general way as a regard for national reputation, 
dignity and honour. Certainly, Conservatives seem to have been most enthusiastic in 
making prestige arguments about Afghanistan around the time of the war.39 Yet leading 
Liberals do not seem to have contested these arguments. For example, one month after 
the Kabul attack, Sir William Harcourt complained in a speech at Southport that ‘we are 
always being called on to take vengeance for outrages that need never have occurred; to 
expend hundreds of lives and millions of money to repair disasters, which by the most 
ordinary prudence might be averted. (Applause).’40 Harcourt did not argue that the 
power of Britain (in India or anywhere else) did not rely on its ability to punish ‘insults’ 
such as the murder of its envoys. In other words, he did not assert that seeking 
vengeance was unnecessary; merely that the attack on the British residency ‘need never 
have occurred’ (that is to say, an envoy should not have been sent to Kabul in the first 
place). Therefore, although Liberals regretted the consensus about the need for 
vengeance they did little to challenge it. Their pessimism on this score was precisely 
because feelings about prestige—understood in the broad way contemporaries seem to 
have understood it—were indeed English. A connection can be made here with the 
                                                            
38   Parry, The Politics of Patriotism, p. 335. 
39  In the parliamentary session starting in early 1880, Lieutenant-Colonel Home-Drummond-Moray 
(Conservative MP for Perthshire) asserted that whatever politicians thought of the government’s 
policy (and of the Afghan war), they would acknowledge ‘that when an Envoy of Great Britain and 
his Staff has been cruelly and treacherously murdered, the only course that could possibly be adopted 
was that of vindicating the dignity of this country and dealing prompt justice for the crime that had 
been committed.’ Hansard, 250 (5 Feb. 1880), cols. 63-4. 
40  Harcourt at Southport, Daily News, 3 Oct. 1879, p. 6. Harcourt became home secretary in the Liberal 
administration of 1880-85. 
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decision to send the Abyssinian expedition in 1867: during the parliamentary debates 
Liberals might (as chapter IV highlighted) have contested the argument that an 
expedition was required in order to restore British prestige, but they did not do so. 
Parry’s argument that Liberals viewed the notion of prestige as ‘un-English’ seems to 
require some qualification therefore.  
 
Cavagnari’s death may also have frustrated Liberal opposition to government policy 
because sheer excitement in a good story tended to suppress sober consideration of 
policy. The Standard reported breathlessly, and with evident pride, that Cavagnari and 
his small escort had maintained a ‘heroic defence’ against an attack by four thousand 
mutinous Afghans, killing over three hundred of them before being overwhelmed.41 A 
headline in the Penny Illustrated Paper identified what quickly became an essential 
contrast within the narrative: ‘AFGHAN TREACHERY AND BRITISH BRAVERY’.42  
The accuracy of information from Afghanistan was very uncertain, as the Daily News 
had acknowledged. Yet, like so many other newspapers, it nonetheless reported—with a 
conviction that belied the difficulties of obtaining accurate information—that the British 
had died, swords in hand, while charging out of their burning residency.43 Very few 
Britons were in fact involved in the defence of the residency. The Britons seem to have 
been Cavagnari, a secretary (Jenkins), a doctor (Kelly) and Lieutenant Hamilton; 
accompanied by seventy-five Indian troops from the Corps of Guides.44 A subsequent 
                                                            
41 Standard, 15 Sept. 1879, p. 5. 
42 Penny Illustrated Paper, 20 Sept. 1879, p. 180. 
43 Daily News, 11 Sept. 1879, p. 5. Even the Radical Reynolds’s Newspaper (which had condemned 
government Afghan policy and fiercely criticised both the prime minister (Beaconsfield) and the 
governor-general (Lytton)) conformed to this heroic presentation, although it added a comradely touch 
by writing that Cavagnari died ‘like a brave man, fighting to the last with his escort and his friends.’ 
Reynolds’s Newspaper, 14 Sept. 1879, p. 1. 
44  Robson, The Second Afghan War, p. 118. 
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military commission concluded that great acts of heroism had taken place.45 But this 
was confirmation of something that had been assumed from the very outset. ‘Doubtless 
Major Cavagnari and his gallant companions…’ The Times wrote with confidence just 
two days after the bare news of the attack had reached Britain by telegram, ‘made a 
gallant defence and sold their lives dearly’.46 
 
The tone of newspaper coverage of the attack seems to have been consistent with the 
sort of adventure narratives that were becoming popular in Britain. In 1868 the 
Standard had assigned G.A. Henty to Sir Robert Napier’s Abyssinian expedition, and an 
edition of Henty’s despatches (The March to Magdala) appeared later that year.47 By 
the mid-1880s there was a market for adventure stories celebrating the ‘pluck’ of British 
soldiers across the empire.48 In September 1879, newspapers were in no doubt that the 
attack made for exciting copy. The first sentence of the Illustrated London News’s 
coverage of the event on 13 September was ‘Distressing news from Cabul!’49 But the 
newspaper reports seem to have reflected the excitement of recent events rather than any 
‘distress’ caused in distant Britain.50 The adventure narrative was so marked in these 
reports that when Henty came to write about the attack, there was scarcely any need to 
vary the script: ‘“Now, lads!” Major Cavagnari exclaimed, “let us rush out and die 
                                                            
45  Robson, The Second Afghan War, p. 121. 
46 Times, 8 Sept. 1879, p. 5. 
47  Some of Henty’s reports for the Standard were copied by the weekly Illustrated London News. Henty 
also made several drawings in Abyssinia, which were engraved and reproduced. A.P. Newbolt, 
‘Henty, George Alfred (1832-1902)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online 
ed. May 2006). 
48 Jonathan Parry cites as an example G.A. Henty’s By sheer pluck (1884), a celebration of the 1873 
Ashanti campaign: Parry, The Politics of Patriotism, p. 344. 
49  Illustrated London News, 13 Sept. 1879, p. 230. 
50 The excitement also featured in broadsheets such as The Times, as for example in this short extract: 
‘our Envoy and his escort massacred, the Ameer besieged in the Bala Hissar, his ordnance, stores, and 
magazines pillaged and destroyed, his troops in open mutiny, and a fanatical mob in possession of his 
capital...’ Times, 9 Sept. 1879, p. 8. 
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fighting hand to hand; better that than to be shot down defenceless here.”’51 
 
In all of the excitement it was difficult to recall that Cavagnari was in Kabul only 
because the government had departed from the policy pursued since 1842, by insisting 
on sending British envoys to Afghanistan. Similarly, the fact that Cavagnari’s fate was 
in one sense entirely unremarkable was glossed over. The vulnerability of Britons in 
Afghanistan had of course been one of the main reasons why governments had not sent 
them there. Lawrence and other Liberals had drawn attention to an obvious precedent 
demonstrating this vulnerability, by referring to the deaths in 1841 of Sir Alexander 
Burnes and Sir William McNaghten. This was a quite ‘remarkable repetition of history’, 
according to The Times.52 But in the days after the attack, the ‘repetition of history’ 
emphasised to contemporaries was the treachery of Afghans in killing British envoys, 
rather than the folly of sending those envoys to Afghanistan in the first place.53  
 
Implications 
The celebratory reporting of the ‘heroic defence’ of the British residency in Kabul, 
together with the Liberals’ difficulties in sustaining their opposition to government 
policy, may at first glance appear as indicators of the cultural purchase of imperialism in 
Britain. The attack happened on the cusp of the period in which historians have 
identified an increase in imperial ‘propaganda’.54 It is certainly possible to construe the 
                                                            
51 G.A. Henty, ‘For Name and Fame; A Tale of the Afghan War’, Every Boy’s Annual, XLIV [n.d. 
1886?], pp. 375-6.  
52 ‘It is a trite saying that history repeats itself, but it would be difficult to find a more striking 
illustration of its truth than is afforded by the attack on the British Embassy at Cabul. We have but to 
go back to the 2d of November, 1841, to find in the attack on Sir Alexander Burnes an occurrence 
almost identical with the assault on Sir Louis Cavagnari on the 3d instant.’ Times, 8 Sept. 1879, 8. See 
also Daily News, 9 Sept. 1879, p. 5. 
53   In 1879 it was remembered that the Afghan who had shot McNaghten in 1841 did so using a pistol 
which McNaghten had presented to him, as a gift, the day before: see e.g. Daily News, 9 Sept. 1879, p. 
5.  
54 E.g. John MacKenzie’s influential Propaganda and Empire considers British public opinion in the 
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reporting of Cavagnari’s death as a shrewd piece of imperial propaganda. The reports 
included several imperial strands. They suggested the ‘treachery’ of Afghans, thereby 
legitimising Britain’s presence in Afghanistan (Cavagnari was the Amir’s ‘guest’, a 
concept of particular importance in Islam, and his presence in Kabul was in accordance 
with the treaty of Gandamak); celebrated the ‘pluck’ of Britons (who were said to have 
inflicted vastly disproportionate losses on their attackers); and perpetuated an 
association between empire and heroism. Moreover, the press narratives cast the British 
in a flattering light as Christian underdogs in the face of a Muslim horde. Such reports 
even managed to depict Britain as the aggrieved party, by substituting a story of 
oppression (the ‘treacherous massacre’ once at Kabul), for one of domination (the 
military power that had taken Cavagnari to Kabul and imposed the terms of the treaty of 
Gandamak on the new Amir). The reports could also be construed as exploiting what 
John MacKenzie has termed the public’s ‘spectatorial fascination’ with colonial 
warfare.55  
 
However, it is much easier to extract imperial content from newspaper reports than it is 
to measure how such reports may have been received.56 It seems in the present case that 
although several imperial elements were present in the various reports, reconstructing 
the story in this way is a little misleading. In September 1879, the news as presented to 
contemporaries rarely seems to have had much coherence. The imperial strands in the 
narrative need to be set in the context of numerous other strands, some of which appear 
to have had meanings quite separate from empire. For example, there was a morbid 
fascination with the precise manner of Cavagnari’s death, and great curiosity regarding 
                                                                                                                                                                              
period from 1880 to 1960.  
55 MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire, p. 6. 
56 This is a potential problem for all cultural history: Peter Mandler has urged historians to identify not 
only the discourse but to whom it belongs. P. Mandler, ‘The Problem with Cultural History’, Cultural 
and Social History, 1 (2004), 96-7. 
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what happened to his body afterwards. Even in the normally sober Daily News, this was 
a subject of particular interest. Initial reports stated that ‘the Envoy was knifed, and the 
bodies of the men were horribly mutilated.’57 Five days later, an ‘eye-witness’ reported 
that Cavagnari had been ‘killed about one o’clock in the day by a clean cut between the 
eyes from one of those heavy triangular-shaped Kabuli knives which every man carries 
in Afghanistan. The knife must have penetrated the brain’.58 A later report however 
suggested that Cavagnari had received a bullet wound in his forehead.59  When General 
Roberts and his staff visited the scene of the attack one month later, they discovered ‘a 
pile of charred logs’. This was a sinister development, as it was thought to mark the spot 
where Cavagnari’s body had been burned. The Daily News solemnly informed its 
readers that excavations were to be made.60 It would have been surprising if this had 
proved a worthwhile dig, given widespread reports that Cavagnari’s head (and his 
shoulders, possibly) had been taken from the British residency, and his body dragged 
through the streets of Kabul.61 These lurid reports appear to have had a meaning quite 
independent of empire; presumably as an indulgence for Victorians with morbid 
proclivities. Such people cropped up in some unlikely guises. One Reverend C. 
Swinnerton in 1880 published an account of the fighting at Futtehabad. Swinnerton 
appears to have been extremely proud of his title: ‘chaplain in the Field with the First 
Division, Peshawur Valley Field Force’, if the frequency with which he used it is any 
guide. Reverend Swinnerton displays a surprising (and not obviously theological) 
interest in the relative efficacy of the cut or the thrust as a means of penetrating the thick 
leather Afghan postheens ‘which clothed the enemy’. He seemed glad to have 
participated in, and melancholy when he reached the end of, ‘the most dashing affair of 
                                                            
57   Daily News, 15 Sept. 1879, p. 4. 
58 Daily News, 20 Oct. 1879, p. 5. 
59 Daily News, 1 Dec. 1879, p. 3. 
60 Daily News, 15 Oct. 1879, p. 4. 
61 Daily News, 27 Oct. 1879, p. 8. 
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the Khyber campaign.’62 
 
How might contemporaries have reacted to the reports of the attack on the British 
residency and Cavagnari’s death? It seems reasonable to suppose that British imperial 
administrators and army officers probably received this news in pre-eminently imperial 
terms. The attack was a stark example of what could happen to the inferior British 
(numerically speaking, of course) when collaboration with native peoples broke down. 
Readers of The Times may have received the news in this light, on account of their 
participation in empire. The Times approached Indian affairs on the basis that there were 
‘few families in this country without one member in the East’.63 This statement is 
extremely misleading; what the newspaper presumably meant was that few families 
who read The Times were not connected in some way with ‘the East’. That would have 
been a much more accurate statement. For the British upper- and upper-middle-classes, 
India offered employment in the army or civil administration that was financially 
rewarding and socially prestigious.64  
 
However, most contemporaries may not have received the news of the attack in pre-
eminently imperial terms. Jonathan Rose, having scrutinised working-class memoirs for 
evidence of how ideas were received by ordinary Britons, has argued that men lapped 
up imperial fiction by Henty not because they identified with empire, but for 
educational value and sheer fun.65 Moreover, Rose found that the ‘intense localism’ of 
the working-classes made it difficult for them to identify with many imperial 
                                                            
62  C. Swinnerton, The Afghan War (London, 1880), pp. 60, 64. 
63 Times, 3 Jan. 1878, p. 6.  
64 P.J. Marshall, ‘Imperial Britain’ in P.J. Marshall (ed.), The Cambridge Illustrated History of the 
British Empire (Cambridge, 1996), p. 330. Between 1874 and 1914, 27% of matriculates from Balliol 
college, Oxford, went on to serve in the empire: Marshall, ‘The elusive history of imperial Britain’, 9. 
65 This explains Henty’s popularity across the political left: J. Rose, The Intellectual Life of the British 
Working Classes (London, 2010), pp. 332, 348. 
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experiences. The same workers who cheered when the monarch visited Bolton were 
indifferent regarding royal visits to Delhi. Thus if rumours of war with the Zulus 
reached them, it was ‘too distant’ to disturb sleep or excite fear.66 Most ordinary Britons 
may therefore have received reports of the attack on the British residency primarily as 
an entertainment. As the Graphic observed a few days after news of Cavagnari’s death 
reached Britain: ‘the ennui of the dull season has given place to the most intense 
excitement throughout the country; the terrible outrage, and the still more terrible 
consequences which are likely to result from it, being the absorbing topics of 
conversation.’67 
 
An imperial mayfly 
In his defence of the British residency, Cavagnari was reported to have displayed many 
of the characteristics (such as gallantry, courage and phlegm) present in men who 
subsequently became imperial icons. For a moment it seemed that Cavagnari might be 
endowed with some sort of enduring heroic status. When politicians returned to 
Westminster in February 1880, some of them were quick to praise Cavagnari’s exploits.  
Sir Stafford Northcote suggested that ‘no day in the history of the Indian Empire of the 
Queen will shine more brightly, as far as the gallantry of her servants is concerned, than 
that on which her Envoy at Cabul and his fellows fell fighting in defence of the 
                                                            
66 Rose concludes that few within the British working-classes were imperialists. Many were only 
vaguely aware that the empire existed; most of them would have struggled to name a couple of 
colonies. Most working-class memoirs do not mention the empire, and those that do usually viewed it 
sceptically. See Rose, The Intellectual Life of the British Working Classes, pp. 332-352. Bernard 
Porter has also argued that there is very little evidence from working-class memoirs to suggest that 
empire formed a part of national identity. Middle-class accounts, emphasising the ignorance of the 
working-classes about empire, pointed the other way. Porter also argued that empire did not ‘impinge’ 
through the formal teaching the majority of the population received in their schools, because the main 
theme of history books in ‘middling’ schools was liberty. Porter, ‘Empire and British National 
Identity’, pp. 262-3. 
67 Graphic, 13 Sept. 1879, p. 246. 
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Embassy.’68 Some leading Liberals also publicly acknowledged Cavagnari’s perceived 
heroism. Earl Granville for example referred in the House of Lords to ‘that gallant hero, 
Sir Louis Cavagnari’.69  
 
However, Cavagnari seems to have receded from public prominence with remarkable 
haste. One can only be tentative in suggesting why he was not the object of what 
Geoffrey Cubitt has termed ‘collective emotional investment’. It is possible that 
suspicions within the army about his ‘imperious’ character became known more widely. 
Writing soon after the treaty of Gandamak, General Sir Neville Chamberlain described 
Cavagnari as ‘inclined to be hasty and imperious… If he were left at Cabul as our agent, 
I should fear his not keeping us out of difficulties.’70 Military historians have been no 
kinder, depicting Cavagnari as ‘a man of rash and restless disposition and overbearing 
temper, consumed by the thirst for personal distinction’ who exercised a ‘pernicious’ 
influence over the governor-general, Lord Lytton.71 The ‘gallant major’ therefore 
sounds as if he may have conformed to the metropolitan characterisation of British 
officers in India as restless, belligerent, and ambitious (described in chapter V). A 
pleasant character was not of course a prerequisite for ‘lionisation’, so this seems 
insufficient, in itself, to explain why interest in Cavagnari was ephemeral. Any enduring 
commemoration of his exploits may have been discouraged by a perception that 
Cavagnari was ‘foreign’. He had been born in France to an Italian father. The inclusion 
of ‘Napoleon’ in his name probably didn’t help, given that British national identity may 
                                                            
68  Northcote, Hansard, 250 (5 Feb. 1880), col. 109. 
69  Granville, Hansard, 250 (20 Feb. 1880), col. 1089. 
70 Chamberlain was one of Cavagnari’s superior officers. G.W. Forrest, Life of Field-Marshal Sir Neville 
Chamberlain (London, 1909), p. 494.  
71 H.B. Hanna, The Second Afghan War 1878-80 (III vols., 1899-1910), vol. I, pp. 119-20. More 
recently, Brian Robson offered a similar assessment of Cavagnari. ‘Of his ability, charm and 
knowledge of the frontier there could be no doubt. But he was also self-confident to the point of 
arrogance, bold to the point of rashness and intensely ambitious.’ Robson, The Second Afghan War, p. 
118. 
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to some extent have been defined against France.72 This hypothesis also seems 
unsatisfactory in itself, for Cavagnari was presented as essentially English. After all, 
what could have been more phlegmatically English than his cool assertion—when told 
by the Amir that his life was in danger—that, should he die, there were many more to 
replace him?73 Cavagnari was not thought to be particularly religious and this may be 
more important to understanding his ‘after-life’. John Morley (Gladstone’s biographer 
and Liberal cabinet colleague) had little doubt that this was why Cavagnari’s death 
stirred the public imagination so little in comparison with the fate of General Gordon.74 
Cavagnari’s relatively low rank may also have been a factor. Perhaps there were simply 
more exciting things to think about after Cavagnari’s death, such as the progress of the 
‘avenging army’ towards Kabul. Or perhaps Cavagnari disappeared from public 
prominence so quickly because there was something transient about much imperialism 
in late nineteenth century Britain.75 
 
* * * 
 
It seems therefore that the political repercussions of the attack on the British residency 
in Kabul were not as ‘extensive and manifold’ as Beaconsfield had feared. The 
immediate political consequence of the ‘treacherous massacre’ was a clamour to avenge 
Cavagnari’s death. Vengeance was framed as a patriotic necessity on grounds of 
                                                            
72  Linda Colley has argued that British national identity was defined against a real or imaginary ‘other’: 
against Catholic France (in particular during a series of wars from 1689 to Napoleon’s defeat in 1815 
between predominantly Protestant Britain and Catholic France) and against a predominantly non-
Christian, non-white colonial empire. L. Colley, ‘Britishness and Otherness: An Argument’, Journal 
of British Studies, 31 (1992), 309-329. 
73 Daily News, 10 Sept. 1879, p. 4. 
74  Morley thought that although his faith was ‘eccentric’ General Gordon was nonetheless able to seize 
the public imagination on its ‘higher side’. Morley, Life of Gladstone, vol. III, pp. 151-2. 
75 Peter Marshall has argued that the ‘showy high imperialism of the late nineteenth century can be 
demonstrated to have been superficial and ephemeral in its impact.’ Marshall, ‘The elusive history of 
imperial Britain’, 10. 
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national honour, dignity and prestige. This consensus for vengeance, together with sheer 
excitement in a good story, seems to have been strangely effective in frustrating Liberal 
opposition to government policy. This political consequence perfectly illustrates one of 
Lawrence’s objections to sending British officers into the wilds of Afghanistan. As 
J.W.S. Wyllie had written many years earlier in the Fortnightly Review, Lawrence’s 
stance on envoys was a natural product of his understanding that ‘white faces, the 
Christian faith, and her Majesty’s uniform, are to the unregulated patriotism and 
burning fanaticism of Central Asiatics what a red rag is to a bull.’ Moreover, Lawrence 
recognised that ‘the person of a British officer embodies so large an emanation of the 
Government’s prestige, that the maintenance or vindication of his dignity and safety 
may, at any moment, create necessity for war, costly as that of Abyssinia and far more 
perilous.’76 That is to say, once a British officer was sent to Kabul, it was likely not 
merely that he would be killed but that the government would have to avenge the 
‘insult’ and ‘exact redress’. Historians should nonetheless be cautious before concluding 
that either the consensus about the need for vengeance, or the celebratory newspaper 
reporting of the ‘heroic defence’ of the doomed residency, necessarily implies the 
strength of imperialism in British culture at this time. The morbid interest in exactly 
how Cavagnari had been killed, and what happened to his body afterwards, 
demonstrates that this was not just an imperial story. Moreover, interest in Cavagnari 
seems to have been fleeting. Some historians have spoken of the ‘theatre’ of empire. In 
that sense the curtain fell with almost indecent haste on Sir Louis Cavagnari, KCB, CSI. 
The ‘gallant major’ seems to have been an imperial mayfly. 
 
 
                                                            




The formulation of Afghan policy, 1864-69 
Responsibility for the government of India had in 1858 been transferred from the East 
India Company to the crown. Sir John Lawrence was therefore, as governor-general of 
India from 1864 to 1869, nominally under orders from a minister responsible to 
parliament. However, four secretaries of state in succession insisted that Lawrence 
should have considerable latitude for deciding what British policy in Afghanistan 
should be. This was partly because these ‘policy-makers’ were impressed with 
Lawrence’s knowledge of India and Afghanistan, as well as his reputation for strength. 
The disparity in respective knowledge between the secretaries of state and Lawrence 
was considerable: only Sir Charles Wood had significant previous experience of Indian 
administration. Yet even in Wood’s case, his reverence for Lawrence is clearly 
discernible. In correspondence with Lord Elgin, Wood referred to Lawrence as the ‘iron 
man’ whose opinion on frontier questions was so authoritative because he knew ‘the 
country & the people so well’.1   
 
The secretaries of state for India seem to have absorbed some of the contemporary 
reverence for Lawrence’s achievements during the Indian Mutiny. The account 
presented to and apparently received by many Britons was that Lawrence’s ‘vigour’ in 
the crisis of 1857-58 had secured first the Punjab and then Britain’s entire empire in 
India. His soubriquet—the ‘saviour of India’—neatly captured contemporary 
perceptions of Lawrence’s instrumentality in preserving British imperium. Lawrence’s 
post-Mutiny standing is also illustrated, as chapter I showed, by the array of official and 
                                                            
1  Wood to Elgin, 26 June 1862 (1) & 16 Nov. 1863, Elgin Mss/7, f227 & /8, f263. 
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private honours conferred on him, as well as by public discussion concerning his claims 
to a peerage.  
 
The authority exercised by Lawrence on Afghan policy was also a consequence of 
political events in Britain. The question of franchise reform was particularly significant 
in this regard, because it led to dissolutions and thus general elections (as well as, in 
Viscount Cranborne’s case, his resignation). The tenure of ministers in this period was 
consequently rather precarious, and in some cases exceptionally short. Earl de Grey and 
Viscount Cranborne were particularly fleeting, surviving at the India Office for only 
five and eight months respectively. Such transience inevitably made it difficult for 
ministers to develop their views on complex questions of Indian foreign policy. 
Franchise reform, acting in concert with other domestic questions including Gladstone’s 
Irish church disestablishment bill, also served to distract the attentions of ministers from 
their official responsibilities. The causal links between foreign policy and domestic 
events have been much debated by historians. Recent research has written persuasively 
about the ‘constant interaction’, or ‘dynamic interaction’, between British foreign policy 
and domestic politics.2 Lawrence’s private correspondence with his secretaries of state, 
a rich but hitherto neglected resource, includes compelling evidence of this ‘interaction’ 
at work. As Chapter II revealed, on the important foreign policy question of reviving the 
Indian Navy, Sir Stafford Northcote told Lawrence that he was unlikely to be able to 
carry such a measure because of domestic political events in Britain. ‘We shall deal 
meagrely and tentatively, instead of boldly, with such questions as an Indian Navy…’ 
Northcote admitted in August 1868, ‘because a great battle is being fought over the Irish 
                                                            
2 Respectively the arguments of Thomas Otte and Paul Readman: Otte, ‘The Politics of Foreign Policy’, 
385-6; Readman, ‘Patriotism and the Politics of Foreign Policy’, pp. 260, 269-70. 
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Church.’3 Northcote also explicitly acknowledged, in October 1868, that his 
‘electioneering distracts me sadly from Indian work.’4 It seems clear therefore that 
frequent ministerial changes and domestic political events contributed to the devolution 
of responsibility for Afghan policy to Sir John Lawrence.  
 
The significance of this devolution of authority is enhanced because it occurred at a 
critical juncture in Anglo-Afghan relations. The combination of civil war in 
Afghanistan and Russian military expansion in central Asia revived an old British 
nightmare: that a foreign power would establish its influence in Afghanistan. This was a 
matter of significant strategic concern to Britain, because policy-makers perceived 
India’s north-west frontier as its most vulnerable border. The devolution of power from 
the imperial metropolis to its periphery illustrates that individuals could exercise 
authority outside constitutional frameworks. Influential scholarship on the powers 
exerted by imperial administrators has tended to concentrate on headstrong governors, 
who acquired new territory by exploiting slow communications with the metropolis or 
by disobeying instructions.5 Lawrence did neither. The authority for determining and 
developing British policy in Afghanistan was voluntarily surrendered to him. This 
demonstrates that the rules regarding the exercise of decision-making authority for 
Indian foreign policy were subject to both domestic circumstances in Britain and 
personalities (or more precisely, assessments of personality).  
 
 
                                                            
3 Northcote to Lawrence, 13 Aug. 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 42. 
4 Northcote to Lawrence, 14 Oct. 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 49. See also Northcote to Lawrence, 17 
Sept. 1868, Lawrence Mss/29, no. 45. 
5 For the capacity of governors to exploit slow communications, see Galbraith, ‘The “Turbulent 
Frontier” as a factor in British expansion’, 151-3. For ‘disobedient’ governors, see Cowling, ‘Lytton, 
the Cabinet, and the Russians, August to November 1878’, 59-79. 
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Masterly inactivity 
Contrary to the assertions of some historians, it has been argued that Lawrence’s 
‘masterly inactivity’ was not a reaction to the first Afghan war, when his brother was 
taken captive. Lawrence’s Afghan policy has instead been explained in the context of 
his pragmatism, his administrative priorities in India, and his assessment that the 
greatest threat to the security of British India came from within its frontiers. Lawrence’s 
stated ambitions as governor-general were to consolidate British power and to improve 
the ‘condition of the people’. In pursuit of these objectives—which he thought were 
interdependent—Lawrence was determined to spend his resources on projects within 
India that would provide tangible benefits to the governed, for he believed that the 
Indian peasant ultimately provided the most effective security for British rule. Fiscal 
considerations were therefore paramount. Lawrence was adamant that light taxation was 
the ‘panacea’ for foreign rule in India; so much so that he preferred recurrent Indian 
government deficits and reductions in British troop numbers to the alternative of 
increasing taxation. It was these pragmatic, administrative and fiscal considerations that 
explain Lawrence’s ‘masterly inactivity’. These considerations are explicit in his 
correspondence with the secretaries of state. In October 1866 Lawrence wrote plainly 
and forcefully to Viscount Cranborne, explaining his confidence that existential threats 
in the form of Russian expansion were a chimera: ‘believe me, our dangers & perils lie 
in India and not from beyond the border. All our money all our resources are wanted in 
India.’ In the same letter, Lawrence went on to explain that in order for Britain to 
consolidate its hold on India it must ‘pay the employees, and in particular the native part 
of them, better than we now do, and all this without adding materially to taxation. How 
is this to be done, if we go extending our occupation beyond the Frontier? We have 
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already in my mind gone too far.’6  
 
Comparisons with his colleagues in the government of India show that Lawrence’s 
approach was consistent with the governing priorities of the ‘official mind’ in India. It is 
possible to make these comparisons because of an intervention by Sir Henry Rawlinson 
in the summer of 1868, when he sent a memorandum on the ‘Central Asian Question’ to 
the India Office. The memorandum was then forwarded to the government of India, 
where Lawrence and his colleagues rejected Rawlinson’s proposals in a voluminous 
series of minutes and memoranda. As chapter III explained, an overwhelming majority 
of civilian and military officials in India shared Lawrence’s assessment that adopting a 
more active policy in Afghanistan would come at a great cost. Quite simply, money 
expended against a remote Russian threat could not be used on the administrative 
projects in India that these officials believed would provide more effective security for 
British rule. The juxtaposition of Rawlinson’s proposals with the careful, sober analysis 
of these Indian officials is illuminating, for it reveals just how unconstrained Rawlinson 
was by the sorts of pragmatic, administrative and fiscal considerations that guided 
government of India officials.   
 
Prestige  
This dissertation has argued that prestige was an important consideration in British 
foreign policy decisions affecting Abyssinia, Afghanistan and India in the period 1864-
79. In the case of Abyssinia, it is explicit in the arguments made by government 
ministers and other politicians that the decision to launch the expedition of 1867-68 was 
motivated, justified and understood in large part as a question of maintaining the 
                                                            
6  Lawrence to Cranborne, 4 Oct. 1866, Lawrence Mss/31, no. 39 (emphasis in original). 
286 
prestige that was considered essential to the control of India. The parliamentary speech 
of Lord Stanley is particularly striking in this regard. Stanley was not speaking from the 
fringes of government, for he was the foreign secretary. He argued that the prestige-
driven security of India made the Abyssinian expedition imperative: the government 
had ‘to consider opinion in India’ because Britain’s control of India relied upon ‘what is 
vaguely called prestige.’7 Stanley explained to the Commons that Britain controlled 
India not exclusively by tangible force in the form of troops, but by an idea: that British 
power ultimately could not be resisted. It was therefore essential for Britain’s position 
in India, Lord Stanley insisted, that ‘whatever it may cost we cannot allow that idea to 
be dispelled; we cannot accept an insult from any uncivilized tribe, and merely say we 
are very sorry, but it is out of our power to punish it.’8 
 
Considerations about prestige therefore influenced policy-makers at the time of the 
Abyssinian expedition. However, the case of Abyssinia should not be seen as 
exceptional in this sense. The research also highlighted the importance of prestige 
around the time of Britain’s 1878 invasion of Afghanistan. Government ministers did 
not always speak frankly on questions of prestige: thus Sir Stafford Northcote reassured 
parliament (two weeks after Britain’s invasion of Afghanistan) that the government was 
not motivated by ‘ambition, or prestige, or covetousness, or anything of that kind.’9 
However, as chapter VII argued, Northcote made the government’s case for war on the 
basis of prestige. He asserted that Britain’s prestige had been damaged by the Amir’s 
refusal, a few weeks earlier, to allow General Chamberlain’s mission to cross the 
Afghan border. Accordingly, Northcote explained that Britain was obliged to ‘take steps 
                                                            
7  Lord Stanley, Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), cols. 211-2. 
8 Lord Stanley, Hansard, 190 (26 Nov. 1867), cols. 211-2. 
9   Sir Stafford Northcote, Hansard, (243) 5 Dec. 1878, cols. 126-7. 
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to vindicate our honour, which is essential as part of our strength in India’.10 
Contemporary assumptions and perceptions about the importance of prestige also help 
to explain the clamour to avenge Cavagnari’s death in September 1879, as chapter VIII 
highlighted.  
 
Official perceptions about prestige also constrained particular policy decisions. Shortly 
after the Abyssinian expedition, Lawrence publicly articulated his opposition to sending 
British officers to Afghanistan. ‘If we send agents into remote countries where the 
government is rude, and the people bigoted and lawless,’ Lawrence told his Calcutta 
audience, ‘we subject them to ill-treatment and insult, which we must be prepared to 
punish by force of arms.’11 Lawrence certainly had other reasons for not sending 
officers across the frontier—as a practical matter, he thought that Indian Muslims would 
secure better intelligence—but his concern regarding the driving-force of prestige was 
clear. For Abyssinia proved what Lawrence feared: that prestige-driven responses to the 
‘insult’ of envoys could prompt massive, protracted and expensive military intervention. 
In other words, Lawrence understood that if British officers were sent to Afghanistan 
they were likely to come to harm, and that Britain would—because of official and 
popular views about prestige—have to punish this by military force. Lawrence therefore 
saw that the greatest hazard in sending officers to Afghanistan was not the likelihood 
that they would die, but that their deaths would provoke an expedition of vengeance that 
would divert Britain’s imperial project in India. In this way, prestige acted to constrain 
policy-makers.  
 
Historians, although at times alighting on prestige, have for the most part been content 
                                                            
10  Sir Stafford Northcote, Hansard, (243) 5 Dec. 1878, cols. 126-9.  
11 Farewell speech of Sir John Lawrence, reproduced in [Malleson], ‘Sir John Lawrence’, 720. 
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to view it merely as one of several contexts in which British foreign policy decisions 
were made. Yet it is apparent from the public statements of ministers before the 
invasions of Abyssinia (1867) and Afghanistan (1878), as well as from press 
commentary in each case, that prestige could provide far more than merely the 
contextual background to policy-making. It is therefore worth speculating why prestige 
has been neglected in the existing scholarship. One possible explanation is simply that 
government ministers rarely referred explicitly to prestige in their correspondence and 
speeches. That would be consistent with one of the findings presented in chapter IV: 
that some politicians were reluctant to talk about prestige, in part because of its 
etymology. If this is the case, then the Abyssinian expedition’s historiographical neglect 
is unfortunate, for the parliamentary debates about the decision to invade offer useful 
evidence of the importance contemporaries ascribed to prestige, especially in terms of 
the control of India. The Abyssinian expedition’s scholarly neglect is exemplified by the 
fact that David Steele omits it entirely in his entry for Lord Stanley in the Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography.12 The same publication’s entry for the secretary of 
state for India, Sir Stafford Northcote, is scarcely less reticent.13 These are surprising 
omissions, because Stanley and Northcote were the ministers with primary 
responsibility for an undertaking of vast military and logistical scale, considerable risk, 
and incredible expense.  
 
One can only be tentative, but historians may also have neglected the importance of 
prestige on account of the term’s inherent vagueness. For example, Jonathan Parry has 
                                                            
12  D. Steele, ‘Stanley, Edward Henry, fifteenth earl of Derby (1826-1893)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford, 2004; online ed. Jan 2008). 
13  The reader of Northcote’s biography learns merely that he ‘was an advocate of the Abyssinian 
expedition, on which he spoke on 27 November 1867, but could not convince Lord Lawrence, the 
governor-general, that India ought to pay for its contingent.’ W.D. Rubinstein, ‘Northcote, Stafford 
Henry, first earl of Iddesleigh (1818-1887)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 2004; 
online ed. May 2009). 
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asserted that Benjamin Disraeli spoke of Britain’s empire in a vague sense of global 
might, or prestige.14 The inherent vagueness of the term makes it difficult to go beyond 
such general assertions and suggest how prestige affected particular policy decisions. 
Many historians may also have neglected prestige because they have taken too narrow 
an approach to terminology. For example, the parliamentary vote of thanks to Sir Robert 
Napier following his success at Magdala made no reference at all to the word prestige. 
Instead it referred to ‘the Vindication of the Honour of the Country.’15 It seems however 
that this was merely an alternative formulation, one perhaps more palatable for 
etymological reasons. As chapter IV argued, contemporaries understood the term 
‘prestige’ in a broad sense, encompassing a regard for national ‘reputation’, ‘honour’, 
‘dignity’ and the ‘impression of strength’. Historians should surely be prepared to 
consider the concept of prestige in a similarly broad sense. This is an approach at least 
one historian has adopted in researching a later period of British (and German) history. 
Jan Rüger’s study of Anglo-German naval rivalry views the dreadnought fleets of both 
powers as ‘floating platforms for the demonstration of sea power’. Rüger found that 
contemporary discussion of fleet reviews concentrated on several concepts clearly 
related to prestige in its broader sense; for these ‘displays’, or ‘demonstrations’, of naval 
strength were designed to ‘impress’ the public at home and abroad. Rüger thus speaks 
of ‘the performance of power’, describing naval displays as occasions at which ‘an 
image of power could be created.’ Admirals were accordingly interested in the ‘image’ 
and ‘impression’ that the fleet would make at reviews.16 Rüger’s approach provides a 
                                                            
14 J.P. Parry, ‘Disraeli and England’, Historical Journal, 43 (2000), 718, 725. See also: J. Parry, 
‘Disraeli, Benjamin, earl of Beaconsfield (1804-1881)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford, 2004; online ed. May 2011).  Parry writes in the Oxford Dictionary entry that when Disraeli 
talked of empire, ‘he meant the historic and symbolic greatness of England, exemplified by its power 
in Europe and its global prestige.’ 
15  Hansard, 193 (2 July 1868), col. 476. 
16  J. Rüger, The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 
10, 203-8. 
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model for examining the importance of prestige in this broader sense, encompassing 
related concepts such as ‘image’, ‘impression’ and ‘demonstration’. It is submitted that 
further research on the importance of prestige to British foreign policy and British 
imperialism—especially but not exclusively in India—would be worthwhile. 
  
Anglo-Indian militarism  
During Lawrence’s tenure as governor-general many Britons seem to have regarded 
army officers in India with suspicion, and Anglo-India as fertile soil for militarism. The 
thesis based this argument on commentary in the metropolitan press, opinions expressed 
in the correspondence of officials, and on the statements of army officers themselves. In 
terms of press opinion, newspapers such as The Times and the Daily News depicted 
British army officers in India as restless, bellicose and ‘ambitious’ for promotion and 
honours. The Times complained that army officers would use Russian expansion as a 
pretext for initiating military advances that appealed to them on grounds of self-interest. 
Seen in this way, proposals for interference in Afghanistan were understood in the 
metropolitan press not as strategic responses to Russian advances in central Asia, but as 
a corollary of the belligerence of British officers in India. In other words, Lawrence’s 
foreign policy critics were not actually concerned about Russian progress, but were 
simply determined to secure expansion on the Indian frontier that would produce 
opportunities for combat, promotion, prize money and socially prestigious honours. An 
editorial published in The Times in December 1867 explained that Lawrence’s ‘masterly 
inactivity’ would inevitably be criticised by military opinion in India, because ‘the real 
influence at work is not the fear of Russia, but the desire of military employment. Our 
Indian armies pine for war, and the prospects for war are upon the whole most alluring 
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upon the north-western frontier.’17 Moreover, as the British community in India was a 
‘purely military society’, there was no difference between ‘public opinion’ and military 
opinion in Anglo-India.18 This was not merely a perception within the Liberal press: as 
chapter V highlighted, Conservative papers also recognised that the ambition of frontier 
officers might lead Britain into another Afghan war.  
 
Nor were these perceptions restricted to the press. The correspondence of officials 
ascribed similar motivations to those who bridled at the policy of frontier restraint. 
Officials also worried about the independent power of the military authorities in India, 
especially the commander-in-chief. The Earl of Elgin was explicit about his suspicions 
in his letters to the secretary of state, Sir Charles Wood. Elgin had ‘no doubt’ that Sir 
Bartle Frere and ‘a good many of his friends on the frontier’ found British policy a little 
‘slow’. Elgin was clear why Frere et al. regretted the lack of more active measures: by 
pursing a policy of restraint the government was denying frontier officers opportunities 
for ‘distinctions, and perhaps even Military Rewards’.19 Men whose experience of 
Indian administration came from the metropolis shared Elgin’s cynicism. For example, 
Grant Duff (parliamentary under-secretary of state for India, 1868-74) complained that 
the determination among British officers to obtain the knighthood of the Bath had 
reached frenzied proportions. Grant Duff thought that this ‘K.C.B. mania’, which ‘raged 
along the Indian frontier line’, helped explain why Lawrence’s Afghan policy was 
criticised by army officers.20 Some senior military commanders were themselves 
frustrated by the belligerence of those calling for British intervention in Afghanistan. Sir 
William Mansfield, commander-in-chief in India, in his official response to 
                                                            
17 Times, 18 Dec. 1867, p. 8. 
18 Times, 8 Sept. 1863, p. 6 & 2 Jan. 1868, p. 6. 
19 Elgin to Wood, 21 May 1863, Elgin Mss/5, f152.  
20 Hansard, 203 (5 Aug. 1870), col. 1620. 
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Rawlinson’s memorandum on the ‘Central Asian Question’ in December 1868, 
deprecated the activities of those who were ‘constantly striving to excite the military 
spirit in England and India against Russia.’21  
 
Anne Summers’s argument that militarism in Britain flourished only from the end of the 
nineteenth century has proved influential.22 If this argument is correct, then militarism 
in Britain itself seems to have had a much earlier antecedent in the wider British world. 
For it seems clear that during Lawrence’s tenure as governor-general militarism may 
have flourished—and was certainly perceived by many Britons to flourish—in the 
British world (specifically, in India) long before the various patriotic leagues and 
‘shock’ of Boer war reverses that are thought to have heralded the arrival of militarism 
in Britain itself. 
 
Although any argument about motivation must include an element of speculation (and 
of course motives are not causes) the consonance between perceptions in the 
metropolitan press and the assessments of ministers and imperial governors in India is 
striking. The breadth and strength of suspicions about the motivations of Anglo-Indian 
officers suggests that further research would be worthwhile. The key question is 
whether there was a causal relationship between officers’ ambitions (for promotion, 
prize money and honours) and territorial expansion. Schumpeter’s argument about the 
sociological causes of imperial expansion may provide a model for such inquiry, 
although in the British case a ‘caste’ of upper-middle- and upper-class military officers 
                                                            
21 Minute by W.R. Mansfield (24 Dec. 1868), Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, enclosure 8, pp. 75-
6.  
22  Summers, ‘Militarism in Britain’, 111, 115. 
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might be substituted for Schumpeter’s class of aristocrats.23  
 
Press influences on British policy in Afghanistan 
Lawrence feared that repeated press criticism, in Britain, would inevitably condemn his 
Afghan policy to modification. Having reached this pessimistic conclusion, he 
nonetheless remained resolute on what he considered the most important policy 
decision; therefore no British envoys or troops crossed the frontier into Afghanistan. 
Lawrence however made concessions to his press critics by acquiescing in the 
construction of new railway lines to the north-west frontier and by providing material 
assistance to Amir Sher Ali Khan. His correspondence is explicit that the former 
decision was made in the hope that it would check public ‘agitation’ that could 
otherwise have led to more active measures in Afghanistan. It seems very likely that the 
latter decision was made in the same hope. For both decisions were clearly preferable, 
in Lawrence’s mind, to ‘plunging into Afghanistan’. Lawrence was confident, as he told 
the secretary of state, that a Russian advance on India in his lifetime was ‘a perfect 
delusion’. However, Lawrence also thought that if constructing the new railway line 
would ‘quiet men’s minds and put a stop to an agitation which may lead to some foolish 
movement forward’ then it would be a price worth paying.24 In a subsequent letter, 
Lawrence reported that he was prepared to accept ‘whatever’ the secretary of state 
might suggest regarding the proposed Lahore-Peshawar line. ‘Anything’, he told 
Northcote, ‘is better than plunging into Afghanistan.’25 It is ironic that the man in India, 
to whom so much discretion had been given by the secretaries of state in London, 
should ultimately have allowed criticism in Britain to influence him in the exercise of 
                                                            
23 Bernard Porter has argued that the imperial classes were remarkably cohesive: ‘almost a caste within a 
class’. Imperial work ran in families, with every male member of some families becoming colonial 
officers. Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists, p. 41. 
24 Lawrence to Northcote, 23 Oct. 1867, Lawrence Mss/32B, no. 60. 
25 Lawrence to Northcote, 2 Jan. 1868, Lawrence Mss/33, no. 2. 
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that discretion in India.  
 
Lawrence’s sensitivity to criticism of his Afghan policy should not be seen as 
exceptional, for the secretary of state and government of India officials to some extent 
shared his anxieties. Sir Stafford Northcote made the same connection between public 
opinion and policy-making, believing that it would ‘strengthen the hands of the 
abstention party’ if it adopted measures (such as constructing the Lahore-Peshawar 
railway line) that would strengthen the north-west frontier.26 Therefore, the calculations 
of the governor-general in India and ministers in London explicitly took account of 
public pressure. In India, Lawrence’s government colleagues regretted that it was not 
difficult for press critics to advocate measures that could ‘delude or influence the 
public.’ These officials deprecated what they termed ‘the constant allusions made in the 
newspapers’ to Russian expansion in central Asia, and the difficulty of preventing 
‘unnecessary alarms’.27  
 
This dissertation has therefore challenged the historiographical contention that British 
officials exhibited a ‘rational detachment’ from external influences such as press 
opinion.28 The behaviour of Lawrence in particular, but also his government colleagues, 
is also somewhat at odds with Paul Kennedy’s more subtle argument about the 
influence of press opinion on British external policy. Kennedy argued that officials 
needed to worry only when normally supportive newspapers criticised particular policy 
                                                            
26 Northcote to Lawrence, 17 Nov. 1867, Lawrence Mss/28, no. 49. 
27 Government of India to secretary of state for India, 4 Jan. 1869, Afghanistan Correspondence, no. 14, 
p. 45. 
28 As chapter VI discussed, Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, in their account of the motives of 
Victorian expansion in Africa, described policy-makers making rational decisions, based primarily on 
strategic factors, with an aristocratic detachment from outside influences. Similarly, in Thomas Otte’s 
recent account of the Foreign Office ‘mind’, press and public opinion are almost entirely absent. 
Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp. 151-2; Otte, The Foreign Office Mind, p. 73. 
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decisions.29 However, that was certainly not the approach followed by Lawrence and his 
government colleagues. Had they followed the pattern of behaviour described by 
Kennedy, officials would have been reassured by coverage in the Daily News, the 
Manchester Guardian and especially The Times. That they were not suggests that some 
qualification is needed to Kennedy’s argument; for official perceptions of press and 
public opinion manifestly did influence particular policy decisions, at least relating to 
Afghan policy in the period 1864-69. 
 
The domestic impact of British imperialism 
Lord Beaconsfield feared that the September 1879 attack on the British residency in 
Kabul, during which the British envoy and his military escort were killed, would have 
profound political repercussions in Britain. However, chapter VIII showed that the 
immediate political consequence of the attack was a clamour to avenge Cavagnari’s 
death. Vengeance was framed as a patriotic necessity on grounds of national honour, 
dignity and prestige. This consensus about the need for vengeance, together with sheer 
excitement in a good story, seems to have been effective in frustrating Liberal 
opposition to government policy. This metropolitan reaction (in this sense reminiscent 
of press reaction to the Abyssinian captives over a decade before) illustrates one of 
Lawrence’s principal objections to sending British officers into Afghanistan: it was 
likely not merely that such officers would be killed but that the government would have 
to avenge what contemporaries termed the ‘insult’ by ‘exacting redress’. 
 
However, chapter VIII also argued that historians should pause before concluding that 
either the consensus for vengeance, or the celebratory newspaper reporting of the 
                                                            
29 Kennedy, Background Influences on British External Policy, p. 56. 
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‘heroic defence’ of the residency, implies the existence of a strong culture of 
imperialism in Britain. Rather, the morbid interest in exactly how Cavagnari had been 
killed (and what happened to his dismembered body afterwards) demonstrates that the 
imperial strand was but one in a somewhat jumbled narrative. Moreover, interest in 
Cavagnari seems to have been fleeting. 
 
This dissertation has also argued that Lawrence’s return to public prominence in 1878, 
as a leading critic of the Conservative government’s Afghan policy, should not be seen 
as a mere footnote to a life largely expended in India. Lawrence’s influence on 
parliamentary Liberals and on the contours of public discussion about Afghanistan 
seems to have been considerable. His significance has however been neglected in the 
existing scholarship about Liberal opposition to the second Afghan war, in which 
Gladstone’s rhetoric about the ‘rights of the savage’ has assumed a central importance. 
The historiographical allure of Gladstone’s Midlothian campaigns is understandable, 
but Lawrence’s alternative humanitarian critique of government policy was more 
representative of the approach of many Liberals to war in Afghanistan. Lord Granville 
was quick to understand what he termed Lawrence’s ‘utility’ for the Liberal party. As 
chapter VII highlighted, Lawrence’s ‘utility’ was in fact manifold: as the ‘saviour of 
India’ he had an enduring patriotic reputation that allowed Liberals to contest 
Conservative claims that their opposition lacked patriotism; as a former lieutenant-
governor of the Punjab and governor-general of India Lawrence was perceived as an 
expert on the north-west frontier, with obvious standing to speak about Afghanistan; 
and his previous mild-mannered parliamentary interventions allowed him to appear, 
plausibly, as a moderate. The fact that Liberals recognised and then exploited this 
‘utility’ demonstrates that returning imperial administrators could exert a discernible 
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and significant influence on politics in the metropolis. 
 
This emphasis on Lawrence’s metropolitan activities in 1878—an approach not 
followed by his biographers—provides an opportunity to examine some of the 
centripetal effects of British imperialism. To put it another way, what did Sir John 
Lawrence bring back from India? When John Hobson published his Imperialism: A 
Study (1902), he articulated a fear that British soldiers and administrators, returning 
from the empire, would bring with them the character of imperialism and take it to 
positions of power such as parliament. Having recently returned from the Boer war, 
Hobson expressed his anxiety about these centripetal effects of British imperialism:  
 
As the despotic portion of our Empire has grown in area, a larger and larger number of men, 
trained in the temper and methods of autocracy as soldiers and civil officials in our Crown 
colonies, protectorates, and Indian Empire… have returned to this country, bringing back the 
characters, sentiments, and ideas imposed by this foreign environment… The wealthier among 
them discover political ambitions, introducing into our Houses of Parliament the coarsest and 
most selfish spirit of “Imperialism”.30  
 
The spirit of imperialism that Hobson worried would be introduced into parliament 
comprised a disregard for the liberties of Britons and the pursuit of profitable 
commercial interests (he asserted that returning soldiers and administrators derived their 
incomes from the maintenance and furtherance of despotic rule). Referring 
pessimistically to ‘the steady reflux of this poison of irresponsible autocracy’, Hobson 
predicted that the imperialism brought back from empire would threaten peace, because 
of the constant temptation to go to war with ‘lower races’. Hobson also wrote darkly 
                                                            
30 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London, 1938), pp. 150-1. 
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about the ‘chronic danger and degradation of militarism’.31 
 
It seems however that Hobson underestimated the strength and durability of liberal 
traditions.32 Lawrence certainly brought back some robust views on the merits of 
‘punitive’ expeditions on the north-west frontier, as chapter VII discussed. However, 
Lawrence used his public platform in the House of Lords (and in his letters to The 
Times) not to undermine the liberties of Britons, or to pursue commercial interests, or to 
argue for war with ‘lower races’, but in order to protest against the folly of the forward 
policy, and subsequently war, in Afghanistan. Lawrence’s aims as governor-general of 
India had been essentially simple. As he told his friend the Duchess of Argyll in 1868, 
towards the end of his term in India: ‘I have done what I could to influence the 
conditions of the people, & maintain the credit of Her Majesty’s Government.’33 These 
objectives continued to motivate Lawrence on his return to Britain. He brought back 
from India the same considerations and characteristics that had marked his tenure at 
Calcutta: pragmatism, fiscal prudence, and an administrative preoccupation that 
reconciled his determination to preserve British power with his sincere solicitude for the 
governed. Some of these concerns were evident in Lawrence’s last speech in the House 
of Lords, which he made on 19 June 1879. By this time, the giant of the Punjab was in 
                                                            
31 Hobson, Imperialism, p. 152. The sentiments expressed by Hobson in Imperialism were presumably 
strongly influenced by his recent personal experiences. He went to South Africa in 1899, as special 
correspondent for the Manchester Guardian. On his return, Hobson became a prominent opponent of 
the Boer war and spoke at public meetings, which were frequently broken up by jingoists. See: J. 
Townshend, ‘Introduction’, in Hobson, Imperialism (London, 1988), pp. 12-14, 25. 
32 P.J. Durrans has argued that ‘in the final analysis neither British politics, nor the British people, nor 
the British constitution were to be “imperialised” in the manner predicted by Liberal critics of 
Disraelian imperialism and their successors. The dichotomy between liberalism at home and 
imperialism abroad remained. It was, however, an uneasy coexistence and it was to become 
progressively clearer that British democracy posed a threat to the Empire rather than the reverse.’ P.J. 
Durrans, ‘A Two-Edged Sword: The Liberal Attack on Disraelian Imperialism’, Journal of Imperial 
and Commonwealth History, 10 (1982), 279. 
33 Lawrence to the Duchess of Argyll, 7 May 1868, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Special Collections, MS 
Eng lett d 74, folio 124. 
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poor health and, according to the Hansard reports, barely audible.34 He died only eight 
days later. Characteristically, Lawrence reminded the Lords of ‘the extreme poverty of 
the people of India’, the suffering caused by recent famines and his opinion that the 
existing burden of taxation was already very great. The recent reduction of the cotton 
duties was therefore ‘an imprudent step’: the import duties on cotton goods ‘fell mainly 
on the richer classes, who were the chief buyers of the finer goods made in England, so 
that the remission was no relief to the great mass of the people, who wore the coarser 
goods made in India.’35 This was the imperialism that John Lawrence brought back 
from India. 
                                                            
34  Lawrence, Hansard, 247 (19 June 1879), col. 159. 
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